Russia and Iran were major allies of Syria under the regime of President Bashar al-Assad until the totalitarian leader was ousted by rebels in early December.

The West is closely watching the new ruler’s actions, including the depth of any future ties with Tehran and Moscow.

“Syria cannot continue without relations with an important regional country like Iran,” Sharaa told Al Arabiya in a wide-ranging interview on December 29.

But relations “must be based on respect for the sovereignty of both countries and noninterference in the affairs of both countries,” he added.

Sharaa urged Tehran to rethink its regional policies and interventions and pointed out that opposition forces protected Iranian positions during the fighting to oust Assad, even though rebels knew Iran was a major backer of the president.

Sharaa said he had expected positive overtures from Iran following these actions but said they have not been forthcoming.

Sharaa, previously known by the nom de guerre Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, said that while he expects Moscow to withdraw its forces from Syria, he also spoke of “deep strategic interests” with the “second most powerful country in the world.”

“Ahmad al-Shara,” Digital, Dream / Dreamland v3/ Clip2Comic, 2024

“We don’t want Russia to exit Syria in a way that undermines its relationship with our country,” he told Al-Arabiya, without providing details.

“All of Syria’s arms are of Russian origin, and many power plants are managed by Russian experts…. We do not want Russia to leave Syria in the way that some wish,” he said.

According to flight data analyzed by RFE/RL, Russia is reducing its military footprint in Syria and shifting some of its assets from the Middle Eastern country to Africa.

To offset the potential loss of its air base in Hmeimim and naval base in Tartus, Russia appears to be increasing its presence in Libya, Mali, and Sudan, although experts say the loss of Syrian bases is a major blow to the Kremlin.

Meanwhile, Sharaa also said that organizing elections in the country could take up to four years and that a new constitution could require three years to be finalized.

The leader expressed hope that the new U.S. administration under Donald Trump — set to take office on January 20 — would lift sanctions on his country.

“We hope the incoming Trump administration will not follow the policy of its predecessor,” Sharaa said.

The rebels who ousted Assad were led by Sharaa’s Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) Islamist group, a U.S. and EU-designated terrorist organization.

Sharaa has publicly pledged to adopt moderate policies regarding women’s rights, national reconciliation, and relations with the international community, although world leaders say they remain wary of the new rulers pending concrete actions.

RFE/RL

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( RFE / RL ) – The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government at the hands of rebels, including Ankara-backed factions, has effectively made Turkey the dominant foreign actor in Syria at the expense of Iran and its ally Russia.

Turkey and Iran have competed for years for influence in the South Caucasus, and this rivalry appears to have now extended to the Levant.

“The Islamic republic has had significant misgivings about Turkish influence in Syria, be it economic, political, or military, long before the fall of Assad. But with the loss of Iran’s sole state ally in the region, these concerns are set to be magnified exponentially,” said Behnam Taleblu, an Iran analyst at the Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD).

Still, experts say Turkey’s rising profile in Syria to the detriment of Iran does not necessarily mean Ankara-Tehran relations will be significantly impacted.

What Is Turkey After?

Since the onset of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Iran and Russia backed Assad while Turkey supported rebel groups opposed to his rule.

Iran needed Assad to remain in power so that it could use Syria as a staging ground to fund and arm its proxies and partners, especially the Lebanese group Hezbollah.

For Russia, Assad’s rule meant Moscow could maintain its Hmeimim air base and naval base in Tartus, which gave it easier access to the Middle East, North Africa, and the Mediterranean Sea.

Ankara wanted a government in Syria more aligned with its regional vision and policies, especially those that would restrain Kurdish groups in northeastern Syria. A coalition of Kurdish parties, including the Democratic Union Party (PYD), heads the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria.

PYD’s armed wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), leads the U.S-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

“Turkey has had three core concerns in Syria: fighting the YPG/PYD, enabling the return of Syrian refugees to Syria, and preventing further refugee flows into Turkey,” said Daria Isachenko, a Turkey expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

Assad’s downfall on December 8 has stemmed the influx of refugees into Turkey, but the “first two concerns remain,” Isachenko added.

Syria is now effectively ruled by the U.S.-designated terrorist organization Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its allies — some of whom are linked with Turkey, Iran’s rival.

Isachenko says Turkey’s growing influence in Syria could further strengthen its position in the Mediterranean Sea if Ankara signs a Libya-style maritime deal with the new authorities in Damascus.

The Road Ahead

Turkey’s growth in stature and Iran’s weakened position in Syria could have ramifications for developments in the South Caucasus, where Iran, Russia, and Turkey vie for influence.

Experts say while the Astana talks — a format sponsored by the three countries to end the conflict in Syria — may be dead, it still served as a platform for managing different interests.

“Coordination and consultation on conflict management between Turkey and Iran as well as Russia on the Middle East and the South Caucasus should not be ruled out,” Isachenko said.

She adds that even in Syria, Turkey and Iran may find some of their interests aligned, such as finding a common adversary in Israel, which has moved into Syrian territory since the fall of Assad.

“Turkish Victory in Syria,” Digital, Dream / Dreamland v3 / Clip2Comic, 2024

Still, some argue that Tehran will seek to undermine Turkey in Syria in the hopes of returning the country into its so-called axis of resistance — Iran’s loose network of regional allies and proxies.

“The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps will look for ways to claw back influence in Syria,” said Taleblu of FDD.

“Downtrodden, disposed, and spurned local actors are easy to co-opt, particularly in states where central authority is weak.”

The Kurdish Question

U.S. support for the Kurdish-led SDF has weakened in recent years due to a combination of factors, including the withdrawal of a majority of U.S. troops in 2018 and 2019 and pressure from Washington’s NATO ally, Turkey.

Ankara, which launched an incursion into northern Syria in 2019 against Kurdish forces, is now in a strong position to further challenge the Kurds, experts say.

Since Assad’s fall, Ankara-backed rebel groups have clashed with Kurdish forces and seized the previously Kurdish-controlled cities of Manbij and Tarafat near the border with Turkey.

Wladimir van Wilgenburg, an Iraqi Kurdistan-based analyst who has co-authored books on Syrian Kurds, says the presence of the 900 remaining U.S. troops might offer some protection to the Kurds but the situation remains precarious.

“The new administration in Damascus likely will prefer relations with Turkey over the SDF,” he said. “The situation is difficult for the Kurds unless they reach an agreement with HTS.”

HTS leader Ahmad al-Sharaa, previously known by the nom de guerre Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, wants to unify all armed groups in Syria under one banner. But if the SDF were to join, it would effectively end Kurdish autonomy in Syria, Wilgenburg says.

Via RFE / RL

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( RFE/RL ) – Russia is reducing its military footprint in Syria and shifting some of its assets from the Middle Eastern country to Africa, flight data and satellite imagery analyzed by RFE/RL appear to show.

Moscow seems to have withdrawn a significant amount of military equipment from its bases in Syria since President Bashar al-Assad, Russia’s longtime ally, was ousted from power on December 8.

To offset the potential loss of its air base in Hmeimim and naval base in Tartus, Russia looks to be increasing its presence in Libya, Mali, and Sudan. But experts say the African countries are unlikely to be viable alternatives.

Still, flight data and satellite imagery suggest Russia is transferring some of its military assets from Syria to its facilities in Africa.

Losing its Syrian bases would be a major strategic setback for Russia, which has used the facilities to project its power across the Middle East and Africa.

Moscow has said it is still in negotiations with the new government in Damascus over the future of its military bases in Syria. But the significant movement of Russian military equipment suggests it is preparing for a partial or full withdrawal from Syria, experts say.

Russia has several bases in Africa, where Moscow has boosted its military footprint in recent years. They include facilities in Libya, Mali, the Central African Republic, and Sudan.

Moving a significant amount of military equipment from Russia or Syria to Africa, however, will be costly, experts say.

File Photo by Gala Iv on Unsplash

“To carry out important operations Russia will have to pay a lot of money. Both for its air and sea fleet,” said Roland Marchal of the Paris Institute of Political Studies.

It would also be more difficult to fly cargo jets all the way from Russia to Africa loaded down with heavy weaponry, with refueling a major challenge. That also assumes Russia can secure overflight rights from Turkey, a regional rival.

Despite the costs, Russia appears to be moving some of its military assets from Syria to bases in Mali and Libya, which is home to an estimated 1,200 Russian mercenaries.

Satellite images also show increased activity in Russia’s naval base in Sudan. Moscow signed a deal to open a base on the African country’s Red Sea coast in 2019. It is unclear if the naval facility is fully operational.

Flight analysis shows Moscow sending cargo planes to Libya, with some coming from Syria and others from Russia.

There has been heavier than usual traffic in recent weeks between Russia and Libya, although it is unclear what the planes were transporting.

A Russian Ilyushin Il-76 jet — a heavy-lift workhorse cargo plane — flew from Russia to Libya on December 12, went back to Russia a day later, and immediately flew back to Libya, flight records show.

Flight records from December 16 also show an Ilyushin Il-76 jet flying from Russia to Moscow’s military base in Bamako in Mali. The jet returned to Russia the next day.

Cargo planes flying from Russia to Libya used the air space of Turkey, a NATO member.

The Washington-based Institute for the Study of War said on December 12 that Russia’s logistical challenges in reaching Africa “will increase the political leverage that Turkey will hold over Russia.”

The think tank also mentioned the “practical costs of supporting Russian operations in Africa if more cargo planes stop to refuel at other airfields.”

Mark Krutov of RFE/RL’s Russian Service contributed to this report.

Maja Zivanovic

( RFE/ RL ) – Iranian police released singer Parastoo Ahmadi in the early hours of December 15 following a brief detention after she performed without the mandatory head scarf, her lawyer has confirmed.

Ahmadi caused a stir on social media earlier this week after recording a performance with her hair uncovered and wearing a dress. The performance, recorded with a crew of male musicians, was uploaded to YouTube.

The police on December 14 claimed she was released after a “briefing session” but a source close to the family told RFE/RL’s Radio Farda that she remained in custody. Her lawyer Milad Panahipur also denied the police claim, writing on X that the authorities were “lying” about her release.

The following day, Panahipur confirmed Ahmadi, who had been detained in her home province of Mazandaran, was released at 3 in the morning.

Two of her bandmates, Soheil Faqih-Nasri and Ehsan Beyraqdar, were also detained briefly.

Ahmadi’s Instagram account is no longer accessible, but her YouTube account remains active.

The video of her performance, dubbed “an imaginary concert” because female performers cannot sing solo in front of an audience, has received around 1.6 million views on YouTube since it was uploaded on December 11.

On December 12, the authorities said legal proceedings had been launched against Ahmadi and her bandmates for the “illegal concert.”

Ahmadi, who gained prominence during the 2022 nationwide protests after singing a song in support of demonstrators, has been widely praised for her performance.

On social media, many have hailed her for fighting “gender apartheid” and showing “bravery, resilience, and love.”

A rising number of women have been flouting the mandatory hijab in public since the 2022 protests, which gave rise to the Women, Life, Freedom movement.

The authorities have tried to crack down and recently passed a law enhancing the enforcement of the hijab by introducing hefty fines, restricting access to basic services, and lengthy prison sentences.

The new hijab and chastity law, which has been widely criticized by even conservative figures, is scheduled to go into effect this month, but at least two lawmakers have said its implementation has been postponed by the Supreme National Security Council.

Via RFE/ RL

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Parastoo Ahmadi: “Karvansara Concert, Parastoo Ahmadi”

Khamenei on December 11 also implicitly blamed Turkey for the lightning push of Syrian rebels who reached Damascus from their strongholds in the northwest with little resistance.

“It should not be doubted that what happened in Syria was the product of a joint American and Zionist plot,” he said.

“Yes, a neighboring government of Syria plays, played, and is playing a clear role…but the main conspirator, mastermind, and command center are in America and the Zionist regime,” Khamenei added.

The U.S.-designated terrorist organization Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its allies — some of whom are linked with Turkey — ousted Assad on December 8, less than two weeks after launching their offensive.

Syria under Assad served as a crucial part of a land corridor connecting Iran to the Levant, which was considered the logistical backbone of the so-called axis of resistance — Iran’s loose network of regional proxies and allies.

Iran spent billions of dollars and sent military advisers to Syria to ensure Assad remained in power when civil war broke out in 2011.

Russia — where the ousted Syrian leader has been granted political asylum — also backed Assad, while Turkey has supported rebel groups who aimed to topple the regime.

A Khamenei adviser once described Syria as the “golden ring” in the chain connecting Iran to its Lebanese partner, Hezbollah. With the ring broken and Hezbollah’s capabilities degraded after a devastating war with Israel, experts say the axis has become severely weak.

“Foiled,” Digital, Dream / Dreamland v3 / Clip2Comic, 2024

Khamenei said only “ignorant and uninformed analysts” would assess that the axis has become weak and vowed that its reach “will expand across the region more than before.”

Reza Alijani, an Iranian political analyst based in France, told RFE/RL’s Radio Farda that Khamenei’s comments were more “trash talk” than anything else.

“The axis may not have been defeated, but it has suffered a serious blow and the Islamic republics arms in the region have been deal major hits,” he said.

Alijani argued that factions within the Islamic republic’s core support base may be starting to question Khamenei’s policies and vision after the recent setbacks, which he said is a cause for concern among the clerical establishment’s top brass.

With reporting by Hooman Askary of RFE/RL’s Radio Farda

Via RFE/ RL

Copyright (c)2024 RFE/RL, Inc. Used with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

( RFE/ RL ) – Iran and Saudi Arabia have been bitter rivals for decades, vying to lead competing branches of Islam and standing on opposing sides of conflicts in Syria and Yemen.

But Tehran and Riyadh have taken major steps to de-escalate tensions and boost cooperation, a move that appeared unthinkable until recently.

The rapprochement has coincided with growing fears of an all-out war in the Middle East, where U.S. ally Israel is engaged in wars against Iranian-backed groups in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon.

The detente process has intensified since Donald Trump’s decisive victory in the U.S. presidential election earlier this month. The president-elect has pledged to bring peace to the region.

“I don’t view this as a warming of relations but rather as a cautious detente,” said Talal Mohammad, associate fellow at the Britain-based Royal United Services Institute.

Reassuring Iran

The first signs of a thaw came in March 2023, when Iran and Saudi Arabia restored diplomatic relations after more than seven years following a surprise Chinese-brokered agreement.

But it was Israel’s invasion of Gaza in October 2023 — soon after the U.S.- and EU-designated Palestinian terrorist group Hamas carried out an unprecedented attack on Israel — that gave real impetus to Iran-Saudi rapprochement efforts.

Since the war erupted, Iran and Israel have traded direct aerial attacks for the first time. The tit-for-tat assaults have brought the region to the brink of a full-blown conflict.

Saudi Arabia is “concerned that these escalating tensions between Israel and Iran could spiral out of control and lead to a broader regional conflict that may impact their interests,” said Hamidreza Azizi, fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

Azizi adds that Sunni-majority Saudi Arabia and Shi’a-dominated Iran are still “far from friends,” despite the recent rapprochement, and they remain rivals vying for influence.

Over the past year, Saudi Arabia has stopped conducting air strikes in neighboring Yemen against the Iran-backed Huthi rebels. Riyadh has also made attempts to negotiate an end to the 10-year conflict pitting the Huthis against the Saudi-backed Yemeni government.

The Huthis have also ceased cross-border attacks on Saudi Arabia. In 2019, the rebels managed to shut down half of the kingdom’s oil production.

The Trump Factor

Trump’s victory in the November 5 presidential election has injected more urgency to the Iran-Saudi rapprochement, experts say.

Saudi Arabia’s top general, Fayyad al-Ruwaili, made a rare trip to Iran on November 10 to meet Armed Forces Chief of Staff Mohammad Baqeri in what Iranian media dubbed “defense diplomacy.”

The following day, Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman accused Israel of committing “collective genocide” against Palestinians in Gaza and explicitly condemned Israel’s attack last month on Iranian military sites.

Azizi says there are fears in the region that Trump’s electoral victory will embolden Israel to intensify its attacks on Iran and Tehran’s interests.

During Trump’s first term in office from 2017 to 2021, his administration pursued a campaign of “maximum pressure” on Iran that included imposing crippling sanctions against Tehran.

At the same time, Trump struck a close relationship with Riyadh. He helped facilitate normalization between several Arab states and Israel under the so-called Abraham Accords.

Before Israel launched its devastating war in Gaza, Saudi Arabia was reportedly on the verge of a historic deal to normalize relations with Israel.

Experts say that the Huthis’ attacks in 2019 on Saudi oil facilities convinced Riyadh that Washington will not come to its aid if it is attacked.

“Given Trump’s tendency toward unpredictable shifts in policy, Saudi Arabia may seek to play an influential role by encouraging Trump to adopt a balanced approach that ensures regional stability without triggering escalation with Iran,” Mohammad said.

“By subtly guiding U.S. policy toward calibrated sanctions rather than aggressive pressure, Saudi Arabia could help maintain regional security while avoiding the risks of open confrontation,” he added.

Israeli Normalization

Normalization talks between Saudi Arabia and Israel have been indefinitely postponed. Saudi officials have recently said that a deal was off until the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

Mohammad says Riyadh has significant strategic incentives to normalize relations with Israel, including security and economic cooperation as well as access to U.S. nuclear and defense technology.

But analysts say Saudi Arabia will only resume talks when the Gaza war is over, given the current public sentiment in the Muslim world toward Israel.

“Normalizing relations without achieving tangible rights for Palestinians could weaken Saudi Arabia’s normative influence within the Islamic world — a position they are keen to maintain,” Azizi argued.

The Saudis will also have to take into account Iran, which staunchly opposes Saudi normalization with Israel.

“Riyadh may consult with Tehran and seek assurances that normalization with Israel would not heighten hostilities or undermine the balance achieved through recent diplomatic outreach to Iran,” Mohammad said.

Copyright (c)2024 RFE/RL, Inc. Used with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

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Al Jazeera English: “Iran-Saudi defence meeting: Generals discuss bilateral relations and cooperation”

RFE/ RL

( RFE/RL RFE/RL ) – Israel’s two-front war in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon, as well as the threat of escalation with Iran, have put the Middle East crisis on boil.

But despite the risk of all-out war involving regional powers Israel and Iran, experts say there is little appetite for a diplomatic solution.

This is largely because the main obstacles to peace are immovable without incentive and persuasion, and the only actors capable of changing the situation are either reluctant to act or are in a position to benefit from escalation, analysts say.

“There are diplomatic solutions to this crisis, but they have to center on the de-occupation of Palestine, since that is the root cause of the conflict,” said Trita Parsi, co-founder of the Washington-based Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.

The main obstacle to such an outcome, Parsi said, “is Washington’s refusal to sincerely push Israel to end its occupation.” If the United States “fundamentally changes its approach, these diplomatic solutions will become politically viable.”

The United States is a key ally of Israel, a major recipient of U.S. arms and aid. But Israel has charted its own course, despite some U.S. pressure, and it is unclear if other players would scale down their military activities in response to Israeli de-escalation.

Expanding War

Israel is currently involved in a two-front war against Iran-backed armed groups — the U.S.-designated terrorist organizations Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Israel launched its war in Gaza a year ago in retaliation for Hamas’s deadly assault on its territory. More recently, the war expanded into Israel’s aerial bombardment and ground invasion of Lebanon intended to cripple Hezbollah and its ability to strike Israel with rockets and missiles.

Hezbollah is both an armed group and political party that controls much of southern Lebanon. The EU has not blacklisted its political wing, which has seats in the Lebanese parliament.

Iran, which helped establish Hezbollah four decades ago to serve as its lead proxy in its shadow war against archenemy Israel, has also engaged in tit-for-tat attacks with Israel in recent months, leading to fears of a broader war involving the two regional heavyweights.

Of the two fronts, analysts told RFE/RL, Israel is more inclined to engage in diplomatic efforts with Hamas because it is interested in securing the release of scores of Israeli hostages taken by Hamas in the October 7, 2023, assault.

Who Has The Military Edge?

Recent polls have shown that Israeli public opinion considers the release of the hostages as the top objective of the war in Gaza.

Israel’s killing of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, the alleged mastermind of the October 7 attack and considered by Washington to be a “massive obstacle to peace,” is also seen as a potential breakthrough.

The State Department characterized Sinwar’s October 17 death as an opportunity to end the conflict in Gaza and secure the release of Israeli hostages. President Joe Biden said it was now “time to move on” and secure a cease-fire.

Hezbollah Seeks Relief

In Lebanon, only Hezbollah and its key backer Iran want a cease-fire because the militant group has “taken such very heavy blows,” according to Middle East expert Kenneth Katzman, a senior adviser for the New York-based Soufan Group intelligence consultancy.

“I don’t think Israel necessarily wants a lot of diplomacy,” he said.

“The End of Diplomacy,” Digital, Dream / Dreamland v3, 2024

Iran, meanwhile, has recently made the rounds among Arab Gulf States in an effort to persuade them to help deter Israel from attacking key targets in Iran. Fears of Israeli attacks against Iranian oil and even nuclear facilities have risen since Iran fired around 180 ballistic missiles on Israel on October 1.

But while some Gulf states have normalized relations with both Iran and Israel, and helped blunt Iran’s missile and drone attack on Israel in April, experts are skeptical of their influence in this diplomatic arena.

“The Arab states have very little sway over Israel, but they have some sway with Washington,” Parsi said in written comments.

Staying On The Sidelines

The Gulf states, as well as Washington, also have their own incentives to stand aside because they want to see Hezbollah weakened, experts said.

Thanassis Cambanis, director of the U.S.-based Century Foundation think tank, said that Saudi Arabia and most of the Gulf states “are tacitly willing to tolerate or even support” the war against Hezbollah because it provides them an advantage in “their own regional contest for power with Iran.”

In Gaza, Cambanis said, “there is a real perverse lack of incentive” for either Hamas or the Israeli government to work out a cease-fire because extending the conflict helps each of them hold onto power.

Cambanis said that a diplomatic process that involved serious U.S. leverage “could very quickly and very easily end the conflict as it stands now.”

But he said that diplomacy cannot currently resolve the underlying causes of the war.

“I don’t think it’s reasonable to expect diplomacy to come up with a long-term solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Nor do I expect diplomacy to urgently come to a long-term resolution of the boundary disputes between Lebanon and Israel,” Cambanis said.

Via RFE/RL

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( RFE/ RL) Muhammad Nasser’s life was torn apart after Hamas, the U.S.- and EU-designated Palestinian terrorist group, carried out an unprecedented attack on Israel one year ago.

Within hours of the October 7 attack that killed some 1,200 people, Israel launched one of the deadliest and most destructive bombing campaigns in modern history in the Palestinian enclave.

Nasser was a reporter working for local and international media outlets in Gaza City, the territory’s capital. But when Israeli forces launched a ground invasion of Gaza weeks later, he was forced to flee his home and drop his profession.

“We had to evacuate quickly and couldn’t take any personal belongings, not even clothes,” Nasser, who lived in the city of Beit Lahia, west of Gaza City, told RFE/RL’s Radio Farda. “I didn’t even have time to get into my car.”

Nasser, a father of six, has also lost members of his extended family in the yearlong war.

“My sister and all her children were killed,” said Nasser, adding they were taking shelter at a school run by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in northern Gaza when it was targeted by Israeli forces.

Israel’s war has taken a huge toll on civilians and infrastructure in Gaza, one of the most densely population areas in the world.

Over 41,000 Palestinians, most of them civilians, have been killed in Gaza since October 7, according to the Hamas-run Health Ministry. Israel has said it has killed around 17,000 Hamas fighters.

More than 85 percent of Gaza’s residents, or over 1.9 million people, are internally displaced in the enclave, the UN estimates. Meanwhile, nearly the entire population of the Gaza Strip is facing starvation due to an extreme lack of food.

“Displacement,” Digital, Dream / Dreamland v3 / Clip2Comic, 2024

Nasser and his family have been constantly on the move to evade Israeli forces and air strikes. They now live in a tent in Al-Mawasi, a narrow strip of land along the Mediterranean Sea.

But even there, Nasser says he fears they will be targeted by Israeli warplanes, which have hit refugee camps, schools, and hospitals in the past year.

Israel said that it has targeted “terror” infrastructure and buildings in Gaza and has accused Hamas of using civilians as human shields.

“My children, my relatives, and I are in grave danger,” said Nasser. “Our relatives are scattered. We can’t even gather in one place to meet.”

He is not alone.

Hakeem, a civil engineer from Gaza City, has also been internally displaced.

“Our entire focus is on finding a safe place to take refuge,” the 41-year-old told Radio Farda. “Where is safer? Where can we get water? This is what our life has become.”

There is no end in sight to Israel’s war in Gaza, which has also killed at least 346 Israeli soldiers. Hamas has been militarily weakened but is still firing rockets on Israel from the strip.

Israel has expanded its war in recent weeks by invading Lebanon and launching air strikes targeting Hezbollah, the armed group and political party that controls much of southern Lebanon.

Despite the escalating violence engulfing the region, Hakeem hopes to one day return to his home in Gaza City.

“We dream of being able to rebuild our lives, return to the north, and regain the life we had before October 7,” said the father of four.

Written by Kian Sharifi based on reporting by Iliya Jazaeri of RFE/RL’s Radio Farda

Copyright (c)2024 RFE/RL, Inc. Used with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

Via RFE/ RL

( RFE/RL ) – The Taliban has attempted to police the public appearances and behavior of millions of Afghans, especially women, since seizing power in 2021.

But the enforcement of the extremist group’s rules governing morality, including its strict Islamic dress code and gender segregation in society, was sporadic and uneven across the country.

Now, the hard-line Islamist group has formally codified into law its long set of draconian restrictions, triggering fear among Afghans of stricter enforcement.

The Law On the Propagation Of Virtue And Prevention Of Vice, which was officially enacted and published on August 21, imposes severe restrictions on the appearances, behavior, and movement of women. The law also enforces constraints on men.

Adela, a middle-aged woman, is the sole breadwinner for her family of 10. She is concerned that the new morality law will erode the few rights that women still have.

The Taliban has allowed some women, primarily in the health and education sectors, to work outside their homes.

“I fear that Afghan women will no longer be able to go to their jobs,” Adela, whose name has been changed to protect her identity, told RFE/RL’s Radio Azadi.

Dilawar, a resident of the capital, Kabul, warned of a public backlash if the Taliban intensified the enforcement of its widely detested restrictions.

“The youth are suffering from extreme unemployment. Oppressing them…will provoke reactions,” the 26-year-old, whose name was also changed due to security concerns, told Radio Azadi.

Long List Of Restrictions

The new morality law consists of 35 articles, many of which target women.

Women are required to fully cover their faces and bodies when in public and are banned from wearing “transparent, tight, or short” clothing. The law also bans women from raising their voices or singing in public.

Women must also be accompanied by a male chaperone when they leave their homes and cannot use public transport without a male companion.

The law forbids unrelated adult men and women from looking at each other in public.

Men must also dress modestly, even when playing sports or exercising. They are prohibited from shaving or trimming their beards. Men are also compelled to attend prayers as well as fast during the holy Islamic month of Ramadan.

“[Men] should not get haircuts, which violate Islamic Shari’a law,” says one of the articles in the law. “Friendship and helping [non-Muslim] infidels and mimicking their appearance” is prohibited.

Afghans are forbidden from “using or promoting” crossses, neckties, and other symbols deemed to be Western.

Premarital sex and homosexuality are outlawed. Drinking alcohol, the use of illicit drugs, and gambling are considered serious crimes.

Playing or listening to music in public is banned. Meanwhile, the celebration of non-Muslim holidays, including Norouz, the Persian New Year, are also prohibited.

The Taliban’s dreaded morality police are responsible for enforcing the morality law. The force, believed to number several thousand, is overseen by the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice.

Under the new law, the powers of the morality police have been expanded.

Members of the force will be deployed across the country to monitor compliance, according to the law. Members of the morality police are instructed to issue warnings to offenders. Repeat offenders can be detained, fined, and even have their property confiscated.

The morality police can detain offenders for up to three days and hand out punishments “deemed appropriate” without a trial.

The Taliban revealed last week that the force detained more than 13,000 Afghans during the past year for violating the extremist group’s morality rules.

‘Hellish Conditions’

The Taliban’s morality law has been widely condemned by Afghans, Western countries, and human rights organizations.

The Taliban has defended the law, which it claims is “firmly rooted in Islamic teachings.”

“This new law is deeply harmful,” said Heather Barr, associate women’s rights director at Human Rights Watch. “It represents a hardening and institutionalization of these rules by giving them the status of law.”

She said the law is a “serious escalation” and “swift slide to ever more hellish conditions for Afghan women and girls.”

Roza Otunbaeva, head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, on August 25 called the law a “distressing vision for Afghanistan’s future” because of the broad powers the Taliban’s morality police will have “to threaten and detain anyone based on broad and sometimes vague lists of infractions.”

Obaidullah Baheer, a lecturer of politics at the American University of Afghanistan, said that parts of the morality law are “extremely vague.”

Yet, the morality police are given broad powers, including to “arbitrarily” punish people without due process, he said.

“[This is] making them the judge, jury, and executioner,” said Baheer.

Via RFE/RL

Copyright (c)2024 RFE/RL, Inc. Used with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

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Bonus Video added by Informed Comment:

“Women banned from speaking in public by Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers” | BBC News