Istanbul (Special to Informed Comment; Feature) – Following the fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Türkiye aims to capitalize on the Syrian opposition’s victory to solidify its position as a key regional player.
For over a decade, Türkiye has been a staunch supporter of the Syrian opposition, providing military aid, diplomatic support, and serving as a key logistical hub for rebel forces. However, this commitment has come at a significant cost to Ankara.
The influx of Syrian refugees has strained Türkiye’s economy and demographics, while the prolonged conflict has also led to diplomatic tensions between Türkiye and the US, UAE, Russia, and Iran.
The civil war has further exposed Türkiye to security threats, including cross-border attacks and the rise of extremist groups, which led Ankara to launch multiple military operations in northern Syria to establish a “safe zone” along the Syrian border.
Despite these challenges, Ankara now sees an opportunity to shape Syria’s future in line with its strategic interests, aiming to leverage the investments and sacrifices made over the course of the 13-year conflict.
Fall of Assad and the Umayyad Mosque as a symbol
Before the rebel offensive in late 2024, Assad’s regime controlled key parts of Syria, including major cities such as Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, and Hama. Many believed Assad had won the civil war, with rebel groups mostly confined to the north.
Recognizing Assad’s strengthened position, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan began efforts to normalize relations between Ankara and Damascus. However, Assad consistently demanded the withdrawal of Turkish forces from northwest Syria as a condition for any diplomatic progress, a demand that Ankara refused to meet.
This diplomatic impasse persisted until late 2024, when a major rebel offensive led to the swift collapse of Assad’s regime.
Just four days after the fall of Damascus, the head of the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MİT), İbrahim Kalın, visited Damascus and prayed at the Umayyad Mosque.
Following Kalın’s visit, Türkiye reopened its embassy in Syria for the first time in 12 years.
On December 22, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan met with Syria’s new de facto leader Ahmed al-Sharaa (previously known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Jolani) in Damascus. Fidan was the first foreign minister to visit Damascus since Assad’s fall.
In September 2012, Erdoğan claimed that he would soon pray at the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, implicitly suggesting that Assad’s regime would be overthrown and that a new, Sunni-dominated leadership would emerge in Syria.
For years, the phrase “praying at the Umayyad Mosque” had been adopted by the Turkish opposition as a critique of Erdoğan’s foreign policy on Syria, suggesting that the anti-Assad policies of Erdoğan have failed.
This is why Kalın’s visit to the Umayyad Mosque was seen as a direct reference to Erdoğan’s 2012 speech.
Photo of Damascus by Juma Mülhem at Pexels.com
Refugees, Economy, and Reconstruction
Türkiye’s main goals in Syria include facilitating the return of refugees, securing its southern borders, countering Kurdish autonomy movements, and maximizing its influence over Syria’s new government. Turkish Interior Minister Ali Yerlikaya announced that 35,114 Syrians have returned since the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad, with expectations that the number of returns could increase further after the school semester ends.
In addition to these security and humanitarian goals, Türkiye also seeks to play a significant role in Syria’s reconstruction. Following Assad’s overthrow, shares of Turkish construction and cement companies surged, driven by expectations that they would benefit from the anticipated rebuilding efforts. Several Turkish media outlets referenced a UN report estimating that Syria’s reconstruction would require at least $400 billion, which many pro-government sources view as a major economic opportunity for Türkiye.
Türkiye has already outlined plans to contribute to Syria’s reconstruction, including initiatives in infrastructure. Transport Minister Abdulkadir Uraloğlu announced an action plan focusing on improving Syria’s transportation network, with particular attention to Aleppo and Damascus airports, the Hejaz Railway, and the M4 and M5 highways.
Additionally, Uraloğlu stated that Türkiye aims to negotiate a maritime demarcation agreement once a permanent government is established in Syria.
In terms of energy cooperation, Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar emphasized the importance of Türkiye’s partnership with Syria, including supplying electricity and collaborating on oil and gas projects. He also described the revival of the Qatar-Türkiye-Europe natural gas pipeline as “an extraordinary opportunity.”
Obstacles
Pro-government media, nationalist groups, and neo-Ottomanist social media accounts in Türkiye celebrate Syria’s new Sunni-dominated leadership as a Turkish expansionist victory, citing examples such as speculation about Turkish potentially becoming an official language in Syria.
This sentiment is echoed by pro-government figures like Cem Küçük, a staunchly nationalist pundit, who uses Turkish nationalist and neo-Ottoman rhetoric to express his views on Syria and the broader region. He stated: “Would it be bad if we had Aleppo? Would it be bad if we had Mecca and Medina? Would it be bad if we had Jerusalem? 82 Jerusalem, 83 Damascus, 84 Mecca, 85 Medina, 86 Cairo.”
His mention of numbers assigned to cities refers to Türkiye’s license plate system, where each of the 81 provinces has an assigned number. By referring to “82” and beyond, he makes an irredentist statement about Türkiye annexing new provinces or territories.
While many media outlets view post-Assad Syria as falling within Türkiye’s sphere of influence, the reality is more complex.
To increase its influence on the new Syrian government and benefit from Syria’s reconstruction, Türkiye first needs a stable, pro-Türkiye regime in place.
The Syrian National Army (SNA) is widely recognized as a proxy force for Türkiye, relying heavily on Turkish support for funding, equipment, and strategic direction. In contrast, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), formerly linked to al-Qaeda, operates with greater autonomy compared to the SNA.
Although Türkiye has officially designated HTS as a terrorist organization, recent developments suggest a more nuanced relationship. Reports indicate that Turkish intelligence has engaged with HTS, and US President-elect Donald Trump also acknowledged that Türkiye’s support helped HTS topple Assad’s regime.
However, it’s important to note that HTS is not directly controlled by Türkiye.
So far, Türkiye’s alliances with both the SNA and HTS have significantly shaped its role in Syria. However, once the dust settles, Türkiye will need to carefully navigate the complexities of these relationships and the diverse interests of various armed factions in Syria to achieve its long-term goals.
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