( Michigan Daily ) – We, the undersigned, are alumni recipients of the Martin Luther King, Jr. Spirit Award at the University of Michigan.

In January of this year, the University awarded recent alum Salma Hamamy the MLK Spirit Award in recognition of her steadfast activism promoting Indigenous sovereignty and Palestinian liberation — activism that included calling for the University to divest from weapons manufacturers. The University also awarded the MLK Spirit Award to the student group Hamamy led as president, Students Allied for Freedom and Equality. Five months later, in May, Provost Laurie McCauley sent a letter to Hamamy’s personal home stating, “With the full support of the Board of Regents and President Ono, I am writing to notify you that your award has been revoked effective immediately,” based on an Instagram story post from her personal social media account. In the letter, Provost McCauley characterized Hamamy’s post as “inconsistent with the University’s values.” This letter was dated May 21, 2024 — the same day that campus police violently removed the University’s Gaza solidarity encampment from the Diag. Whether intentional or not, it planted the decision firmly within the context of a broader attempt to suppress the burgeoning anti-war student movement. 

To our knowledge, never before in the 18-year history of this award have university administrators interfered with — let alone nullified — the careful deliberation and unanimous decision of the Central Campus MLK Spirit Award Selection Committee, a diverse, 13-member body representing the full breadth of central campus undergraduate and graduate programs. Administrators did not consult the Committee. Allowing administrators and the politically influenced University Board of Regents to overturn a tradition led by students, faculty and staff sets a dangerous precedent that threatens the integrity and prestige of this historic award. 

Had the administrators taken the time to speak with Hamamy directly, they would have learned the following, which she shared with us recently: 

In her letter, McCauley suggested that the board revoked the award because of posts Hamamy shared on her Instagram story. In an interview with a Detroit News journalist, University spokesperson Colleen Mastony suggested that administrators revoked the award from Hamamy because she endorsed “violence and murder.” We note that Hamamy’s post shared disturbing surfaced footage of Israeli drones summarily executing displaced Palestinians seeking refuge. Her caption effectively called for the abolition of Zionism and damnation of those who support the crimes of the Israeli state. There is a painful irony in the University claiming Hamamy’s actions run “directly counter to the values of our university” all while administrators stand complicit in the illegal occupation of Palestinian land, the apartheid of Palestinian society and the genocide of the Palestinian people — an ongoing genocide that has killed Hamamy’s own family members.

We do not see Hamamy’s condemnation of Zionism as supporting violence. Instead, it is a call for an end to a political ideology that denies Palestinians their rights to land, self-determination and their very livelihood. Surely we can understand how in this moment, when grave atrocities are being committed against Palestinians month after month, that a member of that community would feel immense anguish, anger and grief — a mix of emotions that those of us who are not Palestinian cannot fully understand. Can Palestinians not rebuke those that kill their families? Must they observe the ongoing and grotesque mass murder of their people with decorum? Are they not human, too? If University President Santa Ono and the board were concerned by comments made by Hamamy in which she condemned the racial supremacy and deadly political ideology of Zionism and those who uphold it — which commits grave crimes against her community day after day — she should have been provided with an opportunity to be heard. 

We were awarded the MLK Spirit Award precisely because of our work to advance social, racial and economic justice in the spirit of the esteemed Dr. King and his explicit struggle against militarism, white supremacy and economic oppression. Palestinian liberation activism is no exception to that. What standing does a university that defames and silences its students engaged in the righteous struggle for Palestinian self-determination have in arbitrating which students deserve social justice awards? What moral authority does a university that overrides the collective decision of a committee it had established — ironically, to engage in a deliberative process in order to choose who to award — have in coopting the message of Dr. King, a message that is surely at odds with an ideological system of apartheid that results in the starvation, torture and land theft of Palestinians? 

The University has long presented itself as a leading institution for social justice. Alumni activists’ images, names, work and voices are frequently showcased to prospective students and donors, and student activists are fully aware of the norms established by the University’s valorization of this tradition. Ono and the Board of Regents’ authoritarian, unjust and calculated decision to capitulate and rescind Hamamy’s award — likely due to unchecked external political and financial pressure — contradicts the values we espouse as advocates for social justice. The University’s administration instigated this unprecedented legacy of prejudiced interference, and we refuse to take part in it. Therefore, we renounce our respective awards and, effective immediately, we withdraw our consent for the University to use our names, images and work for its websites, promotional materials or donor appeals. We also decline to participate, within our capacity, in events or programs hosted by the University until Hamamy’s award is rightfully reinstated and an apology is issued to her. 

Hamamy is an exemplar of the social justice advocacy that the University has to offer. She has inspired us over the last year with her courageous leadership and principled movement building. We unequivocally affirm the growing alumni call for the University to immediately divest from any and all companies profiting off Israel’s ongoing military campaign in Gaza. We fully support and uplift Hamamy’s conscientious hopes for “a world where colonial, racist and violent ideologies are abolished.” We hope the U-M community will mirror her courage in this call to action for a liberated Palestine and an end to the longstanding genocide against the Palestinian people.

Anna Dang is a U-M Alumni and MLK Spirit Award Recipient. The above op-ed is signed and endorsed by 65 MLK Spirit Award Recipients. Their names can be found here.

Via Michigan Daily

He rightly stepped aside after his disastrous debate with Donald Trump, but he continues to lose a far more disastrous debate with Israel’s Prime Minister, weakening the basic principles of US foreign policy. Alongside his humiliating failure to achieve any “red lines” on civilian casualties, Gaza is having significant, long-term moral impacts on Christianity and Judaism.

So far, Democratic Convention organizers — and nominee Kamala Harris — have not agreed to any airtime for Gaza. Yet simply saying “Trump would be worse” to the Uncommitted million primary voters, and the protesters outside, will devalue whatever feel-good effect she may achieve.

As a Holocaust survivor’s son, I was raised to despise antisemitism and support Israel. Over five Middle East visits, however, I learned that Israel is not the beleaguered little guy, but a country enabled by blank-check US support to operate without normal political consequences. Our billions in military aid strengthen the most repressive elements of Israeli society, which denies most Palestinians citizenship. Thus, while criticizing Israel’s government is not antisemitic, the worldwide rise in antisemitism reacting to Gaza is alarming and unsurprising.

To a Presbyterian ethicist, Gaza clearly violates the “Just War” principles of proportionality, avoidance of civilian casualties, and goal of a just peace. Israel’s use of enormous bombs is indiscriminate as the Israeli Army authorizes massive casualties in pursuit of combatants — including 17,000 children, so far.

Aryeh Neier, the co-founder of Human Rights Watch, concludes that yoking one-sided onslaught and deliberate starvation constitutes a genocide. Destroying universities, schools, mosques, churches, libraries, and hospitals — a cultural genocide — makes “just peace” less likely.

Diplomats’ resignations underline our complicity and isolation as Israel’s defender at the United Nations, blocking humanitarian aid and ceasefires. Both Christianity and Judaism — assumed to influence US and Israeli policy — are discredited when basic moral intuitions are disregarded.

Virtually no one excuses atrocities by some Hamas fighters in the October 7 “jailbreak,” nor endorses the intolerance in Hamas’ survival under Israel’s blockade since its legitimate electoral victory in 2006.

But the “Islamic fundamentalist” label, part of demonizing Hamas, is cheap, as US policy empowers Israeli Settler fundamentalism. Settlements put over 500,000 Israelis on West Bank and East Jerusalem land, preempting any “two-state” solution. Biden’s seeking help from the Saudi government — effectively a Taliban with oil money — reinforces religious fundamentalism. It contributes to a disastrous US Middle East policy, and also suggests that much religious belief is pitiless tribalism.

The prophetic core of Judaism, carried into Christianity, confronts unjust uses of power by whoever wields it. Biden’s reflexive condemnation of the university protesters as “antisemitic” revealed his inability to adjust to Israel’s far right turn.

By contrast, look at the brave Jewish Voice for Peace members who fear that Zionism is becoming idolatrous, distorting Jewish ideals. Similarly, the Israeli veterans’ organization, Breaking the Silence, persuades me that the long military occupation of Palestine numbs Israelis to Palestinian human rights.

For Christians, fear of being called antisemitic is the dominant filter for information on Israel, Arabs, and Islam.

This weakens Christianity’s universal approach, the understanding that God “has made from one ancestor all the nations” (Acts 17:26 NRSV) and, from St. Paul, that before God, “there is no longer Jew or Greek, … slave or free, …male and female…” (Galatians 3:28).

Both fundamentalist and mainstream Christians allow the dehumanization of Arabs to poison our perceptions of Muslims, whose hopes for freedom we saw in the Arab Spring and the women’s rights protests in Iran. Islamophobia numbs us to the collective punishment of Palestinians, ironically including the abandonment of the Palestinian Christians.

The lack of honest interfaith dialogue also hurts Christianity and Judaism. Already in 1971, Christian and Jewish scholars published, The Death of Dialogue and Beyond, to avert tensions over Israel/Palestine. Lessons of the Holocaust were invoked, such as how unaccountable power does inevitable evil, and are reconfirmed in Gaza.

Peace — anywhere, anytime — requires justice.

Will Kamala Harris continue to enable genocide? If so, my faith will require me to say “never again” with my vote.

The Rev. Christian Iosso, PhD, is interim minister of the Connecticut Farms Presbyterian Church in Union. A New Providence native, he served as an ethicist for the Presbyterian Church (USA).

Reprinted from the New Jersey Star-Ledger with the author’s permission.

—

Bonus video added by Informed Comment:

AP Video: “US VP Kamala Harris speaks about Israeli strike on Gaza school”

Rupture and Repair is published in pdf format here. Below I excerpt a couple of pages in html with the permission of the authors.

This report details a substantial rupture of trust between students, staff, and faculty in the Muslim, Arab, and Palestinian (MAP) communities and Stanford in academic year 2023-24. These communities have felt afraid for their safety, unseen and unheard by university leadership, and silenced through a variety of formal and informal means when they assert the rights and humanity

of Palestinians. This rupture has been compounded by a longer history of Islamophobia, anti-Arab, and anti-Palestinian sentiment that stretches through and beyond Stanford.

In spring 2024, the question of Palestine remains one of the most pressing political issues of the day, both in our university and on the global stage. A core mission of Stanford is to “educate tomorrow’s global citizens” by enabling students to “engage with big ideas, to cross conceptual and disciplinary boundaries, and to become global citizens who embrace diversity of thought and experience.” This past year, numerous Stanford staff, faculty, and administrators have devoted significant time and effort to honoring these values despite extraordinary scrutiny from Congress, national media, alumni, and others.

Yet the findings of this committee indicate that Stanford has not lived up to this mission. The university has undermined speech, teaching, and research on Palestine. For Muslim, Arab, and Palestinian community members, Stanford’s decisions have diminished their sense of equality, inclusion, and belonging on campus. These decisions have also sent a message to the whole university that Palestine is an exception to Stanford’s stated mission: a topic that one cannot study, discuss, or teach without potentially damaging one’s future.

In this report, we detail, based on hundreds of hours of listening sessions
with students, staff, faculty, and alumni, the challenges of being a member
of Muslim, Arab, and/or Palestinian communities at Stanford. In many cases, these challenges extend to students, staff, and faculty of any identity who align themselves with or engage the rights of Palestinians. We show how these challenges are linked to persistent suppression of speech on Palestine; underrepresentation of community members in conversations that matter; a scarcity of scholarly expertise in Palestinian and Arab studies; and institutional discomfort with the diversity of opinion and expertise that does exist on campus.

The report makes the following core findings:
Students from MAP communities experienced dozens of incidents that undermined their sense of safety and belonging, including physical assaults, threats, and harassment. Although Stanford responded appropriately to some of these incidents and provided security in response to student requests, on many occasions students felt that the institutional response was insufficient given the severity and persistence of incidents . . .

Read the whole thing.

Advance unedited version

Distr.: General

27 May 2024

Original: English

Human Rights Council

Fifty sixth session

18 June–12 July 2024

Agenda item 2

Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner

for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the

High Commissioner and the Secretary-General

              Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel*

1. Introduction and methodology
2. This report summarises the Commission’s factual and legal findings on attacks carried out on 7 October 2023 on civilian targets and military outposts in Israel including rocket and mortar attacks. It also summarises factual and legal findings on Israeli military operations and attacks in the OPT, principally the Gaza Strip, focusing on the period from 7 October to 31 December 2023, examining the imposition of a total siege, evacuation and displacement of civilians and attacks on residential buildings and refugee camps. This report also includes some incidents that took place after 31 December 2023 where they were egregious and deemed representative of a trend. Two conference room papers accompany this report, presenting the Commission’s detailed findings on both situations.^[1] This report is an overview of those papers and should be read in conjunction with them.
3. The Commission sent the Government of Israel six requests for information and access and one request for information to the State of Palestine. The State of Palestine provided extensive comments. No response was received from Israel.
4. The Commission began gathering information on the morning of October 7, as events unfolded on the ground, and applied the same methodology and standard of proof previously adopted for its investigations.^[2] Thousands of open-source items have been collected to date and more than 350 items received following two open calls for submissions issued on 20 October and 1 December 2023.^[3] The open-source material was forensically collected in accordance with international standards on the preservation of web-based content and rules of admissibility of digital evidence. Where needed, the collected open-source material was verified primarily through comprehensive cross-referencing with a broad and varied collection of reputable sources and complemented by advanced forensic examination, including visual media authentication, geolocation and chronolocation analysis, metadata extraction and face recognition.
5. The Commission conducted remote interviews with victims and witnesses and consulted multiple sources of information. It conducted a mission to Türkiye and Egypt from 28 February to 8 March 2024 to gather first-hand accounts from survivors and witnesses. It met with more than 70 victims and witnesses, more than two thirds of them women.
6. The Commission faced several challenges in its investigation. In relation to Gaza, the Commission’s ability to reach out to victims and witnesses was limited, due to the continuing fighting on the ground and major communications disruption. In relation to Israel, Israeli officials repeatedly publicly announced Israel’s refusal to cooperate with the Commission’s investigation.^[4] Israeli officials reportedly barred medical professionals and others from being in contact with the Commission after it approached medical professionals in Israel in December 2023.^[5]
7. Both the 7 October attack in Israel and Israel’s subsequent military operation in Gaza must be seen in context. These events were preceded by decades of violence, unlawful occupation and Israel’s denial of the Palestinians’ right to self-determination, manifested in continuous forced displacement, dispossession, exploitation of natural resources, blockade, settlement construction and expansion, and systematic discrimination and oppression of the Palestinian people.
8. Legal framework
9. The Commission laid out the applicable international legal framework in the OPT and in Israel in its four previous reports and in its terms of reference. The Commission noted the OPT, including East Jerusalem and Gaza, and the occupied Syrian Golan are currently under belligerent occupation by Israel, to which IHL applies concurrently with IHRL.

III.    Factual findings: acts committed by the Hamas Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades[6] and other Palestinian armed groups on 7 October 2023 in Israel

1. Introduction
2. On 7 October, a coordinated attack by more than 1,000[7] members of Hamas military wing and other Palestinian armed groups, accompanied by Palestinian civilians,[8] was launched against Israeli civilian targets and military bases in southern Israel, near the border with Gaza. Attackers entered Israel by land, sea and air under cover of an unprecedented rocket and mortar attack targeting southern and central Israel.
3. According to Israeli sources, more than 1,200 persons were killed directly by members of various Palestinian armed groups and others and by rockets and mortars launched from the Gaza Strip. Of these, at least 809 were civilians, including at least 280 women[9], 68 foreign nationals and 314 Israeli military personnel. Among those killed were 40 children (including at least 23 boys and 15 girls) and 25 persons aged 80 and over. In addition, 14,970 people were injured and transferred to hospitals for treatment. At least 252 people were abducted to Gaza as hostages, including 90 women, 36 children, older people and members of Israeli Security Forces (ISF). About 20 of these abductees were members of ISF, many of whom have since been killed in captivity. As of 21 May 2024, 128 hostages had been released or rescued. This number includes bodies retrieved of killed hostages, and 128 remained in captivity, alive or dead. [10]     
4. The attack began at 06:30, with a heavy barrage of rockets and mortar shells fired at southern Israeli villages and towns.[11] While many rockets were intercepted by the Iron Dome system deployed by Israel, at least 18 civilians were killed by direct projectile hits in Israel on 7 October and in the weeks that followed.^[12] Hamas armed wing and the PIJ publicly claimed responsibility for these attacks and declared in several statements their intention to target civilian locations.
5. Approximately 150,000 people were evacuated from their homes in southern Israel on and immediately after 7 October. As of April 2024, the majority were still displaced, residing in hotels and temporary housing.[13]
6. Killing, mistreatment and abduction in civilian locations
7. Hamas military wing, other Palestinian armed groups and civilians attacked distinct civilian targets in at least 24 localities, as well as public spaces and outdoor festivals. In these sites militants systematically moved from house to house setting homes on fire, shooting into private and public shelters, and removing people from hiding places, killing, injuring and abducting civilians to Gaza. The Commission investigated six distinct attacks in Be’eri and eight attacks in Nir Oz, each involving multiple victims, largely from the same families.
8. In Be’eri, 105 civilians were killed (63 men and 42 women) by members of the military wings of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) as well as by civilians from Gaza. In addition, 31 civilians (13 men and 18 women) were abducted to the Gaza Strip. Attackers entered the kibbutz and shot at residents, cars, pets and houses, killing and injuring, setting houses on fire and abducting people to Gaza. In one case, a nine-month-old baby girl, was shot and killed while hiding with her mother in their safe room in Be’eri. In another case, at least four people were taken out of their homes and killed at the perimeter of the Be’eri, likely while being transferred to Gaza.
9. In Nir Oz, 46 civilians were killed (33 men and 13 women) by members of the military wings of Hamas and the PIJ, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, the armed wing of the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement and the armed wing of the Popular Resistance Committees. Palestinian civilians also participated in these killings. Seventy-two residents of the kibbutz (37 men and 35 women) were abducted to Gaza. In one case, a 79-year-old woman and her 12-year-old autistic granddaughter from Nir Oz were killed close to the perimeter fence with Gaza, allegedly because they were slowing down the retreat of their captors. In another case, a 70-year-old woman and her 73-year-old husband were attacked while out for a walk in the kibbutz. The woman was killed, while her partner was abducted to Gaza where he died in captivity.
10. Many Israeli families suffered a multigenerational impact with several members either killed or abducted to Gaza. In one case in Be’eri, a 48-year-old woman and her two teenage daughters were killed, while the father was abducted to Gaza. In Nir Oz, a family of five was hiding in their safe room when militants broke into the room, shot and killed both parents, and set fire to their home, which resulted in the killing of their three children from smoke suffocation. The children’s grandmother was shot dead in a different safe room in the kibbutz. In another case from Nir Oz, an entire family was abducted to Gaza, including both parents, a four-year-old boy and a 9-month-old baby. Two of the children’s grandparents were also killed in the attack and their bodies were found near the Gaza border.
11. Of 3,000 young people at the Nova music festival in Re’im,^[14] 364 attendees (including 215 men and 136 women) were killed by members of the military wing of Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups, while around 40 others were abducted to Gaza. Victims were killed at the site of the main festival while attempting to hide under the festival stage, in portable public toilets, inside parked cars and in garbage containers. In one case, a man hid by a parked silver car, when Hamas militants shot him to death. Many of those killed were shot while running through a field east of the Nova site, trying to escape. Others were killed while hiding in stationary cars and in public shelters along road 232 where they sought refuge. Survivors in shelters reported lying for hours under piles of bodies waiting for first responders to arrive.
12. The Commission investigated the killing of civilians in four public shelters (near Re’im, Be’eri and Alumim). In all four locations, militants attacked the shelters using grenades and machine gun fire, shooting at any person attempting to escape. In a shelter near Re’im, the Commission found that militants also used a rocket propelled grenade. Militants abducted civilians to Gaza from the Re’im shelter, all of whom were suffering from serious injuries. The similar pattern of attack against these and other public shelters suggests that the attackers planned the modalities of the attacks in advance.
13. In Zikim beach, Hamas militants killed at least 18 civilians, including five teenagers (four boys and one girl), in a public shelter, public toilets and at other locations on the beach. Two boats carrying some 10 Hamas militants arrived at the beach at approximately 06:45. Hamas militants threw grenades into the shelter and then shot The Commission reviewed and verified digital evidence of the attack on the toilet block showing five teenagers crouching while shooting is heard in the background. An ISF soldier is also present, engaging the militants and returning fire. In another video published by Hamas six dead bodies, including the five teenagers, are seen in the toilet block, all of whom appear to have been shot and killed.  
14. The Commission found evidence of mistreatment of civilians and ISF members in several locations, and significant evidence on the desecration of corpses, including sexualized desecration, decapitations, lacerations, burning, severing of body parts and undressing.
15. The Commission estimates that some 130[15] older persons[16] were killed in the attack. In one incident at a bus-stop in Sderot, militants shot and killed 13 civilians, eight of them were over the age of 65.^[17]
16. At least 68 foreign nationals were killed on 7 October.^[18] The Commission documented the torture, attempted beheading and killing of Thai workers in Nir Oz and the killing of 19 Thai and Nepalese exchange students in Alumim.
17. Killing of soldiers considered hors de combat and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in Nahal Oz military outpost
18. The Commission investigated an attack on the Nahal Oz military outpost in which members of the military wing of Hamas and other armed groups killed 66 ISF soldiers, including one male soldier who was decapitated after death, and female intelligence observation soldiers (Tazpitaniyot), who were young, unarmed, and untrained for combat. The Commission found that militants killed at least 20 female soldiers and abducted seven. The Commission notes that in several cases these soldiers were visibly unarmed, wounded, hiding, captured and/or showing signs of having surrendered at the time of their abduction or killing, including one case where three female soldiers were hiding under a desk and shot and killed. The Commission finds reasonable grounds to believe that some soldiers were hors de combat and should not have been attacked.
19. The Commission found that seven female soldiers were taken to Gaza as hostages and viewed footage showing that they had been subjected to physical and verbal abuse. Four female bodies found at Nahal Oz outpost were partially or completely undressed, two of which were isolated in separate rooms, showing signs of physical abuse and sexual violence.
20. SGBV
21. The Commission found indications that members of the military wing of Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups committed gender-based violence (GBV) in several locations in southern Israel on 7 October. These were not isolated incidents but perpetrated in similar ways in several locations and by multiple Palestinian perpetrators. The acts documented by the Commission reflected clear abuse of power by male perpetrators and a disregard for the special considerations and protection of women’s integrity and autonomy granted by international law.
22. Hamas military wing rejected all accusations that its forces committed sexual violence against Israeli women.[19] However, the Commission documented cases indicative of sexual violence perpetrated against women and men in and around the Nova festival site, as well as the Nahal Oz military outpost and several kibbutzim, including Kfar Aza, Re’im and Nir Oz. It collected and preserved digital evidence, including images of victims’ bodies displaying indications of sexual violence, a pattern corroborated by independent testimonies from witnesses. Reliable witness accounts obtained by the Commission describe bodies that had been undressed, in some incidents with exposed genitals. The Commission received reports and verified digital evidence concerning the restraining of women, including hands and sometimes feet of women being bound, often behind the victims’ backs, prior to their abduction or killing. Additionally, the Commission made assessments based on the position of the body, for example images displaying legs spread or bent over, and signs of struggle or violence on the body, such as stab wounds, burns, lacerations and abrasions.
23. The Commission has reviewed testimonies obtained by journalists and the Israeli police concerning rape but has not been able to independently verify such allegations, due to a lack of access to victims, witnesses and crime sites and the obstruction of its investigations by the Israeli authorities. The Commission was unable to review the unedited version of such testimonies. For the same reasons, the Commission was also unable to verify reports of sexualized torture and genital mutilation. Additionally, the Commission found some specific allegations to be false, inaccurate or contradictory with other evidence or statements and discounted these from its assessment.
24. Civilian women were deliberately killed by militants during their abduction or while trying to escape, including in Be’eri, Mefalsim, Nir Oz and close to the Nova site. The Commission has documented three such cases with verified digital footage, showing that women were shot at close range while trying to escape.
25. Ninety women and girls were abducted to Gaza on 7 October. The Commission documented the physical and psychological violence in the process of several of these abductions. Many abductions were filmed, with women placed on the back of vehicles including motorbikes and brought to Gaza; acts committed with force, threat of force or the fear of violence. The abductees were forced to sit very close to their abductors and filmed during their abduction, in several cases placed between two men on a small motorbike, forcing them to coerced intimacy with their abductors. Female abductees have described how they were subjected to physical and psychological violence in the course of their abductions, being treated as “trophies” or “objects” or subjected to insults such as Jewish female The Commission found that women were disproportionally affected by this type of gender-based crime and documented many cases with the same pattern, from both kibbutzim and the Nova festival.
26. Women and women’s bodies were used as victory trophies by male perpetrators. The abduction, violence and humiliation of women were put on public display, either on the streets of Gaza and/or by recording the bodies of women or the acts of the crime and publishing it online for propaganda purposes. This type of gender-based crime was identified by the Commission in many locations, women being the primary but not the only target.
27. The Commission documented the desecration of both male and female bodies, including sexual acts such as undressing the body and/or displaying it partially undressed in public. In several cases the victims’ undressed bodies were displayed as a means of humiliation and disrespect, while these acts were filmed and disseminated. Militants posed with bodies in the streets of Gaza and in videos and photos, violating the personal dignity of the dead persons.
28. Impact on children
29. Forty Israeli children (at least 23 boys and 15 girls), including one under the age of two years and 10 under the age of 10 years, were killed and hundreds more were wounded on 7 October.[20] Twenty children lost both their parents and 96 children lost one parent.[21] In all the cases investigated by the Commission, militants attacked with full knowledge that children were present. In one case, three siblings from Kfar Aza witnessed the killing of their parents. One of the siblings, a three-year-old girl, was then abducted to Gaza, while her brother and sister spent 14 hours hiding in a wardrobe, waiting to be rescued.
30. The Commission found that children were instrumentalized by members of the military wing of Hamas and other armed groups with the intent of achieving specific political or strategic gains. In one case investigated by the Commission, militants used a 17-year-old boy in kibbutz Nahal Oz to lure his neighbours to open their houses, filmed and livestreamed his ordeal. He was later killed, while his 15- and eight-year-old stepsisters were abducted to Gaza. In Holit, two siblings, aged four and four-months respectively, witnessed the murder of their mother. They were then taken and held by a Hamas militant and filmed while the militant said: “look at the mercy in our hearts. Here are the children, we did not kill them.” The video was uploaded on the official Hamas military wing telegram for propaganda purposes.[22] The two children were then taken to a neighbour’s house for the purpose of being abducted and were released on the way to the Gaza Strip. In these and other cases, children were removed from the protection and care of their parents and put in highly vulnerable situations with little ability to understand the situation or voice objection.
31. Children were also intentionally targeted for abduction. Thirty-six children were abducted to Gaza, 10 of whom were abducted alone, without parents or other family members. Thirty-four children were released in November 2023.
32. Israeli response
33. The Commission found that ISF’s response to the attack was initially significantly delayed and, in many places, totally inadequate. Small teams of ISF ground forces appeared in several locations during the morning but they were slow to arrive, insufficient in numbers and lacked coordination with a centralized command and with each other.^[23]Several ISF tanks were active that day, at border locations and in the civilian villages, including one that provided protective cover for civilians in hiding and several ISF members defending a position at the Nova festival site. In many kibbutzim, local rapid deployment security teams fought against the attackers with very little or no external reinforcement.
34. The Commission is aware of allegations that ISF used the “Hannibal Directive”[24] to prevent the capture of Israeli civilians and their transfer to Gaza, even at the cost of killing them. Such allegations were made in relation to ISF actions in the Nova site, including reports of ISF attack helicopters shooting at Israeli civilian cars, resulting in the killing of Israelis. The Commission confirmed the presence of at least eight attack helicopters in various locations on 7 October, but it could not confirm that they shot at civilians or civilian cars, including in the area of the festival. The Commission documented one statement by an ISF tank crew, confirming that the crew had applied the Hannibal Directive by shooting at a vehicle which they suspected was transporting abducted ISF soldiers.
35. The Commission also verified information indicating that, in at least two other cases, ISF had likely applied the Hannibal Directive, resulting in the killing of up to 14 Israeli civilians. One woman was killed by ISF helicopter fire while being abducted from Nir Oz to Gaza by militants. In another case the Commission found that Israeli tank fire killed some or all of the 13 civilian hostages held in a house in Be’eri.
36. The Commission found that Israeli authorities prioritised identifying victims, notifying families and allowing for burial rather than forensic investigation, leading to evidence of crimes, especially sexual crimes, not being collected and preserved. The Commission also notes the loss of potential evidence due to inadequately trained first responders.
37. Factual findings: acts committed by Israel in the OPT
38. Introduction
39. ISF started carrying out airstrikes in the Gaza Strip in the morning hours of 7 October, in response to the Hamas-led attack in Israel.^[25] On 8 October, Israel formally announced the commencement of a major military operation named “Swords of Iron”.^[26] ISF first launched an intense six-week air campaign on the Gaza Strip, followed by ground operations under the cover of heavy artillery. The offensive’s primary military goals, as publicly stated, were to destroy Hamas completely including its governmental functions, and to secure the release of Israeli hostages.^[27]
40. By May 2024, the fatalities in the Gaza Strip were estimated to have exceeded 34,8 Of them, 24,682, including 7,356 children and 5,419 women, were identified as of 30 April.^[28] The number of injured was estimated at 77,908. Disaggregated data were only available for 53,019 (including 12,332 children and 13,996 women).^[29] These numbers are likely higher with thousands of persons still missing, many of them now dead under the rubble.[30] Air and artillery strikes account for the majority of casualties since 7 October.
41. ISF has used a variety of explosive weapons with wide-area effect in its attacks, delivered through airstrikes, tank and artillery fire, and shelling by naval forces. Ground operations, which started on 27 October, proceeded from north to south. These also served to segment the Gaza Strip strategically, cutting the northern half of the Gaza Strip, including Gaza City, the main population centre, from the south, with the establishment of a road in the middle.[31] Most of the population that was evacuated southward and has not been permitted to return.
42. On 12 December 2023, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution demanding an immediate “humanitarian ceasefire” and calling on all parties to the conflict to comply with their IHL obligations.^[32] The International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued orders on provisional measures in the South Africa v. Israel case under the Genocide Convention on 26 January 2024,28 March 2024, and 24 May 2024.^[33] On 25 March 2024, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution demanding an immediate ceasefire for the month of Ramadan, the unconditional release of hostages and effective humanitarian access.[34]
43. Attacks on civilians and civilian objects
44. During the first weeks of the military campaign, ISF primarily used air strikes targeting high-rise buildings and other civilian objects in the al-Rimal neighbourhood, Khan Younis, in Gaza City, Jabalia and al-Shati refugee camps, and other locations, causing thousands of casualties, wreaking devastation and razing entire residential blocks and neighbourhoods to rubble in near-constant heavy bombardments.^[35]
45. Crucial differences from previous hostilities should be noted, including that Israel has forcibly displaced at least 1.7 million Palestinians, as well as the massive scale of the fatalities and destruction. Hostilities between 2005 and 2023 resulted in less than a tenth of the fatalities since 7 October. The Commission has also observed an increasing trend in the number of fatalities of women and children compared with previous hostilities and assesses that this is associated with ISF’s air bombardment campaign and its frequent use of explosive weapons with a wide impact area in populated districts.^[36] This disproportionate effect was identified previously by the 2014 Gaza Commission of Inquiry and thus was foreseen but not prevented.^[37]
46. The Commission documented ISF statements indicative of a change in targeting approach. In one example, on 10 October, the ISF spokesperson said “this is the situation now. We need to use a different language and different terminology. Our attacks in Gaza – it is not like the rounds and the number of targets of the past. The logic is different. In every place, in every space where there is an inkling of intelligence we attack.”^[38] In another example, Israel’s Defence Minister Yoav Galant said, “Gaza will never return to be what it was”, and “I have released all restraints, we use everything”.[39] Given information suggesting relatively low numbers of Hamas militants in proportion to the wider civilian population[40], and given Israel’s repeated assertion that militants are ‘embedded’ within the civilian population,[41] the Commission considers these statements indicate that the Israeli Government has given ISF blanket authorisation to target civilian locations widely and indiscriminately in the Gaza Strip.
47. The Israeli bombardment strategy also appears consistent with the application of the so called “Dahya doctrine”[42] to the Gaza Strip. The Commission investigated several large-scale attacks on civilian targets in the Gaza Strip which are indicative of the use of this doctrine and documented tens of other attacks, including on aid organizations, convoys and refuge sites. In many of these cases, the Commission could not identify military targets as the focus of the attacks. Even when military targets were allegedly present, attacks lacked distinction, proportionality and precautions, resulting in thousands killed and injured and widespread destruction of entire neighborhoods including in Jabalia, Al-Rimal, Al-Yarmouk and Al-Maghazi.
48. Additionally, the Commission investigated cases in which ISF ground forces killed civilians who posed no threat, including holding white flags. In one incident, two civilian women were shot while seeking refuge at a church and the premises shelled. In another incident from November, ISF soldiers filmed the aftermath of the killing of a man in al-Shati refugee camp who they admit was unarmed when killed.[43] On 12 November, in al-Rimal neighborhood a Palestinian woman was shot by a sniper while evacuating and holding the hand of her grandson who was waving a white flag. On 15 November ISF shot and killed three Israeli hostages, one of whom was holding a white flag. ISF admitted in an investigation into this incident that it resulted from a lack of adherence to the rules of engagement. The Commission considers that this and other incidents clearly indicate the permissive practice of shooting to kill without first ascertaining who the targets are and whether they pose a threat.
49. The Commission is aware of reports and ISF allegations that the military wing of Hamas and other non-State armed groups in Gaza operated from within civilian areas. It continues its investigation into this issue.
50. Total siege
51. Israeli attacks and military operations in Gaza have worsened an already dire humanitarian situation. The prolonged blockade on the Gaza Strip, imposed by Israel since 2007, had already undermined the economy and violated the fundamental human rights of the population. On 9 October, Israel announced a complete siege on the Gaza Strip, cutting off essential resources and the movement of goods, heavily restricting the population’s access to food and water, fuel and electricity. All crossings between Israel and the Gaza Strip were sealed, blocking regular and humanitarian aid deliveries. Between 7 and 20 October, no aid trucks entered the Gaza Strip[44], significantly impacting as much as two-thirds of the population already heavily reliant on humanitarian assistance.
52. Israel’s Defence Minister Yoav Gallant framed the siege as a measure of retribution, announcing “a complete siege… no electricity, no water, no food, no fuel. We are fighting human animals, and we act accordingly.”[45]
53. The Commission documented several explicit public statements by Israeli officials indicating, in addition to motives of retribution, an intention to instrumentalize and weaponize the provision of necessities, to hold the population of the Gaza Strip hostage to achieve political and military objectives, including the forced displacement of civilians from northern Gaza Strip and the release of Israeli hostages. The Commission notes that these measures amount to the collective punishment of the entire population for the actions of a few, a clear violation of IHL.
54. Israeli Minister of Energy and Infrastructure Israel Katz had already signed an order on 7 October to cut all electricity supplies to the Gaza Strip. On 8 October, Israeli authorities cut off all water supply from Mekorot through the three connection pipelines to the Gaza Strip. Between 8 October – 14 November, Israel stopped any fuel entering the territory, citing concerns about potential use by Hamas.[46] The impact of these measures on the availability of electricity and water was immediate. By 14 October, the three water desalination plants, which had previously produced 21 million liters of drinking water a day, were reported to have halted operations due to the lack of electricity and fuel.^[47] Israel’s cutting of water supply immediately affected more than 650,000 people.[48] The Gaza Power Plant ceased operation on 11 October after fuel transportation through the Kerem Shalom Crossing was stopped.^[49]
55. Despite the unprecedented and growing needs, Kerem Shalom, the main point of entry for goods from Israel to the Gaza Strip, was entirely sealed by Israel from 7 October – 16 December. Following intense international pressure, Israel opened the crossing for aid trucks on 17 December. Israel allowed the re-opening of the Rafah crossing on 21 October although the quantity of goods and humanitarian assistance reaching the Gaza Strip still fell significantly short of the minimum required to sustain the population.[50] Additional measures have been imposed for the inspection of aid trucks at Nitzana crossing on the border between Egypt and Israel, severely hampering the entry of trucks, restricting or blocking lifesaving humanitarian items.[51]
56. Statements from Israeli officials show their intent to instrumentalize the provision of basic necessities, including food and water, to hold the population of the Gaza Strip hostage to political and military objectives.[52] Since December 2023, more than 90 percent of the population in the Gaza Strip has faced high acute food insecurity, the most acute situation being reported in northern Gaza. This is the compounded result of the destruction and prevention of local food production, including agriculture, fishing and baking, the siege preventing the import of adequate food supplies and the danger to humanitarian workers in distributing the limited food supplies available. As of March 2024, the situation is continuing to deteriorate; 1 million people face catastrophic levels of food insecurity.[53]
57. On 26 January the ICJ ordered in the South Africa v. Israel case under the Genocide Convention, that Israel “enable the provision of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance” to the people of Gaza. Attacks on humanitarian convoys continued after the order. On 28 March 2024, the ICJ issued a second order, that Israel “ensure, without delay… the unhindered provision at scale… of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance”. [54]
58. Siege, hostilities and displacement have had a disproportionate impact on groups in vulnerable situations and their equal enjoyment of fundamental rights, including children and newborns, older persons, persons with disabilities, female-headed households and widows, mothers of young children, and pregnant and lactating women. Children have experienced multifaceted effects and at least 28 have died due to acute malnutrition and dehydration. Children are also particularly vulnerable to the spread of infectious diseases.[55] Women and girls experience gendered harms in relation to sexual and reproductive health, including lack of access to prenatal and post-partum care and ability to manage menstruation hygienically and with dignity. Pre-existing structural discrimination has also exacerbated controlling behaviours from male family members and impacted women’s and girls’ agency.
59. Evacuations and transfer of the civilian population
60. The Commission documented and analysed more than 80 evacuation orders issued by the ISF between 7 October and 30 December 2023. Although ISF did not explicitly use the term “safe zones” in relation to the evacuation areas, and instead used the term “humanitarian aid zone”, it advised civilians to move to these areas “for their safety”^[56], thereby effectively stating that these areas constitute safe zones, with corresponding legal protection.
61. The Commission analysed the dissemination of information regarding evacuations, the feasibility of safe evacuation, the voluntariness of evacuation, safety concerns and the possibility of return considering the extensive damage to structures within the Gaza Strip and the challenges posed by the continuing conflict. The Commission also documented and analysed statements by Israeli officials and public figures demonstrating an intent to forcibly transfer Palestinians.
62. The Commission finds that evacuation orders were at times unclear and confusing, and that the timeframe provided for the civilian population to evacuate safely was unstated or insufficient, particularly in relation to large-scale evacuations.
63. The Commission finds that there was chaos along evacuation routes, including multiple ISF checkpoints, danger of death or injury, lack of transportation and inadequate attention to persons in vulnerable situations. The Commission documented harassment and specific attacks on evacuees, including forcing Palestinians of all ages and genders at gunpoint to strip during evacuation processes and walk for prolonged periods without clothes. These cases indicate that ISF intentionally inflicted much of the hardship experienced during this process. Some of the evacuation processes were also hindered by Hamas threats and attacks against those wanting to leave.^[57]
64. As evacuations were underway, ISF continued attacking designated safe zones, including Rafah and Khan Younis. These attacks resulted in casualties, including deaths of civilians not taking any direct part in the hostilities. At the same time, the massive casualties and destruction by ISF in areas that were evacuated have created conditions whereby whole residential areas have been razed and families have no homes to return to.
65. The Commission documented statements by Israeli officials dehumanizing the Palestinians in Gaza, portraying all Palestinians in Gaza as Hamas militants or Hamas supporters, discussing a second Nakba, proposing the transfer of the civilian population outside the Gaza Strip and re-establishing Israeli settlements.[58] The Commission notes that, despite a warning reportedly issued by the Israeli Government’s Legal Advisor to Israeli ministers on 14 November 2023,^[59] no action was taken by authorities. The Commission is aware that statements do not necessarily indicate policy but considers that those statements inciting to violence, discrimination and hatred may have a causal connection to the commission of violations of international law, including war crimes.
66. The occupied West Bank including East Jerusalem
67. Between 7 October and 31 December 2023, 308 Palestinians, including 80 boys, were killed in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, 300 of them by Israeli forces and eight by settlers. The fatalities in the West Bank within this period exceeded any annual fatality toll since OCHA began collecting data on casualties in 2005. From 7 October 2023 to 30 April 2024, 457 Palestinians, including 112 boys, had been killed by Israeli forces and ten by settlers, including two boys, across the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.^[60] The Commission observed an increase in large-scale militarised search and arrest operations in Tulkarem, Nablus and Jenin in the West Bank.
68. The Commission identified a surge of settler attacks on Palestinian communities immediately after 7 October. Several developments may have contributed to this, including enlisting thousands of settlers in ISF reserve duty, arming and mobilizing settlers, for regular military service in specialised battalions based in the West Bank, establishing and arming additional quasi-military militias in settlements and easing gun-licence registration regulations by Minister of National Security Itamar Ben Gvir. The Human Rights Council has mandated the Commission to investigate settler violence in the OPT and to report in June 2025.
69. The Commission found that on 24 November 2023, members of a Palestinian armed group killed and desecrated the bodies of two persons who they suspected had collaborated with ISF in Tulkarem in the West Bank. The bodies of the two victims were hung on metal structures in front of cheering and filming crowds. One victim was stripped and placed in a dumpster, likely after the public hanging.  
70. SGBV
71. The Commission documented many incidents in which ISF systematically targeted and subjected Palestinians to SGBV online and in person since October 7, including through forced public nudity, forced public stripping, sexualized torture and abuse, and sexual humiliation and harassment. These incidents took place during ground operations in conjunction with evacuations and arrests. Based on testimonies and verified video footage and photographs, the Commission finds that sexual violence has been perpetrated throughout the OPT during evacuation processes, prior to or during arrest, at civilian homes and at a shelter for women and girls. Sexual acts were carried out by force, including under threats, intimidation and other forms of duress, in inherently coercive circumstances due to the armed conflict and the presence of armed Israeli soldiers.
72. The ISF forced public stripping and nudity in many locations, in humiliating circumstances, including when victims were; blindfolded, kneeling and/or with their hands tied behind their back while in underwear; interrogated or subjected to verbal or physical abuse while fully or partially undressed; coerced to do physical movements while naked; and filmed or photographed by ISF doing any of these acts and disseminating the film and photographs. Palestinians were also made to watch members of their family and community strip in public and walk completely or partially undressed while subjected to sexual harassment.
73. Both male and female victims were subjected to such sexual violence, but men and boys were targeted in particular ways. Only males were repeatedly filmed and photographed by soldiers while subjected to forced public stripping and nudity, sexual torture and inhumane or cruel treatment. Palestinian women were also targeted and subjected to psychological violence and sexual harassment online, including shaming and doxing female detainees and drawing gendered and sexualized graffiti, including at a women’s shelter in Gaza that was directly targeted. Israeli soldiers also filmed themselves ransacking homes, including drawers filled with lingerie, to mock and humiliate Palestinian women, referring to Arab women as ‘sluts’. The Commission concludes, based on the circumstances and context of these acts, that GBV directed at Palestinian women was intended to humiliate and degrade the Palestinian population as a whole.
74. The Commission notes the existence of aggravating factors in the commission of these gender-based crimes. First, the specific social and normative context in which these acts have been committed includes strong cultural and religious sensitivities linked to privacy, nudity and the significance of the veil, where stigma and social exclusion can have deep repercussions at the individual and community level for the victim, particularly for women and girls. Second, humiliating digital content disseminated online, reaching a global audience, is extremely difficult to remove from the internet.
75. Based on the way in which such acts were committed, including with filming, photographing and posting material online, in conjunction with the many cases with similar methods observed in multiple locations, the Commission concludes that forced public stripping and nudity and other types of abuse by Israeli military personnel were either ordered or condoned. These acts were intended to humiliate and degrade the victims and the Palestinian community at large, by perpetuating gender stereotypes that create a sense of shame, subordination, emasculation and inferiority. It is evident that such violence is both a part of and has been enabled by the broader targeting and ill-treatment of Palestinians.
76. Impact on children
77. As of 30 April, more than 7,300 Gazan children have been confirmed to be killed, thousands remain unidentified, and 12,332 wounded, according to the Gaza Ministry of Health.^[61] In addition, thousands of children are missing, many of them likely buried under the rubble of destroyed buildings. Rescue efforts have been hampered by airstrikes and ground incursions, shortage of rescue equipment, scarcity of fuel for vehicles and equipment, and limited or no communication capabilities.^[62]
78. Attacks on residential buildings have resulted in significant life-altering physical, emotional and cognitive challenges for affected children, many of whom were pulled from the rubble with serious injuries. The Commission documented several cases of children who had been injured from airstrikes or shelling, including the case of a three-year-old boy, who lost both legs as a result of an attack on an UNRWA school in November 2023. Both his parents and his younger brother were previously killed in October 2023.Around 1,000 children had had one or more limbsamputatedby the end of November 2023[63], some performed without anaesthesia. Attacks also severely impacted infrastructure essential for children’s wellbeing, including hospitals, schools and basic services, resulting in an increased numbers of deaths and preventing adequate treatment for the injured. The health, educational and social effects for children will be lifelong and impact generations. The Commission is concerned by the long-term psychological impact on children who are suffering from increasing symptoms of post-traumatic stress.
79. ISF attacks on densely populated residential areas and refugee camps have resulted in thousands of children losing one or both parents and being separated from their families in the chaos of hostilities. As of February 2024, at least 17,000 children were unaccompanied or separated from their parents.[64] According to the Gaza Ministry of Health, at least 15,173 children in Gaza have lost one or both parents since 7 October.[65]
80. Legal Analysis
81. In relation to the Commission’s investigation into the attack of 7 October in Israel, the Commission found that members of Hamas military wing, members of the military wings of other Palestinian armed groups and Palestinian civilians committed war crimes, as well as violations and abuses of IHL and IHRL.
82. The Commission found that the war crimes of intentionally directing attacks against civilians and murder or wilful killing were committed by shooting and killing residents of kibbutzim and other civilian locations, including women, children and older persons, and by indiscriminately firing projectiles towards populated areas in Israel. The Commission also found that the war crimes of torture, inhuman or cruel treatment and of destroying or seizing the property of an adversary were committed.
83. The Commission found that the war crime of cruel treatment was committed in several locations, as well as the war crime of inhumane treatment and torture. The Commission found that the war crime of outrages upon personal dignity was committed in the desecration of corpses by burning, mutilation and decapitation. The Commission also found the sexualized desecration of both male and female corpses, including the exhibition of undressed bodies.
84. The Commission found that the war crime of taking hostages was committed, in most cases together with outrages on personal dignity and inhumane treatment, including SGBV, such as assault, harassment and intimidation against women while abducted in Israel and taken to Gaza.
85. The Commission found that acts of sexual violence were committed on 7 October in Israel, including at the Nova festival, on road 232, at Nahal Oz military base and kibbutzim Re’im, Nir Oz and Kfar Aza. 
86. The Commission found that members of the military wings of Hamas and PIJ violated the principle of distinction when they attacked, killed and injured the civilian population and intentionally launched rockets and mortars from Gaza into Israel.
87. The Commission found that ISF soldiers violated the principles of distinction, precaution and proportionality when they fired shells at a house occupied by Israeli civilian hostages in Be’eri and directed helicopter fire at a civilian hostage from Nir Oz.
88. In relation to the Commission’s investigation into Israel’s attacks and operations in Gaza and OPT, the Commission found that Israeli authorities and members of the ISF committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, and violations of IHL and IHRL.
89. The Commission found that the war crimes of starvation as a method of warfare; murder or wilful killing; intentionally directing attacks against civilians and civilian objects; forcible transfer; sexual violence; outrages upon personal dignity; and SGBV amounting to torture or inhuman and cruel treatment were committed.
90. The Commission found that through several actions including siege, Israel inflicted collective punishment on the Palestinian population in Gaza, in direct violation of IHL.
91. The Commission found it foreseeable that civilians would be present in the areas targeted by the ISF; nonetheless, the ISF intentionally proceeded to direct its attacks against the civilian population and civilian objects, including places of worship, with such knowledge, in direct violation of the IHL principles of adequate precautions, distinction, proportionality, and special protections for children and women.
92. The Commission found that the chapeau elements of crimes against humanity have been fulfilled, namely a widespread or systematic attack directed against the civilian population in Gaza. The Commission found that the crimes against humanity of extermination; murder; gender persecution targeting Palestinian men and boys; forcible transfer; and torture and inhuman and cruel treatment were committed.
93. The Commission found that the siege and forcible transfer, compounded with widespread destruction caused by attacks and military operations, resulted in the IHRL violations of the rights to family life, adequate food, housing, education, health, social security, and water and sanitation, particularly impacting children and persons in vulnerable situations. The age and gender specific harms resulted in violations of the CRC and rights to non-discrimination in the CEDAW.
94. Conclusions
95. 7 October 2023 has marked a clear turning point for both Israelis and Palestinians, and it presents a watershed moment that can change the direction of this conflict; with a real risk of further solidifying and expanding the occupation. Amid months of losses and despair, retribution and atrocities, the only tangible result has been compounding the immense suffering of both Palestinians and Israelis, with civilians, yet again, bearing the brunt of decisions by those in power.  Children and women make up a large part of those civilians, the latter marginalised from decision-making.
96. For Israelis, the attack of 7 October was unprecedented in scale in its modern history, when in one single day hundreds of people were killed and abducted, invoking painful trauma of past persecution not only for Israeli Jews but for Jewish people everywhere. Palestinians with Israeli citizenship were also deeply affected by the attack of 7 October.
97. For Palestinians, Israel’s military operation and attack in Gaza has been the longest, largest and bloodiest since 1948. It has caused immense damage and loss of life and triggered for many Palestinians traumatic memories of the Nakba and other Israeli incursions.
98. The Commission affirms that both the 7 October attack in Israel and Israel’s subsequent military operation in Gaza should not be seen in isolation. The only way to stop the recurring cycles of violence, including aggression and retribution by both sides, is to ensure strict adherence to international law. That includes ending the unlawful Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory, discrimination, oppression and the denial of the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people and guaranteeing peace and security for Jews and Palestinians.
99. In relation to the attack of 7 October in Israel, the Commission concludes on reasonable grounds that members of the military wings of Hamas and of other Palestinian armed groups, as well as Palestinian civilians who were directly participating in the hostilities, deliberately killed, injured, mistreated, took hostages and committed SGBV against: civilians, including Israeli citizens and foreign nationals; and members of the ISF, including soldiers considered hors de combat, in many locations in southern Israel. These actions constitute war crimes and violations and abuses of IHL and IHRL. 
100. The Commission concludes that civilians were intentionally targeted, that the attack was premeditated and planned over a significant period, reflecting a high degree of organisation and coordination, and implemented in several locations at or about the same time. The attacks were led and coordinated by Hamas and implemented by the military wings of Hamas and six other Palestinian factions, with the participation of some Palestinian civilians.
101. Members of the military wing of Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups abducted primarily Israeli people as hostages to Gaza, without regard for age or gender, to use them in negotiations with the Israeli authorities. Some abductees were shot at and in some cases killed. Many abductions were carried out with significant physical, mental and sexual violence and degrading and humiliating treatment, including in some cases parading the abductees.
102. Israeli children were subjected to physical and emotional mistreatment on 7 October. In addition to those who were killed and injured, many children lost one or both parents. Many children witnessed the killings of their parents and siblings and were also filmed for propaganda purposes by Palestinian armed groups who published videos depicting young Israeli children in vulnerable positions. The Commission finds it particularly egregious that children were targeted for abduction, several of them taken
103. The Commission concludes that members of the military wing of Hamas and Palestinian armed groups targeted women, including by wilful killings, abductions, and physical, mental and sexual abuse. These crimes were deliberate and, in several cases, enforced with violence, intentionally causing great suffering and serious injury to the victims. The Commission particularly notes that women were subjected to GBV during the course of their execution or Women and women’s bodies were used as victory trophies by male perpetrators and the abduction, violence and humiliation of women, were put on public display, either on the streets of the Gaza Strip or online.
104. The Commission identified patterns indicative of sexual violence in several locations and concludes that Israeli women were disproportionally subjected to these crimes. The attack on 7 October enabled perpetrators to commit SGBV and this violence was not isolated but perpetrated in similar ways in several locations and by multiple Palestinian perpetrators. The Commission did not find credible evidence, however, that militants received orders to commit sexual violence and so it was unable to make conclusions on this issue. However, inflammatory language and disbelief around sexual violence, observed with both parties, risks silencing and discrediting survivors, further exacerbating trauma and stigmatization.
105. The Commission notes that Israeli authorities failed to protect civilians in southern Israel on almost every front. This included failing to swiftly deploy sufficient security forces to protect civilians and evacuate them from civilian locations on 7 October. In several locations ISF applied the so-called ‘Hannibal Directive’ and killed at least 14 Israeli civilians. Israeli authorities also failed to ensure that forensic evidence was systematically collected by concerned authorities and first responders, particularly in relation to allegations of sexual violence, undermining the possibility of future judicial proceedings, accountability and justice.
106. In relation to Israel’s military operations in Gaza from 7 October, the Commission concludes that Israel has committed war crimes, crimes against humanity and violations of IHL and IHRL.
107. The Commission concludes that the immense numbers of civilian casualties and widespread destruction of civilian objects and crucial civilian infrastructure are the inevitable results of Israel’s chosen strategy for the use of force during these hostilities, undertaken with intent to cause maximum damage, disregarding distinction, proportionality and adequate precautions, and thus unlawful. ISF’s intentional use of heavy weapons with large destructive capacity in densely populated areas constitutes an intentional and direct attack on the civilian population, particularly affecting women and children. This conclusion is confirmed by the substantial and increasing numbers of casualties, over weeks and months, with no change in Israeli policies or military strategies.
108. ISF has killed and maimed tens of thousands of children, resulting in permanent physical impairment for thousands of children and long-term emotional trauma for all children. Israel has the obligation under international law to ensure that the needs of all children, particularly of the large number of orphans and children separated from their families, are prioritised and addressed. It has a duty to avoid the separation of families and to facilitate their reunification, noting the particular impact separation of family member has on mothers and children.
109. The Commission concludes that evacuation orders issued by ISF were at times insufficient, unclear and conflicting, and did not provide adequate time or support for safe evacuations. Moreover, areas evacuated were attacked with no regard for those who could not or would not evacuate, and evacuees were targeted along the evacuation routes and in designated safe zones. Civilians who choose not to evacuate do not lose their protected status under international law. Moreover, statements by Israeli officials demonstrated an intent to forcibly transfer the population.
110. Israeli authorities consistently presented their military objectives as destroying all of Hamas, releasing Israeli hostages and preventing future threats to the State of Israel emanating from the Gaza Strip, yet their actions and the consequences of their actions indicate other motivations including, vengeance and collective punishment. Statements made by Israeli officials reflected policy and practice of inflicting widespread destruction, killing large numbers of civilians and forcible transfer. The Commission found that statements made by Israeli officials amounted to incitement and may constitute other serious international crimes. Statements aimed at systematically dehumanizing Palestinians, particularly Palestinian men and boys, and called for collective punishment.
111. The Commission concludes that Israel has used starvation as a method of war, affecting the entire population of the Gaza Strip for decades to come, with particularly negative consequences for children. This is a war crime. At the time of writing this report, children have already died due to acute malnutrition and dehydration. Through the siege it imposed, Israel has weaponized the withholding of life-sustaining necessities, cutting off supplies of water, food, electricity, fuel and other essential supplies, including humanitarian assistance. This constitutes collective punishment and reprisal against the civilian population, both of which are clear violations of IHL.
112. The frequency, prevalence and severity of sexual and gender-based crimes perpetrated against Palestinians since 7 October across the OPT indicate that specific forms of SGBV are part of ISF operating procedures. Palestinian men and boys experienced specific persecutory acts intended to punish them in retaliation for the crimes committed on 7 October. The way in which these acts were committed, including their filming and photographing, in conjunction with similar cases documented in several locations, leads the Commission to conclude that forced public stripping and nudity and other related types of abuse were either ordered or condoned by Israeli authorities.
113. SGBV constitutes a major element in the ill-treatment of Palestinians, intended to humiliate the community at large. This violence is intrinsically linked to the wider context of inequality and prolonged occupation, which have provided the conditions and the rationale for gender-based crimes, to further accentuate the subordination of the occupied people. The Commission notes that these crimes must be addressed by tackling their root cause; through dismantling the historically oppressive structures and institutionalized system of discrimination against Palestinians, which are at the core of the occupation.
114. The situation in the West Bank has continued to deteriorate, with Palestinian fatalities recorded since 7 October exceeding any other period since 2005. The rise in fatalities is linked to several highly militarized ISF operations and a surge in violent settler attacks on Palestinian communities, often assisted or condoned by
115. The Commission is aware of reports and ISF allegations indicating that the military wing of Hamas and other non-State armed groups in Gaza operated from within civilian areas. The Commission reiterates that all parties to the conflict, including ISF and the military wings of Hamas and other non-State armed groups, must adhere to IHL and avoid increasing risk to civilians by using civilian objects for military purposes. 
116. The Commission concludes that the individuals who bear the most responsibility for the international crimes, violations and abuses that it has investigated include: senior members of the political and military leadership of Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups and of the Palestinian Joint Operations Room; senior members of the political and military leadership of the Israeli State, including members of the War Management Cabinet and the Ministerial Committee on National Security, other Ministers of the Government and leaders of the ISF. The Commission will continue its investigations focusing on individual criminal responsibility and command responsibility.

• Recommendations

108. To the Government of Israel:

• Immediately end attacks resulting in the killing and maiming of civilians in Gaza, end the siege on Gaza; implement a ceasefire; ensure that those whose property has been unlawfully destroyed receive reparations; ensure that necessities crucial for the health and wellbeing of the civilian population immediately reach those in need;
• Ensure that the rules of engagement for military and security personnel strictly adhere to international standards; investigate, prosecute and punish those who commit violations of IHL and IHRL; publish the rules of engagement and reports of investigations into violations;
• Ensure that age and gender-specific harm is assessed and preventive measures based on gender and child-centric risk assessments are applied to prevent harm to the civilian population during the planning and execution of military operations;
• Cease the practices of forced public stripping and nudity, intimate body searches, removing of women’s veils, abuse and harassment of Palestinians online and in person of all ages and genders; bring those responsible for such acts to justice; address the discriminatory structures and beliefs that enable those violations to prevent their recurrence;
• Ensure that all displaced or evacuated Palestinians are allowed to return safely to their homes and are assisted to do so, and ensure the reconstruction of Gaza in line with Israel’s legal obligations;
• Ensure that all Palestinians who have been arrested and/or detained are treated humanely, report on their state of health and wellbeing, allow ICRC visits, contact with families and medical attention and ensure their treatment in compliance with IHL and IHRL;
• Comply fully and immediately with the ICJ orders on provisional measures issued on 26 January and 28 March, to ensure the unhindered provision of all basic services and humanitarian assistance to Gaza and ensure that the military does not commit acts violating the rights of the Palestinians in Gaza, in compliance with Israel’s obligations under the Genocide Convention;
• Ensure impartial and fair investigations, aligned with principles of IHRL, of crimes committed on 7 October and, where applicable, prosecute those persons arrested in Israel in open trials;
• Allow the Commission to access the OPT and Israel to enable full, impartial and independent investigations, in particular into the Gaza Strip in compliance with the ICJ order on provisional measures issued on 24 May 2024;
• Address mental health needs of survivors and community members who were displaced in the OPT and Israel following the attack, with particular attention to children, women, older persons, foreigners and released hostages.

109. To the Government of the State of Palestine and the de-facto authorities in Gaza:

• Ensure the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages held in Gaza; ensure their protection, including from SGBV; report on their state of health and wellbeing, allow ICRC visits, contact with families and medical attention and ensure their treatment in compliance with IHL and IHRL;
• Stop all indiscriminate firing of rockets, mortars and other munitions towards civilian populations;
• Thoroughly and impartially investigate and prosecute violations of international law, including those committed on and since 7 October 2023, by members of the military wings of Hamas and other Palestinian non-State armed groups in southern Israel and in the OPT; investigate and prosecute violations against those suspected of aiding Israel;
• Take urgent measures to investigate and prosecute individuals responsible for any forms of sexual violence; refrain from discrediting survivors and witnesses of sexual violence.
• Avoid use of civilian objects or property for military purposes, in line with all IHL obligations, and implement a clear separation from civilian areas;

110. To the UN Security Council:

• In light of the continuing threat to international peace and security this conflict poses and the gravity of the crimes, demand, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Government of Israel to immediately implement a ceasefire, end the siege on Gaza, ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid, cease the targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure, and demand the unconditional release of hostages;
• Reaffirm the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination.

111. To the UN Secretary General:

• List Israel in the annexes of the next annual report on CAAC, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1379 (2001) and subsequent resolutions and institutionalize the country task force on monitoring and reporting in the OPT (as noted previously in A/78/198).

112. To all Member States:

• Ensure compliance by all States Parties with all treaty obligations, including common article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, the CAT and the Genocide Conventions;
• Conduct investigations under domestic or universal jurisdiction on core international crimes committed during the current war.

113. To all State Parties to the Rome Statute:

• Support and cooperate fully with the investigation by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in its investigation into the Situation in the State of Palestine.

                *   The present report was submitted to the conference services for processing after the deadline so as to include the most recent information.

                        ^[1]   A/HRC/56/CRP.3 and A/HRC/56/CRP.4.

                        ^[2]   TORs-UN-Independent_ICI_Occupied_Palestinian_Territories.pdf (ohchr.org).

                        ^[3]   https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/co-israel/call-submissions-international-crimes-7-october-2023, https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/co-israel/call-submissions-gender-based-crimes-7-October-2023.

                        ^[4]           https://x.com/giladerdan1/status/1730284375105819003?s=46&t=-c1Omps22oOQ4HkH3ayKDg.

                        ^[5]   See e.g. https://www.timesofisrael.com/government-forbids-doctors-from-speaking-to-un-group-investigating-oct-7-atrocities/?s=08.

                        ^[6]   Officially known as “Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades”, https://en.alqassam.ps/. The Commission uses the terms “Hamas military wing” or “Hamas militants” in this report.

                        ^[7]   https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/news/swords-of-iron-war-in-the-south-7-oct-2023/en/English_Swords_of_Iron_Hamas%20Invasion%20-%20Full%20Map%20-%20v5.pdf.

                        ^[8]   The Commission uses the term “Palestinian civilians” to refer to people from Gaza dressed in civilian clothing who it found had taken part in the attack. In some cases, the Commission could not determine whether members of this group were part of the militant wing of Hamas or any other Palestinian non-State armed group, or whether they were civilians directly participating in the hostilities. 

                        ^[9]   Israeli government data does not provide disaggregated figures for the number of civilians killed. The Commission based this figure on a manual count through the website of the Israeli National Insurance, see https://laad.btl.gov.il/Web/He/TerrorVictims/Default.aspx?lastName=&firstName=&fatherName=&motherName=&place=&year=&month=&day=&yearHeb=&monthHeb=&dayHeb=&region=&period=32`%22.

                       ^[10]   https://www.gov.il/en/pages/swords-of-iron-war-in-the-south-7-oct-2023. Last accessed on 24 May, 2024. This number includes four Israeli hostages held captive by Hamas since 2014.

                       [11]           https://www.idf.il/%D7%90%D7%AA%D7%A8%D7%99-%D7%99%D7%97%D7%99%D7%93%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%9C%D7%97%D7%9E%D7%94/%D7%9B%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%A2%D7%93%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99-%D7%93%D7%95%D7%91%D7%A8-%D7%A6%D7%94-%D7%9C/%D7%94%D7%A6%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%AA-%D7%93%D7%95%D7%91%D7%A8-%D7%A6%D7%94-%D7%9C-%D7%97%D7%A8%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%91%D7%A8%D7%96%D7%9C-%D7%A2%D7%93%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%9E%D7%97%D7%91%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%9D/.

                       ^[12]   https://www.gov.il/en/Departments/news/swords-of-iron-civilian-casualties#Civilian%20casualties.

                       [13]   https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/news/swords-of-iron-war-in-the-south-7-oct-2023/en/English_Swords_of_Iron_Israel-Hamas%20Conflict%202023.pdf, p.4.

                       ^[14]   https://www.gov.il/en/departments/news/swords-of-iron-war-in-the-south-7-oct-2023.

                       ^[15]   https://www.gov.il/en/pages/swords-of-iron-civilian-casualties# . The Commission counted manually all those over 65.

                       ^[16]   The Commission defines older people as those over the age of 65. See https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/ie-older-persons/about-human-rights-older-persons.

                       ^[17]   https://www.gov.il/en/pages/swords-of-iron-civilian-casualties#.

                       ^[18]   https://www.gov.il/en/departments/news/swords-of-iron-civilian-casualties.

                       [19]   The Commission considers the term ‘sexual violence’ to cover a range of physical and non-physical acts of a sexual nature against a person or causing a person to engage in such an act, by force, or by threat of force or coercion.

                       ^[20]   https://www.gov.il/en/departments/news/swords-of-iron-war-in-the-south-7-oct-2023.

                       ^[21]   https://www.children.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/%D7%A4%D7%A8%D7%A7-%D7%9E%D7%AA%D7%95%D7%9A-%D7%99%D7%9C%D7%93%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%91%D7%99%D7%A9%D7%A8%D7%90%D7%9C-2023.pdf.

                       ^[22]   https://t.me/qassambrigades/28517.

                       ^[23]   Such was the case in Be’eri, while in Nir Oz no external reinforcements arrived until militants left in the early afternoon.

                       ^[24]   According to reports, the Hannibal Directive is a procedure to prevent capture of ISF members by enemy forces and was alleged to have been directed against Israeli civilians on 7 October. See e.g. https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2016-06-28/ty-article/.premium/idf-chief-orders-to-revoke-controversial-hannibal-directive/0000017f-e15f-d804-ad7f-f1ff16e00000.

                       ^[25]   https://www.idf.il/%D7%90%D7%AA%D7%A8%D7%99-%D7%99%D7%97%D7%99%D7%93%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%9C%D7%97%D7%9E%D7%94/%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%9C%D7%97%D7%9E%D7%94-%D7%AA%D7%9E%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%91-%D7%9C%D7%90%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%9A-%D7%94%D7%99%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%AA%D7%9E%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%AA-%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%91-%D7%9E%D7%AA%D7%92%D7%9C%D7%92%D7%9C%D7%AA-%D7%97%D7%A8%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%91%D7%A8%D7%96%D7%9C-%D7%9E%D7%9C%D7%97%D7%9E%D7%94-D7%99%D7%A9%D7%A8%D7%90%D7%9C-D7%A2%D7%96%D7%94-%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%93%D7%A2-%D7%A2%D7%93%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%A2%D7%93%D7%9B%D7%A0%D7%99-%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%9F-%D7%9E%D7%9C%D7%97%D7%9E%D7%94-%D7%A9%D7%91%D7%AA-7-10/.

                       ^[26]   https://www.gov.il/he/departments/news/spoke-war081023.

                       ^[27]   See e.g. https://x.com/kann_news/status/1717231828384305632.

                       ^[28]   https://t.me/MOHMediaGaza/5405.

                       ^[29]   https://t.me/MOHMediaGaza/5401.

                       ^[30]   https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/05/1149256.

                       ^[31]   https://www.idf.il/%D7%90%D7%AA%D7%A8%D7%99-%D7%99%D7%97%D7%99%D7%93%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%9C%D7%97%D7%9E%D7%94/%D7%9B%D7%9C-%D7%94%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%94%D7%A4%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%A1%D7%92%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%9E%D7%A2%D7%92%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%9E%D7%97%D7%91%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%94%D7%99%D7%AA%D7%A7%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%99%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%95%D7%94%D7%A9%D7%9E%D7%93%D7%AA-%D7%AA%D7%A9%D7%AA%D7%99%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%98%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%A8-%D7%A6%D7%A7%D7%97-%D7%A0%D7%97%D7%9C-%D7%97%D7%98%D7%99%D7%91%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%A0%D7%97-%D7%9C-%D7%9E%D7%9C%D7%97%D7%9E%D7%94-%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%97%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%A2%D7%96%D7%94/.

                       ^[32]   A/RES/ES-10/22.

                       ^[33]   https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240126-ord-01-00-en.pdf; https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240328-ord-01-00-en.pdf; https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240524-ord-01-00-en.pdf.

                       ^[34]   S/RES/2728.

                       ^[35]   See e.g. https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-4,  https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-20.

                       ^[36]   https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/229018/ewipa_explosive_weapons_with_wide_area_effect
_final.pdf.

                       ^[37]   A/HRC/29/52.

                       ^[38]   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lk1tLVR1wPo.

                       ^[39]   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h9pekNeOYII.

                       ^[40]   The CIA estimates Hamas fighters to be around 20,000-40,000 in 2023: https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/references/terrorist-organizations/.

                       ^[41]   See e.g. https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1718426727288803524.

                       ^[42]   A strategy used by Israel during the second Lebanon war in 2006, encompassing the use of overwhelming and disproportionate force against civilian areas and infrastructure as a means of restraining and deterring Hezbollah. See e.g. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA601846.pdf.

                       ^[43]   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Dp95bN81Ww.

                       [44]   https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/aid-trucks-crossing-egypt-gaza-15-november-2023.

                       ^[45]   https://twitter.com/cogatonline/status/1711718883323752586.

                       ^[46]   https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/official-statements/gaza-strip-unrwa-finally-receives-fuel-much-more-needed-humanitarian; https://gisha.org/en/graph/1-timeline-of-restrictions-on-entry-of-fuel-into-gaza/.

                       ^[47]   https://reliefweb.int/map/occupied-palestinian-territory/gaza-strip-critical-water-and-wastewater-infrastructure-17-october-2023; https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/official-statements/matter-life-and-death-water-runs-out-2-million-people-gaza.

                       ^[48]   https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-8.

                       ^[49]   https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-5; https://gisha.org/en/fourth-turbine-temporarily-activated/.

                       ^[50]   https://www.who.int/news/item/21-10-2023-joint-statement-by-undp–unfpa–unicef–wfp-and-who-on-humanitarian-supplies-crossing-into-gaza.

                       ^[51]   https://x.com/MfaEgypt/status/1718282096202895585.

                       [52]   See e.g. https://twitter.com/IsraeliPM/status/1714723922837410273?t=fE_VrUU_cUyO6YchkpavGA&s=19.

                       ^[53]   https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Gaza_Acute_Food_Insecurity_
Dec2023Feb2024.pdf; https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Gaza_Strip_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Feb_July2024_Special_Brief.pdf.

                       ^[54]   https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240126-ord-01-00-en.pdf, https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240328-ord-01-00-en.pdf.

                       ^[55]   https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/intensifying-conflict-malnutrition-and-disease-gaza-strip-creates-deadly-cycle.

                       ^[56]   https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1712846493747495223?s=20.

                       ^[57]   See e.g. https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1713478861827026955?s=20;https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HaTmx9LPBJE.

                       ^[58]   https://twitter.com/ArielKallner/status/1710769363119141268; https://www.mako.co.il/mako-vod-channel2-news/meet_the_press-9402aea3d6045810/830a0730d9a7b810/VOD-5f8843ca2fe9b81027.htm.

                       ^[59]   https://www.mako.co.il/news-politics/2023_q4/Article-438a607a63acb81026.htm.

                       ^[60]   https://www.ochaopt.org/data/casualties.

                       ^[61]   https://t.me/MOHMediaGaza/5405,https://t.me/MOHMediaGaza/5401.

                       ^[62]   https://www.unicef.org/sop/media/3461/file/UNICEF%20in%20the%20State%20of%20
Palestine%20Escalation%20Humanitarian%20Situation%20Report%20No.15.pdf. Also: https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/05/1149256.

                       ^[63]   https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/bi-weekly-briefing/2023/12/press-briefing-united-nations-information-service.

                       ^[64]   https://www.unicef.ch/en/current/statements/2024-02-02/gaza-17-000-children-separated-their-parents.

                       ^[65]   https://t.me/MOHMediaGaza/5413.

The Watermelon Reports Video: “War Crimes Or Not? British Surgeon’s Testimony from Gaza”

Computer generated transcript from YouTube, edited by ChatGPT 4. I tried to check it a bit against the video but some minor errors may remain. I think it came out as very readable, and, indeed, powerful. – JRIC.:

Dr. Khaled Dawas (Excerpts): “There’s a very dark side to the Israeli state that people are not aware of, and we’re seeing it in front of our eyes at the moment. It’s changing the whole makeup of the Gazan population. You walk around in the hospitals and see people with amputations everywhere. There are a lot of children who I met also who had lost all their families. He describes being blindfolded and handcuffed for days and beaten with metal bars. He said to me, “I’m not the only one that was beaten with metal bars; everyone in there was beaten with metal bars on a regular, often daily basis,” and he showed me his wrists—his wrists were both swollen from the handcuffs, and he showed me the X-ray. The X-ray clearly showed he had multiple rib fractures on both sides. So therefore, anybody who sits on the other side of this argument and says, “Well, this is a complicated issue; we should perhaps stay neutral and let it be,” I don’t think understands the scale of what’s going on.”

This is Moosa Qureshi from the Watermelon Reports.

Dr. Khaled Dawas is a senior surgeon from the United Kingdom. His diary from Gaza has recently been published in one of the UK’s major newspapers, The Telegraph. In addition, he works as a senior surgeon in one of the foremost hospitals in the United Kingdom—that’s University College London Hospital. He supervises researchers in one of the most prestigious institutions in the world—that’s University College London. Of course, he’s speaking here in a purely personal capacity, but I wanted to make his seniority a matter of record. He is here with us today, and we’re very pleased to welcome him. Welcome, Dr. Dawas.

Dawas: Thank you very much Moosa.

Qureshi: Now, the first time I met you was just after your first visit to Gaza a few months ago. I’ve met several doctors such as yourself who have gone over to Gaza and volunteered their time, and they’re all motivated by—usually—altruism; they want to do some good. They feel devastated by seeing the destruction of Gaza on their television screens, and they feel that they want to use their medical skills to help the population. And I’m sure that’s the case for you yourself as well, but you said something that night which actually struck me. You said that one of the reasons you wanted to go to Gaza was to provide testimony; you wanted to come back and say that you had seen this with your own eyes. Can you tell us a bit more about why you think testimony is so important?

Dawas: We’ve seen what’s happening in Gaza happen multiple times over and over again over the years, and not just in Gaza, but also in the West Bank. We know a couple of years ago with the attack on Jenin, which resulted in a lot of death and a lot of destruction, these are happening over and over again, not to the same scale that we’re seeing at the moment. This is, not to overuse the word, unprecedented in our lifetime, and therefore I think it’s important, thinking about the future, about how we try and prevent this happening again. And that’s about waking people’s minds up to what is really happening; to the real nature of the Israeli state.

There is a problem with there’s a very dark side to the Israeli state that people are not aware of, and we’re seeing it in front of our eyes at the moment. And I think this is something that we’ve got to record; we’ve got to be able to use to wake governments and people up to the reality and say that there’s more than just one side to the story. To those who believe there’s only one side, which is the Israeli side—a state that has recognition and credibility worldwide—the fact that Palestinians do not have a state, an internationally recognized state that is recognized on international forums in the same way, is a problem. But the reason that is a problem is because it’s not allowed to be an internationally recognized state. And the testimony that we provide is very important to try and prevent these things happening over and over and over again.

People that we all admire, the strength of character, the resilience of Gazans and Palestinians. But they are human beings, and ultimately those reserves need to be replenished; they need to be supported. And it’s our role, on the outside, who see it differently because we don’t live under those awful circumstances, to make sure that those things are recorded and testimony is recorded to get to that endpoint that I’m talking about: the prevention of this recurring theme over and over again.

Qureshi: So, Dr. Dawas, talking again about your experiences in Gaza recently, the numbers are that there’s something like 2,000 Palestinian deaths at the moment. The Israeli government claims that over 600 of those deaths are Hamas fighters. So when you were working at Al Aqsa Hospital, what sort of patients were you seeing with your own eyes? What’s your testimony? Were a third of the people you were treating fighters? Give us an idea of what sort of patients you would see.

Dawas: I mean, the straightforward answer to that question is that I did not see a single Hamas fighter, as far as I know, in the time I was there. And I was there, overall, for about a month. And I can also say, on behalf of colleagues, many of whom I’ve spoken to who’ve been on the missions in between the first which I went on and the most recent one which is the last one I went on as well, I don’t know anybody who can say, hand on heart, that they’ve met any Hamas fighters during their time there. Which does beg a question as to, you know, where are these supposed injured fighters going? But also, it’s a re-emphasis of the point that the vast majority of the casualties—the dead and the injured—are civilians. The numbers that we hear about, which is 70% women and children, I think, is true. Our experiences certainly support those numbers. And there are also the forgotten population, and I do go on about the idea that we should not be neglecting the young men.

Young men, just because they happen to be of fighting age, they should not be categorized instantly as therefore legitimate targets. And that is what’s happening. We see a lot of young men, clearly a third of the population of patients that I had to treat were young men. These are young men in their late teens and early 20s with all injuries, amputations, life-changing injuries, and a long stay in the hospital. And their crime is that they happen to be in that wrong age group, which means that Israel feels it’s a legitimate thing to do to target them. And these are young men who are brothers, husbands, sons. And they are in Gazan communities; they’re a very important part of the population. They are productive, and they do a lot of the work that’s required in Gaza. So out of those, I do not know a single man that I treated, young man I treated, who I can say hand on heart is a fighter.

Now you know, people say, “Well, how would you know? You wouldn’t recognize them.” But I think you know, we’re not stupid. You can recognize by body type, you can recognize by the way they speak, you can recognize other things which will tell you, indicate to you, give you a sign that who you’re dealing with is somebody who’s a fighter. And I cannot say anybody I treated had those characteristics.

Qureshi: We all know that in wartime young men are killed in disproportionate numbers. But it does sound like if Israel is saying that 600 Hamas fighters have been killed, they have decided that every young male in the Palestinian population is a Hamas fighter, which is clearly a bizarre and ridiculous proposition. In Gaza, can you tell us what were the main types of injuries you saw, and what do you think those injuries tell us about Israel’s military strategy?

The injuries were shrapnel injuries, shrapnel, shrapnel, and some bullet injuries. So blast injuries. And if you see one of the myriad of videos available on social media of what happens when something is targeted in Gaza, you see the stones and the rocks and the debris, wood, and so on flying at incredible speed towards the camera, if it happens. You’ll realize the power of shrapnel because people might underestimate the power of shrapnel. Shrapnel could be a grain of sand, a few millimeters wide, but the heat and the speed it travels at to enter someone’s body causes a lot of damage. It is like a bullet; there’s no doubt about it. And so you saw we saw a lot of injuries shrapnel related. And I, because of by virtue of my specialty, I was dealing with injuries in the abdomen and the chest. So in the abdomen, you were dealing with heavy bleeding, you were dealing with perforated bowel, perforated kidneys, bladder, liver injuries. We had to do quite a few removals of spleens because the spleens were bleeding from the injuries. I had to deal with a very unusual ruptured esophagus because the esophagus was again torn to shreds by shrapnel. And in the chest, dealing again with bleeding, with severe lung injuries. And also, on one occasion, I had to deal with somebody who had a ruptured aorta, which is the biggest vessel coming out of the heart. And that’s because shrapnel had entered his chest and gone right through the chest bone into that vessel. So that’s the majority of injuries.

Of course, people who are at the epicenter of the targeting, die; they get killed. We don’t see those people; we see them as body bags coming to the hospital. And I saw those coming to the hospital as well. And then it’s the people around, probably a radius of about maybe 15 meters, who are the ones who survive it, who come into hospital with the awful shrapnel injuries. Now they come in, and surgeons there do their best. And you can temporize and perhaps repair the damage that’s been done in the short term. But what I also noticed was many of them were dying in the first few days after surgery. So there is that population of patients who are not surviving the initial operation, the initial injury, but dying a few days later because of the complications of the surgery, the severity of the injury.

Now, what does it tell you about Israel’s military strategy? I mean, it tells you from what I can see, and certainly from the stories of people who I spoke to. I spoke to a lot of people, particularly this time around. There is what I would term a scorched earth policy. There is an attempt to try and destroy everything. And of course, we know, and we have been told by many Israeli spokesmen, that they will target a particular person, and the cost of targeting that particular person is, in some ways, irrelevant. If they kill 10 times the number of people they’re targeting as a byproduct of that targeting, that is an acceptable thing to them. But those people are killed. And then you’ve got multiple numbers of those people who are being injured in ways that are life-changing. It’s changing the whole makeup of the Gazan population.

You walk around in the hospitals; you see people with amputations everywhere. Who’s going to look after these people? And there are a lot of people, a lot of children who I met also, who had lost all their families. I met two or three of them as I was walking around the hospital. And I had to remind myself of where I was because my instinct was not to believe it; it can’t be true that you’ve lost absolutely everybody. And then I had to remind myself of where I was; I was in Gaza, and this is happening on a daily basis. And these children were being looked after by neighbors, perhaps, or family friends who would take them in and look after them. But what’s going to happen to them in the long term? So the strategy, it seems, is about just going in and destroying everything in front of you. And taking the excuse that you are targeting a particular population within Gaza, and that is the fighters, the militants, whatever they want to call them.

Qureshi: That’s very devastating testimony you’ve given about the indiscriminate nature of Israel’s military strategy which in itself is a war crime. Did you see any other evidence of direct war crimes? For instance, targeting children, gunshot wounds, things of that nature.

Dawas: Which I’ll describe to you, perhaps what I saw, and I think it’s important and worthwhile that people listening to this, even just make their own minds about this, about the answer to that question. I mean, I’ll tell you what I saw. So even traveling through Gaza, as I did the first time around, because we traveled much more from the residence that we had to the hospital. That house was hit, by the way; the house, the guesthouse as it was called, which is where we were staying in a place called Al Masi in Khan Yunis on the west side near the coast, was hit. That’s the guesthouse for the medical personnel, from Medical Aid for Palestinians; is that right? That’s yes, so it was hit a week after we left it when there was the second mission staying in the house, and that was hit.

As you drive along from the house, the guest house, to the hospital, in those days you would see the destroyed houses along the way. There were many houses that had been destroyed completely by missiles or shells. You would see people having to scrounge for water; there was no water. Water had been turned off, as we know, by the Israelis at the beginning of all this. In October, there was no electricity, and people were having to put up their own tents. What we saw also this time around is that we drove past the house which housed the MSF team, Médecins Sans Frontières, which is another organization that many people will know. And I could see the room that was targeted by an Israeli missile because you could see the fire. It had scorched the frame of that particular room on the outside. And we know that that house was hit, I think maybe twice, but certainly once, and that’s visible. That house is now empty.

In the hospital itself, I met two people who gave me some pretty, well, they were very disturbing stories. One was — I met him one night, one morning, as I was doing a ward round. And he is a man who is wheelchair-bound; he has a chronic problem with his spine. And he described being taken out of a hospital not far from where we were, dragged out, and kept in detention in an Israeli Army detention camp for a few weeks. Because he’s wheelchair-bound, he can’t move. But he was handcuffed to something and he was blindfolded for weeks on end. And he developed pressure sores on both sides. So his hip bones, his femur, was visible on both sides because of the pressure sores from lying in a single position for those weeks on end. So obviously, he would have been lying, moving from one side to the other, but not being able to move more than that. And he developed these awful pressure sores. And I asked him about how he sustained this, and he told me his story. He told me he was handcuffed and blindfolded for weeks on end and then released somehow in the south of Gaza. And he found his way to the hospital. His wife looked after him in the ward, so she was his carer. And I inspected those wounds myself because we would change his dressings on the ward sometimes. And an incredibly stoic man, I have to say, I remember thinking when he told me the story, “How can you tell me the story with a smile?” He said it with a smile, with a gentle smile.

And then the next morning, I was walking through the emergency department, and I met another man who came up to me with his wife and his phone. And people over there carry their x-rays as screenshots on their phones. And he approached me and said, “Doctor, can you look at this; this is my chest x-ray; is it okay?” And, as I did with most people I met, said, “What happened? What’s your story?” Well, I was in an Israeli camp just outside of Khan Yunis, on the Israeli side of the fence, taken out of Al-Nasser Hospital, and kept there for days. And I saw people being dragged out by their external fixators. External fixators are the devices, like skeletons like scaffolds, people have around their limbs which are fractured and which are drilled into the bone to try and bring the bones together. And they’re very commonly used in wartime situations, where you don’t have the facility to try and fix the fracture immediately with the usual gold standard, which is to fix the bone because of all the infections and time constraints and so on. So he described people being dragged out by their external fixators along the street, along the floor, dragged out by the soldiers, and then dumped into these detention camps. And he was one of them, and he didn’t have a fracture at that time. He describes being again blindfolded and handcuffed for days and beaten with metal bars. He said to me, “I’m not the only one that was beaten with metal bars. Everyone in there was beaten with metal bars on a regular, often daily basis.” And he showed me his wrists. His wrists were both swollen from the handcuffs, and he showed me the X-ray. The X-ray showed clearly he had multiple rib fractures on both sides.

Now I, you know, I think anybody listening to these stories will tell you there is something wrong. And anybody who denies that there are crimes going on there needs to rethink all this. Yes, extremely disturbing stories. We can only hope the ICC actually takes action soon; there are rumors that might happen. I can only observe that it’s just—it seems almost unbelievable that the Israeli Army, supposedly the most or one of the most professional and courageous armies in the world, feels that it needs to blindfold and handcuff a man with a spinal injury in a wheelchair for weeks on end—it speaks volumes. Also, that maybe on the last day, as I was, in fact, the day I left, there were scores of people brought in with bullet injuries to their heads. And they were all ages, starting from early teens up to late 20s, and they were sitting in our hospital in the emergency department. A lot of them obviously were going to die; these are injuries not going to be survivable, particularly in those kinds of conditions. So again, this happened, and I saw this on the last day, in my last trip to Gaza, bullet wounds to the head.

Okay, well, I mean, it’s very difficult to believe that bullet wounds to the head are accidental. Just going back to your work in the hospital, did you feel that medical facilities were being targeted? Healthcare workers were being targeted, either deliberately or just generally undermined by the Israeli Army? And if so, how so?

There’s the testimony of people I spoke to, people who’ve been working at Al-Nasser Hospital, who’ve been working at Al-Shifa Hospital. When we were traveling to Gaza this time around, I met somebody at Al-Arish in Egypt, in Sinai, who had just come out of Gaza. And he was a doctor who worked in Al-Shifa and described to me and showed me the footage that he had of the conditions in Al-Shifa Hospital. And he described how at the end of November, before he was forced to leave, he was allowed by the Israeli soldiers in the hospital grounds to bury only 20 of the bodies that were accumulating, that were piling up in the grounds of the hospital. And then they were stopped, and a forklift came along and just picked up the bodies and took them somewhere, and we don’t know where that went. But also, there are testimonies of people from Al-Nasser Hospital, amongst them this man who I described who was taken from that hospital and left in a camp outside an army camp outside of Khan Yunis.

When I was there in January, the reason we had to stop working at Al Aqsa Hospital was that on one particular day, we were operating, and a missile came in through the hospital wall and lodged into one of the windows of the Intensive Care Unit. And that meant that it was too dangerous, and in fact, that night we were told we could not go back to Al Aqsa Hospital. So this is back in January. So, there is targeting that I’ve seen, there’s targeting that I’ve heard about, and we’ve seen—we’ve all seen the footage of what’s happened to Al-Shifa and Al-Nasser Hospital.

Qureshi: I’ve read your article in The Telegraph. It’s incredibly moving. I’d encourage all our viewers to try to read it if possible; it’s freely available on the Internet. One of the things you mentioned, apart from the stories which you’ve also described for us during this interview, was that this time around, on your second trip to Gaza, you saw much more end-stage cancer, much more infection, and much more malnutrition. Can you explain, perhaps to some of our viewers who are not medically trained, what that means for a population?

Qureshi: So in any population, you expect a certain incidence of cancers and chronic diseases. And as we all know, cancers are best treated when they’re caught early. When they’re late, they are, unfortunately, a death sentence for many people. But also, in the context of what’s available for treatment in Gaza, the prognosis is even worse. So what I was seeing this time around, and I saw this from day one, were patients of fairly young age with cancers which are way too advanced to hope for any cure from. I saw cancers of the pancreas, I saw cancers of the liver, I saw colon cancers on one of the patients who I operated on, on the second day when I was there, is a 36-year-old man who had a cancer of his colon which has obstructed his bowel, so that he was very distended, blown up like a balloon, couldn’t open his bowels, very uncomfortable. And so he was only 36, and I operated on him the next morning, and unfortunately he died a few days later. Now, for somebody like that, who’s a young man, and to have this kind of condition and to get to that point, is, I think, a reflection of what we’re going to see in Gaza for the next few years. We’re going to see a huge number of excess deaths from maltreatment, or unavailable treatment for a lot of these diseases.

Qureshi: That’s a very bleak picture you’ve painted. I wonder, just going into a little bit more detail about the cancer deaths you’re seeing, the malnutrition you’re seeing, the infection you’re seeing. Could you explain to viewers what this means in terms of are we seeing the total destruction of Gaza’s healthcare system? Because initially a lot of the deaths were trauma, but are we now seeing sort of secondary deaths? And what do you think will be the scale of mortality associated with this complete destruction of the healthcare system? We’re now going to see excess deaths not as a result of the trauma but as a result of the consequences of having a healthcare system which is destroyed.

Dawas: The healthcare system in Gaza was reliant on two major healthcare centers: Al-Shifa in the north and Al-Nasser complex in the south. Al-Shifa, we’ve seen; we know is completely destroyed. It’s now a shell, and it’s burnt out, and any facility within it has been destroyed. The Al-Shifa people, the employees of Al-Shifa, tried to rejuvenate it after the Israeli Army withdrew from it back a few months ago, and they were successful in trying to reestablish a primary care center. This is a center that could at least look after patients who needed some painkillers, some fluids, some wound management, and maybe some very basic surgery. And then the Israeli Army went back in again a few weeks ago and destroyed all that. And we know killed scores, if not hundreds, of people. We’re now discovering the mass graves that have been unearthed. Al-Nasser Hospital, again, is the same situation—been completely destroyed. We had one of our colleagues who helped work with us in Al Aqsa, he’s not a physician or a doctor, but his home is in Khan Yunis, and his father went back to check on his home which is in the Amal district in the center. And he came back extremely upset because his home, plus the whole city, was destroyed. In fact, his words to me were, “This is worse than what you’re seeing in Gaza because in Gaza at least there are some houses which are upright. In Khan Yunis, in the center, there’s nothing; everything’s been completely leveled out.”

So this destruction of the healthcare system and the two major centers in Gaza—Al-Nasser and Al-Shifa—means that the only hospitals left are the hospitals that used to operate as peripheral small centers of healthcare which can do a certain amount of good, but they cannot cover a population of 1.8 million. As I said Rafa, does not have a hospital system that can cover any of the population it has over there. So, 1.8 million people in a town which used to populate a quarter of a million and has a total number of four operating theaters, no CT scanners, no intensive care beds. You cannot look after trauma patients in that setting.

Qureshi: So then get on to the point of the issue of field hospitals. How good are field hospitals? If you had a very sophisticated army and a huge system of welfare and the funding to do it, you might be able to set up field hospitals that can do their job. But these take a long time; they’re not as good as having hospitals which are already existent in terms of their structure and in terms of the building that they have. They’re not the same thing.

You are one of a few surgeons and physicians who have gone to Gaza to try to alleviate suffering. You are also one of those who have come back and provided testimony to try to motivate our population, our medical establishment, and our politicians to do something. What would you like the British medical establishment to do?

Dawas: In the UK, our healthcare system is looked upon as a model by many people outside of the UK. And we, those of us who work within the system here, of course, we criticize aspects that we think we can improve. But from outside, people look at our system and say this is a system that we would want to emulate. And many people want to come and work in the healthcare system in the NHS in the UK. But also, the education system is also the envy of many people outside of the UK. And I think on those two fronts, it’s important that we make sure that we use that leadership role that we have by default and the model that we have to try and push further what we do well, which is public health. We do that very well. We have a fantastic societal healthcare system that does not cater for people’s ability to pay but rather for their need. And this is an example here in Gaza where we in the UK can also lead in terms of deciding and, not just deciding but rather advising and coming up with a response that I think many of the world will follow.

The healthcare system in Gaza we know has been destroyed. The targeting of individual clinicians and educators in Gaza has been documented as well. And anybody who goes to Gaza and who has a clear picture of what’s going on there cannot fail to understand the tragedy that’s going on. There is no—it’s very—you know. It’s impossible to go and argue that there’s some reason for continuing with what’s going on. The destruction, the war, the killing—there’s no justification for that at all. So therefore, anybody who sits on the other side of this argument and says, “Well, this is a complicated issue; we should perhaps stay neutral and let it be,” I don’t think understands the scale of what’s going on.

We also have a duty as humans. We are lucky in the UK; we are able to express our opinions. We are able to form policies based on evidence. Many people can’t do that. We need to use that ability, our freedom, and also the excellence that we have in the UK to be an example to the rest of the world. And I think that also that opportunity has to be grasped by the politicians to empower us to empower the healthcare system to do so. There is nothing wrong, and there is nothing criminal, if that is any suggestion, in us supporting the people of Gaza and supporting their healthcare system and their education system. This is what’s going to make them come back from the abyss of what it is like now. And I think, you know, this will also be something that will live on our conscience for years and generations to come if we let this opportunity go away. And people who come after us, generations after us, will look back and ask us what we did when this was happening in front of our eyes. We know how history looks at this; we’ve seen this happening in the past. And why we should be allowing it to happen now is way beyond me.

Qureshi: The British government, what would you like them to do?

Dawas: I’d like the British government to think beyond what I recognize as the realpolitik. The realpolitik and about having mutual interests when dealing with other nations is one thing. But as a government that represents a population that has very strong feelings about what’s going on, and I would say I think it’s very visible by the strength of feeling of people that go out on the peaceful marches that we see on a regular basis, that there is a segment of the population which is significant if not a majority. It may well be a majority now who feel that what we’re doing as a country and represented by our government is not right. There needs to be a stronger voice about what is wrong and what is right. Yes, dealing with the economy is one thing, and that is the bottom line, I understand, for many governments. But that’s, I think, that’s also a short-term view. What we do ethically and what we do as a nation that projects an international image is also very important. And I do think that at the moment we are lagging behind. You know, we could say we could argue that perhaps our government and a small minority of other governments are the only remaining ones at the moment that are willing to stand there and say that what is happening in terms of the killing that’s going on is justifiable and that it should carry on until whatever end result the Israeli government feels is appropriate at. And at what cost? The cost is another—you know—sort of tens of thousands have killed. The figures we talk about the 2,000 so far, that’s an underestimate. We know there are thousands of people still buried under the rubble in Gaza. We know that those people who are injured will have an inability to contribute to their lives, to their economies, for many years to come. So to allow this to happen and for our government to say that we should not vote, for example, on a ceasefire, an immediate ceasefire because there are still things to be done, is very difficult to understand from a human point of view. I do hope that there will be some awakening within those who decide policy and can see that they need to represent us, those people who feel that what is happening is wrong and needs to stop immediately. And I hope that change of mind happens very fast; every day counts.

Qureshi: Yeah, so I’m hopeful that testimony such as yours will have an effect. As you said, realpolitik is one thing, but I think once you’ve got genocide, you really—you know, you have to take action, because otherwise, it undermines the entire rules-based system. The population starts thinking, well, you know, why are you saying one thing about Ukraine and another thing about Palestine? And people are not dumb nowadays; we’re seeing everything on social media, and they’re starting to see through politicians. And if we ever had any faith in politicians, I think that faith is well and truly damaged now. Anyway, thank you very much, Dr. Dawas, for your account of your work in Gaza and for your views on the political measures that need to be undertaken in order to put a stop to this terrible, terrible health catastrophe.

Qureshi: Thank you. No, thank you very much, Musa. Thanks for your time, and thanks for what you do as well.

On April 24, a diverse coalition of students assembled at Alumni Park to protest several things. Chief among them were:

1. The administration’s unprecedented decision to deny the valedictorian of the graduating class, this year a Muslim woman of South Asian heritage, the opportunity to make an address at commencement and

2. The ongoing genocide of Palestinians in Gaza by Israel. Students protesting accordingly made several demands of the USC administration, which included calls for divestment and steps to improve campus climate. Students’ plans for the day included yoga sessions, a series of teach-ins about Palestine, and inter-faith activities, all leading to a vigil for the dead at sunset. Protesting students were joined by faculty and other members of the university community. This included several people from our own department, including numerous undergraduate and graduate students. At least four faculty members also joined those gathered at Alumni Park both to protest USC’s complicity in genocide and to ensure the safety of our students. Students were in fact peaceful; they posed no plausible threat to any other member of the university community; their actions were confined to a small part of campus; and they were in no way, shape, or form disruptive to the university’s mission or its day-to-day activities.

Despite these facts, the university administration decided to invite the LAPD onto campus, armed with batons, shields, armor, rubber bullets, and tear gas. In so doing, the administration escalated unnecessarily and introduced violence and weapons into a situation where there had been none.

The actions of USC administration:

· Needlessly and irresponsibly subjected students, faculty, and the wider university community to violence

· Led to the unjust arrest of 93 individuals for trespassing in the place where they work and study; among those arrested were two members of the History Department faculty

· Activated tools of state coercion to suppress free speech and free assembly on campus Like any institution of higher learning, USC’s mission commits the university to developing, cultivating, and applying new knowledge through teaching and research. It is our job as faculty to produce new knowledge, transmit that knowledge to our students, and then help them apply it ethically and morally for the betterment of our communities. We have a duty of care to our students and an ethical commitment to the pursuit of free inquiry. The university administration is therefore obligated to create and maintain a safe space where students and faculty may enjoy the intellectual, social, and material conditions under which teaching and research can flourish. On April 24, learning and exchange did continue. Due to the administration, this was sadly moved from the safety of the classroom and the university commons to police wagons and jail cells. Under no circumstances is any of this acceptable.

On these points, the university administration’s failure is total. By resorting to authoritarian methods, the university has created an environment where inquiry cannot be pursued and ideas may not be freely exchanged. In subjecting our students and colleagues to arbitrary violence, the administration has forfeited its right to lead. We accordingly demand:

· The immediate resignation of President Carol Folt, Provost Andrew Guzman, Senior Vice President Errol Southers, and Chief Lauretta Hill

· That the university drop all charges against the 93 individuals it had LAPD unjustly arrest and reimburse them any and all expenses incurred due to needless detention

· That the university refrain from further intimidation of students involved in peaceful protest or other forms of campus activism, whether it be threatening expulsion, suspension, the loss of scholarships, fellowships, and employment, or other punitive actions

Signed:
*Richard Antaramian, Associate Professor of History
Alice Baumgartner, Associate Professor of History
Marjorie Becker, Professor of History and English
Philip Ethington, Professor of History, Political Science, and Spatial Sciences
*Joan Flores-Villalobos, Assistant Professor of History
Jason Glenn, Associate Professor of History
*Josh Goldstein, Professor of History and East Asian Languages & Culture
Wolf Gruner, Professor of History, Shapell-Guerin Chair in Jewish Studies, and Founding
Director of the Center for Advanced Genocide Research
Sarah Gualtieri, Professor of American Studies & Ethnicity and History and Middle East Studies
Alaina Morgan, Assistant Professor of History
Jay Rubenstein, Professor of History and Religion and Director of the Center for Premodern
World
George Sanchez, Professor of American Studies & Ethnicity and History
Laura Isabel Serna, Associate Professor of History and Cinema & Media Studies
Nayan Shah, Professor of History and American Studies & Ethnicity
Francille Rusan Wilson, Associate Professor of American Studies & Ethnicity, History, Gender &
Sexuality, and Director USC Black Studies Initiative/Emerging Center
Benjamin Uchiyama, Associate Professor of History
*Aro Velmet, Associate Professor of History
*statement co-author

Relevant video added by Informed Comment:

ABC 7: “LAPD arrests more than 90 people after pro-Palestinian protest at USC”

NEWS RELEASE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

8 APRIL 2024

Contact: academicsvsscholasticide@gmail.com

Faisal Bhabha, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University

Heidi Matthews, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University

Stephen Rosenbaum, UC Berkeley School of Law

Over 1,500 North American Academics Condemn Scholasticide in Gaza

Over 1,500 academics based at more than 270 higher education institutions in the United States, Canada and Mexico have signed an Open Letter condemning Israel’s systematic attacks on educational life in Gaza, to mourn these losses and to stand in solidarity with their Palestinian colleagues and students. 

The signatories to the Open Letter denounce Israel’s indiscriminate bombing campaign and ground invasion of Gaza, which has resulted in mass civilian death, injury and widespread devastation for 2.3 million Palestinians. The signatories also deplore the attacks of 7 October 2023 by Hamas and other armed groups.

The right to education is an internationally protected human right enshrined in multiple human rights instruments to which Israel is a party. Scholasticide is the intentional and systematic destruction of educational infrastructure, educators and students. On 4 April 2024, the NBC News report “Class destroyed: The rise and ruin of Gaza’s revered universities” details how “universities across Gaza have been leveled.” 

Whereas education had been a source of hope for Palestinians living under the nearly 57-year-long Israeli occupation of Gaza, today we are witnessing the destruction of educated futures on an unprecedented scale. 

The Open Letter describes how the scholasticide is being carried out in violation of international human rights, humanitarian and criminal law. The signatories write :

“Denying access to education through the widespread and systematic destruction of educational infrastructure, along with deliberate and indiscriminate killing of educators and students, is an essential attribute of the collective punishment Israel is inflicting on Palestinians in Gaza”.

The Open Letter calls attention to the fact that all 12 universities in Gaza have been destroyed or damaged and thousands of university faculty, staff and students have been killed or injured. 

To date, Israel’s attacks have also killed nearly 6,000 school-aged children with another 10,000 wounded. As of January 2024, more than three-quarters of school buildings in Gaza had been damaged. 

The signatories call for academic institutions and scholars around the world to join them in condemning Israel’s attacks on educational futures in Gaza, insofar as “[s]cholasticide facilitates the physical and cultural erasure of the Palestinian people and is integral to rendering the Gaza Strip uninhabitable.”

Al Jazeera English Video added by Informed Comment: “Israel’s war is depriving Gaza’s students of an education | Al Jazeera Newsfeed ”

The Open Letter makes seven calls to action:

1. An immediate and permanent ceasefire and immediate and unconditional release of all hostages;
2. Israel’s compliance with the provisional measures ordered by the International Court of Justice; 
3. An end to Israel’s blockade of the Gaza Strip and its occupation, so that the educational sector can be rebuilt; 
4. Full access of United Nations agencies to the Occupied Palestinian Territories to carry out independent monitoring, investigation, and humanitarian coordination; 
5. All States that have suspended funding to UNRWA – the UN agency which runs many of the Strip’s now closed elementary and secondary schools – to immediately resume funding; 
6. North American universities, governments, NGOs and individual academics to support the reconstruction of educational institutions in Gaza, through financial and in-kind contributions; and 
7. State and individual accountability under domestic and international law mechanisms.

The Open Letter remains open for signature by any academic affiliated with a postsecondary institution in North America.

The Open Letter can be accessed and signed at https://forms.gle/m2c1UpLVXMHuJ3sA8.   

Hebrew University made this announcement on Wednesday, reinstating Professor Shalhoub-Kevorkian:

In a meeting held today between the Rector of the Hebrew University, Prof. Tamir Sheafer, and Prof. Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian, Prof. Shalhoub-Kevorkian clarified that as a critical feminist researcher, she believes all victims and does not doubt their words, and that she did not deny the fact that on 7.10 there were cases of rape in the South. After this clarification, the Hebrew University will allow Prof. Shalhoub-Kevorkian to continue teaching at the School of Social Work and Social Welfare.

Prof. Sheafer stressed that the Hebrew University strongly condemns inciting words and threats against students, lecturers, individuals and groups, and calls on all members of the University community to maintain a safe and respectful study and research environment.

Before this announcement the following letter had been sent:

Prof. Asher Cohen, President
Prof. Tamir Sheafer, Rector
Prof. Asher Ben-Arieh, Dean
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
24 March 2024
Dear President Cohen, Rector Sheafer, and Dean Ben-Arieh,

Prof. Asher Cohen, President Prof. Tamir Sheafer, Rector Prof. Asher Ben-Arieh, Dean The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 24 March 2024

Dear President Cohen, Rector Sheafer, and Dean Ben-Arieh,

We, the undersigned Palestinian faculty (current and former) at Israeli institutions of higher education, find your recent suspension of our dear colleague, Professor Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian, highly alarming and disturbing. Your decision does not only amount to an assault on her personally, and on her internationally esteemed scholarship, but also on all members of the academic community in Israel who aim to think freely, unrestricted by state agendas and ideologies.

Universities must aim to uphold the universality of knowledge, and this requires an unwavering commitment to liberty, equality, and justice. Academic institutions must provide open and safe spaces for the free and equal exchange of ideas and evaluate them according to merit as established within the rigors of academic disciplines. Scholarly discussions can only be fruitful and meaningful within these conditions.

Regrettably, your letter of 12 March 2024 addressed to and about Professor Shalhoub-Kevorkian, as well as other prior public announcements, show that Hebrew University, under your leadership, is failing to adhere to these fundamental academic principles. You would do well to recall Hannah Arendt’s observation that when pervasive thoughtlessness runs rampant, immoral acts become the norm.

Your decision serves to censure Professor Shalhoub-Kevorkian’s voice, along with the voices of other scholars and students who legitimately and rightfully question Israel’s policies and actions. Such critical voices participate in important conversations with academics, legal experts, humanitarian organizations, and NGOs around the world. As a world-renowned expert on state crimes and genocide, Professor Shalhoub-Kevorkian holds particular legitimacy in expressing her researched opinions. Your decision to suspend Professor Shalhoub- Kevorkian sets a dangerous precedent, perilously undermining academic freedom at your institution, and potentially at other institutions as well – signaling a warning to those who might dare to speak against the state.

Instead of fulfilling your duty to protect Professor Shalhoub-Kervorkian’s academic freedom, you are encouraging voices that support the Israeli state in its massive assault on tens of thousands of civilians. Your statements and actions work to further inflame tensions at a time when hate speech of vocal professors and students at Israeli universities, including at yours, is escalating and ultimately escaping sanction. Dissenters and Palestinians are the members of the university community whose safety, and whose right to speak freely, requires your vigilant defense today.

We, the undersigned, request that you publicly withdraw your statements regarding Professor Shalhoub- Kevorkian, and that you work to ensure a safe space for students and faculty at the Hebrew University. Such a step would send an important message to the international academic community that universities must preserve academic freedom first and foremost.

Sincerely,

Michael Karayanni The Hebrew University of Jerusalem ميخائيل كرين 1.
Asʻad Ganim University of Haifa أسعد غانم 2.
Ahmad H. Sa’di Ben Gurion University of the Negev أحمد سعدي 3.
Manal Totry-Jubran Bar-Ilan University منال توتري-جبر ان 4.
Jeries Khoury Tel Aviv University جريس خوري 5.
Sarab Abu-Rabia-Queder Ben Gurion University of the Negev رساب أبو ربيعة 6.
Nidaa Khoury Ben Gurion University of the Negev نداء خوري 7.
Marwan Dwairy Oranim College of Education مروان دويري 8.
Maurice Ebileeni University of Haifa موريس عبلّين 9.
Raif Zreik The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute رائف زريق 10.
Ameed Saabneh University of Haifa عميد صعابنة 11.
Honaida Ghanim Independent هنيدة غانم 12.
Nadeem Karkabi University of Haifa ر كننديم كر 13.
Jihad El-Sana Ben Gurion University of the Negev جهاد الصّانع 14.
Samer Swaid University College London سامر سويد 15.
Fadia Nasser Tel Aviv University فادية ناص 16.
A’as Atrash Independent عاص أطرش 17.
Amira Daher Zefat Academic College أمبر ة ضاهر 18.
Rawia Aburabia Sapir Academic College راوية أبو ربيعة 19.
Ahmad Igbaria Tel Aviv University أحمد إغبارية 20.
Arin Salamah-Qudsi University of Haifa عرين سالمة-قدس 21.
Manar Makhoul Tel Aviv University منار مخّول 22.
Salwa Nakkara University of Haifa سلوى نقارة 23.
Maha Sabbah-Karkabi Ben Gurion University of the Negev مها صبّاح-ركنكر 24.
Abeer Otman The Hebrew University of Jerusalem عثمان ر عبب 25.
Adeem Massarwa Ben Gurion University of the Negev أديم مصاروة 26.
Faisal Azaiza University of Haifa فيصل عزايزة 27.
Ramzi Sulieman University of Haifa رمزي سليمان 28.
Nadim Rouhana Tufts University نديم روحانا 29.
Ahmad Abu Akel University of Haifa أحمد أبو عقل 30.
Rassem Khamaisi University of Haifa راسم خمايس 31.
Bashir Bashir The Open University of Israel ر بشب ر بشب 32.
Mohammad Massalha The Open University of Israel محمد مصالحة 33.
Fuad Iraqi Tel Aviv University فؤاد عراق 34.
Heba Yazbak The Open University of Israel هبة يزبك 35.
Wael Abu-’Uksa The Hebrew University of Jerusalem وائل أبو-عقصة 36.
Taghreed Yahia-Younis Tel Aviv University ر تغريد يحن-يونس 37.
Suleiman Abu-Bader Ben Gurion University of the Negev سليمان أبو بدر 38.
Suheir Abu Oksa Daoud Coastal Carolina University أبو عقصة داود ر سهب 39.
Sarah Abu-Kaf Ben Gurion University of the Negev كف سارة أبو 40.
Mansour Nasasra Ben Gurion University of the Negev منصور نصاصة 41.
Hisham Jubran Beit Berl College هشام جبر ان 42.
Nihaya Daoud Ben Gurion University of the Negev نهاية داوود 43.
Rami Aqeilan The Hebrew University of Jerusalem رام عقيالن 44.
Abdalla Mashall Ben Gurion University of the Negev عبد هللا مشال 45.
Edriss Titi Weizmann Institute of Science إدريس تين 46.
Johnny Mansour Beit Berl College جون منصور 47.
Manal Gabour Beit Berl College منال جبّور 48.
Khalid Ghanayim University of Haifa خالد غنايم 49.
Ahmad Natour The Hebrew University of Jerusalem أحمد الناطور 50.
Yousef Jabareen Tel-Hai Academic College يوسف جبارين 51.
Ibrahim Geries University of Haifa إبراهيم جريس 52.
Ibrahim Taha University of Haifa إبراهيم طه 53.
Hassan Khalilih University of Haifa حسن خليلية 54.
Mahmoud Yazbak University of Haifa محمود يزبك 55.
Tawfiq Da’adli The Hebrew University of Jerusalem توفيق دعادلة 56.
Adel Manna The Hebrew University of Jerusalem عادل منّاع 57.
Areen Hawari The Hebrew University of Jerusalem عرين هواري 58.
Ula Aweida The Hebrew University of Jerusalem عال عويضة 59.
Muhammad Haj-Yahia The Hebrew University of Jerusalem ر محمد حاج يحن 60.
Muhammad Al-Atawneh Ben Gurion University of the Negev محمد العطاونة 61.
Abed El Qadir Kanaaneh Tel Aviv University كناعنة عبد 62.
Muzna Awayed-Bishara Tel Aviv University مزنة عويد-بشارة 63.
Issam Aburaya Seton Hall University عصام أبو ريا 64.
Zahiye Kundos Independent زهية قندس 65.
Nabih Bashir Independent ر نبيه بشب 66.
Muhammad Amara Beit Berl College محمد أمارة 67.
Elinor Saiegh-Haddad Bar-Ilan University اليانور صايغ-حداد 68.
Khawla Abu-Baker Al-Qasemi Academic College of Education خولة أبو بكر 69.
Aida Fahmawi-Watad Al-Qasemi Academic College of Education عايدة فحماوي-وتد 70.
Maram Masarwa Al-Qasemi Academic College of Education مرام مصاروة 71.
Hanna Bishara Tel Aviv University حنا بشارة 72.
Raja Giryes Tel Aviv University رجا جريس 73.
Ayman Agbaria University of Haifa أيمن إغبارية 74.
Muhammad Abu Samra The David Yellin Academic College of Education محمد أبو سمرة 75.
Areej Mawasi Technion أري ج مواس 76.
Nisreen Morqus Oranim College of Education نرسين مرقس 77.
Sylvia Saba-Sadi Gordon College of Education سيلفيا سابا-سعدي 78.
Ismael Abu-Saad Ben Gurion University of the Negev إسماعيل أبو سعد 79.
Wurud Jayusi Beit Berl College / Arab Academic Institute ورود جيوس 80.
Nihaya Wishahi Al-Qasemi Academic College of Education نهاية وشاح 81.
Khaled Abu-Asbe خالد أبو عصبة 82.
Raid Saabni The Academic College of Tel Aviv-Yaffo رائد صعابنة 83.
Asharf Brik Technion ف إبريقرأرس 84.
Norman Metanis The Hebrew University of Jerusalem نورمان إميل مطانس 85.
Riad Agbaria Ben Gurion University of the Negev رياضإغبارية 86.
Saleem Zaroubi University of Groningen ر سليم زارون 87.
Fatina Abreek-Zubiedat Tel Aviv University فاتنة إبريق-زبيدات 88.
Warda Sada Independent وردة سعدة 89.
Loab Hammoud Bar-Ilan University لؤاب حمود 90.
Ahmad Masarwa The Hebrew University of Jerusalem أحمد مصاروة 91.
Amal Rouhana-Toubi Braude – College of Engineering آمال روحانا-رطون 92.
Samir Hajj Oranim Academic College and Beit Berl College حاج ر سمب 93.
Areej Sabbagh-Khoury The Hebrew University of Jerusalem أري جصباغ-خوري 94.
Khaled Furani Tel Aviv University خالد فوران 95.
Banna Shoughry-Badarne The Hebrew University of Jerusalem بانة شغري-بدارنة 96.
Yaqub Hanna Weizmann Institute of Science يعقوب حنا 97.
Manal Shalabi Independent ر منال شلن 98.
Nicole Khayat The Hebrew University of Jerusalem نيكول خيّاط 99.

Mistahi: “We are all Palestinian”

Mistahi was born and raised in Saskatoon, Canada as part of a poor neighbourhood. He was exposed to common problems that are familiar to most in the working class. Everyday he walked by a homeless shelter to attend elementary school. By the time he made it to high school drugs and alcohol were all around and a problem for the youth. The poverty of First Nations peoples and the rampant abuse by the police left an indelible mark on his consciousness. The police murdered one of his classmates by dropping him off on the outskirts of town on a cold winter’s night, a practice known as “a starlight tour.” Mistahi moved to Winnipeg when he was 17 years old and quickly joined the youth and student movement as a senior in high school. Swept up by actions around the demand “education is a right,” he and many youth gained firsthand knowledge and experience on how to stand up for themselves together as an organized force.In his early 20s, Mistahi attended Algonquin College to become a licensed carpenter and has since worked in construction.