Russia and Iran were major allies of Syria under the regime of President Bashar al-Assad until the totalitarian leader was ousted by rebels in early December.

The West is closely watching the new ruler’s actions, including the depth of any future ties with Tehran and Moscow.

“Syria cannot continue without relations with an important regional country like Iran,” Sharaa told Al Arabiya in a wide-ranging interview on December 29.

But relations “must be based on respect for the sovereignty of both countries and noninterference in the affairs of both countries,” he added.

Sharaa urged Tehran to rethink its regional policies and interventions and pointed out that opposition forces protected Iranian positions during the fighting to oust Assad, even though rebels knew Iran was a major backer of the president.

Sharaa said he had expected positive overtures from Iran following these actions but said they have not been forthcoming.

Sharaa, previously known by the nom de guerre Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, said that while he expects Moscow to withdraw its forces from Syria, he also spoke of “deep strategic interests” with the “second most powerful country in the world.”

“Ahmad al-Shara,” Digital, Dream / Dreamland v3/ Clip2Comic, 2024

“We don’t want Russia to exit Syria in a way that undermines its relationship with our country,” he told Al-Arabiya, without providing details.

“All of Syria’s arms are of Russian origin, and many power plants are managed by Russian experts…. We do not want Russia to leave Syria in the way that some wish,” he said.

According to flight data analyzed by RFE/RL, Russia is reducing its military footprint in Syria and shifting some of its assets from the Middle Eastern country to Africa.

To offset the potential loss of its air base in Hmeimim and naval base in Tartus, Russia appears to be increasing its presence in Libya, Mali, and Sudan, although experts say the loss of Syrian bases is a major blow to the Kremlin.

Meanwhile, Sharaa also said that organizing elections in the country could take up to four years and that a new constitution could require three years to be finalized.

The leader expressed hope that the new U.S. administration under Donald Trump — set to take office on January 20 — would lift sanctions on his country.

“We hope the incoming Trump administration will not follow the policy of its predecessor,” Sharaa said.

The rebels who ousted Assad were led by Sharaa’s Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) Islamist group, a U.S. and EU-designated terrorist organization.

Sharaa has publicly pledged to adopt moderate policies regarding women’s rights, national reconciliation, and relations with the international community, although world leaders say they remain wary of the new rulers pending concrete actions.

RFE/RL

Copyright (c)2024 RFE/RL, Inc. Used with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

( RFE/RL ) – Russia is reducing its military footprint in Syria and shifting some of its assets from the Middle Eastern country to Africa, flight data and satellite imagery analyzed by RFE/RL appear to show.

Moscow seems to have withdrawn a significant amount of military equipment from its bases in Syria since President Bashar al-Assad, Russia’s longtime ally, was ousted from power on December 8.

To offset the potential loss of its air base in Hmeimim and naval base in Tartus, Russia looks to be increasing its presence in Libya, Mali, and Sudan. But experts say the African countries are unlikely to be viable alternatives.

Still, flight data and satellite imagery suggest Russia is transferring some of its military assets from Syria to its facilities in Africa.

Losing its Syrian bases would be a major strategic setback for Russia, which has used the facilities to project its power across the Middle East and Africa.

Moscow has said it is still in negotiations with the new government in Damascus over the future of its military bases in Syria. But the significant movement of Russian military equipment suggests it is preparing for a partial or full withdrawal from Syria, experts say.

Russia has several bases in Africa, where Moscow has boosted its military footprint in recent years. They include facilities in Libya, Mali, the Central African Republic, and Sudan.

Moving a significant amount of military equipment from Russia or Syria to Africa, however, will be costly, experts say.

File Photo by Gala Iv on Unsplash

“To carry out important operations Russia will have to pay a lot of money. Both for its air and sea fleet,” said Roland Marchal of the Paris Institute of Political Studies.

It would also be more difficult to fly cargo jets all the way from Russia to Africa loaded down with heavy weaponry, with refueling a major challenge. That also assumes Russia can secure overflight rights from Turkey, a regional rival.

Despite the costs, Russia appears to be moving some of its military assets from Syria to bases in Mali and Libya, which is home to an estimated 1,200 Russian mercenaries.

Satellite images also show increased activity in Russia’s naval base in Sudan. Moscow signed a deal to open a base on the African country’s Red Sea coast in 2019. It is unclear if the naval facility is fully operational.

Flight analysis shows Moscow sending cargo planes to Libya, with some coming from Syria and others from Russia.

There has been heavier than usual traffic in recent weeks between Russia and Libya, although it is unclear what the planes were transporting.

A Russian Ilyushin Il-76 jet — a heavy-lift workhorse cargo plane — flew from Russia to Libya on December 12, went back to Russia a day later, and immediately flew back to Libya, flight records show.

Flight records from December 16 also show an Ilyushin Il-76 jet flying from Russia to Moscow’s military base in Bamako in Mali. The jet returned to Russia the next day.

Cargo planes flying from Russia to Libya used the air space of Turkey, a NATO member.

The Washington-based Institute for the Study of War said on December 12 that Russia’s logistical challenges in reaching Africa “will increase the political leverage that Turkey will hold over Russia.”

The think tank also mentioned the “practical costs of supporting Russian operations in Africa if more cargo planes stop to refuel at other airfields.”

Mark Krutov of RFE/RL’s Russian Service contributed to this report.

Maja Zivanovic

Arab 48 reports that the Polish newspaper Rzeczpospolita, the organizer of the ceremony to be held on January 27, Deputy Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, said, “We are bound to respect the decision of the International Criminal Court in the Hague.”

Rzeczpospolita reported that the Israeli state never asked that Netanyahu participate in the ceremonies, since the Israelis know very well what Warsaw’s response would be if Netanyahu traveled there.

Netanyahu has throughout his political career played politics with the Holocaust, so it is deeply ironic that he cannot attend the ceremony because he is charged with himself having committed war crimes and crimes against humanity. Genocide scholars have criticized the use of the Holocaust to justify Israeli atrocities in Gaza.

The ICC issued the arrest warrant for Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on November 21, 2024 on the charge of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Gaza Strip, including a charge of deliberately starving the Palestinians there.

The countries that have vowed to arrest the Israeli prime minister if he steps foot on their soil include Spain, Holland, Belgium, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovenia. Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo said, “We cannot implement a double standard.”

There is a background to the satisfaction Poland might take in arresting Netanyahu, whose father Benzion Mileikowsky was born in Warsaw. The family changed their name in Israel.

The Poles maintain that the Holocaust was a Nazi German project implemented in part on Polish soil when Poland was occupied and helpless. The Polish parliament in 2018 even passed, and then backed off, a law making it illegal to accuse Poles of having been implicated in the commission of the genocide against the Jews.

In 2019, Netanyahu was quoted as saying in the presence of several journalists, “The Poles collaborated with the Nazis, and I don’t know anyone who was ever sued for such a statement.” He made similar statements on social media, but they were quickly deleted.

Tel Aviv at the time was planning an 8-nation conference in Israel of center-right governments, and the Poles were among the invitees. They boycotted, accusing Netanyahu of racism, which affected the prime minister’s prestige. He then maintained that it was all a misunderstanding and he never said any such thing but had been misquoted.

The two countries clashed again in 2021 over a Polish law limiting any further property claims for damages during the Holocaust. The law was of a piece with the general denial of any Polish culpability in the Holocaust.

Poland has been more sympathetic to Palestinian statehood aspirations than Israel’s right-wing government is comfortable with.

On the other hand, Poland has not itself been vocal in denouncing Israeli actions in Gaza, which Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch categorize as a genocide. Two-thirds of Poles in polling say they don’t want to get involved in the Israel-Palestine dispute.

He nevertheless had the gall to accuse the Prime Minister of Ireland of being a bigot, closing the Israeli embassy in Dublin on the grounds that he views virtually all Irish people as racists. Hmm. There must be a word for when you negatively stereotype an entire people…

Likely the move came in response to Ireland’s recent decision to join in South Africa’s complaint against Israel for genocide with the International Court of Justice. Even more dangerous for the government of Benjamin Netanyahu and Gideon Saar, Ireland is seeking a more practicable definition of genocide. Current international legislation puts too much emphasis on intent and sets the bar for finding genocide so high it is almost impossible to meet.

Deputy Prime Minister Micheál Martin complained, “a very narrow interpretation of what constitutes genocide leads to a culture of impunity in which the protection of civilians is minimised.” He said the Irish view of the genocide convention is “broader” and prioritizes “the protection of civilian life.”

Some things about Saar should be remembered. In his youth he was a member of the far right Tehiya Party and he actively protested the 1982 Israeli withdrawal from Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula as a result of the Camp David peace accords. In other words, Saar has all his life held anti-Arab views and he wants to occupy and colonize the lands of his neighbors. The United Nations Charter, to which Israel is a signatory, forbids acquiring the territory of neighbors through aggressive war, but that was what Israel did in 1967 when it launched an invasion of Egypt, which had not militarily attacked it.

As Interior Minister, Saar rounded up African migrants in Israel and put them in a detention camp. He defended it and wanted to expand it. The camp was just for Africans. Hmm. There must be a word for when you target a particular racial group for collective punishment …

Saar opposed then President Trump’s “Deal of the Century” because it implied some form of a Palestinian state. Saar says Israel must remain the only state “from the river to the sea” (alert American university presidents, who seem to think this diction is racist). He firmly rejects any state for a Palestinian, insisting that they must remain stateless and under Israeli control forever. He says there can never be “two states for two peoples.” He wants to annex much of the Palestinian West Bank, a violation of international law. He considers Hebron (al-Khalil), a major Palestinian city in the Palestinian West Bank, to be part of Israel.

He said that Gaza “must be smaller” after the war, another advocacy of a war crime.

Let’s just imagine an American politician who wanted to occupy Manitoba or Tijuana militarily, who rounded up migrants and put them in camps, and who declared that there can be only one sovereign country in North America and it must be White. Those would be the US equivalents of Saar’s politics. Those politics, in our context, would be forthrightly characterized by everyone as racist.

It is one of the great ironies of our time that a man with these views can have the temerity to brand Irish President Michael D Higgins and Prime Minister (Taoiseach) Simon Harris racist bigots who are prejudiced against Jews.

Higgins gave as good as he got, saying “I think it’s very important to express, as president of Ireland, to say that the Irish people are antisemitic is a deep slander. To suggest because one criticises Prime Minister Netanyahu that one is antisemitic is such a gross defamation and slander.”

Juan Cole, “Pot’o’Gold,” Digital, Dream / Dreamland v. 3, 2024

Higgins came to the same realization as everyone else who has been gaslighted by right-wing Zionists with their phony (and cynical) charges of Jew-hatred whenever anyone objects to Israeli war crimes:

“Originally… I put it down to lack of experience but I saw later that it was part of a pattern to damage Ireland.”

It is sort of like if families of victims murdered by mid-twentieth-century Vegas hit man Bugsy Siegel were accused of only complaining because they didn’t like Jews.

Higgins insisted that Ireland “cannot be knocked off our principle[d] support of international law.” He pointed out that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is the one who has broken international law. [The International Criminal Court has issued an arrest warrant for Netanyahu.]

The Irish president pointed out that the Israeli government is currently violating “the sovereignty of three of his neighbours.” That would be Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. If Saar had his way it would be four, and would include Egypt.

Higgins made the remarks as he accepted the credentials of the new Palestinian ambassador to Ireland. Ireland, Spain and Norway reacted to Israel’s Gaza genocide by recognizing the state of Palestine last May.

The Irish equivalent of The Onion, WW News, made up some amusing reactions. They had one person, asked about the departure of the Israeli embassy from Dublin, say, “Is this the first time the Israeli government has actually given up property?”

Another joke: “Since the embassy will be going spare, we can probably let Palestinian refugees move in?”*

—–

*Revised.

(The Conversation) – The lightning-fast collapse of the Assad regime in Syria has sent shock waves across the Middle East. The disposal of the dictator whose family had ruled the country with an iron fist for more than half a century has triggered a potentially seismic shift in the balance of power in the region.

But there are also important repercussions beyond Syria and its neighbourhood – with Russia one of the more significantly affected powers.

Back in 2015, Assad’s regime had been on the brink of collapse. It was saved by a Russian intervention – with support from Iran and Hezbollah. Launched in the context of a growing threat from Islamic State, Russia enabled Assad’s regime to push back other rebel forces as well.

Over the years that followed, it enabled Assad to consolidate control over the capital, other key cities, and in particular the coastal region where Russia had two military bases.

The future of these bases is now uncertain. The Russian naval base in Tartus – which dates back to Soviet times – as well as an air base at Khmeimim, established south-east of Latakia in 2015, were vital assets for Russia to project military force in the Mediterranean sea and bolster the Kremlin’s claim to Russian great-power status.

Given the importance of the bases for Russia and the significant investments made over the years in propping the regime, Assad’s fall reflects badly on Russia’s capabilities to assert credible influence on the global stage.

Even if Russia somehow manages to negotiate a deal with Syria’s new rulers over the future of its military bases, the fact that Moscow was unable to save an important ally like Assad exposes critical weaknesses in Russia’s ability to act, rather than just talk, like a great power.

There are clear intelligence failures that either missed or misinterpreted the build-up of anti-Assad forces by Qatar, and Turkey’s tacit support of this. These failures were then compounded by diminished Russian military assets in Syria and an inability to reinforce them at short notice. This is, of course, due to Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine.

The depletion of the military capabilities of two other Kremlin allies in the region — Iran and Hezbollah — further compounded the difficulties for Assad and exacerbated the effect of Russia’s overstretch. This also raises the question of whether Russia strategically misjudged the situation and underestimated its vulnerability in Syria.

But even more so, it highlights Russia’s own dependence on allies who do not simply acquiesce to Moscow’s demands — as Assad did when he provided Russia its military bases — but who actively support a wannabe great power that lacks some of the means to assert its claimed status – as Iran and Hezbollah did in 2015.

Where’s China?

Missing from this equation is China. While Beijing had sided with Assad after the start of the Syrian civil war, this support was mostly of the rhetorical kind. It was mainly aimed at preventing a UN-backed, western-led intervention akin to the one in Libya that led to the fall of Gaddafi and has plunged the country into chaos ever since.

A high-profile visit of Assad to China in September 2023 resulted in a strategic partnership agreement. This seemed to signal another step towards the rehabilitation of the Syrian regime, in Beijing’s eyes at least. But when push came to shove and Assad’s rule was under severe threat, China did nothing to save him.

This raises an important question about Chinese judgment of the Syrian regime and the evolving crisis. But there is also a broader point here regarding Russian great-power ambitions.

“Diminished,” Dream / Dreamland v3, 2024

For all the talk of a limitless partnership between Moscow and Beijing, China ultimately did nothing to save Russia from an embarrassing defeat in Syria. Where Russia needed a military presence to bolster its claims to great-power status, Chinese interests in the Middle East are primarily about economic opportunity and the perceived threat of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism.

This has clearly limited Beijing’s appetite to become more involved, let alone to bail out Assad.

Putin diminished

Russia’s position in the Middle East now is in peril. Moscow has lost a key ally in Assad. Its other main allies, Iran and Hezbollah, are significantly weakened. Israel and Turkey, with whom the Kremlin has not had easy relations over the past few years, have been strengthened.

This exposes the hollowness of Russian claims to great-power status. It is also likely to further diminish Russian prestige and the standing that it has in the eyes of other partners – whether they are China or North Korea, members of the Brics, or countries in the global south that Russia has recently tried to woo.

The consequences of that for Ukraine – arguably the main source of Russia’s over-stretch – are likely to be ambivalent. On the one hand, the ease with which Assad was deposed demonstrates that Russia is not invincible and that its support of brutal dictatorships has limits. On the other hand, there should be no expectation of anything but Russia doubling down in Ukraine.

Putin needs a success that restores domestic and international confidence in him —and fast. After all, Donald Trump does not like losers.

Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Over the following decade, Russia’s military intervention in Syria appeared to contradict Obama’s assessment. Russia’s involvement in Syria during this period was often cited as evidence of its great power status. Nevertheless, the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime on December 7, 2024, highlights the limits of Russian power and its declining ability to exert influence on a global scale.

While Russia’s relations with its neighbors have frequently been strained owing to competition for influence and unresolved issues from the Soviet era, its involvement in Syria—a country neither adjacent to Russia nor part of the post-Soviet sphere—was significant. Russia’s direct engagement in the Syrian conflict marked a major shift in its Middle Eastern policy and was perceived as a challenge to the U.S. presence in the region. As Fadi Elhusseini noted, “Even at the peak of the Cold War, Russia’s (either the Soviet Union’s or the Russian Federation’s) role was limited to sending arms, military advisors, and logistical support to its Arab allies. This intervention represented a dramatic escalation in Russia’s involvement and signaled an extraordinary military engagement.”

The establishment of a military base in Latakia in 2015 represented Russia’s first substantial intervention outside its post-Soviet sphere of influence. This action not only sustained Assad’s regime for nearly a decade but also positioned Moscow as a key actor in the Middle East. Russia’s airstrikes and military presence forced Western powers, including NATO, to navigate the Syrian conflict cautiously. At the time, this was celebrated as a reassertion of Russia’s standing as a global power.

“Small Frog in Large Pond,” Digital, Dream / Dreamland v3, 2024

The events of early December 2024, however, have undermined this perception. A series of swift offensives by opposition forces reclaimed key cities, including Aleppo, Homs, and Hama, culminating in the fall of Damascus. Despite the continued presence of Russia’s military base, its inability—or reluctance—to prevent Assad’s downfall raises significant questions about the efficacy of its deterrence strategy. The Syrian opposition, while avoiding direct confrontation with Russian forces, demonstrated that Moscow’s influence in the region is far from absolute.

The implications of these developments are profound. For years, Russian military bases, like those of the United States, were regarded as a guarantee of security for allied regimes. However, the fall of Assad challenges the perception of Russian deterrence. Unlike the United States, which operates over 800 military bases worldwide and has a longstanding history of protecting client states, Russia’s military footprint is far more limited in scope and effectiveness. During the Cold War, U.S. bases served as a counterbalance to Soviet expansion, and they remain a cornerstone in countering both Russian and Chinese influence today. Russia’s failure in Syria suggests that its bases no longer function as a comparable strategic asset.

Russia may attempt to salvage its position through diplomacy or by leveraging its remaining influence in Syria. It could even claim to have facilitated the transition to protect its own interests. Yet, such efforts are unlikely to conceal the reality that Moscow failed to sustain Assad’s rule despite years of military and political investment. This failure will undoubtedly prompt potential allies to reconsider seeking security assurances from Russia, further diminishing its credibility as a global power.

A hallmark of great power status is the ability to operate effectively on multiple fronts. While Russia remains heavily engaged in the war in Ukraine, a true global power would possess the capability to uphold commitments in other regions simultaneously. Moscow’s inability to do so in Syria reinforces Obama’s 2014 characterization: Russia is not a global power but rather a regional one, capable of exerting influence in its immediate vicinity but falling short of broader global ambitions.

The fall of Assad serves as a stark reminder of the limitations of Russian power. It challenges the assumption that military bases alone can ensure sustained influence and raises doubts about Moscow’s ability to act as a reliable guarantor of stability. As the situation in Damascus stabilizes, the world is left to reassess the extent of Russia’s role in shaping global affairs. Indeed, this development may serve as a cautionary message for nations whose security heavily depends on the military bases of foreign patrons -— including those allied with the United States.

Damascus is the prize.

Damascus has an Achilles heel. It is landlocked, deep in the south of the country, and far from the port of Latakia that supplies it.

The other nearby port, Beirut in Lebanon, is a shadow of its former self, and the Lebanese government has closed the borders with Syria. You could get some things in from Iraq by truck, but the Kurdish-led, U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces have taken all of Deir al-Zor province and the checkpoint of Al-Bukamal on the Syrian side of the Syria-Iraq border has fallen to the SDF.

Food, weapons and ammunition have to come from Latakia. The truck route from Latakia down to Damascus passes through Homs.

The fundamentalist Sunni Arab militia, the HTS (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham or the Levant Liberation Council), led by a former al-Qaeda affiliate, had Idlib. In the past week it has taken Aleppo and then moved south to take Hama. (These territories are green in the below map from “X”.)

Homs is next. If the Tahrir al-Sham takes Homs, it can cut Damascus off from resupply.

Game over.

This is the current latest status map of the Civil War in #Syria

Red: Assad’s army, the official army of Syria, aka SAA
Green: all the sub rebels groups
Yellow: kurds
[Hashtags (ignore): #Pushpa2TheRule    #SpotifyWrapped #pragyanagra #Bitcoin ] pic.twitter.com/SCnG7pUmqD

— The_Airplane_Master (@plane12429) December 7, 2024

In 2012-2013, when the fundamentalist Sunni rebels, including al-Qaeda, had taken Homs, they were pushed back out by the intervention of Iran and the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah militia alongside the remnants of the Syrian Arab Army. The fundamentalist hopes of cutting off Damascus were dashed.

In 2015, the Sunni fundamentalists in Idlib in the north of Syria tried out a Plan B, which was simply to take Latakia itself. That would also cut off Damascus from resupply.

Iran and Hezbollah could not muster the sheer manpower to stop this from happening. The Sunni fundamentalists were getting backing from Turkey and the Gulf, and the Syrian Arab Army had seen two-thirds of its troops (mostly themselves Sunni) desert. Hezbollah probably only really has 25,000 fighters despite exaggerated claims, and they were spread thin in Syria and in Lebanon itself. (Lebanon is a small country of maybe 4.5 million citizens, and only a third or so are Shiites, and only half of Shiites support Hezbollah. So it just isn’t that large an organization).

So it is alleged that in the summer of 2015, the head of Iran’s Qods Force, the special operations unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, flew to Moscow and informed Russian President Vladimir Putin that Iran had done all it could. If Russia did not want to see Syria fall to the Sunni fundamentalists led by al-Qaeda — with all its implications for nearby Russian Muslim-majority areas such as Chechnya — then Putin would have to intervene.

On September 30, 2015, Russia started flying air support missions in Syria for the Syrian Arab Army, Hezbollah, and Iraqi Shiite militias, against the Sunni fundamentalists. This combination of ground forces and Russian air support succeeded in defeating the rebels and bottling them up in Idlib in the north.

Therefore, in some ways the fate of the al-Assad government was sealed when President Putin invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The Russian Aerospace Forces became bogged down in the Ukraine War and were simply not available in the same way for deployment in Syria.

The Russian Federation is pulling up stakes and leaving Syria. The embassy in Damascus said on Telegram Friday that owing to the “difficult” military and political situation in Syria, Russian citizens living in the Syrian Arab Republic were encouraged to take the next commercial flight out of the country. (H/t BBC Monitoring). BBC Monitoring also reports that Russian military bloggers had warned this week that if Homs fell, Russia would lose its military bases in Syria.

Homs fell.

“Running Away,” Digital, Dream / Dreamland v3, 2024

Now veteran Iran correspondent Farnaz Fassihi reports at NYT that Iran is withdrawing from Syria.

I suggest that Tehran has no choice but to leave Syria. Without Russian air support, the couple thousand Revolutionary Guards and the remnants of the Hezbollah forces in the country, along with the tattered Syrian Arab Army, cannot hope to defeat the rebels now any more than they could in 2015. The situation is even worse than in in the summer of 2015, since Hezbollah’s forces have been devastated by the recent war with Israel, which saw their commanders blinded or crippled by Israeli booby traps and many of their tactical personnel killed or wounded in battle. Moreover, if Hezbollah attempted to deploy in a big way in Syria now, without Russian air support, Israel would hit them. Russia had offered them their only air defense umbrella, and then only as long as they were doing Russian bidding in targeting the Sunni fundamentalists.

Russian air power made the difference then. Without it, the Syrian government and its few allies are doomed.

The poor performance of the Syrian Arab Army troops at Aleppo shows again that for foreign patrons to stand up a friendly government and back a client army can often produce a Potemkin village, a facade with no reality behind it, which easily falls to pieces under some concerted pressure. This sort of disintegration afflicted the Iraqi National Army built by George W. Bush, the Afghanistan National Army built by Bush, Obama and Trump, and now the Syrian Arab Army stood up by Vladimir Putin and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.

Indeed, a commander of the Qods Force (the special operations overseas branch of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps) and senior adviser to Syria, Brig Gen Kioumars Pourhashemi, was killed in the course of the HTS attack in northern Syria. Most Iranian media is in denial about the fall of Aleppo.

The Syrian Baath government of Bashar al-Assad is as guilty of genocide as the Israeli government, having tortured to death some 10,000 people and having killed hundreds of thousands of innocents in its war to crush the Sunni rebel forces in the teens of the last decade. The rebel HTS also has innocent blood on its hands.

The regional meaning of these events differs according to the lens through which they are viewed.

If we view the victors as Sunni Muslim fundamentalist extremists, their ascendancy will be welcomed by President Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey, who indeed may have a hand in the campaign, since he has been a patron of HTS. Erdogan has championed groups as diverse as the Muslim Brotherhood and the HTS, and while he is not himself a fundamentalist, he enjoys the soft power that accrues to Turkey from his support of groups such as Hamas, MB and others. The Turkish press is speculating that the four million Syrian Sunni refugees in Turkey might be able to return home if the Sunni rebels come to power. Likewise, Qatar, a regional champion of political pluralism that makes a place for political Islam, is a severe critic of the Baathist dictatorship, which wielded its secularism as a political cudgel. Most Sunni Muslims in Lebanon are anything but fundamentalists, but on the whole they will likely be happy about the collapse of the Baath, which they view as a totalitarian Stalinist knock-off in the hands of the Alawite Shiite sect, which discriminates against Sunnis. They are not wrong.

In contrast, the Christians both in Syria (5% of the population) and Lebanon (about a fourth of the population) are terrified today, given HTS’s past harsh record regarding religious minorities.

From the point of view of the region’s nationalist, secular-leaning regimes, this movement is an unwelcome resurgence of radical political Islam. That is how it will be viewed by President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Egypt, who has spent a decade crushing the Muslim Brotherhood, by Qais Saied of Tunisia, by Khalifah Hiftar, the strongman of East Libya, by President Abdelmadjid Tebboune of Algeria, by Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestine Authority, by the Democratic Union Party of the Syrian Kurds, and by Mohammed Bin Zayed of the United Arab Emirates. Bin Zayed has spent his oil money trying to put down Muslim fundamentalists around the region, including in Libya and Sudan, and he is generally on the same page as al-Sisi. Bin Zayed spent some of Saturday on the phone with Bashar al-Assad discussing the events. As noted above, outside the region these events will alarm Russian President Vladimir Putin, who had shored up the al-Assad regime beginning in 2015 with air support from the Russian Aerospace Forces.

From the point of view of those countries that feel threatened by Iran, the development will be greeted as a further sign of Tehran’s enfeeblement. Israel has humiliated Iran and its ally, Hezbollah, during the past four months, which may have emboldened the HTS to make this move. Bashar al-Assad’s Syria is one of Iran’s few firm allies in the Arab world, along with the Houthi government of Yemen, the Shiite-led government of Iraq, and the Hezbollah-influenced government of Lebanon. Syria is a key transit point for Iranian shipments of rockets and other munitions to Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and if it falls then Hezbollah– already on the ropes after Israel’s recent campaign against it — could face a bleak future.

These anti-Iran forces include Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Azerbaijan, and, outside the region, the United States. All are delighted at the news. In 2012-2016 during the Syrian Civil War, the US CIA funneled billions to 40 Sunni Muslim fundamentalist groups in Syria, using Saudi intelligence as the pass-through. These groups were mainly Muslim Brotherhood affiliates and were vetted as “not al-Qaeda.” They were, however, close battlefield allies of the Succor Front (Jabhat al-Nusra), the leading organization in the current HTS or Levant Liberation Council. So the CIA was again de facto allied with al-Qaeda in Syria, as it had been in Afghanistan in the 1980s.

The prospect of the fall of Baathist Syria, however, is not without peril for these same countries, if al-Qaeda-adjacent forces come out on top. Would a wave of fundamentalist fervor in the region really benefit the bon vivant Mohammed Bin Salman of Saudi Arabia? Will the 800 US troops at Tanf in southeast Syria be threatened by the victorious HTS, given that those troops are in part a support for the leftist Kurds of Syria’s northeast that have fought it on many occasions?

Indeed, if the Jabhat al-Nusra or Succor Front, an al-Qaeda offshoot, comes out on top in the new power struggle, even Turkey may come to regret these events. Erdogan has consistently underestimated the danger of groups such as HTS and ISIL, which have their origins in al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia and which split from one another in 2012. Despite its insouciance Turkey has been hit by ISIL bombings on several occasions.

And, will Sunni fundamentalist militias marching into Damascus really be a good thing for the current extremist government of Israel, engaged in a genocidal campaign against Gaza that is justified as an attempt to exterminate Sunni fundamentalist militias? The far right Likud Party’s theory that chaos in its neighbors is good for Israel may be tested.

——

Bonus Video:

Channel 4 News: “Syrian rebels capture most of Aleppo in sudden offensive”

Spain is Europe’s champion at producing solar power, because some of its regions are especially sunny — think Seville. The Global Energy Monitor puts it this way: “The country has more utility-scale solar capacity in operation (29.5 GW) than any other European nation, and more capacity under construction (7.8 GW), and in early stages of development (106.1 GW) than the next three European countries combined.” They have 100 gigawatts of solar in development! That is all the solar capacity the US has now, and it is a much bigger and wealthier country.

Germany comes in second in Europe with 24.6 gigawatts of industrial-scale solar.

So far this year, renewables account for 57.5 percent of electricity in Spain, which is remarkable for an industrial democracy. Renewables only make 26% of American electricity, so Spain is doing twice as well as we are. Spain wants to get 74% of its electricity from renewables by 2030.

Wind power provides 22.4 percent of Spain’s electricity, while solar is at 18.3 percent. Solar, however, is rapidly building out.

Spain has already produced more renewable energy by November this year than it did in the full 12 months of 2023, and production is up 13%. And, this is the second year in a row that renewables produced more electricity for Spain than did fossil fuels.

All this is not an accident. The Socialist government of Pedro Sánchez has an industrial policy when it comes to green energy. He credits outgoing Minister for the Ecological Transition and Demographic Challenge (MITECO), Teresa Ribera Rodríguez, as having spearheaded the expansion of renewables since 2018, leading to some of Europe’s lowest electricity prices for consumers. Sunlight and wind are free, so once you have built the means to capture them, electricity generation is low-cost. This is especially true at a time when the Ukraine War has caused fossil gas prices to increase substantially, hurting countries dependent on it. Ribera is on her way to Brussels to serve on the European Commission, with portfolios in competitive practices and the environment.

In contrast, when they were in power Spain’s conservatives actually put a punitive tax on rooftop solar to benefit the fossil fuel corporations to which they are close.

All the research demonstrates that Socialist democracies make people happier than other systems, and now it turns out they are better for the health of the earth, as well.

Elections matter. But so do civil society initiatives. People are forming cooperatives to share the output of solar installations. Even football (soccer) teams have done this with solar panels at their stadiums.

Spanish utilities are increasingly creating hybrid solar parks that incorporate wind turbines and batteries, as well, to ensure steady power once the sun goes down. Spain has about 1 gigawatt worth of battery storage projects under review, and has a goal of 22.4 gigawatts of battery capacity by 2030 — a deadline that some experts believe the country will easily beat.

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Bonus video added by Informed Comment:

TRT World: “60% of electricity in Spain comes from renewable energy”