The officers of the new government have said various things. BBC Monitoring reports that on December 14, the new minister of defense, Col. Hasan al-Hamada, said on Telegram that the new Syria would not enjoy security until it terminated the “separatist schemes” of what he termed the “PKK” (Kurdistan Workers Party or Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan), which he said held sway over the east of the country. The PKK began as a Marxist separatist faction in the late 1970s and is still viewed as a terrorist organization by the US, Turkey and some European countries.

Since the PKK is based in Iraq and Turkey’s eastern Anatolia, al-Hamada was likely instead referring to the YPG or People’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel) in northeastern Syria, the paramilitary for AANES, which denies any relationship to the more radical PKK. His words were ominous for the Kurdish regions, and reflected the desires of the patron of the ruling faction in the new Syria, Turkey, which wants to see the YPG disarmed.

In contrast, the leader of the new government, Ahmad al-Shara (nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Jolani), has been more conciliatory. BBC Monitoring reports his remarks this weekend to Istanbul-based Syria TV, which is Qatari-owned. He made a distinction between the “Kurdish community” and the “PKK organization.”

On Sunday on a Syrian Telegram channel, al-Shara said that Kurds are a fundamental component of the coming Syria. He added, “The Kurds are a part of the homeland, and were exposed to tremendous injustice, as we were. With the fading of the regime, it may be that the injustice that befell them will fade as well.” He stressed the importance of “justice and equality for all,” such as would ensure “new regulations and a new history in Syria.”

The sweep of HTS forces from Idlib to Aleppo had caused the displacement of some Kurds in the Afrin region. Al-Shara pledged, “We will seek to return our people there to their villages and regions.” If he is sincere and has the power to make this happen, it would be a significant development and would cross his Turkish patrons, who want to break up the band of Kurdish habitation along the Syrian-Turkish border in the north.

Al-Shara’s remarkable statements on Sunday were hailed by the Iraqi Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani, head of that country’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which rules the Kurdistan Regional Government or super-province of northern Iraq.

Barzani said, “We have seen a statement by Ahmed al-Sharaa about the Kurdish people in Syria, in which he described the Kurdish people as part of the homeland and a partner in the future of Syria.” He added that “this vision of the Kurds and of the future of Syria is a source of joy and is welcome to us, and we hope that it will be the beginning of a correction of the course of history and of ending the wrong and unfair actions that were taken against the Kurdish people in Syria.”

Barzani continued that “such a perspective represents a starting point that paves the way for building a strong Syria; and the Kurds, Arabs and all other components of Syria must seize this opportunity to participate together in building a stable, free and democratic Syria.”

Barzani’s reaction is important for a number of reasons. Kurds in Iraq have had their own experience in reintegrating into a largely Arab country after the fall of a Baath regime, and have found ways to be influential in Baghdad while keeping some semi-autonomy. They are sometimes portrayed as the Quebec of Iraq.

Additionally, if the HTS were to move aggressively against the Syrian Kurds, Barzani could push back militarily. Both the KRG military force, the Peshmerga, and the thousands of PKK fighters hiding out in Iraq’s Qandil mountains could make a lot of trouble for the new Syria if it moves aggressively against the Kurds, as new Defense Minister al-Hamada seems to have envisioned. Further, Iraqi Kurds have influence in Baghdad, where Shiite leaders view al-Shara and his colleagues as little better than ISIL.

Moreover, the European Union, individual European countries and the US are watching the HTS-led government carefully to see if it takes the route of human rights, before they will consider lifting sanctions on Syria. The country desperately needs sanctions relief, and avoiding the Arab nationalist mistakes of the past with regard to the Kurds may be one of the prices Damascus has to pay. It won’t make Turkey happy, but Turkey itself would vastly benefit from a lifting of Syrian sanctions, since otherwise Ankara will have to carry the Syrian economy itself and Turkish firms could face sanctions for investing there.

The autonomous Kurdish AANES is for the most part civilly administered by the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat), which follows the left-wing cooperativist philosophy of Brooklyn thinker Murray Bookchin. It rules over roughly 2.4 million of Syria’s 24 million people.

As noted, the paramilitary of the Democratic Union Party is the YPG or People’s Protection Units. They form the core of the Syrian Democratic Forces, which have been backed by the US Department of Defense and which played the major role in defeating the ISIL (ISIS, Daesh) terrorist group that briefly ruled parts of Syria and Iraq 2014-2018. US special operations troops embedded among them.

In 2019, President Donald J. Trump was widely blamed for giving Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan the green light to invade the Kurdish regions of northern Syria and to establish a military buffer zone, which led to the displacement of tens of thousands of Kurds and the deaths of SDF fighters who had saved America’s bacon in the fight against ISIL.

The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces kicked the Baath Party of Bashar al-Assad out of the northeast in 2011 and in recent times had an uneasy truce with it, as long as it respected their semi-autonomy. Arab nationalist Syria had never known what to do with the country’s Kurds, who are not Arabs, and had stripped them of citizenship in 1963.

(The Conversation) – After more than a decade of brutal civil war, it took Islamist militants just 11 days to sweep through Syria and topple the regime of Bashar al-Assad. The offensive, which has been driven by the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), has forced many residents in western Syria to flee their homes in search of safety.

Meanwhile, others are celebrating the end of the Assad family’s five-decade rule. There are long queues of people and cars at Lebanon’s Masnaa border crossing as displaced people return to Syria, and there is also significant congestion at the border with Turkey.

According to Ali Yerlikaya, Turkey’s interior minister, the monthly average of Syrians crossing the border nearly doubled in a single day after Assad was overthrown.

While these events have been unfolding, the situation in a de facto self-governing region in the country’s north-east called the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (also known as Rojava) has not received much attention in the international media. Emboldened by the success of the rebel offensive, the SNA is looking to gain ground in the region.

The region’s governing body has called the fall of Assad a significant moment and expressed hopes for a new chapter in Syria. And Rojava’s powerful armed groups, the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), have both also expressed optimism about the fall the Assad regime.

These statements reflect a shared sense of hope and a commitment to constructive dialogue and collaboration in shaping Syria’s future. But Rojava, which has been a beacon of Kurdish self-administration and democratic governance since the early 2010s when several districts declared autonomy, is under significant threat both from internal and external forces.

Internally, there are tensions between the SDF and Arab tribes over political influence and Rojava’s abundant natural resources. In Manbij, a city to the west of the Euphrates river in northern Syria, there have been heavy clashes between the SDF and the SNA since the start of the rebel offensive. The SDF reported successfully repelling multiple attacks, but eventually withdrew from the city.

Offensives have also reportedly begun in Kobane, which is seen as the birthplace of the Rojava revolution and a symbol of Kurdish resistance. The town is the site of a key battleground where Kurdish fighters defeated Islamic State (IS) in 2014.

In other cities in the region, such as Raqqa, Tabqa and the key desert city of Deir ez-Zor, Arabs are demographically more numerous than Kurds. The future of cooperation between the two groups in these Arab-dominated areas remains uncertain.

Over the past week, SDF fighters have captured Deir ez-Zor and have taken control of Syria’s main border crossing with Iraq. More recently, however, there have been reports suggesting that HTS fighters are gaining control of the city.

Externally, Turkish military operations aimed at weakening Kurdish control of the region are a constant threat to Rojava. Turkey views the SDF and YPG as extensions of the banned Kurdistan Workers’ party and acts to prevent the Kurdish autonomous region along its border from gaining political status, which Turkey views as a direct threat to its national security.

So, in cooperation with allied jihadist groups, Turkey has carried out several operations in northern Syria in recent years to establish a “safe zone” to push back Kurdish forces. Turkish forces previously seized control of the city of Afrin in the north-western reaches of Syria in 2018, which was then under Rojava’s control.

These actions have drawn international criticism, with accusations of human rights violations and war crimes. Sweden, along with several other European states, halted its arms trade with Turkey in 2019. However, Sweden later lifted the restrictions during its application process to join Nato.

Turkey plays a crucial role as an ally to Syrian opposition movements, particularly the SNA. It served as a vital support system for the rebel forces during the recent offensive, as it has done consistently in the past.

Rojava’s future hinges on its ability to navigate these complex dynamics. Maintaining US support is critical, as American military presence provides a deterrent against Turkish aggression. However, the region must also address internal divisions and work towards greater Arab-Kurdish reconciliation to ensure long-term stability.

The path forward

Syria’s opposition groups are highly fragmented, and we do not yet know how power struggles will unfold among them. One thing we do know is that HTS and its leader Abu Muhammad al-Jolani have historic links to al-Qaeda and IS. The group is now presented in a more moderate light, but many uncertainties remain.

Rojava, on the other hand, has fought fiercely against IS, protected Yazidis during the genocidal campaign against them and established humanitarian corridors for their evacuation, and aspires to implement a multi-ethnic society based on the principles of direct democracy, ecology and gender equality.

The Charter of the Social Contract of Rojava safeguards these principles and ensures the representation and rights of Kurds, Arabs, Yazidis, Syriac-Assyrians, Turkmens, Armenians and others.

It is perplexing that, despite the apparent “confidence” in Jolani – a figure who was once branded “the world’s most wanted terrorist” – as a moderate revolutionary leader, there is scant recognition of the democratic model Rojava has offered since its establishment.

Instead of receiving the support it merits, Rojava is being targeted, raising questions about the international community’s priorities and the prospects for sustainable peace in the region. The Syrian people, in all their diversity and voices, must determine ways to build a truly inclusive and democratic Syria where all people can coexist in peace.

Pinar Dinc, Associate Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science & Researcher, Centre for Advanced Middle Eastern Studies, Lund University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Kurds caught in crossfire of Syria ‘power vacuum’ • FRANCE 24 English

Given Bahçeli’s reputation for staunch Turkish nationalism and his opposition to any concessions for the PKK, his remarks have surprised many across the political spectrum.

The day after Bahçeli’s speech, a deadly terrorist attack occurred at the headquarters of Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAŞ), a state-owned aerospace and defense company near the capital, Ankara, leaving seven people dead, including two assailants. Turkish officials attributed the attack to the PKK, which claimed responsibility two days later, on October 25, asserting that the attack was not related to the latest political developments.

Despite the PKK attack in Ankara, the positive momentum surrounding the peace initiative has not yet been derailed.

Historical Background

The PKK was founded in 1978 during a period of widespread political violence between left-wing and right-wing factions in Türkiye. However, before the 1980 coup d’état, the PKK was a small group without significant military or operational capacity.

On September 12, 1980, the Turkish military, led by General Kenan Evren, staged a coup, citing severe instability as the reason. Following the coup, the military suspended the parliament, banned all political parties, and detained thousands of political activists. Political leaders were either arrested or barred from participating in politics.

From 1980 to 1983, Türkiye was under military rule. The military junta prohibited the use of the Kurdish language and restricted Kurdish cultural expression. The oppressive conditions under the military government led the PKK to launch an armed insurgency in 1984 in southeastern Türkiye in order to establish an independent Kurdish state. The first PKK attack on August 25, 1984, marked the beginning of a prolonged conflict.

The Turkish military launched an extensive counter-insurgency campaign. Many PKK members retreated to northern Iraq, particularly to the Qandil Mountains, which became a key base for PKK operations. Over the years, Türkiye has conducted numerous airstrikes and ground operations against PKK positions in northern Iraq.

Abdullah Öcalan was captured in Kenya in 1999 and initially sentenced to death; however, this sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment on İmralı Island in the Sea of Marmara. His capture marked a significant turning point in the ongoing conflict as Öcalan is viewed as the nation’s top security threat, much like how Osama bin Laden was perceived in the U.S.—a central focus of national security efforts.

According to pro-government Hürriyet, since 1984, the conflict has resulted in the deaths of more than 14,000 Turkish security forces, 6,000 civilians, and 46,000 PKK members.

Past Peace Initiatives

In the 1990s, a non-violent political movement advocating for Kurdish cultural and political rights began to form, as many Kurdish politicians saw the need for a legal political party to represent Kurdish interests within the Turkish political system. The People’s Labor Party (HEP), established in 1990, became Türkiye’s first pro-Kurdish party.

Since then, left-wing pro-Kurdish political parties have repeatedly faced legal restrictions, closures, and accusations of links to the PKK, resulting in a cycle of dissolution and re-establishment. The Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) is the most recent and prominent Kurdish-oriented party.

In the early 2000s, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan introduced reforms to improve Kurdish rights. In 2009, the AKP government launched the ‘Kurdish Opening,’ which paved the way for a gradual peace process. By 2013, direct negotiations between the Turkish government and the PKK resulted in a ceasefire and raised hopes for a political resolution.

However, tensions escalated after July 22, 2015, when PKK members killed two policemen in Ceylanpınar. The incident led to the collapse of the peace process, resulting in renewed violence and urban warfare in Kurdish-majority areas. In response, the Turkish government intensified military operations against the PKK in Türkiye and northern Iraq.

Türkiye also launched three ground operations into northern Syria between 2016 and 2019, targeting the People’s Protection Units (YPG). Turkish officials have consistently labeled the YPG/SDF as a PKK offshoot.

While many international media outlets frame Türkiye’s Kurdish issue as a straightforward “Erdoğan vs. the Kurds” conflict, this simplification overlooks significant nuances and obscures the full reality. Broadly categorizing the Kurdish population as a unified bloc opposing Erdoğan fails to recognize the political and ideological diversity within Türkiye’s Kurdish communities.

Erdoğan has frequently sought to divide the Kurdish electorate by appealing to conservative Kurds, as opposed to those who support secular, left-wing parties. This strategy weakens the DEM Party’s influence and bolsters his electoral base, particularly in regions with a significant Kurdish population.

Additionally, some conservative Kurdish groups maintain political ties with the AKP. Hüda-Par (Free Cause Party), a Sunni Islamist Kurdish party, openly supported Erdoğan in the 2018 and 2023 presidential elections and participated in the 2023 parliamentary election under the AKP list.

A New Peace Process?

In early October, rumors of a renewed peace process began circulating after a handshake between Bahçeli and members of the DEM Party during the Parliament’s opening on October 1. Speculation about a potential second peace process grew even further following Bahçeli’s statement regarding Öcalan.

Devlet Bahçeli has previously been a vocal advocate for the execution of Abdullah Öcalan. Notably, at a June 2007 election rally, Bahçeli targeted then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, stating, “Can’t you find a rope to hang him? Here, take this rope and hang him, then,” as he held up a rope to the crowd.

Bahçeli’s previous rhetoric makes his recent statements about Öcalan all the more striking.  In contrast, an ordinary citizen expressing views such as advocating for Öcalan’s release or suggesting he be allowed to speak in parliament would likely face prosecution or imprisonment.

As discussions about a renewed peace process were rekindled, Özgür Özel, the leader of the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), visited Selahattin Demirtaş, the jailed former leader of the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP).

Özel also endorsed the government’s peace bid, stating: “I am offering a state to the Kurds. I am offering the Kurds, who do not feel they belong here, the opportunity to be the owners of the Republic of Türkiye. Let’s create a country where the Kurds do not feel like the “other”…”

Thus far, the main opposition and the DEM Party appear to welcome Bahçeli’s remarks. However, significant differences in outlook are evident. While Bahçeli claims that there is no “Kurdish question” in Türkiye, the CHP and DEM emphasize the need for greater democratization to achieve lasting peace in southeastern Türkiye.

As noted by a prominent expert on the Kurdish issue and professor of political sociology Doğu Ergil, a call made directly to the PKK via Öcalan could lead to a ceasefire but not to lasting peace. For genuine peace, there must be an agreement based on principles and conditions mutually accepted by the societies involved and secured by the rule of law. Moreover, such peace cannot be sustainable if it relies on short-term political interests.

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Al Jazeera English: “Ankara attack on aviation facility: Turkish officials say 5 killed and 22 wounded”

Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is an international norm for states to prevent genocide, mass atrocities, and war crimes, in response to the failure to do so in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The US airdropped food to trapped refugees on nearby Mount Sinjar, but sat on the sidelines as the massacre ensued in this village. Ten years later, the international community still has a Responsibility to Remember (R2R) to the Yazidis who died, to those dealing with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), to the more than 2,000 who are still missing, and to the other victims of war who are only increasing in number in the 21st century – from the north of Iraq to Ukraine to Gaza. The United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/ISIL (UNITAD) was a dedicated R2R body. Yet, its mandate will soon be terminated.

Murad was able to escape and arrived in Germany in 2015. She was one of the fortunate also appointed as a UN goodwill ambassador, the first to represent “Dignity of Survivors of Human Trafficking.” Murad was eventually awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the first Iraqi to ever receive it.

In 2016 she met the Beirut-born British barrister Amal Alamuddin Clooney, who agreed to represent Murad. Both addressed the United Nations, advocating that the ISIS campaign be designated as a genocide. Their work was essential to the Security Council agreeing to establish UNITAD in 2017.

Photo by Levi Meir Clancy on Unsplash

In the lobby of the United Nations General Assembly, a replica of Picasso’s Guernica mural hangs above the podium where international figures field questions from the media, a form of R2R for the multilateral body, as the failure of the world community to act after Guernica eventually led to World War Two. By bearing witness to Guernica, UN diplomats would work to ensure it would not happen again. Yet, Guernica did happen again: in Halabja at the end of the 20th century, and Kocho was the Guernica of the 21st century. 

UNITAD was an attempt to prevent future Guernicas. The Iraqi judicial system lacked the infrastructure to investigate and try all the members of ISIS responsible for these crimes; hence, Baghdad requested the aid of the UN in the form of UNITAD, which has been collecting evidence since 2017.

Yet, the Iraqi government sought to terminate this body’s mandate in 2024 due to conflicts with the UN team investigating the crimes. This denies justice to the survivors of ISIS atrocities. Closing such a body is not only a loss for the female survivors of gender-based violence, the Yazidis, as well as the Iraqi nation in general, it sets a tragic global precedent;  a dedicated UN body is imperative to document genocidal and gendercidal violence, and victims of war.

The genocidal rampage that ensued in Kocho in August 2014 continued for the women in captivity.  To forge homogeneity within their “Islamic” state, ISIS sought the erasure of a pre-Islamic past by destroying pre-Islamic antiquities and what it deemed as “pre-Islamic peoples,” expelling Christians from Mosul, or enslaving Yazidi women to ensure that they could not give birth to future Yazidi children, a form of genocide specifically targeted against one gender, in what can be more specifically called a gendercide. Their captivity not only led to their estrangement from other Yazidis, but any future children born out of this slavery would not be considered part of the endogenous community.

The work of lawyers or human rights investigators is like a historian, trying to collect material from the past from primary sources to construct a narrative in the present. Primary sources, in this case, include the videos and documents produced by ISIS itself documenting their genocide, as well as the testimonies of the victims.

R2R is a reminder, as well, to the damage done to the spiritual heritage of Yazidi temples and Christian churches by ISIS, in addition to forced expulsion. Both physical reconstruction and investment in mental healthcare infrastructure, which Iraq lacks, are still needed.
UNITAD sought to deliver justice. It is a body that needs to be replicated for those who suffer due to decisions made by terrorists, warlords or politicians who will never be held accountable for their actions all the way from Kocho to the fighting in Ukraine and Gaza.
 
As a historian, these deaths and victims inspired me to advocate for R2R for the victims of war. Life is one episode in this greater history of soldiers and civilians from the north of Iraq and Syria under ISIS, to Ukraine to Gaza, who have died or endured trauma and PTSD, internally displaced peoples and refugees, child soldiers, the victims of gender-based violence during conflict, the kidnapped and tortured, those maimed by landmines or IEDs and amputees, many reliant on prosthetics, landscapes poisoned by depleted uranium, to animals and domesticated pets caught up in conflicts that they had no role in creating.

Reprinted with the author’s permission from Rudaw.net

In north-east Syria, the 12-year conflict is far from over. Russian fighter jets buzz US surveillance drones, threatening to bring them down. Iranian-backed militias occasionally fire rockets at US positions. The Assad regime maintains that it will “regain every inch” of Syria, ending Kurdish autonomy in the north-east.

Meanwhile Turkey — considering the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) to be part of the Turkish Kurdish insurgency PKK — carries out periodic strikes, following its seizure of part of the border area in October 2019. And the Islamic State, expelled from its last village is March 2019, is still present. Its cells attack civilians and the Assad regime’s military buses, killing at least 23 troops on August 11.

In a multi-sided confrontation where — amid the regime’s deadly repression — no one has “won”, the headline is of a possible Russian-Iranian-US showdown. But that is a diversion from a local story where Syria’s Kurds could be the biggest losers in the north-east.

On July 16, a Russian Su-35 fighter jet flew close to a US MC-12 turboprop surveillance aircraft, flying in support of operations against Islamic State cells. American officials said the MC-12’s four crew members were endangered, and added that Russian harassment had complicated strike against an IS leader earlier in July. Moscow disregarded the message.

On July 23, another Russian fighter jet damaged a US MQ-9 Reaper drone, carrying our surveillance over northern Syria, when it flew within a few metres and one of its flares struck the Reaper’s propeller. A drone operator kept the Reaper in the air and guided it home.

Lt. General Alex Grynkewich, commander of the 9th Air Force, said: “We call upon the Russian forces in Syria to put an immediate end to this reckless, unprovoked, and unprofessional behaviour.” Some analysts seized on the incidents to declare imminent confrontation. Citing movements of Iranian-backed militia and Assad regime troops and equipment as well as Russian harassment, the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War declared: “Iran, Russia, and the Syrian regime are coordinating to expel US forces from Syria.”

Despite a de facto “deconfliction” arrangement with US forces, Russia has discussed operations with Iran to prop up the Assad regime throughout the Syrian conflict. But ISW’s assessment is hyperbolic. The chair of the US Joint Chief of Staff, General Mark Milley, said in July that additional military deployments were not needed to fend off Russian harassment: “There’s been an uptick, but I wouldn’t overstate it too much. We’ve got adequate capabilities to defend ourselves.”

Equally important, assessments such as ISW’s play down – or even ignore completely – what is actually happening on the ground in Syria in favour of focusing on the interplay between foreign powers. Specifically, attention to a US-Russian-Iranian confrontation ignores the group at greatest risk in any showdown: Syria’s Kurdish population.

A people without a home

In 2015, the prospect was of an Islamic State caliphate across northern Syria. IS controlled about one-third of the country, with the prospect of further gains. But the Kurds, backed by US military assistance, held out. They repelled a four-month siege of Kobane by IS in January 2015, at the cost of thousands of lives, and then began the fightback to reclaim territory.

Raqqa, Syria’s seventh-largest city and the centre of the caliphate, was liberated in October 2017. The following September, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Council declared the establishment of a statelet, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES).

But autonomy would inevitably be tenuous for a Kurdish population — estimated at between 30 and 45 million — struggling for decades for a state in Syria, Iran, Iraq or Turkey. The Assad regime, which suppressed Kurdish protests in 2004-05, was anxious to regain authority that it had lost after nationwide demonstrations began in March 2011.

Tehran’s regime not only chafed at US-supported Kurdish forces but also had its own problematic relations with Kurds in northwest Iran. Turkey’s Erdoğan government, because of its internal fight with the PKK, was also dedicated to breaking the Kurdish areas.

Ankara came close to doing so. Having already overrun the Afrin canton in north-west Syria in 2016, Erdoğan sought an opening to advance in the north and north-east. He got it from Donald Trump, who offered in phone calls in December 2018 and October 2019 to withdraw all US troops. The Pentagon checked Trump on the first occasion, but Erdoğan seized on the second “green light” to launch a cross-border invasion, occupying a strip along the border.

Do “The Kurds Always Lose in the End”?

In April 2013, at an international gathering in Oxford in the UK, a US military officer told me: “I can’t see us maintaining a presence. The Kurds always lose in the end.”

More than a decade later, about 900 US troops remain in Syria, many of them working with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. But Erdoğan is watching, waiting, and saying that the Kurds must capitulate. Assad still insists that he should be the leader of the north-east.

As Iran fences with the US over sanctions and Tehran’s nuclear program, Iranian-backed militias occasionally fire rockets at US positions. And Russia — entangled in what appears to be Vladimir Putin’s losing gamble in Ukraine — pursues Syrian “pinpricks” against the Americans, hoping that Washington will finally abandon the Kurds.

On August 4, as political and military analysts were watching Russia and the US, there was another statement from northeast Syria. A day earlier, a Turkish drone strike on a car killed four members of the Syrian Democratic Forces and wounded two.

The Kurdish-led AANES called on the US to take a public position over the Turkish attacks which have killed dozens of Syrian Kurdish fighters this year. Washington must “have a clear stance … regarding the targeting of our people and fighters”.

There was no immediate reaction from either the US military or the Biden administration.

Scott Lucas, Professor, Clinton Institute, University College Dublin

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The unequal playing field gave the incumbent an unjustified advantage

Written byArzu Geybullayeva

( Globalvoices.org) -Showing up at a polling station, as one of the two presidential candidates, in a country-wide election with a pocket full of cash may not occur to leaders of democratic countries, but in Turkey, that is what the newly re-elected President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan did on May 28. The incumbent president was seen handing out TRY 200 banknotes (USD 10) to his supporters amid cheering and blessings.
In Turkey, campaigning on an election day is prohibited, but given the unequal playing field in the run-up to both elections on May 14 and May 28, it is unlikely that President Erdoğan will face any repercussions. The same applies to countless violations documented by the Turkey-based Human Rights Association (İHD). According to their report, there was violence and vote rigging observed across Turkey on May 28. In Hatay, observers documented mass voting, while in other provinces, representatives of the main opposition CHP faced violence. According to the association, there were also instances in provinces where men voted on behalf of women or pre-stamped ballots were brought from outside. The association said:

In the light of the initial data Human Rights Association (İHD) has received and those reported in the press, it has been determined that violations including mass and open voting, obstruction of observers and party representatives, and physical violence took place in the presidential election runoff. İHD calls on all public authorities, especially the Supreme Electoral Board, to fulfill their duties in accordance with human rights standards in order to ensure fair elections.

On June 1, the Supreme Electoral Board announced the official results of the second round of presidential elections. According to the results, President Erdoğan received 52.18 percent of the votes while his opponent, Kılıçdaroğlu received 47.82 percent.

Predictions for the next five years

Already, a day after the election on May 29, the country witnessed a price hike on gas and alcoholic beverages as well as reports of medical professionals looking to leave the country. According to the Turkish Medical Association (TBB), an independent medical and health professional association, data from March 2022, some 4,000 doctors have left the country in the last ten years. The new data shared by the association showed the number of medical professionals wanting to leave in the first five months of 2023 reached 1,025. But it won’t be just the doctors leaving. According to a survey by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung conducted among Turkish youth to evaluate their social and political opinions, “a significant proportion, 63 percent of young people, expressed a desire to live in another country if given the opportunity,” citing worsening living conditions and declining freedom in Turkey as main reasons for this decision.

Already, there are signs that Turks, from all walks of life — especially those with little children — intend to seek opportunities abroad. Among those wanting to leave are those fearing persecution by the new leadership.

Supporters of the ruling party celebrate the victory on May 28. Image by Aziz Karimov. Used with permission.

There is also the economy and the slumping of the national currency, the Turkish Lira, against the dollar. According to Morgan Stanley analysts, lest President Erdoğan reverses his policy of low-interest rates, the lira could face a 29 percent slump by the end of 2023. On June 3, Erdoğan is set to announce the new cabinet. Among them, is former Minister of Finance, Mehmet Simsek, who is expected to take over all of Turkey’s economic policies, according to reporting by Bloomberg. Pundits say Simsek’s inclusion within the new cabinet is a move that could help prop up Turkey’s struggling economy:

The economy is not the only area where Turkey is likely to see further problems, according to Daron Acemoğlu, a faculty member at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). In a detailed thread on Twitter, Acemoğlu noted judicial independence “was very bad and probably cannot get much worse.” There is also the media environment. According to Acemoğlu while he does not anticipate “a complete ban on all dissident voices,” the conditions may worsen if the state anticipates introducing further “controls on social media.” Acemoğlu also anticipates further erosion of “autonomy and impartiality of bureaucracy and security services,” as well as challenges imposed against civil society and freedoms more broadly.

Some of the restrictions on media were quick to follow. On May 30, The Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) also known as the chief censor in Turkey, launched an investigation against six opposition television channels over their coverage of the elections.

After securing another victory, President Erdoğan delivered a divisive election speech. Speaking to his supporters who gathered at the presidential palace in Ankara, he called the jailed leader of the Kurdish HDP party a terrorist and promised to keep Demirtaş behind bars. During the speech, his supporters began calling for Demirtaş’s execution. In December 2020, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Turkey must immediately release the Kurdish politician. The politician was placed behind bars in November 2016, and if convicted, could face 142 years in prison. The charges leveled against him are being a leader of a terrorist organization, an accusation Demirtaş has denied.

There is also the case of Can Atalay, the newly elected member of parliament, representing the Workers Party, who remains behind bars, despite Atalay’s lawyers’ attempts to free him. All newly elected parliament members are expected to attend the swearing-in ceremony on June 2.

Journalists Union of Turkey (TGS) President Gökhan Durmuş was closely watching the President’s victory speech and released a statement expressing his concern about the divisive nature of the next government and the implications on press freedom in the country.

However, in an atmosphere where the society is divided exactly in two, it will only be possible to continue to be in power by continuing the oppressive policies. And President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has already signaled to the whole society in his balcony speech that this will be their choice.

The future of the opposition alliance

While at first, it was unclear what will happen to the opposition alliance, also known as the Table of Six, the past few days indicate divisions within the group. Uğur Poyraz, the Secretary General of the IYI Party and one of the members of the Table of Six said on June 1, “The name of this alliance is the electoral alliance; when the election is over, the alliance will also disappear. As of May 28, the electoral alliance ended.” But not all members of the alliance share the same sentiments. In a video address shared via Twitter, the leader of Gelecek Party Ahmet Davutoğlu encouraged supporters of the alliance “not to fall into despair or possible provocations,” adding, that those who supported the ruling government and its alliance did so not because they accepted the status quo but due to an environment of fear.

Other members of the alliance, such as the leader of the Felicity party Temel Karamollaoğlu took it to Twitter, where he criticized the ruling government for the polarization, asking whether it was all worth it. “Was it really worth it, declaring half of our nation ‘terrorists, enemies of religion, traitors,’ in return for this result you have achieved? Was it worth all the lies, slander, and insults,” wrote Karamollaoğlu.

The latter was also reflected in a joint statement issued by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) observers:

The second round of Türkiye’s presidential election was characterized by increasingly inflammatory and discriminatory language during the campaign period. Media bias and ongoing restrictions to freedom of expression created an unlevel playing field, and contributed to an unjustified advantage of the incumbent.

The blame game

Many blamed the opposition alliance and its leader for failing to secure victory in these elections but according to Gönül Tol, the founding director of the Middle East Institute’s Turkey program and a senior fellow with the Black Sea Program it is not as simple as that and that fear factor played a significant role. In a Twitter thread, Tol alluded to a handful of complexities that determined the outcomes of these elections. From elections being unfree and unfair, to both pro-democracy and President Erdoğan’s alliance having “existential anxieties,” with both sides seeing the elections “as a war of survival.”  Tol explained:

In such polarized contexts, people do not change their voting behavior easily based on policy preferences, incumbent’s performance or opposition’s promises. Going for the other guy rather than sticking with the devil you know is too big of a risk to take, especially in the face of such dramatic uncertainty. That is why Erdoğan continues to polarize the country.

As for the fear factor, Tol noted that President Erdoğan’s victory speech, was “the most aggressive” to date, “because that is how autocrats cling to power against unfavorable odds. They stoke fear and frame elections as a war for survival. That is how they prevent defections. That is how they can still muster majorities even when they fail to deliver.”

Writing for T24, academic and journalist Haluk Şahin explained that the outcomes of these elections were “determined not by economics and sociology, but by social psychology. In other words, a choice driven by subconscious and subconscious fears, identities, denials, jealousies, desires for worship, and ambitions to dominate.”

Others like political scientist Umut Özkırımlı explained that in order to “to topple an authoritarian regime at the ballot box” two things are needed, “sizeable electoral majorities” and “populist and ethnonationalist strategies” referring to an essay by Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way’s The New Competitive Authoritarianism. In the essay, the authors argue:

Tilting the playing field in countries such as Hungary, the Philippines, Turkey, and Venezuela requires greater skill, more sophisticated strategies, and far more extensive popular mobilization … Prospective autocrats must first command sizeable electoral majorities, and then deploy plebiscitarian or hypermajoritarian strategies to change the constitutional and electoral rules of the game so as to weaken opponents. This is often achieved via polarizing populist or ethnonationalist strategies.

With local elections months away (Turkey is to hold mayoral elections in March 2024) academic Orçun Selçuk said the opposition should stick to “playing the long game”:

Calls for solidarity

On the night of election, as Erdoğan supporters, roamed the streets of Turkey, celebrating into the early hours of the morning, the other half of the country, did not hesitate in shaking off the outcome and calling to keep on fighting.

 

Acclaimed musician, Fazil Say, tweeted on May 29, “No demoralizing, friends, let’s embrace life. Keep up the goodness. Life goes on, music goes on, the world goes on, endless continuation to create and produce beauty.”

 

Well-known entrepreneur Selçuk Gerger, posted on his Instagram, that despite all the struggle, things did not change. “As of today, I will continue to live as I was living in Istanbul in the previous months and years, without regrets or stepping aside. I will not give up even for a moment. We won’t hide. The majority of people born and who grew up in this country are on our side. And yes, today we are really just starting our fight. Let’s not get hide!”

Via Globalvoices.org

Erdogan is demanding that Sweden cooperate with Turkey in repressing Kurdish activist expatriates in Sweden, all of whom he views as terrorists. He also says he is furious about the stunt pulled by Danish-Swedish Islamophobe Rasmus Palodan of burning the holy Qur’an near the Turkish embassy. Paludan is the leader of the far right “Hard-Line Party” (Stram Kurs). No subtleties for these fascists, I guess.

Pal Jonson, the Swedish Defense Minister, had been slated to visit Turkey on Jan. 27, but Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar has canceled that meeting over the controversy.

US State Department spokesman Ned Price condemned the Qur’an burning, but told Reuters, “We have a saying in this country – something can be lawful but awful. I think in this case, what we’ve seen in the context of Sweden falls into that category.”

A Turkish mob gathered in front of the Swedish consulate in Istanbul to burn the Swedish flag. Muslims don’t typically take revenge on the Bible for desecration of their holy book, since they believe in the biblical prophets along with John the Baptist and Jesus.

Although Erdogan is posturing and pretending he does not know that a democracy like Sweden cannot just round up people because they are of Kurdish extraction and that the government cannot prevent people from doing horrible things like burning the Qur’an, he talks as though Sweden could have intervened on these matters if the government wanted to. He has therefore set the tone on Turkish social media, of contempt for the current Swedish politicians, though BBC Monitoring points out that a Google Trends search does not indicate that the controversy between Erdogan and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson is provoking much public interest.

Sweden and Finland applied to join NATO in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, abandoning their long traditions of neutrality. Since admission to the organization requires the assent of all NATO members, and since Turkey joined NATO in 1952, Erdogan immediately began attempting to use Turkey’s vote as a bargaining chip. He sought to make the two countries back down from their generally sympathetic stance toward Syrian Kurds, the territory of which Erdogan invaded with Trump’s blessing. The two had also given political asylum to Kurdish activists who had escaped Turkey.

Kurdish-speakers exist in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran and the Caucasus. The four countries where they are resident fear Kurdish nationalism and separatism and have repressed nationalist Kurds. Only Iraq has granted the Kurds a special status, of a Kurdistan Regional Government, within the Iraqi state, though in 2017 Kurds were prevented from seceding by the Iraqi army. There are three dialects of Kurdish, however, and Kurds are not automaticaly a nation because of their language. Turkish political scientists argue that the large Kurdish population of Turkey largely votes the same way their Turkish neighbors do, and separatism is probably a minority sentiment. After all, Turkey is a relatively prosperous country and a member of the G-20, whereas a Kurdistan in southeast Anatolia would be a poor, agricultural, backward country with few resources. Ankara is, however, as nervous as a long-tailed cat in a room full of rocking chairs about any hint of Kurdish identity.

In December, Sweden extradited a convicted member of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), which some Kurds support, back to Turkey, where he had been handed a six-year sentence in absentia. Both the US and Turkey list the PKK as a terrorist organization.

In part, Erdogan is grandstanding in hopes of forcing on Sweden and Finland more such cooperation on security matters related to Kurdish movements.

In addition, Paul Levin, head of Stockholm University’s Institute for Turkish Studies, argued to AFP that Erdogan is grandstanding on the burning-the-Qur’an-issue to whip his followers into a frenzy that will aid him in the upcoming May 14 elections.

Turkey’s economic news is not good, and Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) is polling worse than it has in the twenty years it has been in power. A foreign policy crisis involving an insult to one key element of Turkish identity is therefore an ideal platform for the combative president, who has championed more freedoms for Muslims while rejecting Iran-style Muslim fundamentalism and hewing to Turkey’s secular constitution.

If Levin is correct in this analysis, it seems to me that deploying a Qur’an-burning as a vehicle to get reelected is nearly as problematic as the Qur’an-burning itself.

Erdogan is also irritable about insults to himself in the Swedish newspapers.

Levin suggests that pro-PKK Kurdish exiles in Sweden, knowing of Erdogan’s short fuse and amour propre, have deliberately provoked insults toward him in the press and on social media in order to forestall Swedish accession to NATO, since that might mean that Sweden would have to agree with Ankara to round them up and hand them over to Turkey, or at least to expel them from Sweden.

The Biden administration seems confident that Erdogan will eventually acquiesce in Swedish and Finnish membership in NATO, because the country wants to buy billions of dollars worth of high-tech F-16 fighter planes and the US may stall that deal until Ankara plays ball on NATO expansion.

( RFE/RL ) – Iranians in the western city of Sanandaj have marked the end of a 40-day mourning period for Homan Abdullahi, a protester killed by security forces in ongoing nationwide protests that have rocked the country since the death of Mahsa Amini, with renewed calls for regime change.

Videos published on social networks showed a large gathering at the grave of Abdullahi with people chanting “The martyr never dies!” and “Death to the dictator!,” a reference to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Homan Abdullahi, 21, was shot and killed by the security forces during the December 7 protests in Sanandaj.

Hengaw, a Norway-based group that monitors rights violations in Iran’s Kurdish regions, quoted eyewitnesses as saying Abdullahi was shot in the chest and died an hour later in a hospital.

Public anger erupted after the September 16 death of 22-year-old Amini, who was in custody after being detained by morality police in Tehran for “improperly” wearing a hijab.

Since Amini’s death, Iranians have flooded streets across the country to protest against a lack of rights, with women and schoolgirls making unprecedented shows of support in the biggest threat to the Islamic government since the 1979 revolution.

Screenshot from Iranian social media

In response, authorities have launched a brutal crackdown on dissent, detaining thousands and handing down stiff sentences, including the death penalty, to protesters.

The activist HRANA news agency said that as of January 15 at least 522 people had been killed during the unrest, including 70 minors, as security forces muzzle dissent.

In recent weeks, protesters have turned the end of the traditional 40-day mourning period following a protester’s death into a stage for antigovernment demonstrations.

Sanandaj is the capital of the western Iranian province of Kurdistan. Amini was from Saqez, a town near Sanandaj.

Written by Ardeshir Tayebi based on an original story in Persian by RFE/RL’s Radio Farda

RFE/RL

( RFE/RL) – Demonstrators in the western Iranian city of Javanrud were set on by security forces and have reportedly faced a martial-style clampdown since gathering in a local cemetery on December 31 to mark the end of the 40-day mourning period for seven protesters killed by security forces in ongoing anti-regime unrest.

Reports from Javanrud on January 1 described harsh security conditions and the widespread presence of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) forces in the streets.

The IRGC and other hard-line enforcers have played a key role in suppressing dissent since the unrest was triggered by the death in custody of 22-year-old student Mahsa Amini in mid-September.

Local sources have accused government forces of using live ammunition and arresting protesters in Javanrud, in Kermanshah Province.

The protests there intensified after security forces stormed the city’s cemetery on December 31 and tried to disperse people who had gathered to honor the dead protesters.

Security forces also used tear gas and live ammunition against protesters in and around the cemetery, reportedly leading to the death of 22-year-old Borhan Eliasi.

The Kurdistan Human Rights Network, a group that monitors the human rights situation in western Iran’s Kurdish region, reported on January 1 that at least 15 people, including 16-year-old Arman Ahmadi, were injured by the firing of pellets and live ammunition by the IRGC.

Reports from the capital claimed the death of another protester who was recently temporarily released from prison, Mehdi Zarei Ashkezari. They said he was buried on December 31 in his hometown of Ashkezar.

Radio Farda was initially unable to confirm the specifics of those reports. The families of many detainees have avoided going public to avoid being targeted by authorities.

Anger over Amini’s death has prompted thousands of Iranians to take to the streets to demand greater freedom and respect for women’s rights.

Thousands of arrests have been made, and some protesters have been sentenced to death.

Protesters in Javanrud have accused government forces of using live ammunition. Via Twitter.

At least 58 journalists have been arrested, according to the International Federation of Journalists, including the most recent detainee, Mehdi Ghadimi.

Ghadimi’s friends and colleagues say he was arrested at his home on January 1.

Iran’s judiciary, which routinely withholds information including on trials in process, has not provided any information about possible charges against Ghadimi.

Written by Ardeshir Tayebi based on an original story in Persian by RFE/RL’s Radio Farda

Via RFE/RL

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