( RFE/RL) – Fewer Iranians have protested on the streets in recent days, more than three months after the nationwide antiestablishment demonstrations erupted.

From the outset, the authorities responded to the rallies with lethal force and mass arrests. But in recent weeks, the government has used increasingly brutal tactics, including the public execution of protesters, in a bid to curb the rallies.

But that has not stopped some Iranians from risking their lives and taking to the streets, especially in the western Kurdistan region, which has been the epicenter of the demonstrations. Three days of protests and strikes were held on December 19-21, following a call for action by protesters.

More Iranians have moved their protests to their rooftops and windows as the risk of arrest and physical harm has increased on the tightly controlled streets.

Videos widely shared on social media appear to show protesters shouting from rooftops and windows late into the night in major Iranian cities in recent weeks. The practice is not new but has become more widespread recently.

Iran has been wracked by protests since the death of a young woman in police custody in September. Via Twitter.

Why It Matters: During the protests, Iranians have found new and creative ways to continue the demonstrations. Besides resorting to shouting antiestablishment slogans at night from their rooftops and windows, some protesters have turned to protest art and graffiti.

While less dangerous, those protesting from their homes are not completely safe. Security forces have shot at and broken the windows of apartment buildings where residents have chanted antiestablishment slogans. Security personnel have also damaged cars parked outside these residential buildings.

What’s Next: These acts of dissent are likely to continue and increase as the government clampdown intensifies. They are difficult for the authorities to stop and allow protesters to sustain the demonstrations with fewer risks.

Via RFE/RL

Copyright (c)2022 RFE/RL, Inc. Used with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave NW, Ste 400, Washington DC 20036.

( RFE/RL/Radio Azadi) – KABUL — The Taliban has imposed a new dress code and gender segregation for women at private universities and colleges in Afghanistan, in line with a decree issued to educational institutions and obtained by RFE/RL.

All female students, teachers, and staff must wear an Islamic abaya robe and niqab that covers the hair, body, and most of the face, according to the extensive document issued by the Taliban-run Education Ministry on September 5. The garments must be black, the text added, and women must also wear gloves to ensure their hands are covered.

Classes must also be segregated by gender — or at least divided by a curtain — according to the order, which added that female students must be taught only by other women. But it added, though, that “elderly men” of good character could fill in if there were no female teachers.

Since seizing power after the collapse of the internationally recognized government in Kabul last month, the Taliban has said “women and girls will have all their rights within Islam.”

The militants have attempted to project a more moderate image and reassure Afghans and the world that it has changed. During its brutal regime from 1996-2001, the Taliban oppressed women and severely restricted girls’ education.

But the Taliban’s new rules — which came into effect on September 6 as private universities reopened — highlight how women’s lives are set to dramatically change under the rule of the hard-line Islamist group after the gains of the past 20 years.

‘Clear Sign Of Repression’

“The new changes like gender segregation in schools and universities are clearly creating more fear and a culture of discrimination against women and girls,” said Samira Hamidi, an exiled women’s rights activist who fled Afghanistan due to threats by the Taliban.

“Women wearing black veils do not represent Afghan culture,” she added. “It is a clear sign of repression in the life of women and girls.”

Before the Taliban’s return to power, Afghan women studied alongside men and attended classes with male teachers. There was also no dress code that forced women to cover themselves.

Photos widely shared by Afghans on social media showed men and women at Ibn Sina University, a private institution in Kabul, separated in classes by a curtain. Many of the women pictured wore black robes and hijabs, although their faces were visible — an apparent violation of the new dress code.

According to the decree issued by the Taliban, women should wear an abaya, the figure-shrouding outer garment, and niqab, a cloth that covers the face except for the eyes.

Maryam, a woman from the southeastern city of Khost, told Radio Azadi that many women were ready to wear a hijab, which covers the head. But she said the all-encompassing niqab or burqa would not be “acceptable to Afghan women.”

‘Good Behavior’

The Taliban also imposed the wearing of burqas in the 1990s.

The Taliban’s decree also said men and women should use separate entrances and exits at universities and colleges.

“Universities are required to recruit female teachers for female students based on their facilities,” the document said.

If it is not possible to employ female teachers, then institutions “should try to hire elderly men teachers who have a record of good behavior.”

While women must study separately, they are also required to finish their classes five minutes earlier than men to stop them from meeting outside.

The documents also stipulates that women must remain in waiting rooms until their male classmates have left the building.

Despite the new restrictions, the Taliban permitting education for women is a positive, said 18-year-old Salgy Baran, who received the highest score in Afghanistan on her university entrance exams this year.

“The Taliban must deliver on what they promise,” she told Radio Azadi, referring to the militant group’s pledge to protect women’s rights, including the right to education. “Our university professors must be encouraged and appreciated, and we must be optimistic about the future.”

Violating Women’s Rights

But others are not convinced that the Taliban has changed and will permit women to exercise their right to education and work.

After the U.S.-led invasion, university admission rates soared in Afghanistan, particularly among women. Millions of girls of all ages also flocked back to school, though the gains in female education were mainly restricted to the cities.

Women also played a role in public life as ministers, members of parliament, and provincial officials. They also had the right to vote and work outside their homes.

When it previously controlled Afghanistan from 1996-2001, the Taliban forced women to cover themselves from head to toe, banned them from working outside the home, limited education only to pre-adolescent girls, and required women to be accompanied by a male relative if they left their homes.

The Taliban has, thus far, reimposed many of the same repressive laws and retrograde policies that defined its extremist former rule.

In Kabul, the Taliban has advised women to largely remain indoors. The militants have dismissed female journalists working for state-run television. The Taliban has also ordered many former female government workers not to return to work even as their male colleagues went back. Many girls’ schools have also remained shut in the capital.

Scores of women have staged protests in Kabul, the western city of Herat, and the northern city of Mazar-e Sharif in recent days, demanding equal rights.

Protest organizers said Taliban militants violently dispersed a crowd of women who had taken to the streets of Mazar-e Sharif on September 6 to call for their rights to be preserved and their inclusion in the new government.

Dozens of women held placards with slogans such as “Violation of women’s rights = Violation of human’s rights” and “We want political participation at all levels,” according to photos shared on social media.

• 
  

  Frud Bezhan

  Frud Bezhan covers Afghanistan and Pakistan, with a focus on politics, the Taliban insurgency, and human rights. He has reported from Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Turkey. Prior to joining RFE/RL in 2011, he worked as a freelance journalist in Afghanistan and contributed to several Australian newspapers, including The Age and The Sydney Morning Herald.

Frud Bezhan covers Afghanistan and Pakistan, with a focus on politics, the Taliban insurgency, and human rights. He has reported from Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Turkey. Prior to joining RFE/RL in 2011, he worked as a freelance journalist in Afghanistan and contributed to several Australian newspapers, including The Age and The Sydney Morning Herald. BezhanF@rferl.org

Via RFE/RL/Radio Azadi

Copyright (c)2020 RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave NW, Ste 400, Washington DC 20036.

——

Bonus Video added by Informed Comment:

Afghanistan crisis: Taliban order university women to wear niqab • FRANCE 24 English

( RFE/RL) – But the long-standing economic, political, and military ties between the South Asian state and the oil-rich Middle East kingdom have been based less on common values and more on transactions, experts say.

Riyadh has provided huge financial support in the form of cheap oil and loans to Islamabad, which has been reeling for years from a struggling economy and energy crisis.

As the custodian of the two holiest sites in Islam, Saudi Arabia has given legitimacy to Pakistan’s political and military elite, which has promoted a conservative Islamic identity in the country.

Riyadh also allegedly helped fund Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program in the 1970s.

In return, Pakistan has sent its forces to help defend the kingdom over the decades.

Islamabad has also cooperated closely with Saudi Arabia to curb the expanding influence in the region of Iran — Pakistan’s western neighbor and Riyadh’s mortal foe.

The Saudis have also been allowed to spread their extremist Wahhabi version of Islam in Pakistan through a vast network of mosques and seminaries.

But those close ties seem to have hit rock bottom as the relationship has hit major snags.

‘Stand With Us’

In unprecedentedly blunt comments, Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi lashed out at Saudi Arabia for its perceived lack of support for Islamabad’s interests in the disputed Kashmir region.

The Muslim-majority Himalayan region is divided between Pakistan and archrival India but claimed by both in its entirety. The two countries have fought three wars over the region.

Qureshi said on August 5 that Islamabad expected the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) — a group of 57 Muslim countries from Africa, the Middle East, and Asia that is based in Saudi Arabia — to convene a meeting on Kashmir.

Otherwise, he said, Pakistan would be “compelled” to “call a meeting of the Islamic countries that are ready to stand with us on the issue of Kashmir,” which has been viewed as a threat to create a new bloc that would rival the Saudi-dominated OIC.

The foreign minister mentioned Iran, Turkey, and Qatar, Riyadh’s regional rivals with which Pakistan has bolstered ties in recent years.

Qureshi said Pakistan last year pulled out of an international summit for leaders of Muslim countries in Malaysia because of Riyadh’s concerns that the meeting could undermine the OIC.

But now, he said, Pakistan was demanding Riyadh “show leadership on the issue” of Kashmir. “We have our own sensitivities,” he said. “Gulf countries should understand this. I’m taking a position despite our good ties with Saudi Arabia. We cannot stay silent anymore on the sufferings of the Kashmiris.”

Qureshi’s comments came on the first anniversary of India’s decision to revoke the special status of territory under its administration in Kashmir, a move that outraged Pakistan.

Pakistan’s Foreign Office on August 6 defended Qureshi’s rare public criticism of Riyadh, saying the minister’s remarks reflected the “people’s aspirations and expectations.”

Game Of Loans

The same day, media reports in Pakistan said the government was forced to repay $1 billion of a $3 billion loan it had secured from Saudi Arabia.

Those loans were part of a $6.2 billion package announced by Saudi Arabia in October 2018, which included a total of $3 billion in loans and a further $3.2 billion loan for oil imports.

Media reports also said Pakistan had not received any oil under the deal since May.

In February, Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman signed investment deals with Pakistan worth $20 billion, including for a $10 billion refinery and petrochemicals complex in the port city of Gwadar.

Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan was criticized and even mocked on social media for chauffeuring for the crown prince upon his arrival in Islamabad, a move intended to portray the kingdom’s importance to Pakistan.

On August 10 — just days after Qureshi’s outburst, the Saudi ambassador in Islamabad met with Pakistan’s chief of army staff, General Qamar Javed Bajwa. The military holds an oversized role in the country’s domestic and foreign affairs.

A Pakistani government statement said that “matters of mutual interest, the regional security situation, and bilateral defense relations between the two brotherly countries were discussed during the meeting.”

‘Ungrateful’

“The Saudis have stood by Pakistan in times of need,” says Husain Haqqani, Pakistan’s former ambassador to the United States and a director at the Washington-based Hudson Institute. “But Riyadh feels Pakistan is less forthcoming in supporting Saudi Arabia on its security concerns while demanding both economic assistance and political support.”

Pakistan failed to send troops to help a Saudi-led coalition that has been fighting Huthi rebels in Yemen since 2015.

Meanwhile, Islamabad is wary of the burgeoning economic ties between Riyadh and New Delhi. Saudi Arabia has become India’s fourth-largest trading partner and the main source of its oil imports, with bilateral trade at $27 billion annually.

In comparison, Pakistan’s bilateral trade with Saudi Arabia stands at just $3.6 billion.

“The Saudis look at Pakistan as an ungrateful recipient of their assistance, including direct budget support, oil supplied on a deferred-payment basis, and several hundred thousand jobs for unskilled workers,” Haqqani says. “But for the Saudis, India is a major trading partner and they are refusing to play Islamabad’s zero-sum game on India.”

In recent years, Saudi Arabia has expelled thousands of Pakistanis for not possessing valid legal documents, although some observers say the expulsions are the consequences of worsening diplomatic relations.

Saudi Arabia remains the main source of Pakistan’s remittances. Overseas Pakistani workers sent nearly $19 billion home between July 2019 and April 2020, with $4.4 billion remitted from Saudi Arabia alone, according to the State Bank of Pakistan.

Mosharraf Zaidi, a Pakistani columnist and former diplomat, says the diplomatic row will have “implications” for Islamabad, adding that the government has made “a habit of making bombastic statements about the closest strategic partners of the country.”

“Saudi Arabia is not a casual partner of the country,” Zaidi says.

Najam Sethi, a prominent Pakistani journalist, wrote in a column that Pakistani-Saudi ties had “hit rock bottom already” and Qureshi’s “outburst is a consequence of this fact rather than a cause of it.”

Imtiaz Gul, head of the independent Center for Research and Security Studies in Islamabad, says the spat with Riyadh is an “expression of frustration with the lack of Saudi support on Kashmir and its close economic relations with India.”

But he says it does not signal a strategic realignment by Islamabad, which has forged warmer ties recently with Iran. “Pakistan will largely remain aligned with Saudi Arabia and the other OIC countries, including Turkey,” Gul says. “The relationship with Iran has been tricky and very wobbly from the very beginning. And I don’t expect it to reach to the level of our relationship with Turkey or Saudi Arabia.”

‘Thoughtless’

Pakistani opposition parties and political commentators have slammed the government for its public criticism of Riyadh, arguing that Islamabad cannot afford to alienate its Saudi benefactors.

Khurram Dastagir, a former defense minister and central leader of the opposition Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) party of ousted Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, said Qureshi’s remarks were “most unfortunate and ill-advised” because “we have a long-standing relationship with Saudi Arabia.”

Dastagir said that “if there are differences, they should not be expressed in the unfortunate manner as said by the foreign minister.”

Farhatullah Babar, a former senator and central leader of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), told RFE/RL that Qureshi’s statement was “irresponsible, thoughtless, and undiplomatic.”

Via RFE/RL

——

Bonus Video added by Informed Comment:

The Times of India: “As relations with Saudi Arabia deteriorates, Pakistan foreign minister rushes to China”

The blasts, south of the Strait of Hormuz, followed last month’s attacks on vessels off the nearby United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) that Washington also blamed on Tehran. Almost a fifth of the world’s oil passes through the strait.

Tensions have escalated since May 2018, when U.S. President Donald Trump pulled out of a 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and major powers that aimed to curb Tehran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. Washington has since reimposed stiff economic sanctions. Tehran has repeatedly warned it would block the Strait of Hormuz if it could not sell its oil because of U.S. sanctions.

RFE/RL spoke with Scott Lucas, an Iran expert at Birmingham University in Britain and editor of the EA World View website, about the attack and its possible repercussions.

RFE/RL: The U.S. military has blamed Iran for the attacks on the tankers. What possible political, economic, and military motivations would Iran have for allegedly targeting the vessels?

Scott Lucas: There is nothing conclusive about Iranian responsibility at this point. When you assess the possible motives behind this attack, we should consider the context.

The background in terms of quasi-military operations would be the attacks on the four ships, including the two Saudi tankers, in the U.A.E. port on May 12. It would include the drone attacks on Saudi pumping stations by Huthi rebels recently. Politically, the context for this would be a much tougher line this week from Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who not only rejected mediation by Germany and Japan but did so in very strong terms.

This doesn’t mean in any way I think that the Iranians necessarily did it. But there is a possible and plausible scenario under which it could have occurred. It could mean a faction within the Iranian system carried out military operations to say to the Americans and their allies, “Look, if you are going to come after us, we can hurt you.”

I’m not saying that’s what happened. What I’m saying is that if the Iranians were responsible then what it means is that the supreme leader and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps [IRGC] are expecting American-led attempts at regime change or effectively a surrender of its position in the region and what the Iranians are saying is that they will not tolerate that. They’re saying to the Americans, “If you think you can use military force to make us do this, we’ve got military capabilities as well.”

RFE/RL: Does Iran have the military and intelligence capabilities to pull off such an attack?

Lucas: Iran certainly has the capabilities of carrying out such an attack. There’s some confusion over whether the ships were hit from a flying object or they were disabled and damaged by limpet mines. The Iranians fought a ground, air, and naval war with Iraq from 1980-88, including in the Persian Gulf and the Strait Of Hormuz. Iran has developed military capabilities against a series of what they would call “regional enemies” like Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Yes, they have the capabilities to attack shipping. We’ve known that for years. We have just always wondered if Iran would ever take the step to attack shipping. That’s the unanswered question we have at this moment.

RFE/RL: U.S. acting Ambassador Jonathan Cohen said that “no proxy group in the area has the resources or the skill to act with this level of sophistication.” Do Lebanon’s Iran-backed Hizballah movement or the Iranian-backed Huthi rebels in Yemen have such capabilities?

Lucas: This is where the question of the flying object versus the limpet mine takes on significance. We know that the Huthis have carried out attacks on Saudi shipping by using airborne missiles. So we do have a group like the Huthis who have attacked shipping in the area. Why they would want to attack, for example, these ships and what their motives would be is a much different question.

My response here would be to put the Iranian side of the case. The Iranians are saying that the Saudis, the U.A.E., the Israelis, and the Americans all have motive in carrying out a false-flag attack and damaging these tankers and blaming it on the Iranians to set up the pretext for military action or at least more extensive sanctions. The Iranian argument would be that “we are being set up as the fall guy for this.”

RFE/RL: The U.S. military released a video on June 13 that it said showed Iran’s IRGC removing an unexploded mine from the side of one of the oil tankers. The U.S. military also released photographs showing the apparent mine, which attaches to the side of a ship magnetically, before it was removed later the same day. Does this apparent evidence incriminate Iran or is it inconclusive?

Lucas: I would expect Iran’s response to be that the IRGC unit were helping that ship by removing the unexploded mine that had been placed there by someone else. The question will still remain: who placed that mine in the first place? The U.S. will insist that Iran was removing it to cover up its trail. This will become a political battle, amongst many, in the days to come.

RFE/RL: Besides Iran, what other state or nonstate actors could be responsible or would benefit from this attack?

Lucas: Those who would benefit from Iran being found guilty of this would be their rivals in the region — Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., and Israel. Certainly, U.S. hard-liners would be supported in their case for stronger action against Iran if Tehran was found culpable. But that leads to Iran saying that those parties who benefit set up the attack to justify the maximum-pressure strategy that is being pursued by the Trump administration.

There is no evidence yet that this was a false-flag attack. We also don’t have conclusive evidence that Iran is responsible for this. While we await that evidence, and it might never come, this becomes a political choice. Do you believe the Iranians who say they are being set up as the scapegoats or do you believe the Americans and their allies that say Iran is the culprit?

One thing is clear: We now have a resurgence of tension between the U.S., Iran, and other countries that after having retreated from military confrontation last month and with mediation being firmly rejected by Iran, we are back to a dangerous escalation. It doesn’t mean that war is on the way, but it does mean the opportunity for the avoidance of war has shrunk.

RFE/RL: What kind of possible responses might we see from the United States and the region?

Lucas: That’s a huge question in terms of what responses and how far do they go. Where we were last month was that the Americans were moving a carrier strike force to the Persian Gulf and bombers. And they were going to station bombers in Qatar as a show of its military capability.

Now that was checked because various U.S. agencies got Trump to say, “Let’s not go too far.” We’re at the point where those military forces could be moved back to the region. Do the Americans take the position they did in the late 1980s? Back then they put in military forces to patrol the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. We know that ended very badly, culminating with a U.S. warship shooting down an Iranian civilian plane that killed almost 300 people.

Would the U.S. and Israel go further with a renewal of covert attacks? We know there were attacks on Iran to limit their nuclear program, including assassinating Iranian nuclear scientists and the introduction of computer viruses. Would the U.S. go in and try to cripple Iranian infrastructure like the electricity grid or power stations with cyberwarfare?

On the other hand, what could the Iranians do? The Iranians can carry out asymmetric warfare through allies like Hizballah and the Huthis. Remember, Iran stands accused by European governments of carrying out bomb and assassination plots in recent years. So, there’s a whole variety of actions that each side can take. But if they take any of those actions, they’re committing themselves to an escalation. And this time, there may not be a way of stepping back from an escalation that does lead to overt military confrontation.

RFE/RL: What is the likelihood of a direct military confrontation between Iran and the United States? In 1988, the United States launched Operation Praying Mantis in the Persian Gulf, attacking and destroying Iranian sea bases, a frigate, and other ships in retaliation for Tehran’s use of sea mines during the Iran-Iraq War.

Lucas: I don’t think either side goes in thinking, “I want war.” We have been here before, as in the late 1980s, when each side was calculating on military steps which were short of war. The problem is that when you take military steps short of war, the other side could respond. You could then respond to their response and then you would have an upward spiral that does end in a widespread conflict.

Let’s look at what’s happening now. If the Americans put military forces into the Persian Gulf and the Iranians decide to buzz the forces by sending speed boats or by even threatening the use of naval mines, do the Americans then respond with fire upon IRGC forces?

War doesn’t occur in a single dramatic moment. It occurs step by step, and that’s the risk we are facing now. It’s a risk that is now at its highest point since the 1980s of something that escalates into a direct military confrontation.

RFE/RL: Is there still a chance that diplomacy could de-escalate tensions?

Lucas: There’s always a chance. We had diplomacy that de-escalated tensions that led to the 2015 nuclear agreement. The point is that on both sides we are getting steps that are rejecting diplomacy. The Americans quite clearly did that by shredding the nuclear agreement. That was their message to Iran. The Iranians have made their latest message very clear by rejecting diplomacy.

Someone has got to step in and says to both sides to pull back from military measures and signals. But the problem is it goes beyond military signals. Iran is demanding a diplomacy that eases U.S. sanctions. The Trump administration is demanding a diplomacy in which Iran has to give up its uranium-enrichment program and to end their activities in the Middle East, whether it’s Iran’s involvement in Syria’s civil war, Yemen’s civil war, or Lebanon’s Hizballah.

Neither side is going to make concessions at this point. Diplomacy is always possible but at this point diplomacy has a very limited window in terms of what it can do.

Via RFE/RL

Copyright (c) 2019. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave NW, Ste 400, Washington DC 20036.

——

Bonus video added by Informed Comment:

Aljazeera English: “US releases video it claims show Iran removing mine from tanker”

But economists say that while the U.S. measures will hit Iranian oil sales, which account for 70 percent of the country’s revenues, they will not completely halt them.

Iran can skirt U.S. sanctions and still sell oil through different avenues, say analysts, who predict that Tehran’s petroleum exports will not fall more than 30 percent from current levels.

Ahead of May 8, the first anniversary of U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw from a controversial 2015 nuclear deal with Tehran, an Iranian official said the country would circumvent renewed sanctions by selling oil on the “gray market.”

Under the 2015 deal between Iran and world powers, Tehran was to curb its nuclear program in exchange for relief from international sanctions. The United States reimposed crippling economic sanctions on Tehran months after pulling out of the agreement, dealing a major blow to Iran’s crisis-hit economy. Last month, Washington ended waivers for major importers of Iranian oil.

Even if Iran can sidestep U.S. sanctions, it is unclear if buyers want to risk huge penalties to buy its oil, say analysts.

‘Off The Grid’

One tactic previously employed by Iran to bypass U.S. sanctions and sell its oil is through the use of “ghost” tankers.

Iran has hidden the destination of its oil sales by strategically switching off oil tankers’ AIS signal, an automatic tracking system. This has made it difficult to pinpoint the origin, route, and the date a tanker is loaded and unloaded.

Other tactics used by Iran at sea include ship-to-ship oil transfers and discharging and loading oil at remote ports. Tehran has also been known to reflag its tankers and use documents from other countries to mask their ships’ origins.

Iran was exporting around 2.5 million barrels of oil a day in April 2018, the month before Trump withdrew the United States from the nuclear deal. Since U.S. sanctions on Iran’s oil industry were reinstated in November, Iranian oil exports have decreased by more than half to around 1.1 million barrels per day (bpd).

Scott Lucas, an Iran expert at Birmingham University in Britain and the editor of the EA World View website, says some industry experts estimate that Iran is exporting up to 400,000 barrels of oil per day above officially acknowledged levels through methods such as turning off transponders on tankers. Lucas says industry experts predict that U.S. sanctions will further decrease Iran’s current official oil exports by up to 20 or 30 percent.

“The U.S. aim is not an embargo with action to intercept and stop tankers,” says Lucas. “Instead, Washington will aim at the financial networks supporting transactions.”

Scott adds that these “off-the-grid movements” may give some relief from tightening U.S. sanctions, but they increase the risk of Tehran being seen as the “culprit rather than the victim in this showdown.”

Iran has the support of the other signatories of the nuclear deal — Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany — which have criticized Washington for unilaterally pulling out of the deal and reimposing sanctions, despite multiple reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Tehran was complying with the agreement.

Ditch The Dollar

U.S. sanctions prevent Iran — and those who want to do business with them — from dealing in U.S. dollars, the global reserve currency, and from using SWIFT, the U.S.-dominated global-transaction network. Oil is also priced and traded in U.S. dollars.

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said Iran plans to get around U.S. sanctions by selling oil in other currencies.

“You can use your own currency,” he told reporters in New York in September, saying countries were making deals with Tehran to use their own currencies in bilateral trade. “Sell stuff in your own currency, buy stuff in the other country’s currency, and at the end of a specific period, balance it out in a non-dollar currency. It’s quite possible. And may even be profitable.”

Iran has used this tactic before when it was under sanctions, dealing in euros and the Chinese yuan.

But Scott says deals in currencies like the yuan or the Indian rupee are “not attractive because the currencies are nonconvertible or are limited in the international financial system.”

Oil For Goods

Tehran can also reach barter deals with countries.

Russia has said it would buy at least 100,000 barrels a day of Iranian oil. Moscow has offered to pay for the oil with Russian machinery and food, according to Russia’s Oil Ministry. Moscow has also pledged to invest in the Iranian oil sector as Western companies draw back.

In 2017, Russia implemented an oil-for-goods program with cash-strapped Iran, with Moscow buying Iranian oil in exchange for Russian goods, including oil pumps and pipes, gas-drilling equipment, metal and wood products, leather, and wheat. The two countries have been working on oil-for-goods deals worth up to $20 billion.

Many buyers of Iranian oil are vulnerable to U.S. sanctions because they use the U.S. banking system. But Russia and China are less vulnerable because their economies and financial systems are less connected to the United States than Western countries.

Iran has previously had barter deals with China and India. At the time, Iranian critics of government policies maintained that bartering partners were selling useless merchandise to Iran.

“Whenever there are excessive regulations or sanctions, black markets spontaneously emerge as a way out from under the regulations and sanctions,” says Steve Hanke, an economist at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore. “So, for a sanctioned seller, there is a way out. But it comes at a price: lower profits from sales.”

Going Private

Iran also has the option of selling oil through the Iran Energy Exchange (IRENEX), a rial-based, domestic oil exchange.

Selling oil is in the hands of the state, but to skirt U.S. sanctions the government last year began to sell to private buyers through IRENEX.

On April 30, Iran offered 1 million barrels of oil on IRENEX to attract new, private buyers.

Naysan Rafati, an Iran analyst at the International Crisis Group, says the exchange keeps the details of the buyers private because they might be targeted by U.S. penalties.

But the domestic energy exchange has not proven to be successful. Fars news agency reported on April 30 that only 70,000 barrels were sold at $60 a barrel, lower than the price on world markets.

Naysan says that, fundamentally, Iran must grapple with the question of demand.

“We will have to see what appetite, if any, those companies doing the buying have for possible penalties by a U.S. administration that’s clearly made this a key policy objective,” he says.

Via RFE/RL

Copyright (c) 2019. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave NW, Ste 400, Washington DC 20036.

——

Arirang News: “U.S. toughens its stance on Iran sanctions exemptions: source”

Mohammad moved back to his native Kabul after living more than 10 years in Iran, where he washed cars and worked in construction to earn money to send back to his family of eight in Afghanistan.

Mohammad is among the hundreds of thousands of Afghan migrants who once flocked to Iran for work but who have returned to their war-torn homeland amid a crippling economic crisis. It is unclear if the returnees plan to stay in Afghanistan temporarily or for the long-term.

Iran’s economic turmoil, which has sent unemployment soaring and the national currency plummeting — has hit Afghan migrants particularly hard. The demand for work in the gray economy, where most Afghans work, has declined sharply. Iran’s currency, the rial, has weakened against the afghani and is at record lows against the U.S. dollar, which is widely used in Afghanistan.

More than 400,000 undocumented Afghan migrants left Iran in 2018, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) — a massive increase from 2017, when 187,000 returned over the course of the entire year. The mass exodus has been “largely driven by recent political and economic issues in Iran, including massive currency devaluation,” according to the IOM’s July report.

‘Better Here Than In Iran’

The dire state of Afghanistan’s economic and security situation underlines the extent of Iran’s economic woes. The war-torn country that Afghans are returning to suffers from around 40 percent unemployment, is heavily dependent on dwindling foreign aid, and is in the midst of the worst drought in decades. Humanitarian groups say the returnees, should they stay, could exacerbate the problems Afghanistan is facing.

Yet for Mohammad and many others, Afghanistan still represents an improvement.

“The rial has really come down,” says Mohammad. “The rial is worthless. I couldn’t even make enough money to cover my own expenses. So I couldn’t send any money back to my family in Afghanistan.”

Among them was Sediqullah, who spoke to RFE/RL’s Radio Free Afghanistan after getting off a bus at Kabul’s main bus terminal.

Wearing a traditional piran-tumban and a checkered scarf, the 32-year-old says he lived for several years in the Iranian city of Zahedan, near the Afghan border, and found work in construction.

“It’s better here than in Iran,” says Sediqullah. “Even if I earn 300 afghanis ($4) [per day], it’s still more than I would make in Iran. I don’t think many Afghans will stay in Iran. Many will come back to Afghanistan.”

‘Massive Currency Devaluation’

Nick Bishop, emergency response officer for IOM Afghanistan, says that because “Afghans in Iran primarily work in the informal economy — [in] construction, agriculture, and other forms of labor — the demand for this type of work is drastically reduced.”

On January 1, a U.S. dollar was worth 42,900 rials. On July 31, the rial traded at a record low of 119,000 to the dollar.

The plummeting value of the rial has coincided with U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision in May to withdraw from the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and world powers. Washington is reimposing sanctions on Tehran in two stages, in August and November.

Economists say U.S. sanctions will severely affect Iran’s ability to conduct trade and restrict access to finances and foreign investment. It will also adversely affect Iran’s ability to sell oil, Tehran’s most lucrative export.

In April, Iran fixed the rial at 42,000 to the U.S. dollar, but black-market rates skyrocketed as Iranians rushed to illegal traders, seeking to protect their savings by buying dollars. In June, the government softened its stance after many banks refused to sell dollars at the artificially low rate.

The currency crisis has resulted in a spike in unemployment and in the cost of everyday goods.

Afghans Targeted In Iran

The downturn in Iran has particularly affected the estimated 1 million registered Afghan refugees and the estimated 1.5 million to 2 million undocumented Afghans living there. But its effects could be even more far-reaching.

“Afghans [in Iran] typically send home the main parts of their earnings in the form of monthly remittances. The Afghan economy itself will suffer direct and immediate effects. Less money coming from working males who are instead returning home to few jobs, combined with an ongoing drought and resource competition with other returnees, will mean a significant decline in the economy,” says the IOM’s Bishop.

For decades, Afghans have turned to Iran to earn a living, despite widespread reports of migrants facing violence and injustice there.

Tehran has expelled many Afghans, who are often blamed for insecurity and unemployment in Iran, and periodically threatens those who remain with mass expulsion.

Many of them moved to Iran following the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the civil war that followed the Soviet withdrawal. Others sought refuge in Iran after the Taliban took power in Afghanistan. Many have taken on menial work that is of little interest to Iranians.

In 2015, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a decree allowing all Afghan children to be allowed an education. But Afghans are still denied basic services, including access to health care, jobs, and even housing.

Frud Bezhan

Frud Bezhan covers Afghanistan and the broader South Asia and Middle East region.

BezhanF@rferl.org

Featured Photo courtesy RFE/RL: More than 400,000 undocumented Afghan migrants left Iran for Afghanistan so far in 2018, many of them in buses from Herat, near the Iranian border, to Kabul. (illustrative photo).

Via RFE/RL

Copyright (c) 2018. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave NW, Ste 400, Washington DC 20036.