( Middle East Monitor ) – The timing, as with so much in the ongoing wars in Gaza and Lebanon, was most appropriate. The Israeli Knesset had signalled its intent on crippling and banishing the sole agency of humanitarian worth for Palestinian welfare by passing laws criminalising its operations by 92 to 10 on October 28.

The attack on UNRWA also came with a contemporaneous legal effort, this time from South Africa.  Pretoria had already made its wishes clear on December 28, 2023 in filing an application in the International Court of Justice alleging “violations by Israel regarding the [United Nations] Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide […] in relation to Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.”  Acts and omissions by Israel, argued the South African government, were alleged to be of a “genocidal” nature, “committed with the requisite specific intent … to destroy the Palestinians in Gaza as part of the broader Palestinian national, racial and ethnical group”.

By May 10, South Africa had filed four requests seeking additional provisional measures with modifications to the original provisional measures laid down by the ICJ.  The momentum, and frequency of the actions, even gave certain commentators room to wonder: Was Israel’s own due process rights regarding judicial equality and the right to be heard compromised?  Israel had promised to submit written observations by May 15 to the ICJ when faced with the sudden announcement on May 12 that the court would be holding an oral hearing instead.

These debates have been taking place before the concerted, dedicated, enthusiastic pulverisation of Gaza, and the ongoing killing, terrorisation and displacement of Palestinians in the West Bank.  In these cases, due process remains fantasy and distant speculation, especially concerning civilians.  With increasing regularity, there is chilling evidence that Israeli units have a programmatic approach to destroying a viable infrastructure and means of living on the strip.

On October 22, the Israeli human rights organisation B’Tselem expressed horror at the sheer scale “of the crimes Israel is currently committing in the northern Gaza Strip in its campaign to empty it of however many residents are left […] impossible to describe, not just because hundreds of thousands of people enduring starvation, disease without access to medical care and incessant bombardments and gunfire defies comprehension, but because Israel has cut them off from the world.”

In a chilling overview of the exploits of the IDF’s 749 Combat Engineering Battalion written by Younis Tirawi and Sami Vanderlip for Drop Site News, a record of systematic elimination of cultural, structural and intellectual life in the Gaza Strip is evident.  As members of the battalion’s official D9 company stated: “Our job is to flatten Gaza.”  In an operation that saw the destruction of the Al-Azhar University, First Sergeant David Zoldan, operational officer of Company A of the battalion, delights with fellow soldiers on seeing the explosion: “Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined, did you see?!”

As the world awaits the ICJ’s verdict, Israel’s genocide continues – [Cartoon / Mohammad Sabaaneh]

Statements of this sort are frequent and easily found up the chain of command.  They are also uttered with ease at the highest levels of government.  On October 21, Israeli Minister for National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir had told a “settlement” conference held in a restricted military zone that Gaza’s inhabitants would be given the chance to “leave from here to other countries”.  His reasoning for this ethnic cleansing has remained biblically consistent: “The Land of Israel is ours.”

In a media statement from its Department of International Relations and Cooperation dated October 28, the South African government announced its filing of a Memorial to the ICJ pertaining to its ongoing case against Israel.  The Memorial itself runs into 750 pages, with 4000 pages of supporting exhibits and annexes.  (Its December 2023 application had run into 84 pages.)  “The problem we have is that we have too much evidence,” remarked South Africa’s representative to The Hague, Ambassador Vusimuzi Madonsela to Al Jazeera.

Zane Dangor, director- general of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, was more practical.  Israel might well inflate its dossier of bloody misdeeds, but some line had to be drawn in the submissions.  “The legal team will always say we need more time, there’s more facts coming.  But we have to say you have to stop now.  You [have] got to focus on what you have.”

While the formal contents of the Memorial remain confidential, the clues are thickly obvious.  It contains, for instance, evidence that Israel “has violated the genocide convention by promoting the destruction of Palestinians living in Gaza, physically killing them with an assortment of destructive weapons, depriving them access to humanitarian assistance, causing conditions of life which are aimed at their physical destruction and ignoring and defying several provisional measures of the International Court of Justice, and using starvation as a weapon of war to further Israel’s aims to depopulate Gaza through mass death and forced displacement of Palestinians.”

Despite that comprehensive assortment of alleged crimes, the legal commentariat wonder how far this latest effort will necessarily go in linking the decisions of Israeli officialdom with genocidal intent.  That Israel is committing war crimes and violating humanitarian law is nigh impossible dispute.  The threshold in proving genocide, as international jurisprudence has repeatedly shown over the years, is a high one indeed.  The dolus specialis – that specific intent to destroy in whole or in part the protected group – is essential to prove.

Cathleen Powell of University of Cape Town, for instance, has her reservations.  “If they can find genocidal statements from state officials and show that that directly led to a particular programme that led to the destruction on the ground, then that’s probably a very strong case,”.  But making that link would be “very difficult”.

Dangor has no doubts.  “Genocidal acts without intent can be crimes against humanity.  But here, the intent is just front and centre.”  Suffice to say that Israeli lawmakers and officials, aided by the exploits of the IDF, are making proving such intent an easier prospect with each passing day.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor or Informed Comment.

Via Middle East Monitor

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(The Conversation) – The ongoing war in Sudan has often been overlooked amid higher-profile conflicts raging across multiple continents. Yet the lack of media and geopolitical attention to this 18-month-long conflict has not made its devastation in terms of human lives any less stark.

Since fighting broke out in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, both of which had been part of a power-sharing military government, the country has seen the displacement of more than 14 million people and the carving up of the country by geography and ideology.

And while we may never know the exact death toll, the conflict in Sudan is certainly among the deadliest in the world today.

As scholars of public health, conflict and human rights and Sudanese-American health workers, we are keenly aware of how fraught it can be to estimate mortality in war for a slew of practical and political reasons. But such estimates are of critical importance: They allow us to understand and compare conflicts, target humanitarian aid for those still at risk, trigger investigations of war crimes, bear witness to conflict and compel states and armed groups to intervene or change.

The difficult work of counting the dead

A profound humanitarian crisis is occurring in Sudan, characterized by ethnic cleansing, mass displacement, food scarcity and the spread of disease, complicated further by flooding in the northern states.

Considering a death toll in such a conflict includes counting not only those who are killed as a direct result of violence – itself a difficult thing to determine in real time – but also those who have died by conflict-exacerbated factors, such as the absence of emergency care, the breakdown of vaccination programs and a lack of essential food and medicine. Estimating this latter death toll, called indirect mortality, presents its own challenge, as the definition itself varies among researchers.

In congressional testimony, U.S. special envoy to Sudan Tom Perriello recognized the estimation challenges when noting there had been anywhere between 15,000 and 150,000 deaths in Sudan – an exceedingly wide range that was attributable, in part, to the complexity of determining indirect mortality.

Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), a nonprofit specializing in conflict-related data collection, has recorded an average of more than 1,200 direct conflict deaths per month in Sudan, with nearly 19,000 deaths in the first 15 months of the conflict. This figure is similar to the 20,000 deaths estimated by the Sudan Doctors Union and the 19,000 figure used by the Sudan Protection Cluster, a centralized group of U.N. agencies and NGOs that used World Health Organization data.

ACLED sources its estimates of deaths from traditional media, reports from international NGOs and local observers, supplemented by new media such as verified Telegram and WhatsApp accounts. The Sudan Doctors Union, on the other hand, gives on-the-ground estimates of conflict deaths.

When available, distinct data sources such as surveys, civil registers and official body counts can make an estimation more accurate. However, this data is often available only in retrospect, after the cessation of conflict. It is therefore critical to use both the available data and precedents from previous conflicts to capture a reasonable estimate of the human costs of an ongoing conflict.

A 2010 article in The Lancet estimated that there are 2.3 indirect deaths for every direct conflict death, based on data from 24 small-scale surveys conducted in Darfur from 2003 to 2005. As such, using ACLED’s data of 18,916 direct deaths, we estimate that in the current Sudan conflict, there are an additional 43,507 indirect deaths – or more than 62,000 total deaths.

We believe our estimate is very conservative. When estimating mortality in the ongoing conflict in Gaza, a different group of scholars, also writing in The Lancet, used a multiplier of four indirect deaths for every direct death to estimate the overall mortality there.

Meanwhile, a report from the Geneva Declaration Secretariat showed an average of 5.8 indirect deaths for every direct death across 13 armed conflicts from 1974 to 2007.

Using that latter multiplier, the number of indirect deaths in Sudan would jump to nearly 110,000 – meaning the total deaths in the region amount to 130,000 – double our estimate.

This range is wide, but it acknowledges how difficult it can be to estimate indirect deaths and how they can vary significantly with the shape of a conflict.

The Sudanese conflict in context

For all the tremendous loss of life these numbers reflect, they surely underestimate the true human costs of the conflict.

Sudan already had a fragile and underfunded health system before the fighting started. And compared with other ongoing conflicts such as in Gaza and Ukraine, there was already a more precarious baseline, with higher child mortality and lower life expectancy.

Since the war in Sudan began, there have been consistent reports of mass killings, forced disappearances, sexual violence, deliberate blocking of food and medicine, and other forms of violence against civilians.

Much of the violence is ethnically targeted, and the Darfur region – where a full-scale famine has been declared – has suffered disproportionately.

The destruction of civilian infrastructure and interrupted aid mechanisms are preventing medicine, food, clean water and vaccinations from getting to in-need populations.

Health care workers and facilities, not only in at-risk Darfur but also throughout the country, have been the target of attacks. Nearly 80% of medical facilities have been rendered inoperable. And at least 58 physicians have been killed, in addition to the many that were targeted in previous crises.

Given the persistent targeting of health care systems and restricted access to humanitarian corridors, indirect deaths in Sudan are likely to grow as hospitals shut down, even in the capital Khartoum, due to bombardments, ground attacks and a lack of critical supplies.

The costs for Sudanese children are especially alarming. Thirteen children die per day in Zamzam camp in North Darfur, according to Doctors Without Borders, mostly due to undernutrition and food scarcity.

And nearly 800,000 Sudanese children will face severe, acute malnutrition through 2024, a condition that requires intensive care and supplemental nutrition merely to prevent death. Even before the conflict, children were severely threatened by a lack of access to care, including basic preventive care such as early immunization.

“Refugees,” Digital, Midjourney / Clip2Comic, 2024

Finally, the transmission of communicable diseases thrives in conflicts like the one in Sudan, where there has been widespread population displacement, malnutrition, limited water and sanitation, and lack of appropriate sheltering. In August, a cholera outbreak led to a spiking death rate of more than 31 deaths per 1,000 cholera cases. And instances of such disease effects are likely underestimates in a country lacking health care penetration and monitoring.

The limitations of estimations

The massive internal displacement of more than 14 million people in Sudan complicates the estimation of death tolls, as shifting populations make establishing baselines nearly impossible.

Moreover, there is typically a dearth of official information collected and released during conflicts.

So establishing a concrete estimate of the true impact of armed conflict often comes after the cessation of hostilities, when expert teams are able to conduct field studies.

Even then, estimates will require assumptions about direct deaths, indirect-to-direct death ratio and the quality of existing data.

But as scholars working at the intersection of public health and human rights, we believe such work, however imperfect, is necessary for the documentation of conflict – and its future prevention. And while there are many current global conflicts that require our urgent attention, the conflict in Sudan must not be lost in the mix.

_Editor’s note: Israa Hassan, a physical medicine and rehabilitation resident at Texas Rehabilitation Hospital-Fort Worth and advocacy director at the Sudanese American Physicians Association, contributed to this article.

Sarah Elizabeth Scales, Post-Doctoral Researcher, Department of Environmental, Occupational, and Agricultural Health, University of Nebraska Medical Center; Blake Erhardt-Ohren, DrPH Candidate, University of California, Berkeley; Debarati Guha Sapir, Professor of Public Health, Université catholique de Louvain (UCLouvain); Khidir Dalouk, Assistant Professor of Medicine, Oregon Health & Science University, and Rohini J Haar, Faculty, Epidemiology Division, School of Public Health, University of California, Berkeley

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

(The Conversation) – Sudan’s war runs grimly on. The two main protagonists (though there are others involved) are each claiming local victories. The Sudanese army appears to be slowly regaining control of the ruined capital, Khartoum, and has recovered some ground it lost elsewhere in Sudan. And the rival Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continues its brutal siege of the western city of El Fasher.

But, while the army seems to have the upper hand at present, neither they nor the RSF looks likely to win outright. Instead, the two sides keep up a mutual battering with ill-aimed barrages of artillery fire and bombs that destroy markets, wreck hospitals, and each day add to the grim toll of civilian death and misery.

Abdel-Fattah al Burhan, the general who seized power and derailed what was supposed to be a transition to civilian rule after the revolution of 2019, still insists he is the head of Sudan’s legitimate government, and that the army will win the war.

The RSF’s leader, Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, who is referred to as Hemedti, had initially been willing to play deputy to Burhan, but is now his bitter enemy. He makes a show of being willing to negotiate, but relentlessly pursues a military victory.

It is tempting to point the finger at actors outside Sudan for their part in the spiralling violence. There are multiple credible allegations that the governments of the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia and Russia have all helped arm or finance one side or other in pursuit of regional influence or economic gain. Libya’s eastern – but not internationally recognised – government has also been accused of complicity.

Some would say there are sins of omission as well as commission. The US, EU and others have all called for an end to this war. But they could be doing more to stop the flow of weapons and money that helps keep the fighting going, and to mobilise more concerted action to protect civilians.

The world stands accused of turning its back on Sudan, despite being its biggest hunger and displacement crisis. But external actors did not start the war, and they cannot simply end it.

Despite their common cause in a counter-revolutionary coup in 2021, the war started when Burhan and Hemedti fell out over who would have military and political primacy – and the associated economic benefits – in Sudan.

They’ve already decided the country isn’t big enough for the both of them, so it’s nigh-on impossible to negotiate the usual kind of deal that shares power between foes.

Burhan is intensely sensitive about the fragile sovereignty of his government, and views external mediation as foreign meddling. He has always insisted that the army can win an outright victory, and now he is encouraged by recent gains. Yet he is a long way from regaining control of the whole country.

“Burhan at War,” Digital, Dream / Dreamland v3 / Clip2Comic, 2024

Hemedti, who craves the status that would come from negotiations, makes grandiloquent offers of ceasefires, coupled with promises to respect human rights – all while the RSF continues to murder, rape and loot. Hubris and hypocrisy make poor bases for negotiation.

A precarious balancing act

This is also not a war simply being waged between two individuals. Neither the army nor the RSF are coherent or well disciplined – the RSF, in particular, is a messy constellation of armed men, mostly from western Sudan (and, allegedly, further afield). They share a distinctive style of camouflage dress and a sense of long-term exclusion, but are not under close or effective control.

The army has more formal structures – too many, perhaps – but these are also fragmented. Strong on generals and air firepower but weak on fighting forces, the army is adapting the government’s old playbook of mobilising local militias.

The war has become several wars, drawing in other armed groups whose alliances with either the army or the RSF are contingent or opportunistic.

Since independence in 1956, Sudan has mostly been a militarised state, where power was won by force. Those who ruled it feared their fellow soldiers and so created alternative forces, hoping these would back them against potential coups. Some of these groups had distinct social bases in particular regions or ethnic groups.

This fragmentation had been happening since the 1970s, but it became endemic during the long reign of Sudan’s former president, Omar al-Bashir. Bashir stayed in power for 30 years by dividing possible rivals within the ruling elite, and used the multiplying, competing arms of the “security forces” to fight rebels on the margins.

What seemed like a powerful, authoritarian system was, in fact, a brutal but precarious balancing act. After Bashir fell in 2019, the transitional government floundered. The soldiers seized power, then the complex rivalries and institutional fragmentation proved unsustainable. The core institutions that held Sudan together have shattered.

So who, if anyone, can put Sudan back together again? Burhan and Hemedti are in no mood, and may anyway lack the control of their followers needed for any deal to stick.

Civilian politicians were discredited by the bickering of the transition, and the most prominent of them seem confused between claiming to be a government-in-exile or trying to build a bigger anti-war coalition.

At present, Sudan faces either the long-term absence of central authority or, more dramatically, an effective division into two or more states, whether or not these are internationally recognised. Some might say we should not mourn this – Sudan was a colonial creation, made by violence and predation. But this is an outcome that may only increase misery and misrule.

However, there is still resistance amid the ruination. Sudan’s post-Bashir transition to democracy, as envisaged by the UN and others, is long dead. But in some vital ways, the popular revolution that toppled Bashir lives on.

Grassroots emergency response rooms organise whatever lifesaving support for desperate communities that they can. And women and youth – the revolution’s vanguard – continue to organise, agitate and debate Sudan’s future among themselves, as well as demand a role in making it. They deserve our solidarity.

Many, both Sudanese and non-Sudanese, refuse to let go of the idea of a better Sudan that has never yet been realised, but just might rise up from these ashes.

Justin Willis, Professor of History, Durham University and Sharath Srinivasan, David and Elaine Potter Professor, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

(The Conversation) – In September 2024, the United Nations’ independent fact-finding mission to Sudan issued its first report. Citing grave human rights violations amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity, the report called for the immediate deployment of an independent and impartial force to protect civilians.

Nearly 18 months after the outbreak of fighting, the humanitarian situation in Sudan has become dire, with nearly 25 million people in need of assistance. Is the deployment of a peacekeeping presence to protect civilians feasible or even advisable? Jenna Russo, whose research focuses on the protection of civilians in armed conflict settings and the UN’s contribution to peace processes, shares her insights.

Would it be a good idea to deploy peacekeepers in Sudan again?

The United Nations’ (UN) and African Union’s (AU) efforts to broker peace in Sudan since the outbreak of war in April 2023 have focused on achieving a ceasefire. So far they have been unsuccessful.

Calls to address civilians’ immediate security concerns are increasing. While communities have done much to facilitate self-protection, they continue to be targeted and more needs to be done.

For many years, Sudan had a peacekeeping presence. From 2007 to 2020, the UN and AU jointly led a hybrid peacekeeping presence in Darfur. This was followed by a UN-led political mission. However, since the latter’s sudden exit in February 2024, there has been no regional or international presence in Sudan responsible for protecting civilians.

It’s important to state that (almost) no one is suggesting the deployment of a full-scale, multidimensional peacekeeping operation. Rather, some – including the UN’s independent fact-finding mission – are calling for a more limited deployment of security forces to protect civilians. Sudanese authorities, however, have rejected this recommendation.

Providing widespread protection across Sudan is likely unfeasible given the size of the country and the intensity of the fighting. But it may be possible to provide more targeted protection.

This could include the creation of “green zones” to protect areas where displaced persons are sheltering and facilitate humanitarian aid, which is critical given the risk of famine. A regional or international security presence could also monitor rights violations and support local self-protection efforts.

What would a successful deployment require?

While the gravity of the situation in Sudan is clear, there are barriers to deploying a protection or broader peacekeeping mission.

First, it’s not clear who would lead the mission. Less than a year ago, Sudanese authorities kicked out the UN-led political mission, citing its ineffectiveness in supporting the political transition and protecting civilians. Most stakeholders are pessimistic that the warring parties will agree to another UN-led mission, which is a pre-condition for UN peace operations.

Some have questioned whether the consent of the Sudanese authorities is required, given their role in leading the 2021 coup. However, the UN has learned hard lessons from deployments where consent is lacking (including, recently, Mali). Thus, the UN security council is unlikely to approve a mission that would be resisted by the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces and could lead to additional attacks on civilians and peacekeepers.

This raises the question of whether the AU could deploy a protection mission. The AU is also involved in trying to support the political process. While it’s not clear that either party would consent to an AU-led presence, it’s more viable than a UN-led mission.

Because of this, some have suggested that Sudan could be a test case for resolution 2719, which was unanimously adopted by the UN security council in December 2023. It allows AU-led peace support operations to receive UN funding on a case-by-case basis.

The resolution is primarily understood as providing support for peace enforcement (as opposed to peacekeeping), but some council members are reportedly open to using it for other types of intervention in Sudan.

Photo by ammar nassir on Unsplash

Second, even if the security council could agree on a mission to Sudan – a tall order given current council divisions – this raises a broader question. Can a mission succeed if it lacks a political role?

The UN has been clear that peacekeeping missions should be deployed to support a political process and be guided by a political strategy. A protection mission without a political mandate would be a clear deviation from this principle.

Previous lessons also give pause to deploying a purely protection mission. For example, the UN mission in Chad was deployed to protect civilians from violence flowing from neighbouring Sudan. However, because it didn’t have a political mandate, it lacked leverage with the authorities and was kicked out by the government after less than three years.

What are the options?

The UN security council and the AU peace and security council have both asked their respective secretariats to prepare recommendations on the protection of civilians in Sudan.

However, policymakers may find themselves with few good options. While there are no easy answers, the following are some points to bear in mind.

First, the UN and AU should consider options for sending a physical protection force to Sudan to keep areas safe for displaced people and facilitate the delivery of aid. However, policymakers will have to consider how such a presence can be connected with political efforts. This is needed to provide protection actors with leverage to maintain access and put pressure on perpetrators.

Second, those involved in the political process need to integrate protection into their mediation efforts. The lead-up to negotiation processes can be a crucial time for mediators to focus on the protection of civilians. This is because warring parties may ratchet up their use of violence to improve their bargaining positions. Mediators can also include specific language within agreements – relating to sexual and gender-based violence, for example – which can later be used to hold the parties accountable for their behaviour.

Third, at the international level, member states must put diplomatic pressure on the warring parties and on third-party states that are supporting them. In particular, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been implicated in providing weapons to the Rapid Support Forces, though it denies such allegations. Other countries within the region and beyond also have a stake in the outcome of Sudan’s civil war, given the oil and other resources coming from the country. The amount of money tied up in the conflict is a major barrier to peace. However, unless external powers use diplomatic pressure to stop efforts to arm both sides of the war, it is unlikely to stop.

Finally, greater assistance should be given to community-led efforts for self-protection. A communications blackout has severely impeded civilians’ abilities to protect themselves, and must end. Cash programmes are also critical to help individuals buy food and other life-saving supplies.

Despite the difficulties of reaching some communities amid the ongoing fighting, all efforts should be made to continue integrating their perspectives into planning for protection.

Jenna Russo, Researcher and lecturer, City University of New York

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

(The Conversation) – The United Nations has accused foreign players of prolonging the war in Sudan, making it harder for the country to find peace. The fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces started in April 2023. It was sparked by two generals competing for power after a failed political transition.

Since then, the conflict has taken on a regional and international dimension. Several external actors are supporting the two warring parties with arms, ammunition and money. The United Arab Emirates is emerging as one of the foreign players most invested in the war.

We asked May Darwich, who has studied the alliances that countries in the Middle East form in the Horn of Africa, for insights into this evolving situation.

Why is peace proving elusive in Sudan?

In a little over a year of civil war, Sudan has become the site of one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. The country – the largest agricultural producer in Africa and seen as a potential breadbasket for the region – is now on the brink of the worst famine in the world.

According to the UN refugee agency, more than 7 million people are internally displaced, nearly 2 million have fled to neighbouring countries and 25 million (half of the population) are in dire need of humanitarian assistance. Estimates suggest that over 20,000 people have been killed since the war began in April 2023.

Yet, prospects for peace are dim.

Fighting shows no signs of abating, efforts to hold peace talks have failed and the involvement of foreign actors is prolonging the violence.

Regional powers and neighbours have lined up behind either of the two generals at the centre of the conflict: Abdel Fattah al-Burhan of the Sudanese Armed Forces and Mohamed “Hemedti” Dagalo of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. Both warring parties have since been accused by the UN of committing war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

Sudan is surrounded by major arms-trafficking hubs. Weapons and ammunition are smuggled in through countries like Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic. Countries like the United Arab Emirates and Iran are supplying the war through these countries. This violates a UN arms embargo against Sudan.

Which are the biggest foreign players?

Several regional and international actors have a stake in the outcome of the conflict.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia, for instance, support the Sudanese army. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), Libya and Russia (through the Wagner Group) support the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces.

The UAE has emerged as the foreign player most invested in the war. It views resource-rich, strategically located Sudan as an opportunity to expand its influence and control in the Middle East and east Africa.

Since 2018, the UAE has invested over US$6 billion in the country. This includes foreign reserves in the Sudanese central bank, agriculture projects and a Red Sea port. The UAE has also recruited and paid fighters from Sudan, drawn mostly from the Rapid Support Forces, to join its conflict in Yemen.

Since 2019, the UAE has undermined Sudan’s democratic transition following the ouster of long-serving president Omar al-Bashir. Abu Dhabi empowered both the army and the paramilitary force against the civilian wing of the government. With the outbreak of the civil war, the UAE has focused on the Rapid Support Forces.

Abu Dhabi has repeatedly denied its involvement in arming the paramilitary force or supporting its leader Hemedti. However, the evidence suggests otherwise and the UAE’s dark role in the war has become an “open secret”.

The announcement by US rapper Macklemore cancelling an October 2024 concert in Dubai over the UAE’s role “in the ongoing genocide and humanitarian crisis” reignited international attention on Abu Dhabi’s role in the war.

The UAE’s involvement in Sudan highlights a broader pattern in this sheikhdom’s foreign policy in the last decade: aligning with local forces to secure geopolitical and economic interests across the Middle East and east Africa.

“Khartoum,” Digital, Midjourney, Clip2Comic, 2024

In Sudan, the UAE has joined forces with Russia to support the Rapid Support Forces through the Wagner Group. The Wagner Group has been active in Sudan since 2017, primarily in connection with resource extraction projects in regions like Darfur, where Hemedti’s forces were active and became a central ally in these endeavours.

According to UN experts, the UAE established logistical operations to send weapons to the Rapid Support Forces through its networks in Libya, Chad, Central African Republic, South Sudan and Uganda. Armaments and supplies were disguised as humanitarian aid.

What’s in it for the UAE?

The interactions and alliances involving the UAE and the Rapid Support Forces reflect the complex and often opaque nature of modern geopolitical manoeuvring in Sudan.

Reports suggest that Hemedti acts as a custodian of Emirati interests in Sudan. These interests include gold and agriculture products.

Gold has been one of the main drivers of the Sudan conflict. It allows both parties to fuel their war machines. The UAE is the main beneficiary of this trade. It receives nearly all the gold smuggled from Sudan and has become a hub for laundering trafficked gold into the global market. The latest available statistics show that, officially, the UAE imported precious metals from Sudan valued at about US$2.3 billion in 2022.

Additionally, the UAE imports 90% of its food supply. Since the global food crisis in 2007, the UAE has made food security one of its highest priorities and started investing in farmlands abroad.

In Sudan, two Emirati firms are farming over 50,000 hectares in the north, with plans for expansion. Agricultural produce is then shipped through the Red Sea. To bypass the port of Sudan, which was run by the Sudanese government, the UAE signed a new deal in 2022 to build a new port on the coast of Sudan to be operated by the Abu Dhabi Ports Group.

The UAE has used the Rapid Support Forces to secure its interests and ambitions in achieving food security.

Who, and what, could break the Sudan deadlock?

The humanitarian situation in Sudan is worsening, but the international community has done little to address it.

In addition to its inability to raise sufficient aid for Sudan, the international community has applied no pressure on the UAE. The UN security council has failed to address the credible allegations by its own panel of experts on Sudan over Abu Dhabi’s involvement.

Human Rights Watch has accused the Rapid Support Forces of committing genocide, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing in the ongoing war. However, so far, there are no prospects for holding the UAE accountable for its role with the paramilitary force. The country continues to leverage its alliances with the west.

Unless the international community is willing to stop foreign actors from fuelling the conflict, Sudan risks descending into a catastrophic humanitarian crisis that will haunt the world for decades to come.

May Darwich, Associate Professor of International Relations of the Middle East, University of Birmingham

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

“Sudan’s conflict is one of the world’s worst humanitarian and human rights crises, with warring parties committing atrocities with impunity, and newly acquired weapons and equipment are likely to be used in the commission of further crimes,” said Jean-Baptiste Gallopin, senior crisis, conflict, and arms researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Fighters from both the SAF and the RSF have since mid-2023 posted photos and videos of new foreign-made kits, such as armed drones and anti-tank guided missiles.”

Human Rights Watch analyzed 49 photos and videos, most apparently filmed by fighters from both sides, posted on the social media platforms Facebook, Telegram, TikTok, and X (formerly known as Twitter), showing weapons used or captured in the conflict. The apparently new equipment that Human Rights Watch identified, which includes armed drones, drone jammers, anti-tank guided missiles, truck-mounted multi-barrel rocket launchers, and mortar munitions, was produced by companies registered in China, Iran, Russia, Serbia, and the UAE. Human Rights Watch was not able to establish how the warring parties acquired the new equipment.

The new visual evidence of equipment not known to previously be in the possession of Sudanese actors, and evidence that it is being used, suggests that the warring parties acquired some of these weapons and equipment after the start of the current conflict in April 2023. In one case, lot numbers indicate the ammunition was manufactured in 2023.

Since the conflict between the SAF and the RSF began in Sudan in April 2023, countless civilians have been killed, millions have been internally displaced, and millions face famine. The SAF and the RSF may use such weapons and equipment to continue to commit war crimes and other serious human rights violations not just in Darfur, but across the country.

The United Nations Security Council is expected to decide on September 11 whether to renew the Sudan sanctions regime, which prohibits the transfer of military equipment to the Darfur region. The sanctions regime was established in 2004, when Darfur was the epicenter of a conflict with widespread human rights abuses, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing. Since April 2023, the new conflict has affected most of Sudan’s states, but Security Council members have yet to take steps to expand the arms embargo to the whole country.

These findings demonstrate both the inadequacy of the current Darfur-only embargo and the grave risks posed by the acquisition of new weapons by the warring parties. A countrywide arms embargo would contribute to addressing these issues by facilitating the monitoring of transfers to Darfur and preventing the legal acquisition of weapons for use in other parts of Sudan.

The Sudanese government has opposed an expansion of the arms embargo and in recent months has lobbied members of the Security Council to end the sanctions regime and remove the Darfur embargo altogether.

The prevalence of atrocities by the warring parties creates a real risk that weapons or equipment acquired by the parties would most likely be used to perpetuate serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law, harming civilians. 

Two verified videos filmed by drones and posted on pro-SAF social media accounts show the drones attacking unarmed people in civilian clothes in Bahri (Khartoum North), one of Khartoum’s twin cities. One video, posted to X by a pro-SAF account on January 14, shows a drone dropping two mortar projectiles on apparently unarmed people in civilian clothes as they cross a street in Bahri, killing one person on the spot and leaving four others motionless after the explosions.

Another video, posted to a pro-SAF account on March 19, 2024, shows a drone dropping a munition on people wearing civilian clothes who are loading a truck with apparent sacks of grain or flour in the busy courtyard of the Seen flour mills in Bahri, injuring or killing a man who lies motionless on the floor. No weapons or military equipment are seen near the targeted areas in either video.

Ending the arms embargo would end the work of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan. The panel is one of the few entities that provides the Security Council with regular, in-depth reporting on the conflict in Sudan since the SAF-aligned government successfully demanded the closure of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan in December 2023.

In recent weeks, the discussion around renewal at the Security Council has shifted toward a renewal of the Darfur embargo and associated sanctions regime, which means, if adopted, the status quo would continue.

The Sudan sanctions regime has faced challenges since its inception. The Panel of Experts and Amnesty International have documented that the governments of Belarus, China, and Russia violated the embargo for years, yet only one individual has ever been sanctioned for violating the embargo. In a report published in July, Amnesty International found that “recently manufactured weapons and military equipment from countries such as Russia, China, Türkiye, and the UAE are being imported in large quantities into Sudan, and then diverted into Darfur.”

At a minimum, the Security Council should proceed with the planned “technical rollover” and maintain the existing Sudan sanctions regime, which, despite its limitations, provides the UN and Security Council members with crucial reporting and tools for sanctions. It should also take more robust actions in the face of violations of the existing embargo, notably by sanctioning the individuals and entities violating it.

“The Security Council should expand the Darfur arms embargo to all of Sudan to curb the flow of arms that may be used to commit war crimes,” Gallopin said. “The Security Council should publicly condemn individual governments that are violating the existing arms embargo on Darfur and take urgently needed measures to sanction individuals and entities that are violating the embargo.”

Via Human Rights Watch

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Bonus Video added by Informed Comment:

BBC News: “Sudan on verge of ‘worst famine in the world’ as civil war continues | BBC News”

(The Conversation) – China-Africa relations have deepened over the past two decades, characterised by increased economic cooperation, investment and infrastructure development. China is now Africa’s largest trading partner, with partnerships focused on building roads, railways and energy projects.

As the ninth Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) kicks off this week in Beijing, a new, green theme is shaping their relationship: the global renewable energy race.

We asked Lauren Johnston, a development economist with expertise in China-Africa relations, to provide some insights into this development as it positions both regions as key players in the global shift towards green energy.

How is the race for green energy shaping relations between China and Africa?

The global climate crisis has created a push for renewable energy technology – like solar or wind power – which would lessen reliance on polluting energy sources. China saw some years ago it had a chance to lead in such a new industry.

Africa is home to a lot of the important minerals needed to create renewable technologies – like copper, cobalt and lithium, key ingredients in battery manufacture.

The race for green energy is therefore leading to a rush for these minerals in Africa, led by China, the US and Europe.

Chinese mining presence in Africa, which is much lower than western presence, is concentrated in five countries: Guinea, Zambia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Among them, the DRC, Zambia and Zimbabwe are the crucible of the new green energy race in Africa. They are home to Africa’s copper belt and the greatest store of lithium, copper and cobalt.

The DRC is particularly important. It has significant reserves of cobalt and high grade copper, as well as lithium. Cobalt is an unusually hard metal with a high melting point and magnetic properties. It is a key ingredient in lithium batteries.

More than 70% of the world’s cobalt is produced in the DRC and 15%-30% of that is produced by artisanal (informal) and small-scale mining.

China is the leading foreign investor – it owns some 72% of the DRC’s active cobalt and copper mines, including the Tenke Fungurume Mine – the world’s fifth largest copper mine and the world’s second largest cobalt mine.

China’s CMOC Group is the world’s leading cobalt mining company. It could produce up to 70,000 tonnes, thanks to the new Kisanfu mine.

In 2019, the DRC and China were responsible for about 70% of global production of cobalt and 60% of rare earths.

Zimbabwe is another country in which China has been investing within the context of the green energy race. Zimbabwe is home to Africa’s largest lithium reserves, a critical element in electric-vehicle battery production. In 2023 Prospect Lithium Zimbabwe, a subsidiary of Chinese company Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt, opened a US$300 million lithium processing plant. It has capacity to process 4.5 million tonnes a year of hard rock lithium into concentrate for export, against a global backdrop of some 200 million tonnes produced annually.

Digital, Midjourney, PS Express, 2024

There are a couple of other developments on the continent that are worth watching.

China is investing in the first mega-scale battery factory on the continent, in Morocco.

Chinese interests also have permission to develop the world’s largest untapped high-grade iron ore deposit, in Guinea. Iron ore, used in steel production, plays a crucial part in the renewable energy sector in several ways – for instance, steel is used in wind turbines and in mounting structures for solar panels. The agreement to exploit the Simandou iron ore deposit involves various countries. China’s steel-making giant Chinalco is among the players. Production is due to begin in early 2026.

As China ramps up investments in these green minerals, what concerns exist for African countries?

China’s growing control over key renewables minerals brings several challenges to African minerals suppliers.

For African countries it generates concerns for development – many want to add value to their minerals endowment at home rather than export raw materials to China and then import manufactures. China has been criticised for abandoning African interests by adding value in China and not in Africa. Many people and industries on the African continent lack access to reliable and affordable energy – and local industry is keen to capture that market.

For instance, according to the International Energy Agency, China controls over 80% of the global manufacturing steps involved in making solar panels. The concentration of production in China, alongside competition, has pushed down global solar panel prices.

China’s solar industry is keen to close Africa’s energy gap, providing sustainable energy to the millions that don’t have access. For instance, at this year’s Forum on China–Africa Cooperation gathering, China is expected to advance its Africa Solar Belt Programme. This is an agenda supported by the World Resources Institute which not only seeks to use solar energy to close Africa’s energy gap, but also to focus on powering schools and healthcare facilities with solar too.

Some countries, like South Africa, are pushing back by imposing tariffs on solar imports to protect their local industries.

There are also fears that the race to renewables, and the approach of Chinese mining-sector firms in Africa, is setting back workers’ conditions. Expansion of mines in some countries has also led to forced evictions and human rights abuses.

What can African countries do differently to take advantage of China’s mineral rush?

There are several steps they can take.

First, they can pay more attention to basic labour standards and human rights.

Second, African firms should aim to learn from their Chinese partners. They can develop the industrial knowledge and understanding of the skills and capabilities needed on the continent, similar to how China learned from Japanese, Taiwanese, Singaporean and western companies in the past.

Third, learn from how other emerging markets manage their relations with China. For instance, with China’s help, Indonesia has taken control of the global nickel market. Indonesia started by banning nickel exports in 2014, aiming to build up its own industries for processing and manufacturing. This plan was supported by Chinese investments.

Lastly, what I call China’s Hunan Model for Africa has a focus on agriculture, mining, transport and construction industries, and on building talent. This includes technical and vocational training.

The more African nations position themselves to take advantage of training programmes from other countries, the better their young people will be prepared to drive industrial growth and economic development in Africa.

Lauren Johnston, Associate Professor, China Studies Centre, University of Sydney

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

(The Conversation) – Germany was a significant – and often brutal – colonial power in Africa. But this colonial history is not told as often as that of other imperialist nations. A new book called The Long Shadow of German Colonialism: Amnesia, Denialism and Revisionism aims to bring the past into the light. It explores not just the history of German colonialism, but also how its legacy has played out in German society, politics and the media. We asked Henning Melber about his book.

What is the history of German colonialism in Africa?

Imperial Germany was a latecomer in the scramble for Africa. Shady deals marked the pseudo-legal entry point. South West Africa (today Namibia), Cameroon and Togo were euphemistically proclaimed to be possessions under “German protection” in 1884. East Africa (today’s Tanzania and parts of Rwanda and Burundi) followed in 1886.

German rule left a trail of destruction. The war against the Hehe people in east Africa (1890-1898) signalled what would come. It was the training ground for a generation of colonial German army officers. They would apply their merciless skills in other locations too. The mindset was one of extermination.

The war against the Ovaherero and Nama people in South West Africa (1904-1908) culminated in the first genocide of the 20th century. The warfare against the Maji Maji in east Africa (1905-1907) applied a scorched earth policy. In each case, the African fatalities amounted to an estimated 75,000.

“Punitive expeditions” were the order of the day in Cameroon and Togo too. The inhuman treatment included corporal punishment and executions, sexual abuse and forced labour as forms of “white violence”.

During a colonial rule of 30 years (1884-1914), Germans in the colonies numbered fewer than 50,000 – even at the peak of military deployment. But several hundred thousand Africans died as a direct consequence of German colonial violence.

Why do you think German debate is slow around this?

After its defeat in the first world war (1914-1918), the German empire was declared unfit to colonise. In 1919 the Treaty of Versailles allocated Germany’s territories to allied states (Great Britain, France and others). The colonial cake was redistributed, so to speak.

This did not end a humiliated Germany’s colonial ambitions. In the Weimar Republic (1919-1933) colonial propaganda flourished. It took new turns under Adolf Hitler’s Nazi regime (1933-1945). Lebensraum (living space) as a colonial project shifted towards eastern Europe.

The Aryan obsession of being a master race culminated in the Holocaust as mass extermination of the Jewish people. But victims were also Sinti and Roma people and other groups (Africans, gays, communists). The Holocaust has overshadowed earlier German crimes against humanity of the colonial era.

After the second world war (1939-1945), German colonialism became a footnote in history. Repression turned into colonial amnesia. But, as Jewish German-US historian and philosopher Hannah Arendt suggested in 1951 already, German colonial rule was a precursor to the Nazi regime. Such claims are often discredited as antisemitism for downplaying the singularity of the Holocaust. Such gatekeeping prevents exploration of how German colonialism marked the beginning of a trajectory of mass violence.

How does this colonial history manifest today in Germany?

Until the turn of the century, colonial relics such as monuments and names of buildings, places and streets were hardly questioned. Thanks to a new generation of scholars, local postcolonial agencies, and not least an active Afro-German community, public awareness is starting to change.

Various initiatives challenge colonial memory in the public sphere. The re-contextualisation of the Bremen elephant, a colonial monument, is a good example. What was once a tribute to fallen colonial German soldiers became an anticolonial monument memorialising the Namibian victims of the genocide. Colonial street names are today increasingly replaced with names of Africans resisting colonial rule.

Numerous skulls – including those of decapitated African leaders – were taken to Germany during colonialism. These were for pseudo scientific anthropological research that was obsessed with white and Aryan superiority. Descendants of the affected African communities are still in search of the remains of their ancestors and demand their restitution.

Similarly, cultural artefacts were looted. They have remained in the possession of German museums and private collections. Systematic provenance research to identify the origins of these objects has only just begun. Transactions such as the return of Benin bronzes in Germany remain a matter of negotiations.

The German government admitted, in 2015, that the war against the Ovaherero and Nama in today’s Namibia was tantamount to genocide. Since then, German-Namibian negotiations have been taking place, but Germany’s limited atonement is a matter of contestation and controversy.

What do you hope readers will take away from the book?

The pain and exploitation of colonialism lives on in African societies today in many ways. I hope that the descendants of colonisers take away an awareness that we are products of a past that remains alive in the present. That decolonisation is also a personal matter. That we, as the offspring of colonisers, need to critically scrutinise our mindset, our attitudes, and should not assume that colonial relations had no effect on us.

Remorse and atonement require more than symbolic gestures and tokenism. In official relations with formerly colonised societies, uneven power relations continue. This borders on a perpetuation of colonial mindsets and supremacist hierarchies.

No former colonial power is willing to compensate in any significant way for its exploitation, atrocities and injustices. There are no meaningful material reparations as credible efforts of apology.

The colonial era is not a closed chapter in history. It remains an unresolved present. As the US novelist William Faulkner wrote:

The past is never dead. It’s not even past.

Henning Melber, Extraordinary Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

—-

Bonus video added by Informed Comment:

Al Jazeera English: “Namibia: The Price of Genocide | People and Power”

( Tomdispatch.com ) – For months, we’ve all been able to stay reasonably informed about the wars in Gaza and Ukraine. But there’s another horrific war that’s gotten so little coverage you could be excused for not knowing anything about it. What we have in mind is the seemingly never-ending, utterly devastating war in Sudan. Think of it as the missing war. And if we don’t start paying a lot more attention to it soon — as in right now — it’s going to be too late.

After 15 months of fighting in that country between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), experts in food insecurity estimate that almost 26 million people (no, that is not a misprint!), or more than half of Sudan’s population, could suffer from malnutrition by September. Eight and a half million of those human beings could face acute malnutrition. Worse yet, if the war continues on its present path, millions will die of hunger and disease in just the coming months (and few people in our world may even notice).

By now, those warring armies have driven Sudan to the brink of all-out famine, partly by displacing more than a fifth of the population from their homes, livelihoods, and farms, while preventing the delivery of food to the places most in need. And you undoubtedly won’t be surprised to learn that, with their foreign-policy eyes focused on Gaza and Ukraine, our country’s government and others around the world have paid remarkably little attention to the growing crisis in Sudan, making at best only half-hearted (quarter-hearted?) gestures toward helping negotiate a cease-fire between the SAF and RSF, while contributing only a small fraction of the aid Sudan needs to head off a famine of historic magnitude.

From Emergency to Catastrophe

In late June, the U.N.-backed Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) system, which monitors regions at risk of starvation, reported “a stark and rapid deterioration of the food security situation” in Sudan. It noted that the number of people suffering hunger severe enough to qualify, in IPC terms, as Phase 3 (“Crisis”) or Phase 4 (“Emergency”) has ballooned 45% since the end of last year. In December 2023, no Sudanese had yet made it to Phase 5 (“Catastrophe”), a condition characteristic of famines. Now, more than three-quarters of a million people are in that final phase of starving to death. Indeed, if the conflict continues to escalate, large parts of Sudan may spiral into full-blown famine, a state that exists, according to the IPC, when at least 20% of an area’s population is suffering Phase-5 hunger.

Until recently, the worst conflict and hunger were concentrated in western Sudan and around Khartoum, the country’s capital. Now, however, they’ve spread to the east and south as well. Worse yet, the war in Sudan has by now displaced an astounding 10 million people from their homes, more than four million of them children — a figure that looks like but isn’t a misprint. Many have had to move multiple times and two million Sudanese have taken refuge in neighboring countries. Worse yet, with so many people forced off their land and away from their workplaces, the capacity of farmers to till the soil and other kinds of workers to hold down a paycheck and so buy food for their families has been severely disrupted.

Not surprisingly, 15 months of brutal war have played havoc with crop production. Cereal grain harvests in 2023 were far smaller than in previous years and stocks of grain (which typically supply 80% of Sudanese caloric intake) have already been fully consumed, with months to go before the next harvest, a stretch of time known, even in good years, as the “lean season.” And with war raging, anything but a bumper crop is expected this year. Indeed, just as planting season got underway, fierce fighting spilled over into wheat-growing Gezira, one of Sudan’s 18 “states” and renowned as the nation’s breadbasket.

Sudan desperately needs food aid and it’s simply not getting enough. The U.N. High Commission for Refugees has received less than 20% of the funds necessary to help feed the Sudanese this year and has had to “drastically cut” food rations. As Tjada D’Oyen McKenna, head of the aid nonprofit Mercy Corps, told the New York Times, “World leaders continue to go through the motions, expressing concern over Sudan’s crisis. Yet they’ve failed to rise to the occasion.”

Worse yet, in the swirling chaos, even the food aid that does make it to Sudan is largely failing to reach starving populations in anything approaching adequate quantities — and when available, it’s usually unaffordable. Famished people are reportedly boiling leaves, as well as eating grass, peanut shells, and even dirt.

Starvation: “A Cheap and Very Effective Weapon”

For many families, the one thing keeping starvation at bay may be a local free soup kitchen. In a report published in May, Timmo Gaasbeek of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations noted, “Sudan has a long tradition of sharing food. After the war broke out and hunger spread, community-level initiatives for sharing food sprang up across the country. These ‘soup kitchen’ initiatives are often informal but can be very well organized.”

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Gaasbeek warned, however, that soup kitchens can fill only so many gaping holes in a system shattered by wartime destruction, displacement, and crop failure. His institute estimates that at current rates of food sharing, 2.5 million people could die of hunger and disease by the time crops are harvested in September. In other words, a shocking 10-20% of the Sudanese in the hardest-hit areas could die — mortality rates similar to ones suffered during horrendous famines in parts of Nigeria in 1969, Ethiopia in 1984, and Somalia in 1992.

By Gaasbeek’s calculations, more aggressive food sharing through soup kitchens and other means could cut the total death toll to a still-appalling one million. But that seems unlikely since even the existing efforts by local mutual-aid groups and international organizations to provide food have come under attack from both sides in the war. Six international experts writing for the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights have accused SAF and RSF of “using food as a weapon and starving civilians.” They also found that the “deliberate targeting of humanitarian workers and local volunteers has undermined aid operations, putting millions of people at further risk of starvation.”

We recently got in touch with Hadeel Mohamed, an educator with whom we’d spoken last October after she fled Sudan for Egypt. In a July 16th email to us, she wrote that “the war in Sudan, like many wars, has proved to be more an attack on civilians than on any armed forces.” Still in contact with neighbors who stayed behind in Khartoum, she reports that neither army is protecting civilians. In fact, the two at times appear to be tag-teaming to do them in. When, for instance, RSF forces carry out a raid, her contacts tell her, SAF troops are often “removed from the locations hours before the attacks occur.” Worse yet, for those now trying to flee as she did last year, “Some said that, in their attempts to escape Khartoum, they’ve encountered RSF forces waiting to loot them. All their supplies were stolen once again!”

Alex de Waal of the World Peace Foundation told the BBC that the RSF paramilitary is “essentially a looting machine. They rampage through the countryside and towns, stealing everything there is.” They even bombed and looted the last hospital still functioning in Northern Darfur state. No less horribly, the government’s SAF troops are guilty of trying to starve people in areas now occupied and controlled by the RSF and, according to De Waal, neither side is willing to “relinquish what is a cheap and very effective weapon.”

Echoes from a Thousand Miles Away

Is Sudan’s nightmare starting to sound grimly familiar?

* Families displaced multiple times, with war following hot on their heels.

* Food aid falling desperately short of what’s needed.

* Humanitarian aid intercepted by soldiers and other armed men before it can reach intended recipients.

* Soup kitchens attacked.

* Aid workers targeted for death.

* Hospitals bombarded, invaded, and shut down.

* Crop production capacity sabotaged during a hunger emergency.

* Washington doing little or nothing to stop the horror.

Might we be thinking, perhaps, of a small 25-mile strip of territory a thousand miles directly north of Khartoum, just on the other side of Egypt?

Sadly enough, there are many striking parallels between the wars being waged on the civilian populations of Sudan and Gaza. It would nonetheless be wrong to blame world interest in the nightmare in Gaza for drawing attention away from the civil war in Sudan. Neither of those crimes against humanity, in their scale and ghastliness, should be exploited by anyone to minimize the weight and urgency of the other. Worse yet, simply paying more attention to the nightmare in Sudan and sending its people more food aid won’t address the imbalance. The fact is that neither the Sudanese nor the Gazans have received what they most urgently need right now: an end to their respective conflicts.

Efforts by the U.S. and other countries to push for cease-fires in both places and an end to each of those wars have proven almost cataclysmically inadequate and ineffective. For Sudan, it’s been especially discouraging. Talks last year between the SAF and RSF brokered by Saudi Arabia and the United States failed to even reduce the fighting there and recent attempts to revive those talks all too expectably broke down. In early June, Egypt hosted supporters of both of Sudan’s warring parties in Cairo for negotiations. The only outcome: the creation of a supremely bureaucratic subcommittee to draft a meaningless communique.

Collective Courage

Last October, Hadeel Mohamed wrote that there was then only one modest hope in Sudan. For the millions of Sudanese living through their latest national nightmare, she told us, “You really come back to more community-based aid. With our limited resources, with our limited abilities, we still find people rising up to take care of each other.” And they’re still doing it. It’s just not enough to prevent a disastrous famine, as long as the sectarian fighting continues.

With weak support from the outside world, civilians in Sudan have little choice but to rely on long traditions of social cohesion and mutual aid as they work to survive and somehow bring the war in their country to an end. In that, there’s yet another parallel with the war on Gaza’s civilians: the coordinated service, heroism, and sacrifice personified by Palestinian journalists, taxi drivers, first responders, healthcare professionals, and countless other people is now legendary.

Civilians in many such situations are too often portrayed in the world media as nearly helpless victims. The Sudanese and Palestinian people are showing that image to be fallacious by acting with the kind of collective courage, endurance, and solidarity that’s all too rare in the comfortably situated societies that are leaving them to starve. They’re being cruelly victimized, yet they’re refusing to play the victim.

The wartime food-sharing movement in Sudan that operates soup kitchens is a good example. It’s led by grassroots neighborhood groups called “resistance committees” that started forming more than a decade ago in the wake of the Arab Spring, with the mission of providing social protection and provisioning in their home communities. They have since proliferated throughout Sudan, operating locally and independently but together forming a remarkably well-integrated national network.

The resistance committees took a leading role in grassroots protests against the October 2021 military coup that cut short a national transition to democratic rule then underway in Sudan. Eighteen months later, the current war erupted when the two generals who had led that coup turned on each other, with one leading the armed forces and the other the Rapid Support Forces. Throughout the ensuing war, at great risk to their own safety, resistance committee members have played essential lifesaving roles. While working to fend off hunger in their communities, they have also prioritized the maintenance of human rights, continuation of social services, and defense of direct democracy, while urging fervent opposition to the SAF, the RSF, and more generally the incessant militarization of their country. Some are also mobilizing their communities for self-defense.

Sudan expert Santiago Stocker suggested recently that the resistance committees, “because of their support among youth and local legitimacy in Sudan, are a voice the international community should support and elevate.” The committees are one part of a broader grassroots civilian movement that participated in those ill-fated Cairo talks. That movement, Stocker argues, could sooner or later help break the deadlock in Sudan by pressing other nations to move decisively to help end the war. They could urge, for example, that “the international community… increase punitive measures, including sanctions, against RSF and SAF leadership and key members of the SAF’s governing coalition, including businesses and hardline religious groups.”

While it’s important indeed that Gaza remains a focus of our attention as long as the nightmarish Israeli campaign there continues, it’s no less important that those of us in the Global North focus on the less visible war in Sudan and push our governments to impose punitive measures on that country’s generals and other elites, while pulling out all the stops (and ample cash) to get food to the millions who desperately need it.

Sudan should simply no longer be callously ignored.

Copyright 2024 Stan Cox and Priti Gulati Cox

Via Tomdispatch.com