However, contrary to the Emirati claim, Palestinians believe leverage would never come with normalization, but rather, it would only come by rejecting any engagement until the Palestinian state is concrete. Furthermore, Palestinians feared that “if [normalizations are] not conditioned on significant Israeli steps toward enabling the creation of a Palestinian state, [these kinds of normalization] debilitate the Palestinian national project.”

Guzansky and Heistein were also cautious about the Emiratis’ ability to influence the Israeli state. They warned that if it becomes clear that the UAE fails to change Israeli behavior over Palestine, this can hinder further normalization with other states. Guzansky and Heistein stated Should Israel and the UAE engage in a public spat on anything relating to the Palestinian issue, that would likely discourage those Arab or Muslim states weighing the prospect of normalization from moving ahead if it becomes apparent that these agreements are unable to influence Israeli policy in that regard.

Three years since normalization: When will leverage arrive?<  UAE, the Arab Group & China on Gaza Humanitarian Corridor Resolution | United Nations

Since the UAE and Israel have normalized relations, many symbolic and concrete steps have been taken between the two parties that are evidence of warm relations, from appointing ambassadors to direct flights. However, three years of normalization did not prove much leverage when it came to Emirati influence over Israel’s treatment of Palestinians. As much as it is evidence of the October conflict in which Israel responded disproportionately by claiming over 5,000 Palestinians’ lives, the UAE could not play a significant role in influencing Israel in previous Israeli aggression either. This was the case during Israeli aggression in Sheikh Jarrah

Looking back three years after normalization, Qatar increased its leverage more than the UAE, not because it increased its relations with Israel; instead, it became almost the most significant actor in the Arab world, which has relatively warm ties with Hamas. Qatar’s engagement with Hamas and its close relations with the US gave Doha an intermediary role between Hamas, Israel, and the US. On the other hand, the UAE not only recognized Hamas as a terrorist organization but also questioned the authority of the leader of the Palestinian Authority, as it no secret< that the UAE supports Mohammad Dahlan over Mahmoud Abbas. Furthermore, despite Egypt and Jordan having normalized their relations much earlier in 1979 and 1994, respectively, they never had publicly warm relations like the UAE. Therefore, not only did Israel-UAE normalization have much influence over the Israeli side, but the Emirates also lost even further credibility with the Palestinian side. Even with the normalization, the UAE could have balanced the relations better by upgrading its relations with different stakeholders in Palestine.  

What now? Will Saudi Arabia normalize with Israel?<  
The recent event showed, one more time, that none of the Muslim/Arab majority states have much leverage over Israel when it comes to ceasing the tension and decreasing the violence against Palestinians. Not only the UAE and other Arab countries, which normalized in post-2020, but also countries such as Turkey, whose relations go back to the founding years of Israel, Egypt, and Jordan, which have decades of recognition and are significant actors for Israeli security, have limited influence, especially in the last few years. Therefore, if these normalizations serve as an example, it would be naive to think that Saudi normalization will have a different fate.  

It was reported that Saudi Arabia and Israel were in the normalization process when Hamas’s surprise attack occurred on October 7. Saudi Arabia softened its condition from an independent state for Palestinians in 2002 to “a good life for the Palestinians” in 2023, an interpretation that the Israeli occupation is no longer a deal-breaker.

The Biden administration is keen to finalize the deal to kill two birds with one stone. The first bird is US domestic politics. Biden wants a diplomatic achievement that will beat the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco’s normalization with Israel, which was masterminded by Biden’s predecessor and, most likely, his rival in the upcoming presidential election, Donald Trump. The international bird is to make Chinese-brokered Riyadh-Tehran normalization less relevant as the Israel-Saudi alliance might create a stronger anti-Iranian bloc.

However, Saudi Arabia should consider what the UAE has earned and lost domestically and internationally before inking any agreement. Also, even though both states have similar authoritarianism, Saudi Arabia should be more aware of such normalization’s domestic and global reactions. Contrary to the UAE, Saudi Arabia claims leadership for the Islamic world as it hosts the two holiest sites for Muslims and also due to the state’s founding ideology. However, the latter has been eroded in recent years. Therefore, the Saudi Arabian leadership should consider these conditions before committing to any deal.

Analysts rushed to comment that the enlargement is anti-democratic and China-centric; however, a close look at the enlargement shows that the enlargement is not only about China but more of a consensus of the five powers, including, more importantly, India and Russia in addition to China. Of course, China is the most potent power in the bloc and might increase its influence over time. However, the current expansion shows that none of these countries are states that India and Russia reject, as they include Saudi Arabia and the UAE, two powers that have warm relations with India and an increasingly close relationship with Russia. Moreover, Brazil was already willing to accept Argentina as a member of BRICS in case it would help the neighbouring country in its quest for foreign reserves.

Indeed, these analysts ignore the warm relations between India and the two Gulf states, underestimate the tension between China and India, and tend to show the current members of BRICS under great Chinese influence, which is not necessarily true as India and China have significant issues, including but not limited to border crises. Otherwise, China President Xi Jinping’s meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the BRICS Summit in South Africa would not present a significant diplomatic incident.. The tension worsened in 2020 and cost the lives of 20 Indian soldiers.

Is BRICS+ the new G7?

In its current form, BRICS represents around 40.72 percent of the world population; if the new members accept the offer, the representation will rise to 45.95 percent, a significant rate as China and India’s share is around 35.48 percent. Similarly, the current GDP share of the BRICS is around 25.77 percent, while the expansion would bring it to around 28.99 percent, another significant increase as 17.86 percent of the current club’s GDP comes from China alone. On the other hand, the G7 represents around 27 percent of the world’s GDP and around 10 percent of the world’s population.

BRICS has long been considered an alternative initiative to the Western system as it includes Russia and China as leading powers, despite its loose institutionalization. One of the BRICS targets is to de-dollarise trade and bypass US sanctions on global trade. Indeed, BRICS created a development bank to encourage trade in local currencies and support developmental projects, an alternative to the Western-centric IMF and World Bank.

While BRICS, in its current form, does not challenge UN-based institutions, it can be considered an alternative to the G20 or G7, if not a rival. The G20, too, is not a very effective platform but a place where world leaders discuss significant issues and attempt to form a global agenda. Indeed, G20 meetings have recently been defined as “empty talks” by analysts.

China and the Gulf

While none of the new members states that China would reject their membership, showing their membership as pure Chinese influence is inherently wrong as they include two members of the GCC with India who already share close ties. The close ties between India and the GCC can be seen from the G20, too, as India invited the UAE and Oman as this year’s G20 guests, in addition to Saudi Arabia, a permanent member of the G20.

While India is particularly close to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates because of the number of expatriates in the Gulf, China is interested in these states for more strategic reasons. China made headlines in May when it brokered a normalisation agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, inviting Iran and its regional rivals Saudi Arabia and the UAE together to the bloc is interesting as the bloc does not want to include only the “isolated” countries from the Western system, preventing it from being a platform of excluded powers.

Even though the existence of Russia and China and their influence in the bloc signal anti-Americanism, BRICS, even in its 11-member form, is not inherently anti-American. Indeed, Brazil’s president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, stated, “We do not want to be a counterpoint to the G7, G20, or the United States.” This is an important message for Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as they do not want to exclude themselves from the American security umbrella but also want to diversify their security and strategic importance to gain leverage against the US. Thus, by joining this kind of organisation, they hit two birds with one stone.

Not long ago, in 2022, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were granted dialogue partners in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, an even bigger anti-Western organisation than the BRICS. Iran was granted full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Council in 2023. Therefore, despite Iran and its Gulf rival Saudi Arabia and the UAE not sharing warm relations and having situated themselves on different poles, if Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s role is upgraded to full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Council and Saudi Arabia accepts BRICS offers, these two non-Western organisations would be platforms where they can have dialogue and use it as leverage with the West. As these two clubs will be new platforms where non-Western states have leadership, they can offer more equal negotiations between Iran and its Gulf neighbours, as none would have better privileges over others.

Of course, considering the new members, including the closest US MENA partners such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt, one wonders if they are really asking for an alternative to US hegemony. In its 11-state form, the new bloc can benefit the organisation and the new members, including those directly linked to the US security umbrella. While Russia and China attempt to counterbalance the US-based Western system, most of the new members, most importantly in our case, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, attempt to diversify their geopolitical engagements with the rest of the world while still giving greater attention to the US and the West. The greater attention paid to the US and the West can be seen from their reactions to the offer, particularly Saudi Arabia’s. While UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed published a statement showing his appreciation of the offer, Saudi Arabia is yet to accept the offer and stated it will study the deal and give an appropriate decision,” a message to its Western allies that their priorities are still the West and also could be a bit disappointed by the offer to Iran too.

In short, considering the share of China and India’s oil and gas exports from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, along with India’s warm relations with these states, the invitation of these two states can be considered Indian-influenced as much as Chinese. Moreover, considering South Africa’s relations with Ethiopia and Brazil’s relations with Argentina, one can say BRICS’s enlargement is not solely Chinese dictation but more of a common ground for all members.

The initiation of Rightly can be justified by looking to recent Qatar-US relations. Qatar was isolated during the four-year presidency of Republican Trump both by its neighbors and by the US Presidency. Trump, who had problems with liberal media, was not a fan of Al Jazeera either. Because Qatar’s rivals (Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) think-tanks, lobbies, and media were closer to the right than left, they had more space and voice in the Trump administration. Qatar’s move in this sense seems more strategic as it does not want to be left out one more time when Republicans come to power.

Al Jazeera as a soft power

Even though the platform’s halt is not expected, one should remember that this move is not Al Jazeera’s first of its kind in the US. The Doha-based media network launched the Al Jazeera American in 2013 and closed it down in 2016 after spending around 2 billion dollars. Al Jazeera is one of the successful examples of ‘soft power.’ Qatar is a small but rich country thanks to its enormous gas reserves. The gas revenues transformed the tiny monarch into one of the most influential powers in the region. Internal and external investments accumulated the influence. Internally, Qatar invested in arts, sports, and public diplomacy, transforming the country into one of the regional hubs. Externally, Qatar invests in many countries’ real estate, finance, sports, and other sectors with the hand of its state investment funds. With these internal and external investments, Qatar not only became visible and known to the international audience but gained influence in the world.

Other than these investments, Qatar’s successful tool was its soft power strategy. Al Jazeera can be considered one of the most known and successful examples of its kind, not only for Qatar but for almost all ‘Global South.’ As a matter of fact, Al Jazeera has been considered as the voice of the Global South. The channel mostly undertakes a ‘liberal’ stand which is considered left in the US. Al Jazeera’s broadcasts of the Palestinian intifada, US occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, and finally the Arab Spring were remarkable to the degree that it raised tension between the parties. George Bush, for example, revealed his wish to bomb Al Jazeera’s center due to its coverage. Al Jazeera’s, once again, proved its effectiveness in Arab Spring protests in which it sided with the protesters over the dictators.

Al Jazeera’s Motivation on ‘Rightly’

Al Jazeera’s motivation to create a right-wing channel is twofold: American domestic politics and the other is Qatar’s motivation to increase its influence and bargaining power. The 2020 US election was one of the most unconventional elections in recent years. The sitting president rejected the outcome and suggested that the votes were stolen. What was more interesting was Twitter’s ban on Trump. Twitter had been the sole medium for Trump’s communication during his 4-year presidency. Thus, such a move caused Trump’s silence.

‘Silence’ was a frequently used term for Trump, suggesting that he was the voice of the silenced crowd, the voice of the voiceless. The fact that even the right-wing media platforms internal division increased the silent state of the right-wing. Fox News, for example, did not cover Trump as he wished so. At the same time, the left-wing media was flourishing both in traditional and social media. In this sense, Al Jazeera’s new move can be considered a pragmatic move aiming to fill the lacune. If Rightly succussed to the same degree of Al Jazeera Arabic or Al Jazeera English, then Doha will significantly influence the American right-wing audience.

The second motivation was the Al Jazeera Network’s ineffectiveness in 3.5 yearlong blockades to Qatar by its neighbors, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. As the right-wing President Trump exclusively and openly prioritized the material gains over everything, liberal platforms such as Al Jazeera English found it very difficult to influence Trump as Trump’s material gain was more in siding with the Saudi Arabi bloc. By creating the Rightly, Qatar aims to invest in influencing the right-wing politicians, including future Republican Presidents, to avoid the repeat of the same isolation. If Rightly achieve to gain the American right-wing audience, Qatar would be able to diversify its influence and secure its interests whomever it is power.

The question, however, is not limited to whether the Rightly will be visible but is the possible harm that it will create for the existing brands. As Al Jazeera has been the voice of Palestinians, Afghans, and Iraqis who suffer most from the Republican President’s decisions, will it be able to prevent its prestigious status for long?