Given Bahçeli’s reputation for staunch Turkish nationalism and his opposition to any concessions for the PKK, his remarks have surprised many across the political spectrum.

The day after Bahçeli’s speech, a deadly terrorist attack occurred at the headquarters of Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAŞ), a state-owned aerospace and defense company near the capital, Ankara, leaving seven people dead, including two assailants. Turkish officials attributed the attack to the PKK, which claimed responsibility two days later, on October 25, asserting that the attack was not related to the latest political developments.

Despite the PKK attack in Ankara, the positive momentum surrounding the peace initiative has not yet been derailed.

Historical Background

The PKK was founded in 1978 during a period of widespread political violence between left-wing and right-wing factions in Türkiye. However, before the 1980 coup d’état, the PKK was a small group without significant military or operational capacity.

On September 12, 1980, the Turkish military, led by General Kenan Evren, staged a coup, citing severe instability as the reason. Following the coup, the military suspended the parliament, banned all political parties, and detained thousands of political activists. Political leaders were either arrested or barred from participating in politics.

From 1980 to 1983, Türkiye was under military rule. The military junta prohibited the use of the Kurdish language and restricted Kurdish cultural expression. The oppressive conditions under the military government led the PKK to launch an armed insurgency in 1984 in southeastern Türkiye in order to establish an independent Kurdish state. The first PKK attack on August 25, 1984, marked the beginning of a prolonged conflict.

The Turkish military launched an extensive counter-insurgency campaign. Many PKK members retreated to northern Iraq, particularly to the Qandil Mountains, which became a key base for PKK operations. Over the years, Türkiye has conducted numerous airstrikes and ground operations against PKK positions in northern Iraq.

Abdullah Öcalan was captured in Kenya in 1999 and initially sentenced to death; however, this sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment on İmralı Island in the Sea of Marmara. His capture marked a significant turning point in the ongoing conflict as Öcalan is viewed as the nation’s top security threat, much like how Osama bin Laden was perceived in the U.S.—a central focus of national security efforts.

According to pro-government Hürriyet, since 1984, the conflict has resulted in the deaths of more than 14,000 Turkish security forces, 6,000 civilians, and 46,000 PKK members.

Past Peace Initiatives

In the 1990s, a non-violent political movement advocating for Kurdish cultural and political rights began to form, as many Kurdish politicians saw the need for a legal political party to represent Kurdish interests within the Turkish political system. The People’s Labor Party (HEP), established in 1990, became Türkiye’s first pro-Kurdish party.

Since then, left-wing pro-Kurdish political parties have repeatedly faced legal restrictions, closures, and accusations of links to the PKK, resulting in a cycle of dissolution and re-establishment. The Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) is the most recent and prominent Kurdish-oriented party.

In the early 2000s, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan introduced reforms to improve Kurdish rights. In 2009, the AKP government launched the ‘Kurdish Opening,’ which paved the way for a gradual peace process. By 2013, direct negotiations between the Turkish government and the PKK resulted in a ceasefire and raised hopes for a political resolution.

However, tensions escalated after July 22, 2015, when PKK members killed two policemen in Ceylanpınar. The incident led to the collapse of the peace process, resulting in renewed violence and urban warfare in Kurdish-majority areas. In response, the Turkish government intensified military operations against the PKK in Türkiye and northern Iraq.

Türkiye also launched three ground operations into northern Syria between 2016 and 2019, targeting the People’s Protection Units (YPG). Turkish officials have consistently labeled the YPG/SDF as a PKK offshoot.

While many international media outlets frame Türkiye’s Kurdish issue as a straightforward “Erdoğan vs. the Kurds” conflict, this simplification overlooks significant nuances and obscures the full reality. Broadly categorizing the Kurdish population as a unified bloc opposing Erdoğan fails to recognize the political and ideological diversity within Türkiye’s Kurdish communities.

Erdoğan has frequently sought to divide the Kurdish electorate by appealing to conservative Kurds, as opposed to those who support secular, left-wing parties. This strategy weakens the DEM Party’s influence and bolsters his electoral base, particularly in regions with a significant Kurdish population.

Additionally, some conservative Kurdish groups maintain political ties with the AKP. Hüda-Par (Free Cause Party), a Sunni Islamist Kurdish party, openly supported Erdoğan in the 2018 and 2023 presidential elections and participated in the 2023 parliamentary election under the AKP list.

A New Peace Process?

In early October, rumors of a renewed peace process began circulating after a handshake between Bahçeli and members of the DEM Party during the Parliament’s opening on October 1. Speculation about a potential second peace process grew even further following Bahçeli’s statement regarding Öcalan.

Devlet Bahçeli has previously been a vocal advocate for the execution of Abdullah Öcalan. Notably, at a June 2007 election rally, Bahçeli targeted then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, stating, “Can’t you find a rope to hang him? Here, take this rope and hang him, then,” as he held up a rope to the crowd.

Bahçeli’s previous rhetoric makes his recent statements about Öcalan all the more striking.  In contrast, an ordinary citizen expressing views such as advocating for Öcalan’s release or suggesting he be allowed to speak in parliament would likely face prosecution or imprisonment.

As discussions about a renewed peace process were rekindled, Özgür Özel, the leader of the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), visited Selahattin Demirtaş, the jailed former leader of the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP).

Özel also endorsed the government’s peace bid, stating: “I am offering a state to the Kurds. I am offering the Kurds, who do not feel they belong here, the opportunity to be the owners of the Republic of Türkiye. Let’s create a country where the Kurds do not feel like the “other”…”

Thus far, the main opposition and the DEM Party appear to welcome Bahçeli’s remarks. However, significant differences in outlook are evident. While Bahçeli claims that there is no “Kurdish question” in Türkiye, the CHP and DEM emphasize the need for greater democratization to achieve lasting peace in southeastern Türkiye.

As noted by a prominent expert on the Kurdish issue and professor of political sociology Doğu Ergil, a call made directly to the PKK via Öcalan could lead to a ceasefire but not to lasting peace. For genuine peace, there must be an agreement based on principles and conditions mutually accepted by the societies involved and secured by the rule of law. Moreover, such peace cannot be sustainable if it relies on short-term political interests.

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Al Jazeera English: “Ankara attack on aviation facility: Turkish officials say 5 killed and 22 wounded”

Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is an international norm for states to prevent genocide, mass atrocities, and war crimes, in response to the failure to do so in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The US airdropped food to trapped refugees on nearby Mount Sinjar, but sat on the sidelines as the massacre ensued in this village. Ten years later, the international community still has a Responsibility to Remember (R2R) to the Yazidis who died, to those dealing with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), to the more than 2,000 who are still missing, and to the other victims of war who are only increasing in number in the 21st century – from the north of Iraq to Ukraine to Gaza. The United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/ISIL (UNITAD) was a dedicated R2R body. Yet, its mandate will soon be terminated.

Murad was able to escape and arrived in Germany in 2015. She was one of the fortunate also appointed as a UN goodwill ambassador, the first to represent “Dignity of Survivors of Human Trafficking.” Murad was eventually awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the first Iraqi to ever receive it.

In 2016 she met the Beirut-born British barrister Amal Alamuddin Clooney, who agreed to represent Murad. Both addressed the United Nations, advocating that the ISIS campaign be designated as a genocide. Their work was essential to the Security Council agreeing to establish UNITAD in 2017.

Photo by Levi Meir Clancy on Unsplash

In the lobby of the United Nations General Assembly, a replica of Picasso’s Guernica mural hangs above the podium where international figures field questions from the media, a form of R2R for the multilateral body, as the failure of the world community to act after Guernica eventually led to World War Two. By bearing witness to Guernica, UN diplomats would work to ensure it would not happen again. Yet, Guernica did happen again: in Halabja at the end of the 20th century, and Kocho was the Guernica of the 21st century. 

UNITAD was an attempt to prevent future Guernicas. The Iraqi judicial system lacked the infrastructure to investigate and try all the members of ISIS responsible for these crimes; hence, Baghdad requested the aid of the UN in the form of UNITAD, which has been collecting evidence since 2017.

Yet, the Iraqi government sought to terminate this body’s mandate in 2024 due to conflicts with the UN team investigating the crimes. This denies justice to the survivors of ISIS atrocities. Closing such a body is not only a loss for the female survivors of gender-based violence, the Yazidis, as well as the Iraqi nation in general, it sets a tragic global precedent;  a dedicated UN body is imperative to document genocidal and gendercidal violence, and victims of war.

The genocidal rampage that ensued in Kocho in August 2014 continued for the women in captivity.  To forge homogeneity within their “Islamic” state, ISIS sought the erasure of a pre-Islamic past by destroying pre-Islamic antiquities and what it deemed as “pre-Islamic peoples,” expelling Christians from Mosul, or enslaving Yazidi women to ensure that they could not give birth to future Yazidi children, a form of genocide specifically targeted against one gender, in what can be more specifically called a gendercide. Their captivity not only led to their estrangement from other Yazidis, but any future children born out of this slavery would not be considered part of the endogenous community.

The work of lawyers or human rights investigators is like a historian, trying to collect material from the past from primary sources to construct a narrative in the present. Primary sources, in this case, include the videos and documents produced by ISIS itself documenting their genocide, as well as the testimonies of the victims.

R2R is a reminder, as well, to the damage done to the spiritual heritage of Yazidi temples and Christian churches by ISIS, in addition to forced expulsion. Both physical reconstruction and investment in mental healthcare infrastructure, which Iraq lacks, are still needed.
UNITAD sought to deliver justice. It is a body that needs to be replicated for those who suffer due to decisions made by terrorists, warlords or politicians who will never be held accountable for their actions all the way from Kocho to the fighting in Ukraine and Gaza.
 
As a historian, these deaths and victims inspired me to advocate for R2R for the victims of war. Life is one episode in this greater history of soldiers and civilians from the north of Iraq and Syria under ISIS, to Ukraine to Gaza, who have died or endured trauma and PTSD, internally displaced peoples and refugees, child soldiers, the victims of gender-based violence during conflict, the kidnapped and tortured, those maimed by landmines or IEDs and amputees, many reliant on prosthetics, landscapes poisoned by depleted uranium, to animals and domesticated pets caught up in conflicts that they had no role in creating.

Reprinted with the author’s permission from Rudaw.net

In north-east Syria, the 12-year conflict is far from over. Russian fighter jets buzz US surveillance drones, threatening to bring them down. Iranian-backed militias occasionally fire rockets at US positions. The Assad regime maintains that it will “regain every inch” of Syria, ending Kurdish autonomy in the north-east.

Meanwhile Turkey — considering the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) to be part of the Turkish Kurdish insurgency PKK — carries out periodic strikes, following its seizure of part of the border area in October 2019. And the Islamic State, expelled from its last village is March 2019, is still present. Its cells attack civilians and the Assad regime’s military buses, killing at least 23 troops on August 11.

In a multi-sided confrontation where — amid the regime’s deadly repression — no one has “won”, the headline is of a possible Russian-Iranian-US showdown. But that is a diversion from a local story where Syria’s Kurds could be the biggest losers in the north-east.

On July 16, a Russian Su-35 fighter jet flew close to a US MC-12 turboprop surveillance aircraft, flying in support of operations against Islamic State cells. American officials said the MC-12’s four crew members were endangered, and added that Russian harassment had complicated strike against an IS leader earlier in July. Moscow disregarded the message.

On July 23, another Russian fighter jet damaged a US MQ-9 Reaper drone, carrying our surveillance over northern Syria, when it flew within a few metres and one of its flares struck the Reaper’s propeller. A drone operator kept the Reaper in the air and guided it home.

Lt. General Alex Grynkewich, commander of the 9th Air Force, said: “We call upon the Russian forces in Syria to put an immediate end to this reckless, unprovoked, and unprofessional behaviour.” Some analysts seized on the incidents to declare imminent confrontation. Citing movements of Iranian-backed militia and Assad regime troops and equipment as well as Russian harassment, the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War declared: “Iran, Russia, and the Syrian regime are coordinating to expel US forces from Syria.”

Despite a de facto “deconfliction” arrangement with US forces, Russia has discussed operations with Iran to prop up the Assad regime throughout the Syrian conflict. But ISW’s assessment is hyperbolic. The chair of the US Joint Chief of Staff, General Mark Milley, said in July that additional military deployments were not needed to fend off Russian harassment: “There’s been an uptick, but I wouldn’t overstate it too much. We’ve got adequate capabilities to defend ourselves.”

Equally important, assessments such as ISW’s play down – or even ignore completely – what is actually happening on the ground in Syria in favour of focusing on the interplay between foreign powers. Specifically, attention to a US-Russian-Iranian confrontation ignores the group at greatest risk in any showdown: Syria’s Kurdish population.

A people without a home

In 2015, the prospect was of an Islamic State caliphate across northern Syria. IS controlled about one-third of the country, with the prospect of further gains. But the Kurds, backed by US military assistance, held out. They repelled a four-month siege of Kobane by IS in January 2015, at the cost of thousands of lives, and then began the fightback to reclaim territory.

Raqqa, Syria’s seventh-largest city and the centre of the caliphate, was liberated in October 2017. The following September, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Council declared the establishment of a statelet, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES).

But autonomy would inevitably be tenuous for a Kurdish population — estimated at between 30 and 45 million — struggling for decades for a state in Syria, Iran, Iraq or Turkey. The Assad regime, which suppressed Kurdish protests in 2004-05, was anxious to regain authority that it had lost after nationwide demonstrations began in March 2011.

Tehran’s regime not only chafed at US-supported Kurdish forces but also had its own problematic relations with Kurds in northwest Iran. Turkey’s Erdoğan government, because of its internal fight with the PKK, was also dedicated to breaking the Kurdish areas.

Ankara came close to doing so. Having already overrun the Afrin canton in north-west Syria in 2016, Erdoğan sought an opening to advance in the north and north-east. He got it from Donald Trump, who offered in phone calls in December 2018 and October 2019 to withdraw all US troops. The Pentagon checked Trump on the first occasion, but Erdoğan seized on the second “green light” to launch a cross-border invasion, occupying a strip along the border.

Do “The Kurds Always Lose in the End”?

In April 2013, at an international gathering in Oxford in the UK, a US military officer told me: “I can’t see us maintaining a presence. The Kurds always lose in the end.”

More than a decade later, about 900 US troops remain in Syria, many of them working with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. But Erdoğan is watching, waiting, and saying that the Kurds must capitulate. Assad still insists that he should be the leader of the north-east.

As Iran fences with the US over sanctions and Tehran’s nuclear program, Iranian-backed militias occasionally fire rockets at US positions. And Russia — entangled in what appears to be Vladimir Putin’s losing gamble in Ukraine — pursues Syrian “pinpricks” against the Americans, hoping that Washington will finally abandon the Kurds.

On August 4, as political and military analysts were watching Russia and the US, there was another statement from northeast Syria. A day earlier, a Turkish drone strike on a car killed four members of the Syrian Democratic Forces and wounded two.

The Kurdish-led AANES called on the US to take a public position over the Turkish attacks which have killed dozens of Syrian Kurdish fighters this year. Washington must “have a clear stance … regarding the targeting of our people and fighters”.

There was no immediate reaction from either the US military or the Biden administration.

Scott Lucas, Professor, Clinton Institute, University College Dublin

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The unequal playing field gave the incumbent an unjustified advantage

Written byArzu Geybullayeva

( Globalvoices.org) -Showing up at a polling station, as one of the two presidential candidates, in a country-wide election with a pocket full of cash may not occur to leaders of democratic countries, but in Turkey, that is what the newly re-elected President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan did on May 28. The incumbent president was seen handing out TRY 200 banknotes (USD 10) to his supporters amid cheering and blessings.
In Turkey, campaigning on an election day is prohibited, but given the unequal playing field in the run-up to both elections on May 14 and May 28, it is unlikely that President Erdoğan will face any repercussions. The same applies to countless violations documented by the Turkey-based Human Rights Association (İHD). According to their report, there was violence and vote rigging observed across Turkey on May 28. In Hatay, observers documented mass voting, while in other provinces, representatives of the main opposition CHP faced violence. According to the association, there were also instances in provinces where men voted on behalf of women or pre-stamped ballots were brought from outside. The association said:

In the light of the initial data Human Rights Association (İHD) has received and those reported in the press, it has been determined that violations including mass and open voting, obstruction of observers and party representatives, and physical violence took place in the presidential election runoff. İHD calls on all public authorities, especially the Supreme Electoral Board, to fulfill their duties in accordance with human rights standards in order to ensure fair elections.

On June 1, the Supreme Electoral Board announced the official results of the second round of presidential elections. According to the results, President Erdoğan received 52.18 percent of the votes while his opponent, Kılıçdaroğlu received 47.82 percent.

Predictions for the next five years

Already, a day after the election on May 29, the country witnessed a price hike on gas and alcoholic beverages as well as reports of medical professionals looking to leave the country. According to the Turkish Medical Association (TBB), an independent medical and health professional association, data from March 2022, some 4,000 doctors have left the country in the last ten years. The new data shared by the association showed the number of medical professionals wanting to leave in the first five months of 2023 reached 1,025. But it won’t be just the doctors leaving. According to a survey by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung conducted among Turkish youth to evaluate their social and political opinions, “a significant proportion, 63 percent of young people, expressed a desire to live in another country if given the opportunity,” citing worsening living conditions and declining freedom in Turkey as main reasons for this decision.

Already, there are signs that Turks, from all walks of life — especially those with little children — intend to seek opportunities abroad. Among those wanting to leave are those fearing persecution by the new leadership.

Supporters of the ruling party celebrate the victory on May 28. Image by Aziz Karimov. Used with permission.

There is also the economy and the slumping of the national currency, the Turkish Lira, against the dollar. According to Morgan Stanley analysts, lest President Erdoğan reverses his policy of low-interest rates, the lira could face a 29 percent slump by the end of 2023. On June 3, Erdoğan is set to announce the new cabinet. Among them, is former Minister of Finance, Mehmet Simsek, who is expected to take over all of Turkey’s economic policies, according to reporting by Bloomberg. Pundits say Simsek’s inclusion within the new cabinet is a move that could help prop up Turkey’s struggling economy:

The economy is not the only area where Turkey is likely to see further problems, according to Daron Acemoğlu, a faculty member at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). In a detailed thread on Twitter, Acemoğlu noted judicial independence “was very bad and probably cannot get much worse.” There is also the media environment. According to Acemoğlu while he does not anticipate “a complete ban on all dissident voices,” the conditions may worsen if the state anticipates introducing further “controls on social media.” Acemoğlu also anticipates further erosion of “autonomy and impartiality of bureaucracy and security services,” as well as challenges imposed against civil society and freedoms more broadly.

Some of the restrictions on media were quick to follow. On May 30, The Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) also known as the chief censor in Turkey, launched an investigation against six opposition television channels over their coverage of the elections.

After securing another victory, President Erdoğan delivered a divisive election speech. Speaking to his supporters who gathered at the presidential palace in Ankara, he called the jailed leader of the Kurdish HDP party a terrorist and promised to keep Demirtaş behind bars. During the speech, his supporters began calling for Demirtaş’s execution. In December 2020, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Turkey must immediately release the Kurdish politician. The politician was placed behind bars in November 2016, and if convicted, could face 142 years in prison. The charges leveled against him are being a leader of a terrorist organization, an accusation Demirtaş has denied.

There is also the case of Can Atalay, the newly elected member of parliament, representing the Workers Party, who remains behind bars, despite Atalay’s lawyers’ attempts to free him. All newly elected parliament members are expected to attend the swearing-in ceremony on June 2.

Journalists Union of Turkey (TGS) President Gökhan Durmuş was closely watching the President’s victory speech and released a statement expressing his concern about the divisive nature of the next government and the implications on press freedom in the country.

However, in an atmosphere where the society is divided exactly in two, it will only be possible to continue to be in power by continuing the oppressive policies. And President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has already signaled to the whole society in his balcony speech that this will be their choice.

The future of the opposition alliance

While at first, it was unclear what will happen to the opposition alliance, also known as the Table of Six, the past few days indicate divisions within the group. Uğur Poyraz, the Secretary General of the IYI Party and one of the members of the Table of Six said on June 1, “The name of this alliance is the electoral alliance; when the election is over, the alliance will also disappear. As of May 28, the electoral alliance ended.” But not all members of the alliance share the same sentiments. In a video address shared via Twitter, the leader of Gelecek Party Ahmet Davutoğlu encouraged supporters of the alliance “not to fall into despair or possible provocations,” adding, that those who supported the ruling government and its alliance did so not because they accepted the status quo but due to an environment of fear.

Other members of the alliance, such as the leader of the Felicity party Temel Karamollaoğlu took it to Twitter, where he criticized the ruling government for the polarization, asking whether it was all worth it. “Was it really worth it, declaring half of our nation ‘terrorists, enemies of religion, traitors,’ in return for this result you have achieved? Was it worth all the lies, slander, and insults,” wrote Karamollaoğlu.

The latter was also reflected in a joint statement issued by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) observers:

The second round of Türkiye’s presidential election was characterized by increasingly inflammatory and discriminatory language during the campaign period. Media bias and ongoing restrictions to freedom of expression created an unlevel playing field, and contributed to an unjustified advantage of the incumbent.

The blame game

Many blamed the opposition alliance and its leader for failing to secure victory in these elections but according to Gönül Tol, the founding director of the Middle East Institute’s Turkey program and a senior fellow with the Black Sea Program it is not as simple as that and that fear factor played a significant role. In a Twitter thread, Tol alluded to a handful of complexities that determined the outcomes of these elections. From elections being unfree and unfair, to both pro-democracy and President Erdoğan’s alliance having “existential anxieties,” with both sides seeing the elections “as a war of survival.”  Tol explained:

In such polarized contexts, people do not change their voting behavior easily based on policy preferences, incumbent’s performance or opposition’s promises. Going for the other guy rather than sticking with the devil you know is too big of a risk to take, especially in the face of such dramatic uncertainty. That is why Erdoğan continues to polarize the country.

As for the fear factor, Tol noted that President Erdoğan’s victory speech, was “the most aggressive” to date, “because that is how autocrats cling to power against unfavorable odds. They stoke fear and frame elections as a war for survival. That is how they prevent defections. That is how they can still muster majorities even when they fail to deliver.”

Writing for T24, academic and journalist Haluk Şahin explained that the outcomes of these elections were “determined not by economics and sociology, but by social psychology. In other words, a choice driven by subconscious and subconscious fears, identities, denials, jealousies, desires for worship, and ambitions to dominate.”

Others like political scientist Umut Özkırımlı explained that in order to “to topple an authoritarian regime at the ballot box” two things are needed, “sizeable electoral majorities” and “populist and ethnonationalist strategies” referring to an essay by Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way’s The New Competitive Authoritarianism. In the essay, the authors argue:

Tilting the playing field in countries such as Hungary, the Philippines, Turkey, and Venezuela requires greater skill, more sophisticated strategies, and far more extensive popular mobilization … Prospective autocrats must first command sizeable electoral majorities, and then deploy plebiscitarian or hypermajoritarian strategies to change the constitutional and electoral rules of the game so as to weaken opponents. This is often achieved via polarizing populist or ethnonationalist strategies.

With local elections months away (Turkey is to hold mayoral elections in March 2024) academic Orçun Selçuk said the opposition should stick to “playing the long game”:

Calls for solidarity

On the night of election, as Erdoğan supporters, roamed the streets of Turkey, celebrating into the early hours of the morning, the other half of the country, did not hesitate in shaking off the outcome and calling to keep on fighting.

 

Acclaimed musician, Fazil Say, tweeted on May 29, “No demoralizing, friends, let’s embrace life. Keep up the goodness. Life goes on, music goes on, the world goes on, endless continuation to create and produce beauty.”

 

Well-known entrepreneur Selçuk Gerger, posted on his Instagram, that despite all the struggle, things did not change. “As of today, I will continue to live as I was living in Istanbul in the previous months and years, without regrets or stepping aside. I will not give up even for a moment. We won’t hide. The majority of people born and who grew up in this country are on our side. And yes, today we are really just starting our fight. Let’s not get hide!”

Via Globalvoices.org

Erdogan is demanding that Sweden cooperate with Turkey in repressing Kurdish activist expatriates in Sweden, all of whom he views as terrorists. He also says he is furious about the stunt pulled by Danish-Swedish Islamophobe Rasmus Palodan of burning the holy Qur’an near the Turkish embassy. Paludan is the leader of the far right “Hard-Line Party” (Stram Kurs). No subtleties for these fascists, I guess.

Pal Jonson, the Swedish Defense Minister, had been slated to visit Turkey on Jan. 27, but Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar has canceled that meeting over the controversy.

US State Department spokesman Ned Price condemned the Qur’an burning, but told Reuters, “We have a saying in this country – something can be lawful but awful. I think in this case, what we’ve seen in the context of Sweden falls into that category.”

A Turkish mob gathered in front of the Swedish consulate in Istanbul to burn the Swedish flag. Muslims don’t typically take revenge on the Bible for desecration of their holy book, since they believe in the biblical prophets along with John the Baptist and Jesus.

Although Erdogan is posturing and pretending he does not know that a democracy like Sweden cannot just round up people because they are of Kurdish extraction and that the government cannot prevent people from doing horrible things like burning the Qur’an, he talks as though Sweden could have intervened on these matters if the government wanted to. He has therefore set the tone on Turkish social media, of contempt for the current Swedish politicians, though BBC Monitoring points out that a Google Trends search does not indicate that the controversy between Erdogan and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson is provoking much public interest.

Sweden and Finland applied to join NATO in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, abandoning their long traditions of neutrality. Since admission to the organization requires the assent of all NATO members, and since Turkey joined NATO in 1952, Erdogan immediately began attempting to use Turkey’s vote as a bargaining chip. He sought to make the two countries back down from their generally sympathetic stance toward Syrian Kurds, the territory of which Erdogan invaded with Trump’s blessing. The two had also given political asylum to Kurdish activists who had escaped Turkey.

Kurdish-speakers exist in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran and the Caucasus. The four countries where they are resident fear Kurdish nationalism and separatism and have repressed nationalist Kurds. Only Iraq has granted the Kurds a special status, of a Kurdistan Regional Government, within the Iraqi state, though in 2017 Kurds were prevented from seceding by the Iraqi army. There are three dialects of Kurdish, however, and Kurds are not automaticaly a nation because of their language. Turkish political scientists argue that the large Kurdish population of Turkey largely votes the same way their Turkish neighbors do, and separatism is probably a minority sentiment. After all, Turkey is a relatively prosperous country and a member of the G-20, whereas a Kurdistan in southeast Anatolia would be a poor, agricultural, backward country with few resources. Ankara is, however, as nervous as a long-tailed cat in a room full of rocking chairs about any hint of Kurdish identity.

In December, Sweden extradited a convicted member of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), which some Kurds support, back to Turkey, where he had been handed a six-year sentence in absentia. Both the US and Turkey list the PKK as a terrorist organization.

In part, Erdogan is grandstanding in hopes of forcing on Sweden and Finland more such cooperation on security matters related to Kurdish movements.

In addition, Paul Levin, head of Stockholm University’s Institute for Turkish Studies, argued to AFP that Erdogan is grandstanding on the burning-the-Qur’an-issue to whip his followers into a frenzy that will aid him in the upcoming May 14 elections.

Turkey’s economic news is not good, and Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) is polling worse than it has in the twenty years it has been in power. A foreign policy crisis involving an insult to one key element of Turkish identity is therefore an ideal platform for the combative president, who has championed more freedoms for Muslims while rejecting Iran-style Muslim fundamentalism and hewing to Turkey’s secular constitution.

If Levin is correct in this analysis, it seems to me that deploying a Qur’an-burning as a vehicle to get reelected is nearly as problematic as the Qur’an-burning itself.

Erdogan is also irritable about insults to himself in the Swedish newspapers.

Levin suggests that pro-PKK Kurdish exiles in Sweden, knowing of Erdogan’s short fuse and amour propre, have deliberately provoked insults toward him in the press and on social media in order to forestall Swedish accession to NATO, since that might mean that Sweden would have to agree with Ankara to round them up and hand them over to Turkey, or at least to expel them from Sweden.

The Biden administration seems confident that Erdogan will eventually acquiesce in Swedish and Finnish membership in NATO, because the country wants to buy billions of dollars worth of high-tech F-16 fighter planes and the US may stall that deal until Ankara plays ball on NATO expansion.

( RFE/RL ) – Iranians in the western city of Sanandaj have marked the end of a 40-day mourning period for Homan Abdullahi, a protester killed by security forces in ongoing nationwide protests that have rocked the country since the death of Mahsa Amini, with renewed calls for regime change.

Videos published on social networks showed a large gathering at the grave of Abdullahi with people chanting “The martyr never dies!” and “Death to the dictator!,” a reference to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Homan Abdullahi, 21, was shot and killed by the security forces during the December 7 protests in Sanandaj.

Hengaw, a Norway-based group that monitors rights violations in Iran’s Kurdish regions, quoted eyewitnesses as saying Abdullahi was shot in the chest and died an hour later in a hospital.

Public anger erupted after the September 16 death of 22-year-old Amini, who was in custody after being detained by morality police in Tehran for “improperly” wearing a hijab.

Since Amini’s death, Iranians have flooded streets across the country to protest against a lack of rights, with women and schoolgirls making unprecedented shows of support in the biggest threat to the Islamic government since the 1979 revolution.

Screenshot from Iranian social media

In response, authorities have launched a brutal crackdown on dissent, detaining thousands and handing down stiff sentences, including the death penalty, to protesters.

The activist HRANA news agency said that as of January 15 at least 522 people had been killed during the unrest, including 70 minors, as security forces muzzle dissent.

In recent weeks, protesters have turned the end of the traditional 40-day mourning period following a protester’s death into a stage for antigovernment demonstrations.

Sanandaj is the capital of the western Iranian province of Kurdistan. Amini was from Saqez, a town near Sanandaj.

Written by Ardeshir Tayebi based on an original story in Persian by RFE/RL’s Radio Farda

RFE/RL

( RFE/RL) – Demonstrators in the western Iranian city of Javanrud were set on by security forces and have reportedly faced a martial-style clampdown since gathering in a local cemetery on December 31 to mark the end of the 40-day mourning period for seven protesters killed by security forces in ongoing anti-regime unrest.

Reports from Javanrud on January 1 described harsh security conditions and the widespread presence of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) forces in the streets.

The IRGC and other hard-line enforcers have played a key role in suppressing dissent since the unrest was triggered by the death in custody of 22-year-old student Mahsa Amini in mid-September.

Local sources have accused government forces of using live ammunition and arresting protesters in Javanrud, in Kermanshah Province.

The protests there intensified after security forces stormed the city’s cemetery on December 31 and tried to disperse people who had gathered to honor the dead protesters.

Security forces also used tear gas and live ammunition against protesters in and around the cemetery, reportedly leading to the death of 22-year-old Borhan Eliasi.

The Kurdistan Human Rights Network, a group that monitors the human rights situation in western Iran’s Kurdish region, reported on January 1 that at least 15 people, including 16-year-old Arman Ahmadi, were injured by the firing of pellets and live ammunition by the IRGC.

Reports from the capital claimed the death of another protester who was recently temporarily released from prison, Mehdi Zarei Ashkezari. They said he was buried on December 31 in his hometown of Ashkezar.

Radio Farda was initially unable to confirm the specifics of those reports. The families of many detainees have avoided going public to avoid being targeted by authorities.

Anger over Amini’s death has prompted thousands of Iranians to take to the streets to demand greater freedom and respect for women’s rights.

Thousands of arrests have been made, and some protesters have been sentenced to death.

Protesters in Javanrud have accused government forces of using live ammunition. Via Twitter.

At least 58 journalists have been arrested, according to the International Federation of Journalists, including the most recent detainee, Mehdi Ghadimi.

Ghadimi’s friends and colleagues say he was arrested at his home on January 1.

Iran’s judiciary, which routinely withholds information including on trials in process, has not provided any information about possible charges against Ghadimi.

Written by Ardeshir Tayebi based on an original story in Persian by RFE/RL’s Radio Farda

Via RFE/RL

Copyright (c)2022 RFE/RL, Inc. Used with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave NW, Ste 400, Washington DC 20036.

One of those murdered was Emine Kara, who led a Kurdish women’s movement in France and had been active in the fight against the ISIL terrorist organization. People subdued him and turned him over to the police when the latter arrived.

He is being investigated for “murder and attempted murder due to race, ethnicity, nation or religion” and for “unauthorized acquisition and possession of weapons” according to Anadolu. That is, he is being looked at for hate crimes and weapons possession offenses as well as murder.

William M. tried to excuse his actions by psychologizing them. He admitted to “a hatred of foreigners that had become pathological.” It is just violent hatred, William.

He characterized himself as “depressed” and “suicidal,” and so was released from custody on health grounds.

So get this: He said he wanted to kill some Kurds because the YPG in Syria that fought ISIL (Daesh) had taken the latter prisoner instead of just killing them.

Huh? The Syrian Kurdish fighters put quite a lot of ISIL fighters in the grave. In fact, they were the only armed group in the Middle East that President Obama could find who would take up arms against ISIL. They did also take prisoners. You aren’t allowed to kill them once they are POWs. That is a war crime.

French police said that an examination of his phone and computer did not turn up any evidence that William M. was part of a far right group. For that reason, the case will not be referred to counter-terrorism officials.

It seems pretty obvious that William M. is being treated with kid gloves by the French authorities and that if he were Muslim they wouldn’t be interested in whether he had psychological problems, and he would be in pre-trial detention.

As it is, Anadolu reported on Monday that the prosecutor is going to ask for pre-trial detention.

But further troubling evidence of kid gloves also emerged, according to Christophe Ayad at LeMonde. Last year, William M. went on a rampage with a sword, attacking people at a camp of migrants at Bercy Park at the 12th Arondissement in Paris.

Shouting “Death to migrants!” he chopped away at their tents and then started cutting people, slicing a man on his back and his behind, then he cut a minor and apparently some others, before he was subdued.

The police came and arrested him. But they also took 4 of the 5 injured victims in for questioning and kept them for 48 hours. The victims maintain they they were given no first aid while in detention, were not offered the services of a translator, and that their statements were never actually taken.

That time William M. really was put in pre-trial detention, but he was released on parole on December 12 of this year. His release was made conditional on his not possessing any weapons and on his agreement to seek psychiatric help.

Really, this case is like a real-life parody of my classic column, Top Ten differences between White Terrorists and Others.

There are several hundred thousand Kurds in France, which has an admirable tradition of offering political asylum to persecuted groups.

“The Iranian authorities have unleashed alarming violence against protesters in Sanandaj since September,” said Tara Sepehri Far, senior Iran researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Both the protests and the government’s brutal response to them reflect the government’s longtime repression of the Kurdish people’s cultural and political freedoms.”

Human Rights Watch interviewed 14 victims and witnesses, including three former detainees and three family members of detainees in Sanandaj. Researchers also analyzed 17 videos and photographs posted to Twitter, Telegram, and Instagram from Sanandaj during this period.

Use of Excessive and Unlawful Lethal Force

Iranian security forces used excessive and lethal force against anti-government protesters and others in Sanandaj throughout September, October, and November in violation of international human rights law. Particularly violent crackdowns occurred on October 8 and November 17. Security forces using shotguns and Kalashnikov-pattern assault rifles fired live ammunition, pellets, and teargas at and towards protesters. They also fired teargas into homes and destroyed private property. One agent in civilian clothes fired an assault rifle at apartments.

Human Rights Watch found that the protests generally were peaceful, but some protesters threw rocks and other objects at the security forces. The security forces can take appropriate action against specific protesters committing violence, but this does not justify the security forces’ using excessive force.

Security forces killed at least six people altogether on October 8 and November 17. The Kurdistan Human Rights Network reported that security forces also beat and fatally shot Momen Zandkarimi, age 17 or 18, on November 2. In a video posted to social media on November 3, a man who identifies himself as Zandkarimi’s father said his son was shot with metal pellets, causing internal bleeding. Human Rights Watch reviewed video footage posted on social media claiming to show Zandkarimi’s body being washed for burial. Wounds on the back of the body appear to be from pellet rounds, said a physician consulted by Human Rights Watch, in addition to one larger circular wound. Researchers could not verify the cause of death. 

Human Rights Watch spoke to five witnesses about the October 8 events. Protesters gathered in small numbers near Azadi Square in central Sanandaj, and in the Feyz Abad, Ghatarchian, and Sharif Abad neighborhoods. They said that police responded by shooting teargas and pellets at the protesters and beating them with batons.

A witness said he saw a man fatally shoot Peyman Menbari, 24, in the back in the Ghatarchian neighborhood. He said he and Menbari were in a group of about 50 protesters. “I saw that he threw a stone towards the IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] and [plainclothes] agents,” he said. “Then I heard him sigh and fall in front of me.” The witness said that other protesters identified the man who shot Menbari as a local paramilitary Basij member whom they knew by name and who was accused of helping the IRGC identify protesters.

The Kurdistan Press Agency, Kurdpa, reported that on October 8 at around noon, Yahya Rahimi was shot in his green car on Pasdaran Street after he reportedly honked in support of protesters. Human Rights Watch reviewed and verified four videos shared on social media on October 8 and 9 related to the attack. In one video, masked men attack a green car and shatter its windshield. In the second, men with rifles run after the same car. In the third, the driver is seen severely bleeding and unresponsive behind the wheel, surrounded by broken glass.

A 32-year-old man who was on the scene shortly after the killing said he saw a man, whom he described as a plainclothes agent, running from the scene. “I went closer and saw that the driver was killed. I saw that the windshield was broken,” he said, adding that it looked like a bullet passed through the windshield.

In the fourth video, taken from another side of the car, the unresponsive man has a large wound behind his right ear. Human Rights Watch could not independently verify that the man was Yahya Rahimi, though his father told reporters that “Islamic Republic agents” attacked his son’s car and killed him. A notice on social media said Rahimi’s funeral was on October 9 and 10.

The witness said that he too was attacked later that afternoon. He provided photos of his back showing his injuries, which he said were caused by police firing metal pellets at him after he and other protesters peacefully chanted slogans. He estimated that he saw police shoot more than 10 other people with pellets that day, including in the face.

Four witnesses said security forces carrying assault rifles and shotguns shot teargas into traffic in various neighborhoods. A 30-year-old woman said she saw police attacking cars and breaking windshields with batons in the Sharif Abad neighborhood, near Pasdaran Street.

On November 17, 40 days after the killing of the four protesters on October 8, the day when people typically gather to mourn the dead, thousands of people gathered in the Behesht Mohammadi cemetery. Witnesses said that the Iranian police special units and the Revolutionary Guards attacked and shot at mourners, killing at least two people. The witnesses identified the forces by their uniforms. The 32-year-old man who took part in the October 8 protests also saw security forces shoot teargas and use shotguns against mourners who were chanting slogans 100 to 200 meters away from Qeshlaq Bridge. The bridge connects the cemetery to the city. He said a few people were throwing Molotov cocktails and stones at the police, but that most were peaceful.

He said the security forces shot and wounded several mourners including a teenage boy and two men, one in the abdomen and the other in his arm. He said that security forces took the bodies of two other men, reported as Aram Habibi and Shaho Bahmani by the Kurdistan Human Rights Network – from Kowsar Hospital, despite their families’ objection.

The United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms prohibit the use of excessive force at all times and using lethal force except in cases of imminent threat of death or serious injury. The 2020 UN “Guidance on Less-Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement” says, “Multiple projectiles fired at the same time are inaccurate and, in general, their use cannot comply with the principles of necessity and proportionality. Metal pellets, such as those fired from shotguns, should never be used.” International norms on the use of teargas projectiles say that teargas should only be used to disperse unlawful assemblies where necessary and proportionate and should be fired at a high angle.

Iran’s security forces should immediately stop using shotgun-fired pellets and other such indiscriminate weapons, Human Rights Watch said.

Abuses Against Detainees

Human Rights Watch documented serious abuses against detainees, including women and children. The violations included arbitrary arrests, denial of medical care, and torture and other ill-treatment, including threats, beatings, and sexual harassment and assault. The authorities routinely failed to provide information to families about the circumstances and whereabouts of people in their custody.

Two women arrested together during the first week of protests in September said that security forces beat, sexually assaulted, and threatened them with rape during arrest and while they were held at the police station. A family member of a 17-year-old girl arrested in October said the police threatened her with sexual assault and sexually harassed her at the police station. One of the women said that during her arrest in September, a security officer hit her neck, threw her to the ground, and dragged her by the hair before six or seven officers beat her. One then kicked and beat her with a baton while forcing her into a car. She said she suffered internal bleeding and fractures.

The two women said that after being held at the police station, they and other female detainees were transferred to Sanandaj’s juvenile correctional center. There, they said they were forced to take turns sleeping on the floor due to insufficient space and did not have enough blankets. They said the police did not inform their families about their arrest or admit they were holding them when their families came to look for them.

A number of people described the authorities violently arresting children and beating them in custody. One 43-year-old man said he saw plainclothes agents ambush a teenager in the Maskan Mehr apartment complex on October 9 and beat him while arresting him. In another case, a woman said she saw security forces beat a boy in Baharan township before detaining him. The relative of 13-year-old boy said plainclothes agents arrested him while he was going to the supermarket. When the family eventually located him and he was released on bail, he had severe injuries, including a broken rib.

“Iranian authorities have dramatically escalated abuses against protesters in custody,” said Sepehri Far. “Governments seeking to hold Iran accountable for rights violations should pay special attention to the serious abuses against detainees.”

Via Human Rights Watch