But the comfortable majority of the center has experienced significant changes. Firstly, it has shrunk by around 20 parliamentarians out of the 720 that make up the parliament. Secondly, it has moved to the right. The Social Democrats experienced limited losses, Renew lost more than a fourth of its members, and the European People’s Party (EPP) won 13 seats. And thirdly, and more importantly, the idea that these three parties represent a solid center that will not reach agreements with the far-right belongs to the past.

On the campaign trail, Ursula von der Leyen, European Commission President and main candidate of the EPP, announced that she would accept the votes of the far-right party Brothers of Italy to be re-elected in her position by the European Parliament, which cannot propose candidates but can turn them down. Brothers of Italy is the party of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni.

Both von der Leyen and the leader of the EPP, her fellow countryman Manfred Weber, have been engaged in a long-running campaign to portray Meloni as a moderate leader. They have been relatively successful, partly because the EPP’s movement to the right has bridged the gap with the far-right. Before the European elections, the EPP approved a manifesto calling for tripling the staff of Frontex, the European border agency accused of multiple human rights violations. In a proposal that echoes Rishi Sunak’s Rwanda Plan, the EPP also announced it wants to transfer asylum seekers in the EU to so-called “third safe countries”, where their asylum claims would be processed.  

Hans Kundnani, the author of the book “Eurowhiteness: Culture, Empire and Race in the European Project” (a very recommendable work reviewed here for Informed Comment), provides a sharp analysis of this change. As he explains, “to understand the influence of the hard right on the EU, it is necessary to go beyond the raw numbers and to look at the way that it is shaping the agenda of the centre right. There has always been a way that the hard right could win without winning.”[1]

Two main reasons have turned Meloni’s Brothers of Italy into an attractive partner for the center-right, and none of them is related to the party’s supposed moderation. The first is that Brothers of Italy is the strongest political force in Italy, and Meloni’s 24 parliamentarians in Brussels will hold considerable leverage in a context where comfortable majorities will be difficult to assemble.

The second is that Meloni, contrary to other far-right leaders such as the Hungarian Viktor Orbán, subscribes to trans-Atlanticism and the continuation of military support for Ukraine. The recent publication of a video by an undercover journalist in which some leading members of Meloni’s party give fascist salutes should belie Meloni’s moderation, in case the politician’s self-declared admiration for Mussolini in her youth years was not sufficient.  But in an EU that is becoming increasingly militarized, support for NATO turns far-right politicians into moderate conservatives. This helps explain why von der Leyen’s European Commission is delaying the publication of a report on eroding press freedom in Italy.

Von der Leyen might eventually not need Brothers of Italy’s votes to stay as Commission President, especially if she convinces the European Greens to vote for her. But a new damn has been broken in the normalization of the far-right in Europe, and we can expect the EPP to vote more often together with the far-right in the coming parliament. At the same time, the EPP might use the threat of reaching out to the far-right to tone down proposals coming from its left on topics such as combating climate change.

In the European Parliament, the far-right is divided into two groups. The Conservatives and Reformists faction includes Meloni’s Brothers of Italy, the Spanish party Vox, and the Polish Law and Justice, which was voted out of office in 2023 after causing major damage to the rule of law. Meanwhile, the Identity and Democracy faction includes Le Pen’s National Rally or Salvini’s Lega, the other far-right party in Italy’s ruling coalition.

The combination of the two far-right groups has increased its presence in the European Parliament by 23 seats. This figure, however, fails to capture the magnitude of their rise. The far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) finished second in a German-wide election for the first time in history and is sending 15 parliamentarians to Brussels. The AfD won the elections in eastern Germany and received the second most votes in the south of the country.

During the 2019-2024 period, the AfD parliamentarians belonged to the Identity and Democracy group until they were expelled shortly before the European elections. Le Pen had long sought to dissociate herself from the AfD because the German party hurt her efforts to present a supposedly moderated image. The trigger for the AfD’s expulsion was an interview by the AfD main candidate in the European elections, Maximilian Krah, with the newspaper La Repubblica. In the interview, Krah said that not all members of the SS, the Nazi elite group responsible for the concentration camps, could be considered criminals.

One of the biggest winners in the European elections was a party whose leader, Herbert Kickl, made very similar statements about the SS in 2010. Kickl leads the far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), for which the European elections represented their first win in an Austria-wide election. They collected 25.4% of the votes, closely followed by the main center-right and center-left parties. Austria will celebrate national elections at the end of September, and the FPÖ is currently leading the polls.

Journalist Paul Lendvai’s recently published book “Austria Behind the Mask: Politics of a Nation since 1945” provides valuable insights to understand Austria’s recent history, and why the far-right might be able to appoint a chancellor in the Alpine country before the end of 2024. The FPÖ, founded in 1956, was first led by Anton Reinthaller and then, until 1978, by Friedrich Peter. They were both former SS officers.

It was under the leadership of Jörg Haider in the 1990s that the FPÖ consolidated its results in successive parliamentary elections over the 20% mark. About Haider, Lendvai writes that he “catered to the shrinking group of old Nazis and the steadily growing group of radical xenophobes.”[2] In the Austrian parliament, for instance, Haider referred to Nazi extermination camps as “punishment camps”. In 1999, the FPÖ finished second in an election to the Austrian parliament for the first (and until now, only) time and entered the government as the junior partner of the center-right Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP). Haider stayed away from government positions to minimize the international anger against the new coalition. This did not prevent the EU from imposing temporary sanctions on Austria.

Such a strong response might have been counter-productive, as it contributed to the FPÖ self-portrayal as political outsiders, argues Lendvai. What is clear is that the irate EU reaction from 2000 was not repeated when the ÖVP and the FPÖ established a new coalition government in 2017. Under the coalition agreement, “the FPÖ succeeded in winning, among other things, such key portfolios as the interior, foreign and defence ministries, control over all secret services and the post of governor of the National Bank.”[3] The coalition collapsed after a corruption scandal was revealed in 2019 involving Heinz-Christian Strache, the FPÖ leader. This notwithstanding, a new coalition between the center-right and the far-right is a very real likelihood after this year’s election, and this time the FPÖ could be in the leading role.

The recent elections to the European Parliament, as well as the Austrian case, show that the far-right is not in a position to reach absolute majorities in proportional representation systems. This might be different in the French parliamentary elections that will start this weekend, where the two-round system in 577 constituencies could facilitate the achievement of a parliamentary majority for Le Pen’s National Rally.

The far-right has been increasingly normalized both discursively and in the coalition politics of center-right European parties. The EU sanctions against Austria in 2000 after the entry of the FPÖ into the Austrian government were perhaps a strategic mistake in the long-term, as Lendvai argues. Still, they were a manifestation of the feeling that an Austrian government including the FPÖ needed to be treated differently, that a red line should be drawn. When Meloni became Prime Minister of Italy in 2022, or when, last month, Geert Wilders’ far-right Party for Freedom (PVV) managed to form a coalition government in the Netherlands, the red line drawn in 2000 was nowhere to be seen.

[1] Hans Kundnani, “Confronting the New Europe.” The New Statesman, June 11, 2024. https://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/2024/06/confronting-the-new-europe.

[2] Paul Lendvai, “Austria Behind the Mask: Politics of a Nation since 1945” (London: Hurst & Co., 2023), p. 62.

[3] Ibid., p. 73.

—

Featured image by Marc Martorell Junyent.

(The Conversation) – A new conceptual tool is required to fully understand the most recent rhetorical strategies of far-right activists and politicians, including former U.S. President Donald Trump. This is precisely what the concept of “intersectionality of hate” aims to do.

Analysts and academics have been talking about the intersectionality of hate for several years now. In doing so, they draw on the notion of intersectionality developed by African-American law professor Kimberlé Crenshaw to designate a reality shaped by sexism, racism, classism and other categories (there are some 30 in all).

Crenshaw points out that African-American women have always been aware of this complex reality. Mary Church Terrell, a Black suffragist, declared around 1920 that “a white woman has only one handicap to overcome, that of sex. I have two: sex and race.”

While researching anti-feminism and discourses of men’s victimhood related to a so-called crisis of masculinity, I became aware of how the new concept of intersectionality of hate makes it possible to understand the interweaving of hateful discourses. The French historian Christine Bard, with whom I have the good fortune to collaborate, rightly points out that “anti-feminism practises intersectionality, but it’s the intersectionality of hate,” which brings together sexism, racism, antisemitism, xenophobia and homophobia.

This interweaving of hate speech can also be viewed from different points of view, for example, from the racist and xenophobic or “anti-gender” and transphobic movements.

Conceptual innovation

The popularity of the concept of intersectionality no doubt explains the synchronous appearance of the intersectionality of hate on both sides of the Atlantic.

The article “How Trump Made Hate Intersectional” appeared in New York magazine on November 9, 2016, the day after Trump’s election. It was signed by the African-American intellectual Rembert Browne, who explained how the Republican candidate federated voters. “Trump won the presidency by making hate intersectional. He encouraged sexists to also be racists and homophobes, while saying disgusting things about immigrants in public and Jews online.”

Hatred is mixed here with the fear of being robbed of one’s country, institutions and personal achievements, and with anger at not having what one thinks one is entitled to simply by virtue of being a heterosexual white male. This attitude is reminiscent of that of the “Angry White Men” that was much talked about just a few years ago: it is no longer limited to blaming a single group for real or imagined personal problems but blames all minority groups. That means there is no longer a single scapegoat, but a whole herd.

At the same time, in France, Bard, who has shown that anti-feminism and lesbophobia are intertwined and mutually reinforcing, analyzed 1,367 articles dealing with women, gender and sexuality published in the far-right weekly Minute.

MSNBC: “‘He’s broke’: AOC roasts Trump for hosting a campaign rally in the Bronx”

She found that “the intersectionality of hate is practised, associating feminism, homosexualism, Islamism and immigrationism.” She notes that political and media figures are targeted with particular intensity if they are women, and also if they are Jewish, Muslim or of African origin. The historian concludes that this intersectionality of hate runs counter to any egalitarian or inclusive perspective.

Attacks on progressives

Shortly afterwards, the journal Atlantis: Critical Studies in Gender, Culture, and Social Justice devoted a short special report to the intersectionality of hate, associating it with the far right, which attacks progressives and accuses them of imposing their values and defending “minorities.”

In addition to racist and sexist attacks, there are also virulent accusations against “cultural Marxists” (or “wokes”) who allegedly control the State in order to develop “positive discrimination” programs and influence the education system to be able to indoctrinate young people with “political correctness.”

Each attack is an opportunity to point out that the essence of the United States is European, Anglo-Saxon, Christian, heterosexual, capitalist and meritocratic. The attacks also serve to distract attention from the elite that really dominates the country, which is made up of multi-billionaires in the White House, as well as heads of big business and media.

The intersectionality of hate is disseminated by influential traditional (Fox News) and web (Daily Stormer and Daily Wire) media, think tanks like the National Policy Institute and polemicists like Christopher Rufo and Ben Shapiro.

Terrorism

The notion of intersectionality of hate is taken up again in the analysis of hate speech and those associated with terrorist attacks. For example, a study in Europe, Intersectional Hate Speech Online, concludes that “Women remain the group of people most often targeted by intersectional hate speech […], for example Muslim women, Roma women or Women of Colour. […] Another target group for intersectional hate speech is women in public positions.”

Europol also mentions the intersectionality of hate in its 2020 Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. The agency presents a list of attacks motivated by anti-feminism, racism and xenophobia. It gives the example of the one perpetrated in 2011 in Norway by the Nazi Anders Breivik, who claimed in his manifesto to be defending Christian European civilization, and who massacred 76 young socialists.

Europol also mentions Elliot Rodger, who committed one of the first mass murders associated with involuntary celibates in California in 2014, and who also expressed sexist and racist hatred in his manifesto.

“I was anti-everything,” answered a former French gendarme when the court asked him if he was homophobic, during a trial for having planned attacks on several targets. The defendant had also written a neo-Nazi manifesto celebrating Breivik.

Other Islamophobic attackers had planned to attack feminists. The one who targeted the Québec mosque in 2017 was interested in feminist groups at Laval University, and the one who decimated a Muslim family in Ontario, in 2021, had scouted abortion clinics.

Finally, British journalist Helen Lewis points out in her article “The Intersectionality of Hate”, published in The Atlantic, on a mass killer who targeted Buffalo’s African-American community in 2022, that his manifesto included antisemitic cartoons.

Victim rhetoric

So, the intersectionality of hate works by superimposing similar analytical frameworks that systematically deduce the same dynamics from reality, and always lead to the same conclusion: the white heterosexual male is a victim of “minorities” he must resist.

This rhetoric helps to legitimize even the most obvious abuses, such as voting for the would-be dictator for a day Trump, or imposing one’s vision of things through terrorist violence.

The intersectionality of hate also targets progressives and reflects the refusal to recognize that the “majority” of white heterosexual men is, in reality, a minority whose claim to superiority, or even supremacy, is well and truly contested in the name of social justice.

Francis Dupuis-Déri, Professeur, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM)

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

( The Middle East Monitor ) – The recent move by some European nations to recognise the state of Palestine will have wider repercussions for Israel and the far-right elements within its government and society, according to experts. Ireland, Spain and Norway plan to formally recognise Palestine next week, and more European nations are expected to follow suit in the coming days.

“This issue of Palestinian statehood has been discussed for many years,” Yossi Mekelberg, an associate fellow at Chatham House’s MENA Programme, told Anadolu. “I think what accelerated it recently is the war in Gaza, and all of a sudden, the Israeli-Palestinian issue is back on the table.”

With their announcement, these European countries have sent a “signal that leaving this conflict unattended has dire consequences,” he said. “One of the ways to deal with it is to change the dynamic in the relations between the Israelis and Palestinians.”

According to Mekelberg, a lot has to do with the Israeli government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with a key factor being the fact that it is the most far-right in history. “Plus there is the continuous building of settlements and settler violence, which sends the message to the international community that… the government has no interest in peace.”

The three countries have their own different ways and reasons to recognise Palestine, but the common thread could be an attempt at “breaking the deadlock,” the expert suggested. “It needs to be broken by changing the balance of power between the Israelis and the Palestinians, by making negotiations between a state and state, and not between a state and an organisation [the PLO].”

Israel, on the other hand, is “trying to spin it as a sort of a reward for Hamas or something that will derail any future peace process, which I think is not the case,” he said. “If all sides read into this, what they should see is that it can actually enhance the chances of peace.”

On the US position on the issue, Mekelberg said that there are divisions between Washington and some EU countries. He pointed out that the US veto remains the only obstacle to Palestine getting the UN Security Council’s backing for full membership.

“I think that when it comes to Palestinian statehood, the US is quite isolated in its opinion, not only with the EU, but also internationally.”

The decision taken by Spain, Ireland and Norway is the outcome of “growing coordination to advance a credible political track to achieve a ceasefire in Gaza and support Palestinian self-determination,” added Hugh Lovatt, senior policy fellow with the MENA Programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “Recognition can contribute towards advancing a sustainable post-conflict solution for Gaza… Without strong political support for Palestinian self-determination, any post-conflict political efforts for Gaza will lack legitimacy.”

Recognition, he said, will provide further European impetus to exclude and sanction Israeli settlements – including potentially setting the scene for a push by “like-minded” countries for an EU ban on settlement products and financial services.

Al Jazeera English: “What does the increasing recognition of Palestinian statehood mean? | Inside Story”

Lovatt expects more countries to recognise Palestine in the future. “Slovenia has indicated that it will follow suit by 13 June once its parliament votes on the subject. Other European countries such as France and Belgium are contemplating similar moves, although this does not appear imminent.” He pointed out that European governments are also responding to domestic public pressure to do more to support Palestinian rights. “So, it is good foreign policy and good domestic politics.”

Lovatt believes that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas will see this as a victory for his “internationalisation strategy launched in 2011,” but many Palestinians will view it as “symbolic” and “without concrete action for a ceasefire in Gaza and holding Israel to account over its violation of international law and settlement policy.”

Spain, Ireland and Norway are all countries that had been pressing Israel to stop its deadly attacks on civilians in Gaza, noted Tugce Ersoy Ceylan, an associate professor at the Izmir Katip Celebi University in Turkiye.

“Since international bodies did not take any sanction decision within the context of international law, they may have decided to take such a path to make a stand. This unilateral symbolic recognition may have been made so as not to remain a spectator, even if it is late in the day.”

Ceylan does not view the move as “progress towards resolving the Palestinian issue,” but said that it was significant that “the right of Palestinians to establish a state, which had been forgotten and condemned to the status quo of unresolved issues, is being brought up again by significant Western states.”

She suggested that this would not lead to “any immediate pressure” on Israel to sit at the negotiating table, not least because “Netanyahu is determined not to compromise.”

A wave of recognition by other countries is unlikely, but “it would not be surprising if EU governments… developed other formulas… to clear their names.”

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor or Informed Comment.

The Middle East Monitor

This work by Middle East Monitor is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

Outside the court, at most twenty people could be counted as being there to support Höcke at some point during the morning. In their conversations, they complained that the procedure against Höcke was politically motivated. This had been Höcke’s message from the very beginning. Meanwhile, around 600 demonstrators had protested against the radical right politician earlier on the morning, before the start of the judicial process. There will be hearings until mid-May, but it is already clear that the most severe punishment for Höcke would be the payment of a fine. 

Höcke, who rivals Donald Trump in his mastery of self-victimization, failed to explain in his initial “X” post why he had to appear before a court in Halle. The AfD politician, who can be openly described as a fascist according to a German court, had to answer for his use, on at least two occasions, of the slogan “Alles für Deutschland” (Everything for Germany). The phrase was employed by the paramilitary National Socialist group SA (“Sturmabteilung”, or Storm Division). Using National Socialist slogans and symbols is a punishable crime in Germany. 

Höcke, a former history teacher, promised he did not know the origins of the slogan. His repeated use of expressions with strong National Socialist connotations, such as “entartet” (degenerate) or “Volkstod” (death of the nation) in public speeches and his 2018 book, belie this claim. Furthermore, the German sociologist Andreas Kemper has long established that there are striking parallels between Höcke’s public statements and different articles that appeared under the pseudonym Landolf Ladig in neo-Nazi publications more than a decade ago. One of these articles argued that Germany had been forced into a “preventive war” in 1939. 

The lack of open support for Höcke in front of the court in Halle was all the more embarrassing because the radical right politician had been given an incredibly powerful loudspeaker by Elon Musk, the billionaire and owner of Twitter/ “X”  since October 2022. Musk reacted to Höcke’s “X” post denouncing what in his eyes was a restriction on freedom of speech and asked him, “What did you say?”. After Höcke explained he had said “Everything for Germany”, Musk asked why the phrase was illegal. “Because every patriot in Germany is defamed as a Nazi, as Germany has legal texts in its criminal code not found in any other democracy,” replied Höcke. He forgot to add that no other democracy is the successor state of a regime that killed 6 million Jewish people and set the European continent on fire, with up to 20 million deaths in six years in Europe alone. 

Al Jazeera English Video: “German far-right politician on trial for alleged use of banned Nazi slogan”

Höcke has made abundantly clear in public statements how he understands Germany’s National Socialist past. He has referred to the monument to the Murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin as a “monument of shame” and said that history is not black-and-white when asked to comment about Nazism. Elon Musk’s apparent support for Höcke should not come as a surprise given their shared antisemitic and Islamophobic views. The South African businessman has launched antisemitic tropes against Hungarian-American billionaire and philanthropist George Soros. According to Musk, Soros “wants to erode the very fabric of civilization. Soros hates humanity.” The AfD, like so many other far-right movements around the world, has also targeted Soros. Furthermore, Musk recently espoused the antisemitic conspiracy theory that Jewish communities push “hatred against Whites.” Musk’s Islamophobia does certainly not lag behind. The “X” owner agreed with a far-right blogger who said France has been conquered by Islam. Again, Musk’s Islamophobia is a perfect fit for the AfD. The party was accurately described as having “a manifestly anti-Muslim program” by an independent commission established after a right-wing terrorist killed nine people, who had originally come as migrants, in Hanau in February 2020. 

Musk and the AfD have supported each other in the past. In September 2023, the billionaire criticized the German government’s funding of NGOs rescuing migrants in the Mediterranean and called people to vote for the AfD. Three months later, the co-leader of the AfD, Alice Weidel, said Musk’s takeover of Twitter was good for “freedom of opinion in Germany.” One of the deputy leaders of the AfD group in the German parliament, Beatrix von Storch, has supported Musk in his ongoing confrontation with the Brazilian Justice Alexandre de Moraes. The judge is demanding that “X” close accounts spreading fake news in Brazil. Since then, Musk has become a hero for the Brazilian far-right backing former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. 

The mutual sympathies between Musk and German-speaking far-right radicals also extend to the Austrian political scene. According to Harald Vilimsky, a member of the European Parliament for the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), Musk’s overtake of Twitter represented an end to censorship. The FPÖ, founded in 1955, has a far longer history than the AfD, established in 2013. Their political programs, however, defend similar far-right positions and both parties are members of the Identity and Democracy Party group in the European Parliament, one of the two far-right groups at the European level.

Meanwhile, in March 2024, Martin Sellner, the leader of the radical right group Identitarian Movement in Austria, was interrupted by the local police while delivering one of his racist speeches in the small Swiss municipality of Tegerfelden, close to Germany. When Sellner posted about the police action against him, Musk replied by asking whether this was legal. Sellner, taking a page from Höcke’s self-victimization, said that “challenging illegal immigration is becoming increasingly riskier than immigrating illegally.” The local police were simply enforcing a legal provision that allows them to force people out of the region if they “behave in a prohibited manner.” Sadly enough, Sellner is used to spreading his racist propaganda with impunity.

Martin Sellner and the Identitarian Movement’s hatred against migrants knows no limits. This transnational group of radicals hired a ship in 2017 to prevent NGOs in the Mediterranean from assisting boats in distress. Once they ran into technical problems, the Identitarians were helped by Sea Eye, a German NGO that normally rescues migrants instead of radical racists. The Identitarians have directly benefited from Musk’s acquisition of Twitter. After Musk bought the company, Sellner’s account on the social platform, and also that of his Identitarian Movement, were reinstated. Twitter had blocked the accounts in 2020 as they violated the rules to prevent the promotion of terrorism and violent extremism that the social platform had in place back then. In his first post after his Twitter account was reinstated, Sellner explicitly thanked Musk for “making the platform more open again.” Sellner was denied entry to the United States in 2019 because he had a $1,700 donation from the right-wing terrorist who killed 51 people in two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, also in 2019. 

In January 2024, the independent German investigative platform Correctiv reported that Sellner had presented his proposals for the deportation of millions of migrants with foreign citizenship and Germans with a migration background in a secret meeting in November 2023. The encounter in Potsdam, organized by two German businessmen, counted with the participation of Roland Hartwig (who at the time was the personal aide of the AfD co-leader Alice Weidel) and Ulrich Siegmund, the AfD parliamentary leader in Saxony-Anhalt. Some members of the “Werteunion” (Values Union), an ultra-conservative group within the center-right CDU, were also in attendance. The findings by Correctiv finally led the CDU to cut its ties to the “Werteunion”. 

The lack of open displays of support for Höcke in Halle last week was comforting. Even more positive were the mass protests against the far-right politician and the AfD in front of the court. However, recent polls in both Germany and Austria are reason for great concern. The AfD would currently receive around 18% of the votes and finish second in an election to the German parliament. Meanwhile, its Austrian counterpart, the FPÖ, would be close to 30% of the national vote and emerge as the strongest party. Austria will vote this autumn, whereas elections in Germany should take place at the end of 2025. 

In both Germany and Austria, as well as in other countries such as the United States and Brazil, the far-right is benefiting from Musk’s support and open-door policy to radicals on “X.” Needless to say, though, Musk is just offering a new platform to very old ideas. The far-right’s threat would hardly be less serious if the billionaire had a sudden political conversion. What to do, then? One of the banners at the demonstration against Höcke in Halle pointed to the holistic approach that will be needed to counter the far-right. The banner read “AfD Stoppen! Juristisch, Politisch, Gesellschaftlich.” In English: “Stopping AfD! Judicially, Politically, Socially.” 

A more permissive attitude toward guns in Israel following Oct. 7 will only lead to greater Israeli violence and impunity.

(The Conversation) – Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has signaled that Israel’s military will soon launch an invasion of Rafah, the city in the southern Gaza Strip. More than 1 million Palestinians, now on the verge of famine, have sought refuge there from their bombed-out cities farther north. Despite U.S. President Joe Biden’s warning against the move, Netanyahu appears, for now, undeterred from his aim to attack Rafah.

The attack is the latest chapter in Israel’s current battle to eliminate Hamas from Gaza.

But it’s also a reflection of an ideology, known as the “Iron Wall,” that has been part of Israeli political history since before the state’s founding in 1948. The Iron Wall has driven Netanyahu in his career leading Israel for two decades, culminating in the current deadly war that began with a massacre of Israelis and then turned into a humanitarian catastrophe for Gaza’s Palestinians.

Here is the history of that ideology:

A wall that can’t be breached

In 1923, Vladimir, later known as “Ze’ev,” Jabotinsky, a prominent Zionist activist, published “On the Iron Wall,” an article in which he laid out his vision for the course that the Zionist movement should follow in order to realize its ultimate goal: the creation of an independent Jewish state in Palestine, at the time governed by the British.

Jabotinsky admonished the Zionist establishment for ignoring the Arab majority in Palestine and their political desires. He asserted the Zionist establishment held a fanciful belief that the technological progress and improved economic conditions that the Jews would supposedly bring to Palestine would endear them to the local Arab population.

Jabotinsky thought that belief was fundamentally wrong.

To Jabotinsky, the Arabs of Palestine, like any native population throughout history, would never accept another people’s national aspirations in their own homeland. Jabotinsky believed that Zionism, as a Jewish national movement, would have to combat the Arab national movement for control of the land.

“Every native population in the world resists colonists as
long as it has the slightest hope of being able to rid itself of the danger of being colonised,” he wrote.

Jabotinsky believed the Zionist movement should not waste its resources on Utopian economic and social dreams. Zionism’s sole focus should be on developing Jewish military force, a metaphorical Iron Wall, that would compel the Arabs to accept a Jewish state on their native land.

“Zionist colonisation … can proceed and develop only under the protection of a power that is independent of the native population – behind an iron wall, which the native population cannot breach,” he wrote.

Jabotinsky’s heirs: Likud

In 1925, Jabotinsky founded the Revisionist movement, which would become the chief right-wing opposition party to the dominant Labor Party in the Zionist movement. It opposed Labor’s socialist economic vision and emphasized the focus on cultivating Jewish militarism.

In 1947, David Ben Gurion and the Zionist establishment accepted partition plans devised by the United Nations for Palestine, dividing it into independent Jewish and Palestinian Arab states. The Zionists’ goal in accepting the plan: to have the Jewish state founded on the basis of such international consensus and support.

Jabotinsky’s Revisionists opposed any territorial compromise, which meant they opposed any partition plan. They objected to the recognition of a non-Jewish political entity – an Arab state – within Palestine’s borders.

The Palestinian Arab state proposed by the U.N. partition plan was rejected by Arab leaders, and it never came into being.

In 1948, Israel declared its independence, which sparked a regional war between Israel and its Arab neighbors. During the war, which began immediately after the U.N. voted for partition and lasted until 1949, more than half the Palestinian residents of the land Israel claimed were expelled or fled.

At the war’s end, the historic territory of Palestine was divided, with about 80% claimed and governed by the new country of Israel. Jordan controlled East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and Egypt controlled the Gaza Strip.

In the new Israeli parliament, Jabotinsky’s heirs – in a party first called Herut and later Likud – were relegated to the opposition benches.

Old threat, new threat

In 1967, another war broke out between Israel and Arab neighbors Egypt, Syria and Jordan. It resulted in Israel’s occupation of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip and Golan Heights. Yitzhak Rabin led Israel’s military during that war, called the Six-Day War.

From 1948 until 1977, the more leftist-leaning Labor Party governed Israel. In 1977, Menachem Begin led the Likud to victory and established it as the dominant force in Israeli politics.

However in 1992, Rabin, as the leader of Labor, was elected as prime minister. With Israel emerging as both a military and economic force in those years, fueled by the new high-tech sector, he believed the country was no longer facing the threat of destruction from its neighbors. To Rabin, the younger generation of Israelis wanted to integrate into the global economy. Resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, he believed, would help Israel integrate into the global order.

In 1993, Rabin negotiated the Oslo Accords, a peace deal with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. The two men shook hands in a symbol of the reconciliation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The agreement created a Palestinian authority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as part of the pathway to the long-term goal of creating two countries, Israel and a Palestinian state, that would peacefully coexist.

That same year, Benjamin Netanyahu had become the leader of the Likud Party. The son of a prominent historian of Spanish Jewry, he viewed Jewish history as facing a repeating cycle of attempted destruction – from the Romans to the Spanish Inquisition, the Nazis and the Arab world.

Netanyahu saw the Oslo peace process as the sort of territorial compromise Jabotinsky had warned about. To him, compromise would only invite conflict, and any show of weakness would spell doom.

The only answer to such a significant threat, Netanyahu has repeatedly argued, is a strong Jewish state that refuses any compromises, always identifying the mortal threat to the Jewish people and countering it with an overwhelming show of force.

No territorial compromise

Since the 1990s, Netanyahu’s primary focus has not been on the threat of the Palestinians, but rather that of Iran and its nuclear ambitions. But he has continued to say there can be no territorial compromise with the Palestinians. Just as Palestinians refuse to accept Israel as a Jewish state, Netanyahu refuses to accept the idea of a Palestinian state.

Netanyahu believed that only through strength would the Palestinians accept Israel, a process that would be aided if more and more Arab states normalized relations with Israel, establishing diplomatic and other ties. That normalization reached new heights with the 2020 Abraham Accords, the bilateral agreements signed between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and between Israel and Bahrain. These agreements were the ultimate vindication of Netanyahu’s regional vision.

It should not be surprising, then, that Hamas’ horrific attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, took place just as Saudi Arabia was nearing normalization of relations with Israel. In a twisted manner, when the Saudis subsequently backed off the normalization plans, the attack reaffirmed Netanyahu’s broader vision: The Palestinian group that vowed to never recognize Israel made sure that Arab recognition of Israel would fail.

The Hamas attack gave Netanyahu an opportunity to reassert Israel’s – and Jabotinsky’s – Iron Wall.

The massive and wantonly destructive war that Netanyahu has led against Hamas and Gaza since that date is the Iron Wall in its most elemental manifestation: unleashing overwhelming force as a signal that no territorial compromise with the Arabs over historical Palestine is possible. Or, as Netanyahu has repeatedly said in recent weeks, there will be no ceasefire until there’s a complete Israeli victory.

Eran Kaplan, Rhoda and Richard Goldman Chair in Jewish Studies, San Francisco State University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The court was unanimous in determining that neither Colorado – which had banned Trump from the ballot – nor any other US state is qualified to decide on the eligibility of a presidential candidate. Furthermore, a majority opinion coming from the five conservative judges – three of them nominated by Trump himself – determined that only the US Congress can disqualify an individual from running for office on the grounds of insurrection.

This majority opinion, the three progressive judges in the minority warned, risked closing the door to any possible future US Supreme Court decision to ban an insurrectionist from becoming President. An indictment against Trump for his role in inciting the attack on the Capitol on January 6, 2021, is still possible but the Supreme Court would probably not act on it.

On the other side of the Atlantic, in Germany, media attention is focused on a judicial proceeding taking place in Münster, a city in the West of the country. At the core of the dispute, we find the far-right party “Alternative für Deutschland” (Alternative for Germany or AfD) and the “Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz” (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution or BfV), a domestic intelligence agency that has no clear counterpart in other European countries.

The agency’s role is to police anti-constitutional extremism. The BfV, however, has often been unable or unwilling to fulfill this vital task. From 2012 to 2018, when the president of the agency was Hans-Georg Maaßen, the AfD – founded in 2013 – grew more powerful and more radical. Maaßen recently founded a right-wing party called “Werteunion” (Values Union) that is willing to reach agreements with the AfD and embraces part of its agenda.

In 2021, the BfV determined that the AfD merited the category of “suspected case of far-right extremism.” The far-right party appealed against the decision and the case has dragged on until now. The hearing in Münster is the second and last appeal. The AfD is likely to lose the appeal, but that would not imply its illegalization. A win for the BfV would bring further rights to investigate and surveil the activities of the party.

Both Trump and the AfD have been following the same legal strategy when forced to appear before the courts: delay, delay, and, if possible, delay even further. CNN reporter Stephen Collinson notes that Trump “appears to want to also forestall jury verdicts until after the general election – likely because polls have suggested some voters would be less keen to vote for him if he is a convicted felon.”

Meanwhile, the AfD wants to prevent for as long as possible a final decision on whether the BfV was right in qualifying the AfD as a “suspected case of far-right extremism.” This could negatively affect its electoral performance. There are elections to the European Parliament in June and regional elections in the three Eastern states of Saxony, Thuringia, and Brandenburg in September. In the European elections, the AfD is polling second with around 20% of the vote, whereas in the three Eastern states, the radical right is polling first with over 30% of the vote.

After the September elections in three of the five eastern states, broad coalitions, or at least tacit alliances from the left to the center-right will be needed to avoid that the far-right reaches its highest level of power in Germany since the end of the Second World War. In this sense, it is very worrying that the leader of the center-right CDU, Friederich Merz, continues to equate the left-wing party “Die Linke” with the AfD, announcing it will reach agreements with neither of these forces. Unless the pre-election polls are wrong by a huge margin, the CDU will soon be forced to pick a side.

By delaying the legal process in Münster, the AfD does not only seek to preserve the pretense that it is just as legitimate as any other German party – if not more, according to their discourse. The far-right party also seeks to prevent the BfV from taking the next step and qualify the whole AfD as “proven right-wing extremist”. The regional AfD groups in the eastern states of Saxony, Thuringia, and Saxony-Anhalt are already classified in this category.

DW News Video: “Why is Germany’s far-right AfD party so successful? | DW News”

The AfD has close ties with openly neo-Nazi groups and some of its leaders, especially in eastern Germany, have adopted a language very often reminiscent of Adolf Hitler and his Nazi party. Björn Höcke, the regional leader of the AfD in Thuringia and powerbroker within the national leadership of the party, has used multiple times the expression “Everything for Germany”, the motto of the SA, a paramilitary Nazi group that was key in Hitler’s power takeover in 1933.

Höcke has said that Africans have a biological reproduction strategy different from Europeans or, about Adolf Hitler, that “there is no black and white in history.” The AfD often employs terms such as “Volkstod” (death of the German nation), as well as “Stimmvieh” (voting cattle) for voters of opposing parties.

The AfD has often fantasized about the possibilities of “remigration”, a common term among far-right European groups. The concept refers to the deportation of people with a migration background and has been popularized by Martin Sellner, an Austrian neo-Nazi. The Austrian ideologist is banned from entering the US because he accepted money from – and probably met – Brenton Tarrant, a white supremacist terrorist. In 2019, Tarrant killed 51 people and injured 40 more in his attack against two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand. On March 19 it became known that Sellner had been banned from entering Germany.

The concept of “remigration” is not a new one, and Höcke and other members of the most radical current within the AfD have been toying with the idea for years. However, many Germans became aware of how specific the concept of “remigration” has become in recent times when it was revealed that Sellner had presented his racist theses in a secret meeting in Potsdam organized by two businessmen. The meeting was attended by high-ranking AfD cadres – among them Ulrich Siegmund, the AfD leader in Sachsen-Anhalt – and some low-ranking members of the center-right CDU, who were later forced to resign. According to research by the independent investigative platform Correctiv, Sellner proposed that a far-right government in Germany should plan the deportation of asylum seekers, non-Germans with residency rights, and “non-assimilated” German citizens.

The Correctiv revelations triggered a wave of massive demonstrations in Germany against the far-right. They also renewed the discussion on whether a process should be started to ban the AfD. A call for a party ban can be issued by the German government, the parliament, or the Bundesrat, an institution where the different German states are represented. The final decision would always be in the hands of the German Constitutional Court. The process could take years and there would be no guarantee of success. The openly neo-Nazi National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) was deemed too politically irrelevant to be banned when the Constitutional Court decided on the matter in 2017.

There is no consensus between the different German parties on whether an attempt to ban the AfD is the path to follow. The differences of opinion are also found within the parties. Whereas a parliamentarian for the center-right CDU was one of the early proponents of banning the AfD, the leader of the party Frederich Merz is against this. The neoliberal FDP is generally against the ban. Meanwhile, the Social Democrats of Chancellor Olaf Scholz have not taken a clear position, as views diverge on the issue. Within the Greens, banning the AfD would probably find wider acceptance. Every case is different, but the governing coalition in the northwestern state of Bremen, where the Social Democrats lead a government with the Greens and the left-wing “Die Linke”, has asked for an AfD ban.

German society appears to be equally divided on the appropriateness of initiating a process to illegalize the AfD. According to a poll from February 2024, 51 percent of the population was against starting such a process and 37 percent was in favor. The percentages change significantly when citizens are asked whether the AfD should continue to receive public funding as the other parties do. 41 percent are in favor while 48 percent want public funds not to reach the AfD.

On February 23, I attended a counterdemonstration against Martin Sellner, the neo-Nazi who has been pushing for “remigration”, when he visited the city of Chemnitz, in the state of Saxony. The protest was organized by “Chemnitz Nazifrei”, a group that has been mobilizing against the far-right for fourteen years in a city that represents a radical right stronghold.

Before the march against Sellner, I discussed with two activists of the “Chemnitz Nazifrei” movement their views on whether a procedure should be started to ban the AfD. They told me this had been a major issue of discussion within their group in recent times. Although more members of the “Chemnitz Nazifrei” movement are in favor of an AfD ban than against it, there is no clear majority.

One of the strongest arguments in favor of a ban, the activists I interviewed remarked, is the significant consequences this would have for the AfD’s financial situation, which could be forced to reduce its activities. At the same time, they fear that AfD followers could become more violent if a ban was implemented. They did not discard that something similar to the assault on the Capitol in Washington could take place in Germany if the AfD was banned. The open question for the members of “Chemnitz Nazifrei”, as for many others, is: If you ban the AfD, what about the situation afterward? A poll from February 2024 shows that only 43 percent of those who plan to vote for the AfD would be willing to consider voting for another party in the coming years.

It is certainly urgent to discuss whether Trump should be able to run again for president, or whether the AfD should be banned by the Constitutional Court. But the key issue is that broad sectors of both German and US society – a far stronger one in the latter case – have radicalized themselves to the extent that they are ready to use the instruments of democracy to undermine its foundations. This does not mean that every Trump or AfD voter is anti-democratic, and part of these voters can still be convinced to move to less extremist positions. But a considerable percentage of them, and maybe even the majority, have crossed the point of no return.

Democracy is not only destroyed through authoritarian power grabs or military coups but also through free and fair elections. While Germany has known this for a long time due to its historical trajectory, this does not necessarily imply that it is better prepared than other countries. The poor performance of the BfV in protecting the Constitution is proof of this.

While democratic systems offer many opportunities that right-wing radicals can exploit, they are not defenseless and have mechanisms to combat radicalism. If all democratic forces in Germany take the right-wing threat seriously – and here the center-right CDU needs to play a responsible role – and focus on what unites them, the AfD can still be kept away from the main centers of power in the country. It might be too late for the US, where Biden has recovered some ground in the polls in recent months but lags behind Trump in the states that will probably decide the November election. Germany, meanwhile, still has a strong anti-AfD majority but should not be too complacent.

As 2023 ended, European nations failed to agree on a $54-billion package of assistance for Ukraine at a time when that country was desperately trying to stay afloat and continue its fight against Russian occupation forces. Bizarrely, the failure of that proposal coincided with a surprising EU decision to open membership talks with that beleaguered country.

In other words, no military aid for Ukraine in the short term but a possible offer of a golden ticket to join the EU at some unspecified future moment. Ukrainians might well ask themselves whether, at that point, they’ll still have a country.

One person, right-wing Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, is largely responsible for that contradictory combo. He singlehandedly blocked the aid package, suggesting that any decision be put off until after European Parliamentary elections in early June of this year. Ever the wily tactician, he expects those elections to signal a political sea change, with conservative and far-right forces — think of them as Donald Trump’s allies in Europe — replacing the parliament’s current centrist consensus. Now an outlier, Orbán is counting on a new crop of sympathetic leaders to advance his arch-conservative social agenda and efforts to cut Ukraine loose.

He’s also deeply skeptical of expanding the EU to include Ukraine or other former Soviet republics, not just because of Russian sensitivities but for fear that EU funds could be diverted from Hungary to new members in the east. By leaving the room when that December vote on future membership took place, Orbán allowed consensus to prevail, but only because he knew he still had plenty of time to pull the plug on Ukraine’s bid.

Ukrainians remain upbeat despite the aid delay. As their leader Volodymyr Zelensky tweeted about future EU membership, “This is a victory for Ukraine. A victory for all of Europe. A victory that motivates, inspires, and strengthens.”

But even if Orbán’s resistance were to be overcome, a larger challenge looms: the European Union that will make the final determination on Ukraine’s membership may not prove to be the same regional body as at present. While Russia and Ukraine battle it out over where to define Europe’s easternmost frontier, a fierce political conflict is taking place to the west over the very definition of Europe.

In retrospect, the departure of the United Kingdom from the EU in 2020 may prove to have been just a minor speedbump compared to what Europe faces with the war in Ukraine, the recent success of far-right parties in Italy and the Netherlands, and the prospect that, after the next election, a significantly more conservative European Parliament could at the very least slow the roll-out of the European Green Deal.

And worse yet, a full-court press from the far right might even spell the end of the Europe that has long shimmered on the horizon as a greenish-pink ideal. The extinguishing of the one consistent success story of our era — particularly if Donald Trump were also to win the 2024 U.S. presidential election — could challenge the very notion of progress that’s at the heart of any progressive agenda.

Orbán’s Allies

For decades, Dutch firebrand Geert Wilders, leader of the far-right Party for Freedom, has regularly garnered headlines for his outrageous statements and proposals to ban Islam, the Quran, and/or immigrants altogether. In the run-up to the November 2023 parliamentary elections in the Netherlands, it looked as if he would continue to be an eternal also-ran with a projected vote total in the mid to upper teens. In addition to the usual obstacles he faced, like the lunacy of his platform, he was up against a reputed political powerhouse in Frans Timmermans, the architect of Europe’s Green Deal and the newly deputized leader of the Dutch center-left coalition.

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To everyone’s surprise, however, Wilders’s party exceeded expectations, leading the field with 23% of the vote and more than doubling the number of Party for Freedom seats in the new parliament.

Although mainstream European parties had historically been reluctant to form governments with the far right, some have now opportunistically chosen to do so. Far-right parties now serve in governments in Sweden and Finland, while leading coalitions in Italy and Slovakia.

Wilders, too, wants to lead. He’s even withdrawn a 2018 bill to ban mosques and the Quran in an effort to woo potential partners. Such gestures toward the center have also characterized the strategy of Giorgia Meloni, the head of the far-right Brothers of Italy party, who downplayed its fascist roots and pledged to support both NATO and the EU to win enough centrist backing to become Italy’s current prime minister.

But what happens if there’s no longer a political center that must be wooed?

That’s been the case in Hungary since Viktor Orbán took over as prime minister in 2010. He has systematically dismantled judicial, legislative, and constitutional checks on his power, while simultaneously marginalizing his political opposition. Nor does he have to compromise with the center, since it’s effectively dropped out of Hungarian politics — and he and his allies are eager to export their Hungarian model to the rest of Europe. Worse yet, they’ve got a strong tailwind. In 2024, the far-right is on track to win elections in both Austria and Belgium, while Marine Le Pen’s far-right party leads the polls in France and the equally intemperate, anti-immigrant Alternative fur Deutschland is running a strong second to the center-right in Germany.

No less ominously, the Identity and Democracy bloc, which includes the major French and German far-right parties, is projected to gain more than two dozen seats in the European parliamentary elections this June. The European Conservatives and Reformists bloc, which contains the Finnish, Polish, Spanish, and Swedish far-right parties, will also probably pick up a few seats. Throw in unaffiliated representatives from Orbán’s Fidesz party and that bloc could become the largest in the European parliament, even bigger than the center-right coalition currently at the top of the polls.

Such developments only further fuel Orbán’s transnational ambitions. Instead of being the odd man out on votes over Ukrainian aid, he wants to transform the European Union with himself at the center of a new status quo. “Brussels is not Moscow,” he tweeted in October. “The Soviet Union was a tragedy. The EU is only a weak contemporary comedy. The Soviet Union was hopeless, but we can change Brussels and the EU.”

With such a strategy, wittingly or not, Orbán is following the Kremlin playbook. Russian President Vladimir Putin has long wanted to undercut European unity as part of an effort to divide the West. With that in mind, he forged alliances with far-right political parties like Italy’s Lega and Austria’s Freedom Party to sow havoc in European politics. His careful cultivation of Orbán has made Hungary functionally his country’s European proxy.

Not all of Europe has jumped on the far-right bandwagon. Voters in Poland last year even kicked out the right-wing Law and Justice party, while the far right lost big in the latest Spanish elections. Also, far-right parties are notoriously hard to herd and forging a consensus among them will undoubtedly prove difficult on issues like NATO, LGBTQ rights, and economic policy.

Still, on one key issue they’re now converging. They used to disagree on whether to support leaving the EU, Brexit-style, or staying to fight. Now, they largely favor a take-over-from-within strategy. And to make that happen, they’ve coalesced around two key issues: the strengthening of “Fortress Europe” to keep out those fleeing the Global South and frontally assaulting that cornerstone of recent EU policy, the Green energy transition.

The Fate of the Green New Deal

In Germany, the far right has gone after, of all things, the heat pump. The Alternative fur Deutschland’s campaign against a bill last year to replace fossil-fuel heating systems with electrical heat pumps propelled the party into second place in the polls (thanks to an exaggeration of the cost of such pumps). The French far right is also on the political rise, fueled in part by its opposition to what its leader Marine Le Pen, in a manifesto issued in 2022, called “an ecology that has been hijacked by climate terrorism, which endangers the planet, national independence and, more importantly, the living standards of the French people.” In the Netherlands, Wilders and the far right have similarly benefited from a farmer backlash against proposals to reduce nitrogen pollution.

A report from the Center for American Progress concludes that European far-right groups “frame environmental policies as elitist while stoking economic anxiety and nationalism, which erodes trust in democratic institutions and further distracts from genuine environmental concerns.” Researchers from the University of Bergen in Norway are even more pointed: “Populist far-right parties portray fossil fuel phase-out as a threat to traditional family values, regional identity, and national sovereignty.”

The European far right, in other words, is mobilizing behind a second Great Replacement theory. According to the initial version of that conspiracy theory, which helped a first wave of right-wing populists take power a few years ago, immigrants were plotting to replace indigenous, mostly white populations in Europe. Now, extremists argue that clean green energy is fast replacing the fossil fuels that anchor traditional (read: white Christian) European communities. This “fossil fascism,” as Andreas Malm and the Zetkin Collective have labeled it, marries extractivism to ethnonationalism, with right-wing whites clinging to oil and coal as tightly as Barack Obama once accused their American counterparts of clinging to guns and religion.

Believers in this second Great Replacement theory have demonized the European Green Deal, which is dedicated to reducing carbon emissions 55% by 2030. The overall deal is a sophisticated industrial policy designed to create jobs in the clean energy sector that will replace those lost by miners, oil riggers, and pipeline workers. However urgently needed, the Deal doesn’t come cheap and so is vulnerable to charges of “elitism.”

Worse yet, the backlash against Europe’s Green turn has expanded to efforts in the European Parliament to block pesticide reduction and weaken legislation on the reduction of packaging. As a result of this backlash, Politico notes, “The Green Deal now limps on, with several key policies on the scrapheap.” A rightward shift in the European Parliament would knock the Green Deal to the ground (and even kick it while down), ensuring a further disastrous heating of this planet.

The War of Ideas

The war in Ukraine seems to be about the territory Russia has occupied, the fight over the European Green Deal about politics and the far right’s search for an issue as effective as immigrant-bashing to rally voters. At the center of both struggles, however, is something far more significant. From Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin to Marine Le Pen at the reactionary barricades in Paris, the far right is fighting over the very future of European ideals.

Narrowly, that debate is just the latest iteration of a longstanding question about whether Europe should emphasize expanding its membership or the deeper integration of the present EU. Until now, the compromise has been to set a distinctly high bar for EU membership but provide generous subsidies to the lucky few countries that make it into the club. By turning a cold shoulder to a neighbor in need, after having benefitted enormously from EU largesse since the 1990s, Hungary is challenging that core principle of solidarity.

But Orbán and his allies have a far more radical mission in mind: to transform European identity. Right now, Europe stands for extensive social programs that even right-wing parties are reluctant to consider dismantling. The European Union has also advanced the world’s most consequential collective program on a green energy transition. And despite some backlash, it remains a welcoming space for the LGBTQ community.

In other words, the EU is still a beacon for progressives around the world (notwithstanding the neoliberal reforms that are regressively remaking its economic space). It remains an aspirational space for the countries on Europe’s borders that yearn to escape autocracy and relative poverty. It’s similarly so for people in distant lands who imagine Europe as an ark of salvation in an increasingly illiberal world, and even for U.S. progressives who are envious of European health care and industrial policies, as well as its environmental regulations. That the EU’s policies are also the product of vigorous transnational politicking has also been inspirational for internationalists who want stronger cross-border cooperation to help solve global problems.

In the late 1980s, as the Warsaw Pact disintegrated and the Soviet Union began to fall apart, political scientist Francis Fukuyama imagined an “end of history.” The hybrid of market democracy, he argued, would be the answer to all ideological debates and the European Union would serve as the boring, bureaucratic endpoint of global political evolution. Since the invasion of Ukraine, however, history is not only back, but seems to be going backward.

The far right is at the forefront of that retreat. Even as the EU contemplates expansion eastward, a revolt from within threatens to bring about the end of Europe itself — the end, that is, of the liberal and tolerant social welfare state, of a collective commitment to economic solidarity, and of its leading role in addressing climate change. The battle between a democratic Ukraine and the autocratic Russian petrostate is, in other words, intimately connected to the conflicts being waged in Brussels.

Without a vibrant, democratic Ukraine, the eastern frontier of Europe abutting Russia is likely to become a zone of fragile, divided, incoherent “nation states,” hard-pressed to qualify for EU membership. Without a powerful left defending Europe’s gold-standard social safety nets, libertarians are likely to advance their attempts to eat away at or eliminate the regulatory state. Without Europe’s lead, global efforts to address climate change will grow dangerously more diffuse.

Sound familiar? That’s also the agenda of the far-right in the United States, led by Donald Trump. His MAGA boosters, like media personalities Tucker Carlson and Steve Bannon, have been pulling for Viktor Orbán, Geert Wilders, and Vladimir Putin to send Europe spiraling backward into fascism.

Short on resources and political power, progressives have always possessed one commodity in bulk: hope. The arc of the moral universe is long, Martin Luther King, Jr., prophesied so many years ago, but it bends toward justice. Or maybe it doesn’t. Take away the European ideal and no matter what happens in the American presidential election this year, 2024 will be the year that hope dies last.

Copyright 2024 John Feffer

Via Tomdispatch.com

It would take a multi-volume book to detail all the horrible and catastrophic things Murdoch has done to the world. In Informed Comment, which is a sort of sprawling Great American Blog, Murdoch has appeared again and again as a villain, as Ernst Stavro Blofeld repeatedly showed up in Ian Fleming’s James Bond series.

Observers have been puzzled over why climate denialism has been particularly virulent in English-speaking countries. Murdoch’s media organizations are a part of the answer. In Australia, where Murdoch has a virtual monopoly on the news industry, he has backed climate denialists for elective office and swayed voters to consider human-made climate change a hoax. Only from about 2021 have the Murdoch outlets backed off complete denialism, choosing instead to encourage a “go-slow” approach (which can be just as bad as denialism). By influencing elites in the UK, Canada, Australia, the US and New Zealand to combat efforts to reduce carbon pollution for the past three decades, Murdoch has helped spew nearly a billion metric tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, which is now coming back to haunt us in the form of megastorms, mega-floods, and mega-droughts that do billions of dollars of damage a year. In that regard alone Murdoch is one of the most significant mass murderers in human history.

Murdoch’s response to the dangers of sea level rise, which could amount to six feet in this century? “We should all move a little inland.” (Reported in Informed Comment 2014.) Some 240 million to 400 million people now living along sea coasts will be displaced over the next 80 years, and Murdoch made a little joke of it. You can almost hear him say, “No, Mr. Bond, I expect you to die.”

Murdoch’s billions have been used not just to push climate denialism but to push reality denialism in general. He backed the Iraq War and that backing may help explain why Tony Blair joined in Bush’s quixotic misadventure in Mesopotamia. Murdoch told an Australian outlet as the Iraq War was building, “Bush is acting very morally, very correctly… The greatest thing to come of this for the world economy, if you could put it that way, would be $20 a barrel for oil. That’s bigger than any tax cut in any country.” He observed at a business conference, like the sociopath he is, ”There is going to be collateral damage. And if you really want to be brutal about it, better we get it done now than spread it over months.”

The war Bush launched against Iraq in 2003 was not really over until at least 2018, and it went on creating collateral damage all that time, i.e., hundreds of thousands of innocent Iraqis were killed. As for petroleum prices, they were about $36 a barrel when Murdoch made his prediction and they went on up to $140 a barrel in 2008, fluctuating after that.

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What brought oil prices down was the 2008 financial crash (to $40 a barrel) and the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, when they really did briefly hit $20 a barrel. Two years later, and despite Iraq’s production of 4.23 million barrels a day, prices were back up to $112 a barrel, and they’re hovering around $90 now.

Murdoch, despite his undeniably mastery of dirty tricks and sharp practices, whereby he has built semi-monopolies, seems actually to know very little about how the world works, being blind to the dangers of climate change and over-estimating the role one country like Iraq could play in a world that produces about 100 million barrels of oil a day globally and in which countries of the global south are increasingly adopting automobile transportation in the place of bicycles and donkey carts.

So maybe Iraq’s oil wasn’t worth all that collateral damage after all.

I pointed in 2011 to News Corp’s involvement in illegally tapping into people’s phone messages and wondered whether Rupert’s media conglomerate is a cult, working by blackmail and intimidation.

I don’t have space to go into Fox’s promotion of white grievance and its racism toward minorities, including Muslims, or its promotion of toxic masculinity and its backlash against gains in women’s rights. I once observed of Roger Ailes’s molestation of his bevy of blonde anchors that they appear to have been not so much hired as trafficked.

Nor can I treat at length here the way Murdoch held his nose and built up Trump, or how his organization is partly to blame for the big lie and the insurrection of January 6. I wish a special counsel would look into that.

The only sliver of good news is that Murdoch’s Fox News has largely discredited itself with anyone under about 70 years old, and its brand has become so toxic that one wonders if it can survive.

News Corp owns Dow Jones & Company, the latter’s Wall Street Journal, News UK (publisher of the Times of London and a raft of scurrilous tabloids), News Corp Australia, Realtor.com and publisher HarperCollins. Most of Murdoch’s film and television properties were spun off in 2013 and purchased by Disney in 2019. The exception was the television news channel, owned by Fox News, of which Murdoch retained control. His plan to merge News Corp and Fox News was foiled by the opposition of News Corp executives who viewed Fox News as a toxic brand that would sully their name.

That’s right, when Murdoch’s media empire was broken up into three in 2013, one of the three successor companies was the skunk at the party. Fox Cable News had become known as a dirty rotten liar of a television channel, with which even Murdoch’s own colleagues feared to be associated.

Their good judgment was borne out last April, when Fox News agreed to pay nearly $800 million to Dominion Voting Systems to avoid a damaging public libel trial. The anchors of Fox Cable News, which is owned by Fox News and ultimately by Murdoch, had repeatedly alleged that Dominion voting machines delivered inaccurate ballot counts, allowing Joe Biden to claim the presidency even though Donald J. Trump had actually won. This rank falsehood did plausible damage to Dominion’s business, and it seems likely that the company would have won at trial and been awarded even greater damages. Smartmatic, another voting machine manufacturer, has launched a similar suit, and Fox turned over thousands of pages of discovery in April.

Murdoch allegedly believed that he could plead the First Amendment, which attests to a dismal level of knowledge about US law. The First Amendment protects individuals from the US government, it doesn’t give people carte blanche to destroy the reputations of others with malicious lies. And while courts seek a high bar for libel cases in the US because of the First Amendment pledge of free speech, unlike in the UK, they haven’t set them aside entirely, and there have been recent landmark libel cases. I’m only hoping that Dominion opened a floodgate, and that further suits against Fox are forthcoming. It is a cancer in the body politic, of deliberate lies, hatemongering and warmongering on behalf of big capital, and we desperately need to be cured of it as a nation.

To quote Bond, “Welcome to hell, Blofeld.”