Some demonstrators actually set a fire in front of the headquarters of the ruling Likud Party, which Netanyahu heads.

The first nine months of 2023 saw regular massive rallies against Netanyahu and his cabinet, which includes elements that are the Israeli equivalent of neo-Nazis. The horrid Oct. 7 attacks by Hamas caused Israelis to pull together and the demonstrations ceased for a long time, with a war cabinet having been formed that included opposition members. Earlier in June, however, Benny Gantz resigned from the war cabinet, essentially a government of national unity, and Netanyahu has now dissolved it. Gantz, a retired general, leads the centrist opposition National Unity Party.

On Saturday Gantz joined in a demonstration in the town of Kiryat Gat in the Southern District, demanding a hostage deal.

Some of the renewed opposition derives from Netanyahu’s refusal to cease bombing Gaza long enough to conclude a hostage exchange agreement with Hamas. The terrorist organization continues to hold an estimated 120 Israelis who were taken hostage on October 7, a mixture of civilians and military, of men and women, and of Israelis and guest workers (some from Thailand).

The families with members who remain prisoners in Gaza’s tunnels have concluded that there is not hope of a hostage deal as long as the current extremist government remains in power. At a news conference near the Ministry of Defense in Tel Aviv, hostage families announced that Netanyahu’s government has to fall before the hostages can be brought out.

Channel 13 carried an interview with hostage families who asserted that Netanyahu does not want a hostage deal because he knows that their return would signal the fall of his government.

Al Jazeera English Video: “‘All of the rats in the Knesset’: Mass antiwar protest in Israel”

Netanyahu is on trial for corruption and were he to lose the position of prime minister and become a civilian again, the trials would go forward and he could be jailed. One of his predecessors as prime minister, Ehud Olmert, went to prison for corruption. The Israeli prosecutors and police don’t play.

President Joe Biden told an interviewer that it would be legitimate to suspect that Netanyahu carries on the nine-month Gaza campaign because he wants to remain in power.

Warrants have been sought against Netanyahu for war crimes by the International Criminal Court.

Netanyahu’s maximalist goal of “destroying Hamas” was brought into question this week by military spokesman Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari, who said, “Hamas is an idea, Hamas is a party, it is embedded in the hearts of people. Whoever thinks that we can make Hamas disappear is mistaken. It is the Muslim Brotherhood, which has been in this area for a great many years.” He said the most you could do is set up an effective rival to it that would provide aid to people and then publicize that this alternative, not Hamas, was doing effective charity work.

Hagari said that anyone who spoke about destroying Hamas was deceiving the public.

That assertion seemed to many observers a not very veiled reference to Netanyahu.

Yediot Aharanot columnist Nadav Eyal wrote in mid-June, “The IDF believes that the tactical achievement allows Israel to ‘pass a phase,’ and in fact to end the war in Gaza through an agreement to return the kidnapped. ‘The end of the war is not the end of the fighting,’ say security officials, ‘the intelligence will continue to flow and so will the possibility of attacking from the air or from the ground.” [Google translate.; h/t for cite BBC Monitoring.]

This increasing split between the extremist government, with its fascist elements that insist on a forever war in Gaza, and the Israeli officer corps, is momentous and perhaps gives the protesters hope.

However, in a parliamentary system Netanyahu can stay in power until 2026 as long as his coalition retains a majority and he can avoid a vote of no confidence. Israeli civil society is too weakened by decades of Likud Party Neoliberalism to intervene effectively.

The protesters were responding in part to dueling news releases about the possibility of a breakthrough in indirect negotiations between Israel and Hamas in Cairo. Al Jazeera reports that a Qatari team is working on technical details of a proposal, which is usually a sign of movement in the negotiations. President Biden sent CIA Director William Burns to Egypt in case there were positive developments. The Hamas delegation in Cairo said Saturday that some progress has been made. UK sources said that a proposal was put forward “that would halt Israel’s war on Gaza for 40 days and exchange captives for Palestinian prisoners.” Hamas spokesman Osama Hamdan told Al Jazeera, “It’s clear that we are moving forward. There are some good points.” But Hamas wants a pledge that Israel would not invade Rafah, which Netanyahu rejects. The Israeli government has not returned negotiators to Cairo. Netanyahu’s rejectionionism is infuriating the families of the hostages.

Hamas holds about 100 Israeli hostages, along with the bodies of 30 more who have died while captive. Israel routinely arrests Palestinians arbitrarily and holds them without charge, so there are in effect thousands of Palestinian hostages in Israeli custody. To be fair, some of the prisoners Hamas wants released were convicted of acts of terrorism.

Families of Israeli hostages joined the Tel Aviv protesters, blasting Netanyahu for its refusal to do a deal with Hamas. They said that Hamas had agreed to the deal but that Netanyahu was once again trying to undermine the talks.

Some demonstrators demanded new elections, while others insisted on a hostage exchange deal. Thousands gathered in Tel Aviv at the Kaplan-Begin intersection, which has been designated by the municipality “Democracy Square.” They called for immediate new elections even as the street was cut off by the police. Another demonstration was held for the families of the hostages and of Israelis detained in Tel Aviv. They said that “Hamas has indicated its agreement on a deal, but Netanyahu is once again trying to undermine the sole chance to save them, hiding behind ‘a high political source.'” They were referring to reports that the anonymous source in the Israeli government throwing cold water on the possibility of a breakthrough in negotiations with reporters is actually just Netanyahu himself.

The hostage families added, “the Israeli people want the hostages returned alive and agree with paying the price, but Netanyahu prefers his political alliance with [extremists] Ben-Gvir and Smotrich.” They said, “If the price for the return of the hostages is stopping the war, the it must be stopped immediately.”

Many hostage families are afraid that an invasion of Rafah will kill the hostages.

WION Video: “Israel-war: Protest in Tel Aviv for release of hostages, thousands of Israelis take to streets”

The leader of the opposition, Yair Lapid, attended the demonstration in Tel Aviv and said, “There is nothing called victory without a deal and the return of the hostages. Instead of all the stupid messages released by ‘a political source,’ Netanyahu must send a negotiating team tonight to Cairo and say to them that they must not return without a deal and the return of the hostages.”

He added, “There is no other mission, or anything else to do. Yesh Atid made promises and will implement them and we will be a complete safety net for the completion of this deal.” “Yesh Atid” or “There is a Future” is the centrist political party that Lapid leads.

Hundreds of people demonstrated outside the prime minister’s residence in Caesarea, demanding elections. Others rallied at the Karkur intersection on route 65 for a hostage exchange deal.

More thousands of protesters came out in Jerusalem, Beersheba, Netanya, Ra’anana and elsewhere to demand a hostage exchange deal.

At the same time, the Religious Zionism and Jewish Power leaders demanded an immediate Israeli invasion of Rafah, according to Arab 48 . Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir and Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich supported Netanyahu and his decision not to send negotiators to Cairo. They emphasized that Israel’s priority must be to continue the war and to invade the region of Rafah in Gaza rather than a deal that might lead to the release of the Israelis held by Hamas.

( RFE/RL ) – Iran’s so-called axis of resistance is a loose network of proxies, Tehran-backed militant groups, and an allied state actor.

The network is a key element of Tehran’s strategy of deterrence against perceived threats from the United States, regional rivals, and primarily Israel.

Active in the Palestinian Occupied Territories, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, the axis gives Iran the ability to hit its enemies outside its own borders while allowing it to maintain a position of plausible deniability, experts say.

Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has played a key role in establishing some of the groups in the axis. Other members have been co-opted by Tehran over the years.

Iran has maintained that around dozen separate groups that comprise the axis act independently.

Tehran’s level of influence over each member varies. But the goals pursued by each group broadly align with Iran’s own strategic aims, which makes direct control unnecessary, according to experts.

Lebanon’s Hizballah

Hizballah was established in 1982 in response to Israel’s invasion that year of Lebanon, which was embroiled in a devastating civil war.

The Shi’ite political and military organization was created by the Quds Force, the overseas arm of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the elite branch of the country’s armed forces.

Danny Citrinowicz, a research fellow at the Iran Program at the Israel-based Institute for National Security Studies, said Tehran’s aim was to unite Lebanon’s various Shi’ite political organizations and militias under one organization.

Since it was formed, Hizballah has received significant financial and political assistance from Iran, a Shi’a-majority country. That backing has made the group a major political and military force in Lebanon.

“Iran sees the organization as the main factor that will deter Israel or the U.S. from going to war against Iran and works tirelessly to build the organization’s power,” Citrinowicz said.

Hizballah has around 40,000 fighters, according to the office of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence. The State Department said Iran has armed and trained Hizballah fighters and injected hundreds of millions of dollars in the group.

Photo by أخٌ‌في‌الله on Unsplash

The State Department in 2010 described Hizballah as “the most technically capable terrorist group in the world.”

Citrinowicz said Iran may not dictate orders to the organization but Tehran “profoundly influences” its decision-making process.

He described Hizballah, which is considered a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union, not as a proxy but “an Iranian partner managing Tehran’s Middle East strategy.”

Led by Hassan Nasrallah, Hizballah has developed close ties with other Iranian proxies and Tehran-backed militant groups, helping to train and arm their fighters.

Citrinowicz said Tehran “almost depends” on the Lebanese group to oversee its relations with other groups in the axis of resistance.

Hamas

Hamas, designated a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union, has had a complex relationship with Iran.

Founded in 1987 during the first Palestinian Intifada, or uprising, Hamas is an offshoot of the Palestinian arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist political organization established in Egypt in the 1920s.

Hamas’s political chief is Ismail Haniyeh, who lives in Qatar. Its military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, is commanded by Yahya Sinwar, who is believed to be based in the Gaza Strip. Hamas is estimated to have around 20,000 fighters.

For years, Iran provided limited material support to Hamas, a Sunni militant group. Tehran ramped up its financial and military support to the Palestinian group after it gained power in the Gaza Strip in 2007.

But Tehran reduced its support to Hamas after a major disagreement over the civil war in Syria. When the conflict broke out in 2011, Iran backed the government of President Bashar al-Assad. Hamas, however, supported the rebels seeking to oust Assad.

Nevertheless, experts said the sides overcame their differences because, ultimately, they seek the same goal: Israel’s destruction.

“[But] this does not mean that Iran is deeply aware of all the actions of Hamas,” Citrinowicz said.

After Hamas militants launched a multipronged attack on Israel in October that killed around 1,200 people, mostly civilians, Iran denied it was involved in planning the assault. U.S. intelligence has indicated that Iranian leaders were surprised by Hamas’s attack.

Seyed Ali Alavi, a lecturer in Middle Eastern and Iranian Studies at SOAS University of London, said Iran’s support to Hamas is largely “confined to rhetorical and moral support and limited financial aid.” He said Qatar and Turkey, Hamas’s “organic” allies, have provided significantly more financial help to the Palestinian group.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad

With around 1,000 members, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is the smaller of the two main militant groups based in the Gaza Strip and the closest to Iran.

Founded in 1981, the Sunni militant group’s creation was inspired by Iran’s Islamic Revolution two years earlier. Given Tehran’s ambition of establishing a foothold in the Palestinian Occupied Territories, Iran has provided the group with substantial financial backing and arms, experts say.

The PIJ, led by Ziyad al-Nakhalah, is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union.

“Today, there is no Palestinian terrorist organization that is closer to Iran than this organization,” Citrinowicz said. “In fact, it relies mainly on Iran.”

Citrinowicz said there is no doubt that Tehran’s “ability to influence [the PIJ] is very significant.”

Iraqi Shi’ite Militias

Iran supports a host of Shi’ite militias in neighboring Iraq, some of which were founded by the IRGC and “defer to Iranian instructions,” said Gregory Brew, a U.S.-based Iran analyst with the Eurasia Group.

But Tehran’s influence over the militias has waned since the U.S. assassination in 2020 of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, who was seen as the architect of the axis of resistance and held great influence over its members.

“The dynamic within these militias, particularly regarding their relationship with Iran, underwent a notable shift following the assassination of Qassem Soleimani,” said Hamidreza Azizi, a fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

The U.S. drone strike that targeted Soleimani also killed Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the deputy head of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella organization of mostly Shi’ite Iran-backed armed groups that has been a part of the Iraqi Army since 2016.

Muhandis was also the leader of Kata’ib Hizballah, which was established in 2007 and is one of the most powerful members of the PMF. Other prominent groups in the umbrella include Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat al-Nujaba, Kata’ib Seyyed al-Shuhada, and the Badr Organization. Kata’ib Hizballah has been designated as a terrorist entity by the United States.

Following the deaths of Soleimani and al-Muhandis, Kata’ib Hizballah and other militias “began to assert more autonomy, at times acting in ways that could potentially compromise Iran’s interests,” said Azizi.

Many of the Iran-backed groups that form the PMF are also part of the so-called Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which rose to prominence in November 2023. The group has been responsible for launching scores of attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria since Israel launched its war against Hamas in Gaza.

“It’s important to note that while several militias within the PMF operate as Iran’s proxies, this is not a universal trait across the board,” Azizi said.

Azizi said the extent of Iran’s control over the PMF can fluctuate based on the political conditions in Iraq and the individual dynamics within each militia.

The strength of each group within the PMF varies widely, with some containing as few as 100 members and others, such as Kata’ib Hizballah, boasting around 10,000 fighters.

Syrian State And Pro-Government Militias

Besides Iran, Syria is the only state that is a member of the axis of resistance.

“The relationship between Iran and the Assad regime in Syria is a strategic alliance where Iran’s influence is substantial but not absolute, indicating a balance between dependency and partnership,” said Azizi.

The decades-long alliance stems from Damascus’s support for Tehran during the devastating 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War.

When Assad’s rule was challenged during the Syrian civil war, the IRGC entered the fray in 2013 to ensure he held on to power.

Hundreds of IRGC commander and officers, who Iran refers to as “military advisers,” are believed to be present in Syria. Tehran has also built up a large network of militias, consisting mostly of Afghans and Pakistanis, in Syria.

Azizi said these militias have given Iran “a profound influence on the country’s affairs,” although not outright control over Syria.

“The Assad regime maintains its strategic independence, making decisions that serve its national interests and those of its allies,” he said.

The Fatemiyun Brigade, comprised of Afghan fighters, and the Zainabiyun Brigade, which is made up of Pakistani fighters, make up the bulk of Iran’s proxies in Syria.

“They are essentially units in the IRGC, under direct control,” said Brew.

The Afghan and Pakistani militias played a key role in fighting rebel groups opposed to Assad during the civil war. There have been reports that Iran has not only granted citizenship to Afghan fighters and their families but also facilitated Syrian citizenship for them.

The Fatemiyun Brigade, the larger of the two, is believed to have several thousand fighters in Syria. The Zainabiyun Brigade is estimated to have less than 1,000 fighters.

Yemen’s Huthi Rebels

The Huthis first emerged as a movement in the 1980s in response to the growing religious influence of neighboring Saudi Arabia, a Sunni kingdom.

In 2015, the Shi’ite militia toppled the internationally recognized, Saudi-backed government of Yemen. That triggered a brutal, yearslong Saudi-led war against the rebels.

With an estimated 200,000 fighters, the Huthis control most of the northwest of the country, including the capital, Sanaa, and are in charge of much of the Red Sea coast.

The Huthis’ disdain for Saudi Arabia, Iran’s regional foe, and Israel made it a natural ally of Tehran, experts say. But it was only around 2015 that Iran began providing the group with training through the Quds Force and Hizballah. Tehran has also supplied weapons to the group, though shipments are regularly intercepted by the United States.

“The Huthis…appear to have considerable autonomy and Tehran exercises only limited control, though there does appear to be [a] clear alignment of interests,” said Brew.

Since Israel launched its war in Gaza, the Huthis have attacked international commercial vessels in the Red Sea and fired ballistic missiles at several U.S. warships.

In response, the United States and its allies have launched air strikes against the Huthis’ military infrastructure. Washington has also re-designated the Huthis as a terrorist organization.

Copyright (c)2024 RFE/RL, Inc. Used with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1250 Connecticut Ave NW, Ste 450, Washington DC 20036.

Via RFE/RL

From attacks by rebels in the Red Sea to raids in northern Israel and the Oct. 7, 2023, assault by Hamas, Western analysts have pointed a finger of blame toward Iran.

Regardless of how involved Tehran is directly in the planning and carrying out of such incidents, the accusations get at a broader truth: In Middle Eastern geopolitics, Iran’s strategy of aligning with violent nonstate actors – notably Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen – influences the regional balance of power.

As experts in Iran’s relationship with its network of proxies, we understand that Iran’s connection with each group is distinct yet interlinked, revealing Tehran’s regional objectives. From southern Lebanon to Gaza to Yemen, these alliances shape the political landscape and highlight the nature of influence and control in proxy warfare. It serves as a counterweight to Iran’s relatively limited conventional military capabilities, forming a key part of its foreign policy.

Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’

Managed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iran’s paramilitary security service that answers only to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, these regional groups form what Tehran has labeled the Axis of Resistance.

The relationship between the groups and Tehran is designed to serve as a balance against both U.S. influence in the region and that of Washington’s regional allies, including Israel and Saudi Arabia.

But to characterize the Axis of Resistance as straight proxies is slightly off. Rather, Iran’s approach – spanning Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and the Palestinian territories – is to extend its influence through strategic partnerships. While based on shared objectives and ideologies, these alliances allow varying degrees of autonomy. Iran provides resources and coordination, but each group maintains its own agenda and local support base, functioning more as partners than proxies. And the relationship between Iran and each member of this Axis of Resistance is unique.

Hezbollah: Iran’s pivotal partner

Established in the early 1980s, Hezbollah – a Shiite militant organization – emerged with direct assistance from Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, primarily as a response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Aiming to establish an Iranian-influenced base on Israel’s border, Tehran provided training, financial support and weaponry, bolstering Hezbollah’s growth and capabilities.

Photo by أخٌ‌في‌الله on Unsplash

This collaboration has led to Hezbollah developing a sophisticated arsenal, including advanced drone technology, chemical weapons and expanded rocket capabilities.

As a result of its involvement in the Syrian civil war and ongoing hostilities with Israel, Hezbollah has professionalized its military. By deploying troops to support the Syrian government in line with Iran’s support for the regime, Hezbollah has transitioned from guerrilla tactics to more conventional warfare. Additionally, its ongoing conflict with Israel has sharpened its military strategy and capabilities. This helped elevate Hezbollah to a notable political and military role within Lebanon’s government, which has frequently aligned with Iran’s geopolitical interests.

This evolution has also enabled Hezbollah to become a mentor and supporter for other Iran-backed groups. Hezbollah has imparted its expertise in drone operations to organizations such as Fatemiyoun in Afghanistan, Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah and Houthi fighters.

The relationship between Tehran and Hezbollah has deepened over the years, evolving from mere assistance to a robust strategic alliance. The entities share goals, strategies and materials. The close relationship between Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and Iran’s Khamenei further cements this alliance.

Despite Iran’s considerable influence, particularly in regional conflicts, Hezbollah retains autonomy in domestic Lebanese politics and its social services.

This Hezbollah-Iran alliance is arguably more significant than Iran’s relationship with other proxies and is instrumental in Tehran’s regional strategy. It not only extends Iran’s influence in the Middle East but also serves as a counterbalance to its adversaries, notably Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Hamas: United against Israel

Emerging in the first intifada, or Palestinian uprising, of 1987, Hamas forged ties with Iran in the early 1990s. Despite the ideological differences – Hamas is predominantly Sunni Islamist, while Iran is a hard-line Shiite regime – they found common ground in their opposition to Israel and a shared vision for Palestinian liberation.

Iran’s backing of Hamas includes financial aid, military training and, crucially, the supply of rocket technology. This funding has escalated Hamas’ operational capabilities, enabling the development of a more sophisticated and far-reaching rocket arsenal.

Iran’s support has shifted the balance in Hamas’ conflict with Israel, demonstrating Iran’s influential role in regional power dynamics.

The alignment between Iran and Hamas, however, has fluctuated. In 2012, differences over the Syrian civil war introduced a rift in their relationship. Hamas’ tacit support for Sunni rebels in Syria was at odds with Iran’s allegiance to the Assad regime, leading to a temporary withdrawal of Iranian support.

However, this strain was not permanent. In subsequent years, the Iran-Hamas relationship was realigned and reinforced, evidenced by Iran’s resumption of substantial military aid. The sophisticated planning and execution of the Oct. 7 attack showed how Hamas has been able to improve its military capacity with a helping hand from Iran.

Nonetheless, the group maintains a degree of political and strategic independence, primarily focusing on Palestinian interests.

This dynamic reflects Iran’s broader regional strategy: to empower allied groups in extending its reach, while granting them autonomy to pursue specific agendas.

Houthis: Strategic ally against Saudi Arabia

Emerging in the 1990s in Yemen as a Zaidi Shia Islamist group, the Houthi movement initially focused on religious and cultural revivalism before progressively becoming engaged in Yemen’s political and military arenas.

Fueled by grievances against the central government and foreign interference in Yemen, the group shifted to an armed rebellion. This evolution was marked by growing confrontations with the Yemeni government and involvement in a wider regional conflict against a coalition led by Iran’s regional rival, Saudi Arabia. This set the stage for their alliance with Tehran.

The Houthis’ alignment with Iran was spurred by shared religious beliefs as well as opposition to both Saudi Arabia and the U.S.

The collaboration with Iran gained momentum following the Houthis’ capture of Yemen’s capital Sanaa in 2014 – a move that is believed to have triggered an escalation in Iranian support.

Support from Tehran came in the shape of sophisticated weaponry, military training and financial aid, and it has substantially enhanced the Houthis’ missile and drone capabilities. The Houthis have utilized this growing capability to challenge Saudi Arabia and, more recently, Israel

Empowered by Iranian support, the Houthis have expanded their operations to include assaults on U.S. and other international vessels in the Red Sea.

Despite the depth of Iranian support, the Houthis retain a level of autonomy, specifically in local Yemeni politics. While Iran’s influence is notable, it does not translate into outright control. Instead, the Houthis are positioned more as strategic allies within Iran’s regional agenda rather than mere proxies.

Iran’s expanding influence

Iran’s proxy network, which extends to groups in Iraq, Syria and beyond, is a key part of Tehran’s strategy to expand its influence and confront that of Washington and its allies.

These partnerships, though seldom involving absolute control, also demonstrate Iran’s adeptness in navigating geopolitical landscapes. The Axis of Resistance allows Iran to adapt its strategy to shifting regional dynamics. For example, positioning Hamas under the Revolutionary Guard’s guidance fits a strategy to confront Israel as regional dynamics shift toward normalization between Israel and Arab states.

France 24 English Video: “Amid US strikes, Yemen rebels bask in praise, international limelight”

Such partnerships also pose a challenge to Iran’s adversaries. Deterring these proxy groups requires navigating a complex web of relationships, interests and ongoing conflicts. And this complexity, coupled with Iran’s pivotal role, has reshaped the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape, signaling a period of heightened tensions with broad international implications.

Sara Harmouch, PhD Candidate, American University and Nakissa Jahanbani, Assistant Professor at the Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy West Point

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Turkish-Israeli relations are witnessing increasing tension in recent days, culminating in Tel Aviv accusing Ankara of giving way to Hamas to conduct its activities on its soil. Although the Turkish Foreign Ministry rejected the Israeli accusations, Israeli newspapers published articles and reports that criticised Turkish-Hamas relations.

There have been several successive developments in recent days that left their mark on the accelerating decline in Turkish-Israeli relations. Once relations begin to calm, they return to tension and escalation once again.

The latest episode of this tension came with the leaking of Israeli intelligence to Britain’s the Telegraph newspaper regarding the nature of Hamas’ presence and activities in Turkey. Ankara was accused of turning a blind eye to the presence of a number of senior Hamas military officials who were planning to carry out armed operations against Israel from Turkey.

Israel claims that the investigations carried out by its security services with a number of Palestinians returning from Turkey to the West Bank indicate that Hamas activists have planned to assassinate a number of Israeli figures, including Nir Barkat, the former mayor of Jerusalem, Roni Sheikh, Inspector General of Israel Police, and Yehuda Glick, a rabbi and member of Knesset who has stormed Al-Aqsa Mosque on numerous occasions.

Israel has claimed, through its security services, that the Turkish authorities not only ignore Hamas operations in the country, but also that the Turkish intelligence is strengthening its relations with the movement’s members in Istanbul.

Israeli security sources revealed that many Hamas members moved in the last year from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank to Turkey. They claim that they then meet the movement’s members, who agree with them to carry out armed operations against Israeli targets, and provide them with instructions, training and necessary funds, even though Turkey and Hamas deny exploiting Turkish territory for such operations.

While Israel has assassinated a number of Hamas members abroad, it has not attacked any in Turkey, perhaps fearing a diplomatic crisis with a NATO member.

The Turkish Foreign Ministry responded to the Israeli accusations with a number of clear statements, beginning with rejecting the Israeli claims regarding Hamas using Turkey as a launch pad for any operations against Israel. Secondly, they stated that the majority of the international community does not view Hamas as a terrorist organisation, but a “political reality” that won the elections in 2006. Thirdly, the UN General Assembly refused to categorise Hamas as a terrorist organisation in 2018, and fourthly, a number of countries, including Turkey, communicate with Hamas on various levels.

Hamas too considered the Israeli accusations baseless lies and slander aimed at inciting against the movement and disturbing its relations with Turkey and its support for the Palestinian cause. The movement stated that its resistance activities do not go beyond the borders of occupied Palestine. Therefore, it seems these Israeli allegations are due to the fact that Israel cannot see released Palestinian prisoners living a normal life in Turkey.

Hamas believes that these Israeli accusations are part of its effort to exert pressure on countries that advocate for Palestinian rights to pursue the movement’s members, harass them and besiege the movement and its activities.

On more than one occasion, Hamas has emphasised that its members and cadres, wherever they are, act in accordance with the laws of the countries in which they live and highly appreciate the hospitality that Turkey and its people have given them.

It seems clear that these Israeli accusations coincide with the major tour conducted by the head of Hamas’ political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, and his meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Haniyeh’s meeting with Erdogan discussed, in-depth, many important issues, especially the issue of Jerusalem, the risks posed to Al-Aqsa Mosque, the role of Turkey in supporting the Palestinian cause and people in Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the diaspora. It also included discussions of developments related to the expected Palestinian elections, the role of Hamas in overcoming the obstacles hindering the elections, and the efforts made to achieve reconciliation and end the division.

The accusations also come a time when Tel Aviv has accuses Ankara of becoming an active member of the anti-Israel axis, saying that it is moving quickly to be the next enemy of Israel.

Israel has clearly expressed its disturbance by Erdogan’s repeated criticism directed at Israel in every international forum, comparing Israel to Nazi Germany, accusing Israel of executing and killing innocent children, women and the elderly in Palestine, and considering himself the only sponsor of the Palestinians and leader of Sunni Muslims in the Middle East.

Israel does not hide its growing concern regarding Turkey’s recent foreign policy, especially the signing of a memorandum of understanding with the Libyan government on marine areas in the Mediterranean, which effectively cuts the sea in half. This could hinder Israel’s building of gas pipelines to Europe, which is important for Israeli gas exports. Meanwhile, the Turkish navy expelled an Israeli ship conducting research from additional gas fields in the territorial waters of Cyprus a few days ago.

The Turkey-Libya agreement has a significantly negative impact on Israel, due to its plan to build a pipeline from Israeli gas fields in the Mediterranean to Italy, through Greek Cyprus, all the way to Athens.

While the Israeli project aims to use a pipeline to export gas to all European countries, Israel believes that Turkey is trying to establish itself as the one that manages the region. This is very worrying from the Israeli point of view, because the aspirations of Erdogan are growing with the passage of time.

In the same context, the Israeli campaign against Turkey for sheltering the Hamas leadership comes in line with a Western campaign that Ankara faces due to its arms deals with Russia, military intervention in northern Syria, and reaching an agreement to demarcate the maritime border with Libya.

Israel’s accusations cannot be separated from what Tel Aviv claims is Ankara’s attempt to exploit the chaos in the region to achieve its expansionist dreams, by having a Turkish foothold in all the Middle East’s files, all of which harms Israel’s security and strategic interests.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

Via Middle East Monitor

This work by Middle East Monitor is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

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Indusdotnews: “Turkey forces Israel’s ship out of Cypriot waters” | Indus News

Following the escalation of the GCC crisis and the deteriorating relationship between Qatar and the Gulf Triad (Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain), along with Egypt, rumors started spreading about a possible deal with the Hamas leadership in Gaza, being orchestrated by Egypt and the UAE. It would seem that the current crisis and its impact on Hamas has been viewed as a golden opportunity to reshape Palestinian politics and possibly curb the Hamas link to the Muslim Brotherhood and Qatar.

According to Reuters, there have been talks between Hamas leaders, such as Yahya Sinwar, and Egyptian officials about the future of leadership in Gaza. Hamas has been negotiating the easing of the blockade and securing fuel supplies with Egypt on the condition that Hamas includes Mohammad Dahlan in the Gaza leadership. However, the expected scope of his potential role within the government is not clear.

Reports claim that the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah was initially happy about the recent crisis in the GCC, and the consequent implications it has on Gaza; however, the leadership is now reconsidering its stance as it sees the possible return of Mohammad Dahlan to the scene as a threat to the current status quo in the West Bank. The decision of Mahmoud Abbas to pressure Hamas by cutting the salaries of public servants in Gaza as well as cutting down the electricity supply seems to have backfired with Egypt and Dahlan emerging as the unlikely saviors for Hamas.

These rumors that might have sounded far-fetched a couple of months ago, no longer seem to be unthinkable. The difficult situation Hamas currently finds itself in, makes these claims much more plausible. For one thing, it has been reported that multiple Hamas leaders have left Qatar, and the decision by Ismail Haniyeh to relocate to Qatar has been retracted. Nevertheless, it may be argued that it was in fact Qatar that sought to distance itself from Hamas due to the current GCC crisis. Whether this shift was initiated by Qatar or Hamas, or whether these changes preceded the GCC crisis, or came as a result of it, remain the subject of a larger investigation. However, the end result for Hamas remains that is has been put in a difficult position as it seems to be losing its Qatari ally, while at the same time being put under intense pressure by Israel and the Palestinian Authorities, whose actions seem to be driving Gaza towards a catastrophic reality.

More importantly, the recent meeting that took place between Egyptian Intelligence and Hamas leaders indicates a high possibility that the alleged deals are being made. What makes it even more so is the fact that Hamas has recently decided to increase security on the borders with Egypt in Sinai by putting up a buffer zone; a request that fell on deaf ears when made by Egypt in the past. Egypt, on the other hand, suddenly decided to supply the Gaza strip with much-needed fuel supplies following the decision by Israel, under the pressure of the PA, to cut the electricity supply. Could this be the Hamas leadership and Egypt’s way of showcasing their good intentions and willingness to cooperate on the new vision for the Gaza strip? In light of this, it seems more likely than ever that Hamas will take the hand that was extended to it by Al-Sisi’s government, and Dahlan, even if both parties may be highly disliked by the movement.

Seeing as this deal could be a real possibility, what are the possible implications on the future of the Palestinian State and the unity of the Palestinian leadership and people?

For one thing, it seems that the PA has been completely sidelined in these negotiations. It is no secret that Dahlan, who aspires to be the successor of Abbas, has fallen out of favor with the PA in 2011 and has been described as the archenemy of Abbas. With the PA constantly cracking down on the supporters of Dahlan, it has become increasingly clear that a return to the PA is unlikely for him. In turn, it is entirely possible that the future of Gaza is one that distances itself from the West Bank rather than seeks a form of unity. In fact, isn’t it possible that the negotiations with Egypt could lead to the complete separation of Gaza from the West bank? As Egypt starts to supply the Strip with its needs and opens the Egyptian-controlled Rafah crossing with Gaza, what will be the possible scope of cooperation between the West Bank and Gaza?

With a lot of speculation going around, there is not much room for certainty. It may be clear, however, that with the Dahlan-Hamas alliance in Gaza, and Abbas’ Fatah in the West Bank, it seems less likely than ever for the two parties to achieve a unified government let alone be able to negotiate the establishment of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. As such, what seems to be the only move currently available for Hamas is one that further divides the Palestinians and further compromises the relationship between the two territories.

If this plan is to actualize, it is also difficult to see the relationship that might bring together Hamas and Dahlan. The latter has been viewed by many as a corrupt figure in Palestinian politics, and a strong supporter of American and Israeli interests. It is also difficult to ignore the past animosity that existed between the two sides, which intensified during the violent clashes of 2007. Is it possible for the two sides to find a middle ground or is this alliance meant to be short-lived?

At the end, the question that presents itself is whether this move will set the Palestinians and their aspirations for an independent Palestinian state on another trajectory, which will be difficult to escape. If the Palestinian front is divided and the negotiation process is further halted, how will this impact the expanding settlement building projects of Israel in the West Bank and East Jerusalem? If this is a foreseeable future, then will it ever be possible for the Palestinians to reverse the damage created by this rift within its ranks? Or is the future of the Palestinians one that sees Gaza returning to Egypt and the West Bank annexed by Israel? If anything, one thing is clear: Israel will continue to be the biggest beneficiary from the internal Palestinian dispute.

This article is published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International licence.

Via OpenDemocracy.org )

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Related video added by Juan Cole:

TRT World: “Israel-Palestine Tensions: Palestinians reject Israel’s security measures”

Saudi Arabia is making a drive to become a regional hegemon. It has long used its oil wealth to achieve a great deal of influence among neighbors, of course. But it is now flexing military muscles. From a Saudi point of view, they have suffered decades of dangerous reversals, and they are determined to push back foes and ensure not just their security but their control.

The dangers the Saudis see include the revolutionary, Shiite Islam of Khomeinist Iran. It is not only a hated rival branch of Islam but Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who came to power in 1979, said “there are no kings in Islam.” It is republican with a small ‘r.’ The Saudis hate it just as the Austro-Hungarian emperors hated the French Revolution. Inasmuch as Hizbullah in Lebanon adopted Khomeinism and is close to Tehran, it is also seen as a threat by the Saudis. The anti-Wahhabi, Zaydi Shiite Houthi movement in Yemen has made the error of imitating Hizbullah and speaking of overthrowing the House of Saud in Riyadh, and Saudi Arabia has gone to war against the Houthis in Yemen. The Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad, dominated by Alawite Shiites who are secular socialists, is seen as an enemy mostly because it is allied with Iran (the Saudis used to support the al-Assads back in the 1970s and 1980s). The Saudis have supported radical fundamentalist guerrillas in Syria such as Jaysh al-Islam.

It so happens that along several dimensions, the groups the Saudis see as threats are the same as those tagged as dangerous by the right wing Likud Israeli government, creating a Saudi-Israeli tacit alliance. Hence the influence in the campaign against Qatar of American Israel lobbies.

Riyadh feels that the Bush administration deprived them of an ally in the form of the Sunni Saddam Hussein, and replaced him with a pro-Iranian, Shiite dominated Iraq that they fear.

On the Sunni Side, the Saudis are anxious about the populist Sunni movement, the Muslim Brotherhood.

Saudi Arabia, a country of some 20 million citizens and 6 million guest workers, follows the ultra-conservative and puritanical Wahhabi form of Islam, which is rejected by all but 21 million or so Muslims in the world. Some Sunnis are attracted to a form of Sunnism inflected by Wahhabism, known as Salafism. The Saudi royal family does use appeals to Muslim arch-conservatism as a form of soft power. But it is also perfectly capable of supporting secular movements and governments. Thus, it backs the Egyptian officer corps, which is nationalist rather than fundamentalist. It favors the secular Palestine Liberation Organization over the fundamentalist Hamas.

Think about the Wahhabis as sort of like Southern Baptists inasmuch as both are very literalist in their approach to scripture, protestant, puritanical, and reject the idea of saints’ intercession with God or gaudy decorations in place of worship, and both are highly patriarchal. The two are very different, but share some religious themes.

Qatar is also a Wahhabi society, but it is a much smaller country (probably 300,000 Qatari citizens and a couple million guest workers, mainly from Asia). Because influential members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood took refuge there in the 1950s and after, since the MB was and still is seen as dangerous subversives in nationalist Egypt.

Think of the Muslim Brotherhood as sort of like a lay Catholic order that enters into politics, the sort of people active in the National Right to Life organization, who want to shape civil law in the light of their canon law. The MB for the most part did not reject saints or visiting their tombs for blessings. It is populist, a movement of the lower middle class (along with some business people and professionals) rather than being aristocratic and absolutist the way Wahhabism is.

If authority in Saudi Arabia is a pyramid with the king at the top and the tribes and clergy and people at the bottom, authority in the Muslim Brotherhood is more like the spokes of a wheel going out in a more egalitarian way from the Supreme Guide and his politburo. The Saudis are afraid the wheel will pull down the pyramid.

The Muslim Brotherhood is not a terrorist organization, and Qatar, contrary to what Trump alleged, is not supporting terrorism. In fact, the common conceit in the West that Wahhabism is linked to terrorism would be hard to prove. Lots of Sunnis and Shiites have committed terrorist acts, as have Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists and Hindus. Most Wahhabis go through life committing no violence. I even know relatively liberal Wahhabis who are more liberal than some Sunnis I know. The oil wealth has created a new generation of cosmopolitan Wahhabi young business people and professionals. There are still many strict puritans, of course, but puritanism, however annoying, is not terrorism. And let’s not forget that America was founded on puritanism.

Qatar stands accused of using the Al Jazeera satellite t.v. station to promote the Muslim Brotherhood. (Religious Palestinians have long been important in its management and staffing). When the Muslim Brotherhood came to power in Egypt in 2011-2012, claiming Islamic authority based on its populism and elections, that posed a severe threat to the Saudi monarchy, which suddenly had a religious and not just secular rival in Egypt. The Saudi elite was afraid Brotherhood influence would come over and challenge the monarchy.

Hamas in Gaza is a distant branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (it is organized by country, so there is no common reporting line). That is one reason the Saudis dislike it and back the secular PLO.

Qatar, from Riyadh’s point of view, is just not a team player. It has supported the Muslim Brotherhood and kindred movements in Egypt and Syria. It is allied with the pro-Muslim Brotherhood Turkey. Qatar’s traditional policy is to keep lines open to Iran and to remain on speaking terms with the ayatollahs, while Saudi Arabia’s deputy crown prince Muhammad bin Salman wants to isolate Iran, cut off its government, and kill it. Qatar is on the exact opposite side from Iran in Syria, where it supported the Muslim Brotherhood rebels, some of whom morphed into radicals. But it doesn’t support the Salafis such as Jaysh al-Islam, who are backed by the Saudis.

Both Qatar and Saudi Arabia have lost in Syria to the Iran-Russia coalition. But since Qatar has no ambitions to be a regional hegemon (it is too tiny for that), they can live with that defeat and still hope to be influential among the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood-linked groups in any post-war settlement. The Saudis are furious about their defeat and inability to dislodge Iran from Syria. The Saudis are on a war footing in their quest for hegemony, and so abhor grey areas. Everything is black and white to them, and Qatar is not following that logic.

The Saudis and their allies have blockaded Qatar, which gets 90% of its food from places like Jordan, from which it is trucked in across Saudi Arabia. If it has to fly or ship in food, that will be an added expense for the guest workers, who could start peeling off.

It isn’t clear exactly what the militant Saudi would-be hegemons want. Qatar has already expelled Hamas members from Doha. Does Riyadh insist on Qatar cutting off the Muslim Brotherhood everywhere? The closure of Al Jazeera or radical changes in its editorial line? Cutting off Iran diplomatically?

The crisis will probably be resolved without such drastic measures. Qatar has the advantage of being the world’s biggest supplier of Liquefied Natural Gas, making it fabulously wealthy and independent. But it suffers from having a tiny citizen population, smaller than that of Cleveland. In military contests, demography is often destiny.

Newsweek is reporting that Iran has cut off funding to Hamas in Gaza, citing Israeli journalism and Hamas sources.

Iran’s relationship with the Hamas party-militia in the Gaza Strip has been an roller-coaster ride in the past three years.

The youth revolutions of 2011 created hard choices for Hamas. As the Syrian protests devolved into civil war between a Shiite-dominated, secular Baathist regime and a mostly Sunni Arab rebellion in which the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood played a prominent role, Hamas’ relations with Damascus were strained. The organization’s natural allies were the Muslim fundamentalists among the Syrian rebels, but it had long depended in part on Syrian government support. (Hamas is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, but it is autonomous and has no reporting line to the Egyptian branch).

Likewise, Iran’s backing for Hamas was an embarrassment as of 2012 because it was also supporting the al-Assad regime.

When Muhammad Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood came to power in Egypt in summer of 2012, Hamas switched to seeking patronage and support from Morsi, and is alleged to have abandoned Iran. Aligning with Egyptian and Syrian like-minded Muslim Brothers made for ideological consistency.

Saudi Arabia doesn’t trust the Muslim Brotherhood and sees it as a sneaky authoritarian cult with radical ambitions. For Hamas to hook up with it was intolerable to the Saudis.

But then in summer of 2013, disaster struck for the fundamentalists. Morsi was overthrown. Hamas had to go back on bended knee to Tehran for patronage, even though Iran was backing the enemies of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, the Syrian regime.

After the US concluded a deal with Iran over the latter’s uranium enrichment program a month ago, a new realignment seemed to take place. The Saudis redoubled their attempt to overthrow the Houthis in Yemen, whom they see as Iran-backed (Iran probably has sent them a couple of million dollars, but the Houthis are mostly indigenous Yemenis.)

Two weeks ago, Khalid Mashaal, the head of the Hamas political bureau, was summoned to Riyadh. It had been years since Hamas was allowed into Riyadh, much less into the palace. There were rumors that Saudi Arabia was determined to wean Hamas off its Iran alliance as a way of closing ranks within the Sunni Arab forces.

Ma’an News Agency reported on July 19:

“Hamas leader Dr Salah al-Bardawil confirmed that the crisis between Hamas and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has seen a major relaxation in the wake of the visit of Khalid Mish’al, head of the Hamas Political Bureau, to Riyadh. Al-Bardawil told Ma’an that the visit by a Hamas delegation, led by Khalid Mish’al, to Saudi Arabia was successful and achieved its objectives. It is considered a major relaxation in relations between Hamas and Riyadh. The Hamas delegation was received by King Salman, custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, Crown Prince Muhammad Bin-Nayif, Deputy Crown Prince Muhammad Bin-Salman, and other Saudi officials.

Relations between Hamas and Saudi Arabia had been sour for years. This is the first visit of its kind to be made by a Hamas delegation to the Kingdom since 2012. Al-Bardawil said: “When relations are broken and then a meeting is held with the king, this signals a clear shift in the relationship and detente with Saudi Arabia.”

He said that “the delegation, which included Mish’al and Musa Abu-Marzuq, Salih al-Aruri, and Muhammad Nazzal, members of the Political Bureau, had a high-level reception. The visit was fruitful. We felt that there is Saudi willingness to support the Palestinian cause. This cuts off the tongue of Netanyahu, prime minister of the occupation, who claims in his speeches that there is a Saudi-Egyptian-UAE coalition in the region to deprive the Palestinians of Arab support.” He added: “Due to the mixed Arab reality, efforts for the Palestinian cause have been shelved and some major states, which are supposed to lead the Arab nation, have been neutralized. This visit aims at returning the Arab effort to its correct place and supporting Palestine.” He added: “Saudi Arabia is a big country and has resources and political influence, which qualify it to be a large supporter of the Palestinian cause on the political, moral, and material levels.”

He said that the Saudi detente means giving freedom to popular Saudi establishments to provide humanitarian assistance to the Palestinians, especially in the Gaza Strip. He confirmed that Saudi Arabia released a number of Hamas personalities during the visit. They had been detained for several months “in the wake of a misunderstanding” in Saudi Arabia. They are estimated to be four persons.

He said that Saudi Arabia would play a role in supporting reconciliation through putting pressure on the Palestinian parties “to become softer on the question of Palestinian partnership in the other part of the homeland. This will certainly help resolve the problem of civil servants and their salaries.”

BBC Monitoring translated on July 23,

“In privately-owned pro-Fatah Al-Quds newspaper, Rasim Ubaydat commented on a recent visit by Khalid Mish’al of Hamas to Riyadh, by saying that Hamas, the Palestinian wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, preferred the Saudi axis in the region to that of Tehran. “Hamas ended the argument within it by finally remaining in the Saudi-Qatari-Turkish- Muslim Brotherhood axis. It had to finally diverge from the Tehran-Damascus-southern Suburb in Beirut [reference to Hizballah]. One of the main objective of its delegation’s visit to Saudi Arabia that was headed by its politburo chief Khalid Mish’al was to prevent a new return to the Iranian axis,” he said.

In another Palestinian paper, in Hamas-run Gaza-based Filastin newspaper, Abdallah al-Aqqad pointed out that the visit could also be a prelude to Saudi efforts to end a rift between Hamas in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, ensuring that Riyadh is a main player in the region. “Saudi Arabia is making efforts to end the split. It might thus soon send an invitation to President Mahmud Abbas [to come to Riyadh],” he said.

An Arabic newspaper, al-Watan, has translated a story from Maariv in the Israeli press. It alleges that Saudi Arabia is desperate to create a Sunni bloc to counter the Shiite one Iran had generally picked up.

Is Saudi Arabia on the verge of picking up Hamas as a client? It is entirely possible.

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Related video:

Wochit News: Hamas Claims Leader and Saudi King Meet in Mecca

GAZA CITY (Ma’an) — Five car bombs targeting the armed wings of Hamas and Islamic Jihad went off in near-simultaneous blasts on Sunday morning in the center of Gaza City and its northern neighborhood of Sheikh Radwan.

Witnesses said the explosions that went off at around 6:30 a.m. appeared to have been caused by bombs placed underneath the cars parked in front of their owners’ homes.

Three of the cars were said to have belonged to members of al-Qassam brigades and two to members of al-Quds brigades, the armed wings of Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

Shrapnel from the blasts hit residential houses, shattering windows and lightly injuring two people who were transferred to a local hospital.

There were no reports of serious injuries.

According to witnesses, the explosions occurred within an interval of 15 minutes.

Graffiti on a wall near one of the bombs reportedly read “Daesh,” the Arabic acronym for the Islamic State group (IS), although no group has claimed responsibility for the attacks.

Police working under Hamas, the movement that rules the Gaza Strip, did not say who they believed was responsible, but vowed action against the culprits.

“This morning, saboteurs exploded several cars of (members of) resistance movements in the Sheikh Radwan neighborhood, causing material damage,” Hamas police said in a statement.

“Security forces have opened an investigation and are searching for those responsible. We assure that the criminals will not escape punishment.”

The explosions appeared to be intended as a warning rather than an attempt to inflict casualties given the early hour, as has occurred with previous incidents.

Since last summer’s devastating war in Gaza, there have been growing signs of internal unrest between Hamas security forces and other militant groups, with a string of small-scale explosions.

Sunday however marked the first time Islamic Jihad was targeted, in an indication the group is viewed as part of the establishment in Gaza.

Many of the more recent attacks are believed to be the work of fringe Salafist groups that have made a name for themselves as unafraid to challenge Hamas, seeking to outbid them in the fight against Israel and the defense of Islam.

There have also been attacks claimed by groups purporting to be from an IS branch in Gaza, although such claims have so far been largely discredited by online militant forums.

According to witnesses, the five explosions in Gaza City on July 19, 2015 occurred within an interval of 15 minutes and three of the cars were said to have belonged to members of Al-Qassam and two to members of Al-Quds. (AFP/Mohammed Abed)

Appeal of extreme groups

Salafis are Sunni Muslims who promote a strict lifestyle based on the traditions of early pious ancestors. While the vast majority of Salafis in Gaza are apolitical, a violent fringe has emerged in recent years.

Hamas has in the past cracked down hard on all Salafis, particularly as the religious group enjoys the support of Fatah.

But more recently Hamas has targeted the more extreme groups, which it views as a threat to its power.

Experts warn that the appeal of extremist groups is growing, particularly among Gaza’s disaffected youth who have been particularly hard hit by conflict, grinding poverty and soaring unemployment and feel let down by traditional Palestinian nationalist movements.

There has been no confirmation from IS itself that it has a presence in Gaza.

However, a number of young Palestinians with few prospects have left Gaza to fight in Iraq or Syria, while others have been drawn towards extremist groups involved in a deadly insurgency against Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula.

Gazans who have gone to fight with the IS in Syria recently released a video calling for Hamas to be toppled in the territory.

In May, mortar rounds were fired against a base for Al-Qassam in an incident claimed by a group calling itself Supporters of the Islamic State in Jerusalem, which has also taken credit for recent rocket fire into Israel.

Growing extremism has led some to renew their call for an easing of the crippling Israeli blockade against the Gaza Strip in hopes that conditions will improve. Gaza’s border with Egypt also remains strictly controlled.

AFP contributed to this report.

Via Ma’an News Agency

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Related video added by Juan Cole:

AFP: “Gaza car blasts target Hamas, Islamic Jihad”