(The Conversation) – With Iran’s firing of some 180 ballistic missiles at Israel overnight, the Middle East is again on the brink of what would be a costly, ruinous regional war. Israel and its ally, the United States, shot down most of the missiles.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu immediately vowed to retaliate for the attack. He called it a “big mistake” that Iran will “pay for”.

The strike marked a dramatic shift in Iran’s calculations following weeks of escalating Israeli attacks on the leaders of its proxy groups, Hamas and Hezbollah, and their forces in both Gaza and Lebanon.

Iran has traditionally outsourced its fighting to Hezbollah and Hamas. It has been very much concerned about getting dragged into direct confrontation with Israel because of the ramifications for the ruling regime – namely the possible internal dissent and chaos that any war with Israel might generate.

When Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh was killed in Tehran in late July, Iran’s leaders said they would respond appropriately. They basically left it to Hezbollah to do that.

And as Israel intensified its military campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon in recent weeks, another Iranian proxy group, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, claimed to have retaliated by launching missiles and drones at Israeli cities and US destroyers in the Red Sea. Israel responded with airstrikes on Yemen.

In this context, from the Iranian point of view, it looked like Iran was just sitting on the fence and not performing its leadership role in challenging Israel. So, to a large extent, Iran had to exert its role as the leader of the so-called “axis of resistance” and get into the fight.

Fighting Israel is very much a pillar of state identity in Iran. The Iranian political establishment is set up on the principle of challenging the United States and freeing Palestinian lands occupied by Israel. Those things are ingrained in the Iranian state identity. So, if Iran doesn’t act on this principle, there’s a serious risk of undermining its own identity.

A delicate balancing act

Yet there are clearly serious risks to this type of direct attack by Iran.

Domestically, the Iranian political regime is suffering from a serious crisis of legitimacy. There have been numerous popular uprisings in Iran in recent years. These include the massive “Women, Life, Freedom” movement that erupted following the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody for allegedly not properly wearing her hijab.

There is also a major dissenting view in Iran that challenges the regime’s anti-US and anti-Israel state identity and its commitment to perpetual conflict with both countries.

So, the authorities in Iran have been concerned that direct confrontation with Israel and the US would unleash these internal dissenting voices and seriously threaten the regime’s survival. It’s this existential threat that has stopped Iran from acting on its principles.

In addition, Iran has a new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, who belongs to the reformist camp and has an agenda of improving Iran’s relations with the West. He has been talking about reviving the Iran nuclear deal with the international community, sending signals that Iran is prepared to talk with the Americans.

But the problem is the regional dynamics have completely changed since that deal was negotiated with the Obama administration in 2015. Iran has been a pariah state in recent years – and even more so since the conflict between Israel and Hamas began a year ago.

Since then, no Western country would deem it appropriate or politically expedient to engage in nuclear talks with Iran, with the aim of alleviating international sanctions on the regime. Not at a time when Iran is openly calling for the destruction of Israel, supporting Hezbollah and Hamas in their attacks on Israel, and now engaging in confrontations with Israel itself.

So the timing is awful for Pezeshkian’s agenda of repairing the damage to Iran’s global standing.

“Iran Ballistic,” Digital, Dream / Dreamland v3 / Clip2Comic, 2024

Ultimately, though, it’s not the president who calls the shots in Iran – it is Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Supreme National Security Council who consider matters of war and peace and decide on the course of action. The supreme leader is also the head of state and appoints the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

The IRGC generals have been advocating for more serious and resolute action against Israel ever since the war in Gaza started. And it looks like the supreme leader has finally listened to this advice.

So, the regime has been maintaining a delicate balance of these factors:
preserving Iran’s state identity and what it stands for in the region, and the need to manage internal dissent and ensure its survival.

In normal circumstances, it was easy for Iran to maintain this balance. It could manage its internal opponents through brutal force or appeasement and advocate an aggressive foreign policy in the region.

Now, the scales have tipped. From the Iranian perspective, Israel has been so brazen in its actions against its proxies, it just didn’t look right for Iran to continue sitting on the fence, not taking action.

As such, it has become more important for Iran to emphasise its anti-American, anti-Israel state identity and perhaps deal with an acceptable level of risk coming from a rise in internal dissent.

Where things go from here

With its attack on Israel, Iran is also prepared for another risk – direct retaliation from Israel and all-out war breaking out.

The conflict in the region is really going according to Netanyahu’s playbook. He has been advocating for hitting Iran and for the United States to target Iran. Now, Israel has the justification to retaliate against Iran and also drag the United States into the conflict.

Unfortunately, Iran is also now prepared to see the entire Persian Gulf get embroiled in the conflict because any retaliation by Israel and perhaps the United States would make US assets in the Persian Gulf, such as navy ships and commercial vessels, vulnerable to attacks by Iran or its allies. And that could have major implications for trade and security in the region.

This is the way things are heading. Iran would know that hitting Israel would invite Israeli retaliation and that this retaliation would likely happen with US backing. It seems Iran is prepared to bear the costs of this.

Shahram Akbarzadeh, Convenor, Middle East Studies Forum (MESF), and Deputy Director (International), Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

In a thinly veiled reference to Iran’s engagement with the international community – and specifically the United States – Khamenei said Iran should not pin its hopes on such engagement, but that is no reason not to hold talks with the enemy.

This is the kind of green light that Pezeshkian needs to engage again with the International Atomic Energy Agency and Western countries on Iran’s nuclear program, and to engage with international interlocutors over its heightened tensions with Israel.

This statement seems to signal a desire to walk back from the brink of an all-out war with Israel over the assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh on Iranian soil in July and revert back to the mutual deterrence that had defined their relationship for years.

This, however, may not be an option given how much the region has changed over the past year.

Crossing a threshold in April

In April of this year, Israel targeted Iran’s embassy complex in Damascus, killing members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.

This led to a carefully choreographed Iranian response. Iran could not ignore the Israeli attack, which the authorities condemned as an assault on Iranian sovereign territory, but did not wish to go into war with Israel. As a result, Iran reportedly gave advance warning of its impending response, which allowed Israel and its allies to shoot down most of the 300-odd missiles and drone fired from Iran.

This response was nonetheless seen as a victory in Iran, as it demonstrated its technological capacity to reach Israel. It also marked a departure from Iran’s default position of talking tough, but not getting involved in direct confrontation.

Iran clearly crossed a threshold in April, but seems very uneasy about the consequences.

Then, on July 31, Haniyeh was assassinated while on a visit to Iran. Although Israel has neither confirmed or denied responsibility, it is widely believed to have been behind it.

This has put the Iranian leadership in a bind. There have been calls from hardliners for retaliation to restore Iran’s image as a country that can defend itself and avenge the killing of a close ally. Khamenei has also insisted Israel will be punished for its action, but the time would be of Iran’s choosing.

It is clear the Iranian leadership cannot afford to look weak and risk damaging their standing among their allies and proxies in the region, which include Hamas, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthi rebels in Yemen and other Shi’a militant groups in Iraq and Syria. But there are also other considerations that weigh heavily on their mind.

“Ayatollah Khamenei,” Digital, Dream / Dreamworld v3, Clip2Comic, 2024.

A crisis of legitimacy

A direct response to Israel could open a Pandora’s box. It would pave the way for further direct attacks by Israel, perhaps even targeted assassinations of Iranian leaders.

This is a real possibility. Israel has demonstrated its willingness to respond to any threat with force under the rubric of self-defence. It has also demonstrated its ability to carry out precision attacks in Iran, such as its retaliatory strike on a radar system in the city of Isfahan after Iran’s missile and drone attack in April.

Furthermore, such escalation presents the real risk of drawing the United States into the conflict.

The Iranian leadership has made an art of brinksmanship. Anti-Americanism is ingrained in the political discourse of the political elite and frames Iranian foreign policy. But Iran has so far avoided war with the United States, because that could risk everything.

The reason: Iran’s leaders are already nervous about their political future, and conflict with Israel and the US could seriously exacerbate the situation.

There is a major disconnect between large segments of society and the ruling regime at the moment. Two years ago, Iran was rocked by spontaneous anti-regime mass protests under the banner of “Woman, Life, Freedom”. They started in response to the death of Mahsa Amini in custody for not wearing her hijab properly, but soon morphed into an anti-establishment revolt that called for the “fall of dictatorship” and an end to the Islamic regime. The revolt was put down by force, arbitrary detentions and executions.

The death of President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in May this year offered an opportunity for the ruling regime to seek a reconciliation with its reformist critics. Pezeshkian, a reformist parliamentarian, was vetted and approved to run in the election to replace Raisi with the intention of increasing voter turnout. Iran’s supreme leader has repeatedly pointed to the voter turnout rate as an indicator of the regime’s legitimacy.

Yet, the participation rate in the first round of the election was just 39.9% – the lowest in a presidential election in Iran’s history – and only reached 49.8% in the final round. This points to the depth of public disillusionment with the political system. Many reformists boycotted the election and dismissed the exercise as a sham and smokescreen for the ruling regime.

Iran’s crisis of legitimacy is at its highest point, making it ripe for another explosion. War with Israel or the United States can ignite this tinder box.

A potential solution for Iran?

So the Iranian leadership faces a dilemma. It cannot walk back from its anti-Israel and anti-US rhetoric. Tehran has built its foreign policy and formed an extensive network, the so-called Axis of Resistance, based on it. It cannot betray this pillar of its identity.

But acting on it would risk the survival of the regime. So the leadership has been looking for an increasingly difficult-to-find balance.

Hezbollah’s recent exchange of fire with Israel may have been the answer. By supporting Hezbollah, Iran can claim to have inflicted pain on Israel without striking itself.

This is aimed at restoring the status quo that existed before April. This strategy outsources the fighting to Hezbollah and Iran’s other proxies to protect the ruling regime from a direct confrontation and ward off an existential threat to the leaders’ rule.

But this may be wishful thinking. This strategy could give Israel the justification it needs to strike Iranian targets again. And this, in turn, could serve as the spark for the public’s pent-up frustration aimed at the brutality of the ruling regime.

Shahram Akbarzadeh, Convenor of the Middle East Studies Forum (MESF), and Acting Director the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The ruling clerical regime in Iran has built its foreign policy on the pillar of anti-Americanism, rejecting what it frames as the “injustice” of US domination and “bullying” of other countries. Washington’s continued support for Israel’s war on Gaza in the face of an increasing international backlash has only reinforced this narrative.

While the US has tried to backtrack and signal that humanitarian considerations should guide Israel’s conduct of the war, the damage to US credibility has been done. Many around the world – and specifically in Muslim countries – do not see the belated US warnings to Israel as genuine.

And Tehran’s message of anti-Americanism is resonating with large segments of the public in the Muslim world.

In one regional opinion survey in late October, for instance, just 7% of respondents said the US had a positive impact on the war, compared to 40% who viewed Iran’s role as positive.

And in December, the highly respected Arab Barometer reported that approval ratings for the Iranian supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, had surpassed those of the Saudi crown prince and Emirati president.

This change in Iran’s standing in the region is being watched with concern by the political elite in the neighbourhood.

What Iran sought to achieve by attacking Israel

Iran’s image has been further enhanced by the fact it is the only Muslim state to attack Israel against the backdrop of public outrage over the war in Gaza.

The Iranian missile and drone attack on Israel on April 13 was calibrated to achieve two key objectives.

First, Iran’s leaders sought to preserve the country’s image as the self-appointed head of the “axis of resistance”, comprised of its proxies in the region – Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and other militia groups in Iraq and Syria.

Iran also wanted to demonstrate the effectiveness of its deterrence model, which is based on the threat of retaliation against Israeli aggression through its proxy actors and expanding missile and drone technology.

Hindustan Times Video: “‘Get Out Now’: Iran-linked Kata’ib Hezbollah’s Ultimatum To U.S. Troops In Iraq | Details”

Coming two weeks after the Israeli attack on its diplomatic mission in Damascus, Iran could not afford to outsource its response to its proxies. While Iran was clearly not ready to start a war with Israel, not responding in-kind to the Israeli attack would have made it look weak and seriously diminished its standing among its allies and proxy groups.

But Iran’s leaders sought to minimise the damage and mitigate the risk of escalation by warning Israel of its attack in advance through intermediaries. This way, Iran could save face without getting embroiled in an all-out war.

Iran’s second objective was to demonstrate to the world that it has the drone and missile technology to hit back at Israel, if it chooses.

For more than a decade, Iran has showcased its missiles during annual military parades to support its claim it can hit Israel if threatened. Its attack last month involved more than 300 drones and missiles. Notwithstanding the fact the damage was minimal, the attack was proof Iran now has the capacity to inflict pain on Israel.

Israel’s limited response to Iran suggests that war has been averted, much to the relief of neighbouring countries. But the long-term implications are more favourable for Iran. This show of strength has likely helped its rejectionist foreign policy find receptive ears in the Muslim world and beyond.

When Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi visited Pakistan on April 23, for example, he was greeted like a celebrity. This was ironic as, earlier this year, Iran and Pakistan had engaged in tit-for-tat aerial attacks.

The two countries agreed to boost bilateral trade to US$10 billion (A$15 billion) a year, about five times the current level. They also released a joint statement calling on the UN Security Council to take action against Israel, saying it had “illegally” targeted neighbouring countries and foreign diplomatic compounds.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi also offered a message of support to Iran, saying:

China noted Iran’s statement that its action was restrained and was an act of self-defence in response to the attack on its embassy.

What this could mean for the region

The implications of a more emboldened Iran for the region are severe. The Iranian authorities feel vindicated by the events of the last seven months. This means their anti-US and anti-Israel rhetoric will remain staunch as ever.

Iran’s drone and missile research and development program is also likely to receive a boost. And Iran’s support for its network of proxies and allies will remain firmly in place, as this enables the Iranian leadership to project power beyond its borders and retain its deterrence capability.

None of this bodes well for Iran’s neighbours. An ideologically energised Islamic regime in Iran would be less accommodating to regional concerns, particularly those aired by governments that have already normalised relations with Israel (such as the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain), or are believed to be heading in that direction (Saudi Arabia).

Moreover, the political credibility of many Arab leaders has suffered in the eyes of their citizens due to their perceived ineffectiveness in supporting the Palestinians in Gaza.

Iran’s leaders did not plan the series of events that started with the Hamas attacks on Israel on October 7. In fact, they were just as surprised by Hamas’ actions as the Israeli intelligence agencies. But they are the obvious beneficiary of the turn of events.

The United States and Israel are gifting Iran and its message of defiance enormous appeal, well beyond the imagination of Iranian authorities.

Shahram Akbarzadeh, Convenor of the Middle East Studies Forum (MESF), and Acting Director the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

(The Conversation) – Iran has warned Israel of severe consequences from “multiple fronts” if it does not halt its relentless bombardment of the Gaza Strip.

This warning is widely interpreted as a declaration of intent for Iran to enter the conflict via its allies and proxies. The Hezbollah militant group, which is already engaged in low-level skirmishes across the Israeli border with Lebanon, and the Assad regime in Syria are both closely aligned with Iran.

Given Iran’s increasingly hostile rhetoric, Washington and Tel Aviv have been deliberating over what to do if and when Tehran gives the order to engage.

Israel’s position on Iran has been uncompromising. In the past, it has advocated for surgical strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and has been implicated in the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists.

Iran’s potential entry into the Gaza war would open a new chapter in hostilities between the enemies – and take the war directly to Iran’s doorstep.

Military and political repercussions

Despite its warnings to Israel, Iran appears reluctant to take the route of directly entering the conflict for fear of risking a harsh Israeli response.

As a result, Iran has been maintaining a difficult balance between its ideological rhetoric and political expediency. But Iran is playing with fire. The balance it seeks to maintain can be easily disrupted in the unpredictable fog of war.

Tehran’s official line is extreme. It denies Israel the right to exist, and refers to it not as a state, but as a Zionist entity. Iranian official declarations are replete with anti-Israel tirades.

Embed from Getty Images
ranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei speaks during a meeting in Tehran, Iran on October 25, 2023. (Photo by Iranian Leader Press Office / Handout/Anadolu via Getty Images)

In June, Tehran unveiled its latest missile and boasted that it had the range to reach Israel. Banners announcing the missile had the words “400 seconds to Tel Aviv” printed in Persian, Hebrew and Arabic.

This message is integral to the ideology of the ruling regime and a rallying cry for its supporters.

Anti-Israel and anti-US venom is a staple of political discourse for the hardline faction that governs Iran under Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Ebrahim Raisi. This faction is bolstered by its control of the judiciary, the parliament and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.

In fact, there are now calls from the hardline camp to follow through with the promise of destroying Israel. The editor-in-chief of Kayhan Daily, known as the mouthpiece of Khamenei, has called for an official declaration of war against Israel.

However, the authorities do not have a death wish. They are fully aware that open confrontation with Israel – or even a confrontation by one of Iran’s proxies – could be very costly for Iran. Not only could there be an Israeli military retaliation on Iranian facilities, but also political repercussions for a regime increasingly unpopular with its own citizens.

The Iranian public is disillusioned with the regime’s ideological zeal against Israel and sees it as a ploy to hide corruption, economic woes and the inability of the government to provide for its citizens.

The chant often heard at protests over the past decade – “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon, I sacrifice my life for Iran” – is a vivid reminder of the gap between the ruling regime and the population.

Widespread protests across Iran following the killing of Mahsa (Zhina) Amini have shown the depth of regime’s unpopularity in the past year. Given this, a military confrontation with Israel could have unpredictable political consequences for the regime.

Al Jazeera English: “Iran warns Israel to stop war in Gaza: FM says situation like ‘powder keg’”

A hostage of its own rhetoric

The ruling regime in Iran has been mindful of US and Israeli red lines to avoid open hostilities.

After the US assassination of celebrated war hero Qassem Soleimani in January 2020, for example, Iranian authorities were enraged and promised “harsh retaliation”. But the response was relatively meek: a pre-warned strike on two Iraqi airfields that housed US troops.

Iran has also followed the same approach in relation to Israel. The survival of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria with Russian and Iranian backing ensured Iran has the capacity to launch attacks on Israel, but it has deliberately refrained from doing so.

This is despite the fact Israel has repeatedly targeted Iranian assets in Syria. In 2018, for example, Israel carried out air sorties in Syria that hit 70 Iranian targets.

In 2020, a similar operation was carried out by Israel to attack Iranian military targets in Syria. And again this year, before the Gaza War, Israel launched air strikes against Iranian forces in Syria. Iran’s response to these acts has been mute.

Iran is a hostage of its own inflammatory rhetoric. The regime has made its political fortune on rejecting the West and Israel. The Palestinian cause has been trumpeted as central to its worldview.

This posture has attracted a following in the Muslim world. And Iran shamelessly exploits this to gain advantage over its Arab rivals, whom Tehran accuses of betraying Palestinians and their plight.

Yet, the Iranian leadership is fully aware that crossing red lines and engaging in open confrontation with Israel (or the US) could pose an existential threat to the regime. That is why Iran has consistently pulled back from the brink of war and opted for low-intensity skirmishes via its proxies that serve its ideological grandstanding but do not jeopardise its survival.

Whether Iran can continue this game of brinksmanship in such a tense and explosive environment is an open question. Iran may not order Hezbollah to unleash its missiles on Israel, but this doesn’t mean it couldn’t happen by accident, through a chain of errors, or even by design.

Just because Iran has trained and sponsored Hezbollah, we cannot automatically assume Tehran has full control over all of its levers.

Shahram Akbarzadeh, Convenor of the Middle East Studies Forum (MESF), and Deputy Director (International) at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University, Deakin University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Despite their differences, the reformist and the hard-line leadership in Iran consistently urged Iranians to take part in elections, presenting it as a matter of national duty. On the eve of the February polls, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei pleaded with the voting public to participate in the elections even if they did not like him, because the future of the country depended on it. This was the most explicit acknowledgement of the widening gap between the regime and the public, and an attempt to appeal to patriotic instincts.

President Hassan Rouhani also referred to similar concepts of national pride and unity to urge electoral participation. He also spoke about the bond between the state leaders and the people that is renewed periodically at elections. He insisted on the idea of the ‘republic’ as a pillar of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The low participation rate and the election results are a significant blow to the regime and to Rouhani.

The election delivered a landslide victory for hard liners. There is an established correlation between high participation rates and the electoral fortunes of the reformist faction in Iran. Low turn-out at the ballot boxes hurts reformers. The reformist camp had a number of setbacks and disappointments during President Rouhani’s term in office which alienated the reformist voting public. The sense of disillusionment with the capacity of reformist and pragmatic leaders to bring change was overwhelming for the majority of the voters.

President Rouhani came to office in 2013 with a popular mandate to bring Iran back from the brink of collapse. His message of hope inspired the public and allowed him to push through a historic nuclear deal with P5+1 (the five permanent members of UN Security Council and Germany). Despite the excitement it generated, the nuclear deal failed to bring Iran out of isolation. In 2018, President Donald Trump withdrew from the deal, snapped back extensive sanctions on Iran by way of exerting ‘maximum pressure’ on the regime and slapped secondary sanctions on any international company that contravened US-imposed sanctions on Iran. This has brought the Iranian economy back to the brink and has resulted in periodic public displays of outrage and frustration.

Iran is more isolated under Rouhani than his firebrand predecessor President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Tensions in the Persian Gulf with the US Navy, the US killing of commander Ghasem Soleimani and Iran’s missile attack on a US base in Iraq have boxed Rouhani in a position of confrontation with the United States. His hard-line critics had long criticised Rouhani’s policy as misguided and ‘weak’ in relation to the United States and see President Trump’s hostile posturing on Iran as vindicating that view.

President Rouhani has also failed to address rampant corruption and mismanagement, key campaign topics against his predecessor’s administration. Politically, Rouhani has spoken regularly about moderation and tolerating diversity of views, but the political scene in Iran did not witness an opening up during his presidency. It is not surprising that voters in his natural electoral base have become disillusioned with his promises and his ability to deliver. This erosion of confidence in Rouhani is symptomatic of the disarray in the reformist camp and evaporating hopes of improving conditions by working within the system.

President Rouhani is now in the unenviable position of working with a hostile parliament. He is cornered internally and externally. His hard-line critics blame him for putting his trust in the good will of the United States and making Iran look weak, while Washington and its regional allies treat him with contempt. There seems no room left for Rouhani to regain the posture of a statesman and salvage his legacy. He is unlikely to be able to take any major foreign policy initiative in his last year in office, which does not bode well for Iran’s behaviour in the region. Rouhani has been reduced to a caretaker president until the next presidential election in 2021, which in all likelihood will bring a hard-liner into office.

The Iranian leadership repeatedly urged for mass participation at the parliamentary elections, calling it a patriotic and Islamic duty and a show of unity in the face of US ‘maximum pressure’. The record low turn-out delivered a major blow to the regime and put on public display the significant disconnect between the public and the ruling regime.

——

Bonus Video added by Informed Comment:

CBS: “Iran’s hardliners win all parliament seats in Tehran”

Iran had warned Europe that it would start dismantling the nuclear accord if the promised economic benefits of the agreement did not materialise. A year after the US withdrew from the nuclear deal, otherwise known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, and imposed very strict sanctions on Iran, the Iranian leadership appears ready to give up on finding a diplomatic solution to this deadlock.

This bodes ill for the future of President Hassan Rouhani and regional security. A weakened Rouhani will find it difficult to fend off his hard-line critics in Iran and keep the nuclear deal alive.

With every step away from diplomacy, the hard-liners have taken a step forward and appear to be now setting the political agenda in Iran.

Rouhani’s riskiest gamble

The JCPOA was signed in 2015 between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany.

This was Rouhani’s greatest achievement and riskiest gamble. He faced the ire of hard-liners in Iran who continue to have a formidable presence in the parliament, as well as the security and judicial system.

They accused Rouhani of selling out Iranian sovereignty and betraying the ideals of the Islamic revolution by scaling back Iran’s nuclear program and subjecting it to an unprecedented international monitoring regime.

Rouhani nonetheless pushed through his agenda of finding a diplomatic solution to Iran’s isolation because he believed that years of sanctions and mismanagement had pushed the Iranian economy to the brink of collapse.

He staked his political fortunes on bringing Iran out of isolation.

The JCPOA was the compromise deal to assure the international community that Iran would not pursue a nuclear weapons program in return for sanctions relief to revive the Iranian economy.

But US President Donald Trump never liked the deal. He campaigned against it and often questioned Iran’s commitment to it, though the UN International Atomic Energy Agency consistently reported on Iran’s compliance with the terms of the agreement.

Read more:
Why Donald Trump is backing the US into a corner on Iran

Despite much lobbying by European powers, Trump withdrew from the deal in May 2018 and reimposed severe unilateral sanctions on Iran, and anyone dealing with Iran.

Losing control to the hard-liners

Trump’s decision to tear up the nuclear deal was seen by the conservatives in Iran as a vindication of their feelings towards the United States. They lambasted Rouhani for putting his trust in the US.

In May 2019, the situation got even more tense after Trump announced that US warships were sailing to the Persian Gulf to counter potential Iranian hostility. No intelligence regarding a suspected Iranian threat was shared.

The escalation of tensions following the alleged Iranian attack on two oil tankers last month, and the downing of a US reconnaissance drone by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards has made it very hard to find a diplomatic solution. Drums of war are silencing voices of diplomacy.

While Rouhani came to office with an olive branch, he realises that he has effectively lost the political contest against his hard-line critics. He has another two years in office, but is at risk of losing the presidency if the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who yields ultimate power in Iran, is disillusioned with his performance.

This realisation has seriously undermined Rouhani, who appears to have adopted the language and posture of the hard-liners in relation to the US. It is unclear if this can save him in office, or embolden his critics who seem to be gaining significant momentum.

In May, the Supreme Leader appointed a battle-hardened General as the commander of the Basij paramilitary force, an arm of the Revolutionary Guards that suppresses domestic dissent.

This was a significant development for the hard-liners in case they seek to assert political control. Basij has been a ruthless security force inside Iran and can provide the necessary street support for a potential coup against Rouhani.

Another notable military commander is General Qasem Soleimani, who has enjoyed a meteoric rise in Iran due to his performance as commander of Quds Force, the Revolutionary Guards’ international arm operating mostly in Iraq and Syria to defeat the Islamic State.

He is considered a war hero by the public and now has the confidence of the Supreme Leader. This is an ominous development for Rouhani.

Breaking with the tenets of the nuclear deal was also clearly not Rouhani’s objective, as it would reverse his hard-won diplomatic gains and discredit his legacy.

Iran’s recent breaches on uranium enrichment and stockpiles were incremental steps to exert pressure on European leaders to adhere to their promises of sanctions relief. This strategy was predicated on the assumption that Europe has more to lose with the collapse of JCPOA than a rift with the United States. It can only be described as a desperate move, showing that Rouhani is fast running out of options.

The window of opportunity for a diplomatic solution is fast closing and the alternative scenario of the return of a combative government in Tehran is looking more and more unavoidable. This would shut the doors to diplomacy and increase the chance of confrontation with the West.

Trump accused Iran of not wanting to sit at the table. He may be fulfilling his own prophecy.

An earlier version of this article implied General Qasem Soleimani was the leader of the Basij security force, when he is actually the commander of the Quds Force.

Shahram Akbarzadeh, Professor of Middle East & Central Asian Politics, Deputy Director (International), Alfred Deakin Research Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

—

Bonus video added by Informed Comment:

Hindustan Times: “French diplomat meets top Iranian official to salvage nuclear deal”

But he did make a public statement about the US commitment to expanding its Persian language broadcast into Iran to counter state censorship, in a strategy reminiscent of the US approach to the former Soviet Union, and subsequently the post-Soviet republics that went through Colour Revolutions in the first decade of the 21st Century. The outcome of that strategy in the post-Soviet space was the sidelining of the pro-Moscow elite and the ascendency of a pro-US leadership. Given the tone of Trump and Pompeo on Iran and the pointed commitment to making US media accessible in Iran, it is hard to avoid drawing a parallel with that historical experience. This is a regime change strategy on the cheap.

Coupled with the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal and the reimposition of US sanctions on Iran, this strategy shuts the gate to any prospects of renewed negotiations. The change of tenor from the Obama era makes it impossible for President Rouhani to continue advocating talks with the United States. Rouhani has been under immense pressure by his hard-line critics for giving up too much control over Iran’s nuclear program to secure a deal in 2015. With President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the deal despite confirmation by the International Atomic Energy Agency that Iran has been compliant with its agreed obligations, Rouhani’s critics have doubled their attacks asking for his resignation.

Even the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei who tries not to be drawn into factional fighting made a public statement to say the US turn-away from the deal was a ‘defeat’ for Rouhani.

Rouhani has tried to defend his political fortunes by adopting a tough-line on the United States, while hoping to save the deal with assistance from the European Union, Russia and China. However, just as diplomatic overtures and deal-making signified foreign policy in Rouhani’s first term, his second term in office is being defined by rapidly escalating tensions with the United States. Rouhani cannot afford to look weak in the face of US hostility and has employed a combative language in response to the Trump administration.

Rouhani mocked the United States for trying to drive a wedge between the Iranian people and the government and evoke a Persian warning of a fool who played with a lion’s tail. Rouhani’s change of tone was also evident while on a trip to Europe a week earlier, when he warned the US not to try and block Iranian oil exports, otherwise no oil will flow through the Persian Gulf. This was widely seen as a threat to block the Strait of Hormuz, a bottle-neck for oil shipments from littoral states of the Persian Gulf. Subsequently, the Iranian Supreme Leader added more weight to that threat by endorsing the idea as an option for Iran.

Growing tension between Iran and the United States and the consequent resumption of sanctions is a nightmare for Rouhani, who came to office with the promise of bringing Iran out of isolation. He has tried to respond to the changed international climate by sounding more and more like his hard-line critics. But the reality is that he is now very vulnerable to a political challenge from those critics. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), with its immense economic muscle and direct line of report to the Supreme Leader (as the Head of State), has been publicly sceptical of Rouhani’s diplomatic overtures and is now gleeful in his set-back. The IRGC welcomed President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the nuclear deal and saw it as an opportunity to revert US-Iran relations back to the pattern of hostility that characterised it for most of the last decades.

The Trump administration’s avowedly anti-Iran agenda and the pursuit of regime change has made President Rouhani a hostage to the hard-line faction and sabotaged his capacity to bring Iran out of isolation. There is little to block IRGC from pushing Rouhani aside, only the Supreme Leader’s concern with setting a precedent, and claiming a more direct role in running the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Featured Photo: AFP/File / Nicholas Kamm, HO. A war of words has erupted between US President Donald Trump and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani.