(Istanbul: Special to Informed Comment; Feature) – On October 22, Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and an ally of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, made an unexpected statement suggesting that Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), could be allowed to speak in the Parliament if he proclaims the dissolution of the PKK in exchange for the possibility of his release.
Given Bahçeli’s reputation for staunch Turkish nationalism and his opposition to any concessions for the PKK, his remarks have surprised many across the political spectrum.
The day after Bahçeli’s speech, a deadly terrorist attack occurred at the headquarters of Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAŞ), a state-owned aerospace and defense company near the capital, Ankara, leaving seven people dead, including two assailants. Turkish officials attributed the attack to the PKK, which claimed responsibility two days later, on October 25, asserting that the attack was not related to the latest political developments.
Despite the PKK attack in Ankara, the positive momentum surrounding the peace initiative has not yet been derailed.
Historical Background
The PKK was founded in 1978 during a period of widespread political violence between left-wing and right-wing factions in Türkiye. However, before the 1980 coup d’état, the PKK was a small group without significant military or operational capacity.
On September 12, 1980, the Turkish military, led by General Kenan Evren, staged a coup, citing severe instability as the reason. Following the coup, the military suspended the parliament, banned all political parties, and detained thousands of political activists. Political leaders were either arrested or barred from participating in politics.
From 1980 to 1983, Türkiye was under military rule. The military junta prohibited the use of the Kurdish language and restricted Kurdish cultural expression. The oppressive conditions under the military government led the PKK to launch an armed insurgency in 1984 in southeastern Türkiye in order to establish an independent Kurdish state. The first PKK attack on August 25, 1984, marked the beginning of a prolonged conflict.
The Turkish military launched an extensive counter-insurgency campaign. Many PKK members retreated to northern Iraq, particularly to the Qandil Mountains, which became a key base for PKK operations. Over the years, Türkiye has conducted numerous airstrikes and ground operations against PKK positions in northern Iraq.
Abdullah Öcalan was captured in Kenya in 1999 and initially sentenced to death; however, this sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment on İmralı Island in the Sea of Marmara. His capture marked a significant turning point in the ongoing conflict as Öcalan is viewed as the nation’s top security threat, much like how Osama bin Laden was perceived in the U.S.—a central focus of national security efforts.
According to pro-government Hürriyet, since 1984, the conflict has resulted in the deaths of more than 14,000 Turkish security forces, 6,000 civilians, and 46,000 PKK members.
Past Peace Initiatives
In the 1990s, a non-violent political movement advocating for Kurdish cultural and political rights began to form, as many Kurdish politicians saw the need for a legal political party to represent Kurdish interests within the Turkish political system. The People’s Labor Party (HEP), established in 1990, became Türkiye’s first pro-Kurdish party.
Since then, left-wing pro-Kurdish political parties have repeatedly faced legal restrictions, closures, and accusations of links to the PKK, resulting in a cycle of dissolution and re-establishment. The Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) is the most recent and prominent Kurdish-oriented party.
In the early 2000s, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan introduced reforms to improve Kurdish rights. In 2009, the AKP government launched the ‘Kurdish Opening,’ which paved the way for a gradual peace process. By 2013, direct negotiations between the Turkish government and the PKK resulted in a ceasefire and raised hopes for a political resolution.
However, tensions escalated after July 22, 2015, when PKK members killed two policemen in Ceylanpınar. The incident led to the collapse of the peace process, resulting in renewed violence and urban warfare in Kurdish-majority areas. In response, the Turkish government intensified military operations against the PKK in Türkiye and northern Iraq.
Türkiye also launched three ground operations into northern Syria between 2016 and 2019, targeting the People’s Protection Units (YPG). Turkish officials have consistently labeled the YPG/SDF as a PKK offshoot.
While many international media outlets frame Türkiye’s Kurdish issue as a straightforward “Erdoğan vs. the Kurds” conflict, this simplification overlooks significant nuances and obscures the full reality. Broadly categorizing the Kurdish population as a unified bloc opposing Erdoğan fails to recognize the political and ideological diversity within Türkiye’s Kurdish communities.
Erdoğan has frequently sought to divide the Kurdish electorate by appealing to conservative Kurds, as opposed to those who support secular, left-wing parties. This strategy weakens the DEM Party’s influence and bolsters his electoral base, particularly in regions with a significant Kurdish population.
Additionally, some conservative Kurdish groups maintain political ties with the AKP. Hüda-Par (Free Cause Party), a Sunni Islamist Kurdish party, openly supported Erdoğan in the 2018 and 2023 presidential elections and participated in the 2023 parliamentary election under the AKP list.
A New Peace Process?
In early October, rumors of a renewed peace process began circulating after a handshake between Bahçeli and members of the DEM Party during the Parliament’s opening on October 1. Speculation about a potential second peace process grew even further following Bahçeli’s statement regarding Öcalan.
Devlet Bahçeli has previously been a vocal advocate for the execution of Abdullah Öcalan. Notably, at a June 2007 election rally, Bahçeli targeted then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, stating, “Can’t you find a rope to hang him? Here, take this rope and hang him, then,” as he held up a rope to the crowd.
Bahçeli’s previous rhetoric makes his recent statements about Öcalan all the more striking. In contrast, an ordinary citizen expressing views such as advocating for Öcalan’s release or suggesting he be allowed to speak in parliament would likely face prosecution or imprisonment.
As discussions about a renewed peace process were rekindled, Özgür Özel, the leader of the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), visited Selahattin Demirtaş, the jailed former leader of the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP).
Özel also endorsed the government’s peace bid, stating: “I am offering a state to the Kurds. I am offering the Kurds, who do not feel they belong here, the opportunity to be the owners of the Republic of Türkiye. Let’s create a country where the Kurds do not feel like the “other”…”
Thus far, the main opposition and the DEM Party appear to welcome Bahçeli’s remarks. However, significant differences in outlook are evident. While Bahçeli claims that there is no “Kurdish question” in Türkiye, the CHP and DEM emphasize the need for greater democratization to achieve lasting peace in southeastern Türkiye.
As noted by a prominent expert on the Kurdish issue and professor of political sociology Doğu Ergil, a call made directly to the PKK via Öcalan could lead to a ceasefire but not to lasting peace. For genuine peace, there must be an agreement based on principles and conditions mutually accepted by the societies involved and secured by the rule of law. Moreover, such peace cannot be sustainable if it relies on short-term political interests.
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