How will the new Syria handle its Greater Israel Problem?

By Muhammad Hussein | –

( Middle East Monitor ) – When Israel’s far-right extremist finance minister Bezalel Smotrich acknowledged in October his aim for a Jewish state that encompasses not only all of the Palestinian territories, but also extends to Syria, some speculated about how such a goal would be achieved. In Israel’s classic strategy of “bit by bit”, according to Smotrich, Tel Aviv will eventually have to cut further into Syrian territory as “it is written that the future of Jerusalem is to expand to Damascus”.

That ominous admission threw further light on the potential pursuit of the Zionism’s “Greater Israel” project, which would cover Jordan, Lebanon, part of Egypt, Syria, Iraq and part of Saudi Arabia. The occupation state would claim the lands as its own and impose Israeli statehood on the local people, unless they too suffer ethnic cleansing as the Palestinians have.

If Israel’s extremists take Damascus, the region will be destabilised; the regional chessboard will be overturned. They would not simply be taking on resistance groups — as is the case in Gaza and Lebanon — but they would also need to invade and conquer an independent, sovereign state. The more covert, proxy dynamics in place up until now would be replaced by a full-scale state v state war. It’s a risky endeavour.

However, the ouster of the Assad regime on 8 December left a security vacuum that enabled Israel to destroy Syria’s major military defence capabilities and deploy its armed forces further into Syrian territory beyond the occupied Golan Heights. Israeli forces are now just kilometres from Damascus.

Assad’s supporters have responded with glee, of course, because this strengthens their spurious claims that the dictator was the only one standing in the way of such an Israeli invasion; that the “axis of resistance” against Israel is now weakened; and that the new Syrian authorities are complicit with the occupation state and even acting as its agent.

Such allegations, though, can be dismissed, not least because the Assad regime has been in contact with Israel for years, and never took any action to regain its territory annexed by Israel or otherwise challenge the occupation. Moreover, the Israeli attacks and destruction of Syria’s defence capabilities more likely prove that Tel Aviv is extremely wary about its new neighbours in charge of Syria.

More than anything, Tel Aviv saw Assad as a useful buffer against any real threat.

It knew that his regime would never mobilise against Israeli forces, at least not effectively. Israeli policy towards Assad has for decades been to maintain a Syria that was strong enough to oppress its own people but never strong enough to pose a military threat in the neighbourhood.

The new Syrian government’s initial attitude towards the Israeli moves into Syrian territory have done little to discredit the allegations of collaboration with the Zionist state as they grapple with this dilemma. Consider, for example, the comments by the governor of Damascus, Maher Marwan, in an interview with NPR, in which he expressed understanding that “Israel may have felt fear” after the fall of Assad, “so it advanced a little, bombed a little, etc.” He has, on the face of it, taken what is in effect an invasion of his country very lightly indeed.

Damascus aims to have cordial relations with Israel, he claimed, stating that, “We have no fear toward Israel, and our problem is not with Israel.” He reportedly stressed that, “We don’t want to meddle in anything that will threaten Israel’s security or any other country’s security. We want peace, and we cannot be an opponent to Israel or an opponent to anyone.” Moreover, a spokesman for HTS avoided the question of Israel’s 300 air strikes on Syria when questioned by Britain’s Channel 4 News.

Syria’s de-facto leader Ahmed Al-Sharaa – also known by his nom de guerre, Abu Mohammad Al-Julani – has expressed his willingness to return to the 1974 agreement with Israel and once again have UN peacekeepers deployed within the demilitarised zone in the Golan Heights.

“We do not want any conflict whether with Israel or anyone else and we will not let Syria be used as a launchpad for attacks,” Al-Sharaa told the Times in London earlier this month. “The Syrian people need a break, and the [air] strikes must end and Israel has to pull back to its previous positions.”

“The White and Blue over Damascus,” by Juan Cole, based on Unsplash images spliced with IbisPaint and processed by Clip2Comic, 2024

Syria’s interim government, rather than having any genuine sympathy towards Israel and its actions, seems to understand the fact that Syrian forces have little to no significant military capabilities to counter the Israeli occupation forces, let alone to launch any kind of offensive to recapture occupied territory.

Given that Israel is reported to have destroyed around 80 per cent of Syria’s air, land and sea defence capabilities, Al-Sharaa is taking a pragmatic approach. His main mission is to stabilise the domestic situation in a number of ways, chiefly by consolidating the security position and striking an agreement among former anti-Assad groups to unite under the Defence Ministry; disarming former regime soldiers; and trying to absorb Kurdish fighters into the new Syrian Army.

In terms of government, the new authorities are still organising their administration. The interim cabinet will serve until March 2025, at least, and a “National Dialogue Conference” is planned to determine the issue of Syria’s governance.

Al-Sharaa is also making efforts to strengthen Syria on the diplomatic front.

He has hosted numerous delegations from the international community over the past three weeks, and secured a number of significant deals covering the rebuilding of Syria’s infrastructure and the revival of its aviation systems. He now seeks to have all sanctions lifted so that the Syrian economy can be revived, and to persuade the US and other Western powers to remove the group which he heads, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), from their “terrorist” lists.

Syria’s new leader and the people around him know that doing or saying anything against Israel will likely damage their efforts to stabilise their country. With neither the military capabilities nor diplomatic leverage in place, they know that they cannot force the occupation state to the negotiation table. Moving against Israeli forces in south-west Syria despite the obvious security threat that they pose, will block any real chance of the incoming Trump administration and other Western governments delisting HTS and giving formal recognition to the new government in Damascus.

Nevertheless, Al-Sharaa has a couple of cards up his sleeve to challenge Israel’s encroachment on Syrian territory: Turkiye and the Gulf States. Turkiye’s involvement in the former opposition offensive and the ouster of Assad is no secret, and it has already expressed support for Syria’s new leadership on military, infrastructural and economic terms. Damascus could well utilise that partnership to have Ankara not only strengthen the new administration, but also to serve as a counterbalance to Israel.

While that may be tempting, it is an option that would be perceived as aggressive. Senior Israelis, including former army officers as well as media outlets are already expressing concern that Turkiye is taking the place of Iran and Russia in Syria and this, claim some, is “limiting Israel’s freedom of action”.

The Gulf States, however, provide a more diplomatic option for Damascus.

Saudi Arabia, the UAE and even Qatar – although Israel would be sceptical of the latter – have made overtures to the new Syrian authorities, and they could be expected to invest heavily in Syria’s economy and infrastructure in the coming years. Such partnerships could be used to get Damascus and Tel Aviv talking.

For now, therefore, Syria’s administration is using a diplomatic hand to counter Israeli aggression, in the hope that the occupation state will not see Al-Sharaa and his colleagues as a security threat. The big question is: how will Israel respond?

 

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor or Informed Comment.

Muhammad Hussein is an International Politics graduate and political analyst on Middle Eastern affairs, primarily focusing on the regions of the Gulf, Iran, Syria and Turkey, as well as their relation to Western foreign policy.