For over a decade, Türkiye has been a staunch supporter of the Syrian opposition, providing military aid, diplomatic support, and serving as a key logistical hub for rebel forces. However, this commitment has come at a significant cost to Ankara.

The influx of Syrian refugees has strained Türkiye’s economy and demographics, while the prolonged conflict has also led to diplomatic tensions between Türkiye and the US, UAE, Russia, and Iran.

The civil war has further exposed Türkiye to security threats, including cross-border attacks and the rise of extremist groups, which led Ankara to launch multiple military operations in northern Syria to establish a “safe zone” along the Syrian border.

Despite these challenges, Ankara now sees an opportunity to shape Syria’s future in line with its strategic interests, aiming to leverage the investments and sacrifices made over the course of the 13-year conflict.

Fall of Assad and the Umayyad Mosque as a symbol

Before the rebel offensive in late 2024, Assad’s regime controlled key parts of Syria, including major cities such as Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, and Hama. Many believed Assad had won the civil war, with rebel groups mostly confined to the north.

Recognizing Assad’s strengthened position, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan began efforts to normalize relations between Ankara and Damascus. However, Assad consistently demanded the withdrawal of Turkish forces from northwest Syria as a condition for any diplomatic progress, a demand that Ankara refused to meet.

This diplomatic impasse persisted until late 2024, when a major rebel offensive led to the swift collapse of Assad’s regime.

Just four days after the fall of Damascus, the head of the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MİT), İbrahim Kalın, visited Damascus and prayed at the Umayyad Mosque.

Following Kalın’s visit, Türkiye reopened its embassy in Syria for the first time in 12 years.

On December 22, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan met with Syria’s new de facto leader Ahmed al-Sharaa (previously known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Jolani) in Damascus. Fidan was the first foreign minister to visit Damascus since Assad’s fall.

In September 2012, Erdoğan claimed that he would soon pray at the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, implicitly suggesting that Assad’s regime would be overthrown and that a new, Sunni-dominated leadership would emerge in Syria.

For years, the phrase “praying at the Umayyad Mosque” had been adopted by the Turkish opposition as a critique of Erdoğan’s foreign policy on Syria, suggesting that the anti-Assad policies of Erdoğan have failed.

This is why Kalın’s visit to the Umayyad Mosque was seen as a direct reference to Erdoğan’s 2012 speech.

Photo of Damascus by Juma Mülhem at Pexels.com

Refugees, Economy, and Reconstruction

Türkiye’s main goals in Syria include facilitating the return of refugees, securing its southern borders, countering Kurdish autonomy movements, and maximizing its influence over Syria’s new government. Turkish Interior Minister Ali Yerlikaya announced that 35,114 Syrians have returned since the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad, with expectations that the number of returns could increase further after the school semester ends.

In addition to these security and humanitarian goals, Türkiye also seeks to play a significant role in Syria’s reconstruction. Following Assad’s overthrow, shares of Turkish construction and cement companies surged, driven by expectations that they would benefit from the anticipated rebuilding efforts. Several Turkish media outlets referenced a UN report estimating that Syria’s reconstruction would require at least $400 billion, which many pro-government sources view as a major economic opportunity for Türkiye.

Türkiye has already outlined plans to contribute to Syria’s reconstruction, including initiatives in infrastructure. Transport Minister Abdulkadir Uraloğlu announced an action plan focusing on improving Syria’s transportation network, with particular attention to Aleppo and Damascus airports, the Hejaz Railway, and the M4 and M5 highways.

Additionally, Uraloğlu stated that Türkiye aims to negotiate a maritime demarcation agreement once a permanent government is established in Syria.

In terms of energy cooperation, Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar emphasized the importance of Türkiye’s partnership with Syria, including supplying electricity and collaborating on oil and gas projects. He also described the revival of the Qatar-Türkiye-Europe natural gas pipeline as “an extraordinary opportunity.”

Obstacles

Pro-government media, nationalist groups, and neo-Ottomanist social media accounts in Türkiye celebrate Syria’s new Sunni-dominated leadership as a Turkish expansionist victory, citing examples such as speculation about Turkish potentially becoming an official language in Syria.

This sentiment is echoed by pro-government figures like Cem Küçük, a staunchly nationalist pundit, who uses Turkish nationalist and neo-Ottoman rhetoric to express his views on Syria and the broader region. He stated: “Would it be bad if we had Aleppo? Would it be bad if we had Mecca and Medina? Would it be bad if we had Jerusalem? 82 Jerusalem, 83 Damascus, 84 Mecca, 85 Medina, 86 Cairo.”

His mention of numbers assigned to cities refers to Türkiye’s license plate system, where each of the 81 provinces has an assigned number. By referring to “82” and beyond, he makes an irredentist statement about Türkiye annexing new provinces or territories.

While many media outlets view post-Assad Syria as falling within Türkiye’s sphere of influence, the reality is more complex.

To increase its influence on the new Syrian government and benefit from Syria’s reconstruction, Türkiye first needs a stable, pro-Türkiye regime in place.

The Syrian National Army (SNA) is widely recognized as a proxy force for Türkiye, relying heavily on Turkish support for funding, equipment, and strategic direction. In contrast, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), formerly linked to al-Qaeda, operates with greater autonomy compared to the SNA.

Although Türkiye has officially designated HTS as a terrorist organization, recent developments suggest a more nuanced relationship. Reports indicate that Turkish intelligence has engaged with HTS, and US President-elect Donald Trump also acknowledged that Türkiye’s support helped HTS topple Assad’s regime.

However, it’s important to note that HTS is not directly controlled by Türkiye.

So far, Türkiye’s alliances with both the SNA and HTS have significantly shaped its role in Syria. However, once the dust settles, Türkiye will need to carefully navigate the complexities of these relationships and the diverse interests of various armed factions in Syria to achieve its long-term goals.

( RFE / RL ) – The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government at the hands of rebels, including Ankara-backed factions, has effectively made Turkey the dominant foreign actor in Syria at the expense of Iran and its ally Russia.

Turkey and Iran have competed for years for influence in the South Caucasus, and this rivalry appears to have now extended to the Levant.

“The Islamic republic has had significant misgivings about Turkish influence in Syria, be it economic, political, or military, long before the fall of Assad. But with the loss of Iran’s sole state ally in the region, these concerns are set to be magnified exponentially,” said Behnam Taleblu, an Iran analyst at the Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD).

Still, experts say Turkey’s rising profile in Syria to the detriment of Iran does not necessarily mean Ankara-Tehran relations will be significantly impacted.

What Is Turkey After?

Since the onset of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Iran and Russia backed Assad while Turkey supported rebel groups opposed to his rule.

Iran needed Assad to remain in power so that it could use Syria as a staging ground to fund and arm its proxies and partners, especially the Lebanese group Hezbollah.

For Russia, Assad’s rule meant Moscow could maintain its Hmeimim air base and naval base in Tartus, which gave it easier access to the Middle East, North Africa, and the Mediterranean Sea.

Ankara wanted a government in Syria more aligned with its regional vision and policies, especially those that would restrain Kurdish groups in northeastern Syria. A coalition of Kurdish parties, including the Democratic Union Party (PYD), heads the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria.

PYD’s armed wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), leads the U.S-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

“Turkey has had three core concerns in Syria: fighting the YPG/PYD, enabling the return of Syrian refugees to Syria, and preventing further refugee flows into Turkey,” said Daria Isachenko, a Turkey expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

Assad’s downfall on December 8 has stemmed the influx of refugees into Turkey, but the “first two concerns remain,” Isachenko added.

Syria is now effectively ruled by the U.S.-designated terrorist organization Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its allies — some of whom are linked with Turkey, Iran’s rival.

Isachenko says Turkey’s growing influence in Syria could further strengthen its position in the Mediterranean Sea if Ankara signs a Libya-style maritime deal with the new authorities in Damascus.

The Road Ahead

Turkey’s growth in stature and Iran’s weakened position in Syria could have ramifications for developments in the South Caucasus, where Iran, Russia, and Turkey vie for influence.

Experts say while the Astana talks — a format sponsored by the three countries to end the conflict in Syria — may be dead, it still served as a platform for managing different interests.

“Coordination and consultation on conflict management between Turkey and Iran as well as Russia on the Middle East and the South Caucasus should not be ruled out,” Isachenko said.

She adds that even in Syria, Turkey and Iran may find some of their interests aligned, such as finding a common adversary in Israel, which has moved into Syrian territory since the fall of Assad.

“Turkish Victory in Syria,” Digital, Dream / Dreamland v3 / Clip2Comic, 2024

Still, some argue that Tehran will seek to undermine Turkey in Syria in the hopes of returning the country into its so-called axis of resistance — Iran’s loose network of regional allies and proxies.

“The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps will look for ways to claw back influence in Syria,” said Taleblu of FDD.

“Downtrodden, disposed, and spurned local actors are easy to co-opt, particularly in states where central authority is weak.”

The Kurdish Question

U.S. support for the Kurdish-led SDF has weakened in recent years due to a combination of factors, including the withdrawal of a majority of U.S. troops in 2018 and 2019 and pressure from Washington’s NATO ally, Turkey.

Ankara, which launched an incursion into northern Syria in 2019 against Kurdish forces, is now in a strong position to further challenge the Kurds, experts say.

Since Assad’s fall, Ankara-backed rebel groups have clashed with Kurdish forces and seized the previously Kurdish-controlled cities of Manbij and Tarafat near the border with Turkey.

Wladimir van Wilgenburg, an Iraqi Kurdistan-based analyst who has co-authored books on Syrian Kurds, says the presence of the 900 remaining U.S. troops might offer some protection to the Kurds but the situation remains precarious.

“The new administration in Damascus likely will prefer relations with Turkey over the SDF,” he said. “The situation is difficult for the Kurds unless they reach an agreement with HTS.”

HTS leader Ahmad al-Sharaa, previously known by the nom de guerre Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, wants to unify all armed groups in Syria under one banner. But if the SDF were to join, it would effectively end Kurdish autonomy in Syria, Wilgenburg says.

Via RFE / RL

Copyright (c)2024 RFE/RL, Inc. Used with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

(The Conversation) – The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria has opened a new front for geopolitical competition in the Middle East.

Now, however, instead of Iran and Russia playing the most influential roles in Syria, Israel and Turkey see an opportunity to advance their conflicting national and regional security interests.

Under their respective leaders, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, relations between the two countries have deteriorated sharply in recent years. This sets the stage for a bitter showdown over Syria.

A new rivalry is emerging

Turkey is widely reported to have backed the offensive led by the Sunni rebel group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), to drive Assad from power, thus backstabbing Syria’s traditional allies, Iran and Russia.

Tehran has intimated that without Turkey’s support, HTS would have been unable to achieve its blistering takeover.

Now, with Assad gone, Erdoğan is believed to be positioning himself as de facto leader of the Sunni Muslim world. He also wants Turkey to be one of the dominant powers in the region.

Erdoğan has said if the Ottoman Empire had been divided in a different way following its defeat in the First World war, several Syrian cities, including Aleppo and Damascus, would have likely been part of modern-day Turkey.

Turkey immediately reopened its embassy in Damascus after Assad’s fall and offered help to HTS in shaping the country’s new Islamist order.

As part of this, Erdoğan has opposed any concession by HTS to the US-backed Kurdish minority in Syria’s northeast, which he regards as supporters of the Kurdish separatists in Turkey.

Meanwhile, Israel has taken advantage of the power vacuum in Syria to advance its territorial and security ambitions. It has launched a land incursion into the Syrian side of the strategic Golan Heights and has executed a massive bombardment of Syria’s military assets across the country.

Israel’s foreign minister said destroying these assets – which included ammunition depots, fighter jets, missiles and chemical weapons storage facilities – was necessary to ensure they didn’t fall into the “hands of extremists” that could pose a threat to the Jewish state.

Turkey sees Israel’s recent actions in Syria and the occupied Golan Heights as a land grab. Israel’s actions have also been denounced by Arab countries, who demand Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity be respected.

Israel is clearly concerned about the rise to power of an Islamist group and the transformation of Syria into a jihadist state.

This is despite the fact that HTS leader Ahmad al-Sharaa (also known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani) has signalled he does not want conflict with Israel. He’s also pledged not to allow any groups to use Syria for attacks on Israel.

At the same time, al-Sharaa has called for the withdrawal of Israel from Syrian territory according to a 1974 agreement that followed the 1973 Yom Kippur war.

Bitter foes

Erdoğan, Turkey’s moderate Islamist president, has long been a supporter of the Palestinian cause and a fierce critic of Israel. But tensions have significantly escalated between the two sides since the start of the Gaza war.

Erdoğan has called for an Arab-Islamic front to stop what he’s called Israel’s “genocide” in Gaza. He has equally berated Israel’s invasion of Lebanon earlier this year.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, meanwhile, has lashed out at Erdoğan over the years. He has called him a “joke” and “dictator” whose jails are full journalists and political prisoners. He has also accused of Erdoğan of committing a “genocide” of the Kurdish people.

Washington, which is allied to both Turkey and Israel, has launched intense diplomatic efforts to ensure that HTS moves Syria in a favourable direction. It is keen to see a post-Assad system of governance aligned with America’s interests.

These interests include HTS’ support for America’s Kurdish allies in northeast Syria and the continued presence of 1,000 American troops in the country. The US also wants HTS to continue to prevent the Islamic State terror group from regaining strength.

“In this Corner . . .” Digital, Dream / Dreamland v3 / Clip2Comic, 2024

The US will also have to manage the emerging geopolitical rivalry between Israel and Turkey in Syria.

Some observers have not ruled out the possibility of an Israeli-Turkish military showdown, should Israel turn what it calls its temporary occupation of the demilitarised zone on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights into a permanent territorial acquisition.

This is not to say a war between them is imminent. But their clashing interests and the breadth of mutual hostility has certainly reached a new level.

Iran’s loss could be costly

For Iran, Assad’s ouster means the loss of a critical ally in its predominantly Shia “axis of resistance” against Israel and the United States.

The Iranian regime had worked hard to build this network over the last 45 years as a fundamental part of its national and wider security. It had propped up Assad’s minority Alawite dictatorship over the Sunni majority population in Syria at the cost of some US$30 billion (A$47 billion) since the popular uprising against Assad began in 2011.

And with Assad now gone, Iran is deprived of a vital land and air bridge to one of its key proxies – Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The Assad regime’s sudden demise is now causing soul searching in Tehran about the wisdom of its regional strategy – and whether it will have any significant role at all in the new Syria. This seems unlikely, as al-Sharaa (the leader of HTS) has declared his disdain for both Iran and Hezbollah.

Al-Sharaa has prioritised the establishment of a publicly mandated Islamist government and Syria’s reconstruction and national unity over a conflict with Israel, Iran’s arch enemy. This will no doubt lead to contention with the hardliners and reformists in Iran.

Only time will tell how all of this will play out. At this stage, the future of Syria and the region hangs in the balance. And much depends on whether HTS leaders will move to set up an all-inclusive political system and unite a Balkanised Syria.

Amin Saikal, Emeritus Professor of Middle Eastern and Central Asian Studies, Australian National University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Türkiye is suffering from increasing summer heat waves, especially in the western part of the country, creating dramatic increases in electricity use from ACs.

But the country has also showed that there is an alternative to this constant ratcheting up of the temperature. According to the energy think tank Ember, 2/3s of the increased demand for electricity, mostly caused by the sweltering temperatures of the summer of 2024, was met by new solar installations. Turkish energy production from solar was up 40% in the first half of 2024, year over year.

By putting in new solar installations, Türkiye in 2024 avoided 16 gigawatts of dirty electricity produced by fossil fuels. All of those fossil fuels would have been imported, since Türkiye is poor in these resources, resulting in a big import bill. That expenditure was also avoided.

“Solar Golden Horne,” Digital, Dream / Dreamland v3 /Clip2Comic, 2024 >

Türkiye reached 16 gigawatts of installed solar capacity this summer, which is 14% of the country’s installed power capacity. It has already risen to 18.7 gigawatts in December. The government wants to increase solar capacity to 22.6 gigawatts in the next twelve months.

A little over half of the country’s electricity is produced by coal-fired and fossil gas-fired plants on a year-round basis, but the government has plans to invest heavily in renewables toward a zero-carbon electric grid over the next little over a decade. It plans 89 gigawatts of new solar and wind capacity by 2035, with plans to invest $108 billion in the transformation.

Greening the Turkish grid is made difficult not only by the extra air conditioning use in increasingly hot summers, but also by the economy’s continued expansion. It is one of the fastest-growing countries in the world economically, which creates vast additional electricity demand.

Türkiye is also going for 14.8 gigawatts of wind generation by the end of next year.

Turkish electric vehicle sales are also surging by 39% this year. The country produces the Togg, for which it is seeking increased Chinese partnerships, and plans to export it to Europe starting next year. The Togg is helping drive EV sales domestically and creating local jobs, showing how green technology can help power clean industrialization.

Türkiye, a member of NATO, is the world’s 17th largest economy, making it a member of the G20, with a projected 2024 nominal GDP of $1.3 trillion. It has a population of 87 million, just a little bit more than that of Germany.

( Foreign Policy in Focus ) – After tenaciously holding on to power for more than a decade of war, the government of Bashar al-Assad crumbled in two weeks of limited fighting. Overwhelmed by a surprise blitzkrieg assault, the Syrian army seemed to melt away in the face of a surprisingly well-armed and well-organized coalition of disparate “rebel” forces that rapidly conquered Aleppo, Hama, and finally Damascus, sending Assad and his family into exile in Moscow.

Assad’s sudden downfall has drastically shifted the facts on the ground in the Middle East. It has compromised the interests of Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah (Syria’s primary protectors over the past decade), while bolstering the positions of the three states that stand most to gain from Assad’s fall: the United States, Israel, and Turkey, whose leaders were quick to celebrate —and take some credit for—Assad’s fall.

The United States, which has sought regime change in Syria since the first Obama administration (if not far longer), has clear reasons to cheer the removal of an ally of Moscow and Tehran—as does Ukraine, which reportedly provided modest support to anti-Assad forces. Israel, for its part, has long sought the overthrow of Assad, and has been accused of partnering with various opposition forces over the years. Having finally achieved their objective, Israel wasted no time initiating a massive bombing campaign to destroy Syrian army equipment, while grabbing more territory in Syria’s southwestern Golan region, an unprecedented seizure of territory that has been reported as “indefinite.” With Syria having been an important conduit for weapons, cash, and materiel for Hezbollah, Israel has also won a tactical victory against the political party and military force with which it had signed an (almost immediately violated) ceasefire deal just prior to Assad’s overthrow.

Although the interests of the United States and Israel in Assad’s ouster are apparent, the role of Turkey is more complex, and arguably more consequential. All evidence points to Turkey having played an integral role in the operation that overthrew Assad’s government, with the Turks likely providing training and material support to at least two of the main rebel forces: The Syrian National Army (SNA) and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a Sunni Islamist group  that had previously been aligned with al-Qaeda. That the assault on Assad’s government began out of Idlib province, which has been under Turkish protection since the start of the Astana Process in 2017, has given further credence to claims of significant Turkish involvement, with accusations proliferating online that many of the rebel forces crossed into Syria from the Turkish border.

In the initial days of the assault, Turkish officials initially denied, and then downplayed, their country’s involvement. Nevertheless, speculation immediately flooded both traditional and social media that this was a Turkish-backed regime change operation—speculation that became difficult to discount after the fall of Aleppo, as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan publicly called for the rebels to march on to Damascus and topple Assad. Though the full truth of Ankara’s involvement may never be known, the belief that Turkey— with American and Israeli support—was substantially involved appears to be widespread in the Middle East and beyond.

Longstanding Relationship

Under Erdogan, Turkey has had a complicated relationship with Assad’s Syria, training anti-Assad forces early in the civil war and later sending its military into Syria for multiple campaigns against Kurdish, Islamic State, and Syrian government forces. Having repeatedly called for Assad’s ouster in the 2010s, however, Erdogan had recently appeared to take a more conciliatory tone with Damascus, calling for new negotiations with Assad (though these overtures were allegedly rebuffed) and expressing “hope” for improved ties as recently as three weeks ago.

Apart from Erdogan’s public statements, there were other reasons to doubt that Turkey would actively push for regime change in Syria. Among these, a primary factor was the aforementioned Astana Process, which had set up a series of “de-escalation zones” in Syria, each of which would be under the protection of the Process’ three signatories: Iran, Russia, and Turkey. Under the terms of the agreement, there was to be “no military solution to the Syrian conflict” and Syrian sovereignty and territorial integrity were to be respected. Although numerous problems arose after 2017, Russia, Iran, and Turkey had remained committed to the terms of Astana. Indeed, mere weeks before the start of the assault, at a scheduled meeting for Astana Process states in Kazakhstan, Turkey reaffirmed its commitment to Syrian “sovereignty” and “territorial integrity.”

Turkey’s apparent violation of its Astana Process obligations, with no prior warning, has almost certainly enraged both Moscow and Tehran, both of which have spent much of the past decade protecting their interests there and fighting to keep Assad in power. Given both countries’ central role in the BRICS economic union, furthermore, Erdogan’s actions in Syria may have jeopardized Turkey’s bid for BRICS membership.

Perceptions of Turkish involvement may pose serious problems for Erdoğan’s domestic standing, too. Most Turks are deeply opposed to Israel’s actions in Gaza, which many view as a genocide. Should Erdogan be perceived domestically as having aided the aims of Israel and America, the sincerity of his increasingly bellicose rhetoric towards Israel will be further questioned, with many Turks highly critical of Ankara’s reluctance to take more forceful action against Tel Aviv.

Given the risks to his own domestic standing and to Turkey’s historically close relations with Russia in particular, what could have motivated Erdogan to push for regime change in Syria, going against both his own public statements and his government’s official policy?

Explaining Turkish Moves

Turkey hosts more than three million Syrian refugees, which has created significant, and sometimes violent, socioeconomic tensions between refugees and native Turks. With a turbulent and highly inflationary Turkish economy, that is suffering from years of ballooning prices and insufficient government support, these tensions have coalesced into a substantial problem for Erdogan’s government, pushing it to seek ways of repatriating Syrians to their home country. With Assad gone, Erdogan almost certainly hopes to have more control over Syrian affairs, allowing him to send Syrians out of Turkey.

A second likely reason for heightened Turkish involvement in Syria concerns the Kurds. The largest ethnic minority group in Turkey, Kurds have had an infamously difficult relationship with the Turkish state since its founding in 1923. Since then, there has been a sizable minority of Turkish Kurds—most notably the members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—who have sought not only greater rights and recognition but a nation-state of their own. In the eyes of the Turkish state, the U.S.-backed Kurdish forces in Syria, presiding over a large swath of territory along the Turkish border, constitute an existential threat to Turkish sovereignty.

The Kurdish issue is made more salient by the coming inauguration of Donald Trump. Just last week, the president-elect strongly stated that the United States should not get involved in events on the ground in the Syria, giving further credence to past reports that Trump intends to pull U.S. forces out of Syria, which Trump had previously stated were there primarily to extract Syrian oil. Should Trump make good on his promises, it would leave the U.S.-backed Kurdish forces unprotected by the presence of American boots on the ground.

The possibility that Trump will indeed remove U.S. troops may have been pivotal to Ankara’s calculations. Indeed, just a few weeks before the assault on Aleppo, Turkish media reported top officials in Erdogan’s government predicting a Trump-led withdrawal, suggesting that this could open up new opportunities for driving out Kurdish forces near the Turkish-Syrian border. Driving out Kurdish forces poses risks for Turkey’s relations with the United States and the broader West, where Kurdish militias have been positively represented throughout the Syrian war. But Erdogan may be expecting that, under Trump, the United States will not get in his way.

Erdogan may also see an opportunity to expand Turkey’s borders, which many in his base see as having been unfairly drawn after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Perhaps Ankara will attempt to make its foothold in northern Syria permanent and expand that area by taking over areas currently held by the Kurds. Yet Turkey’s presence in the north, along with its close relations with HTS and SNA, provides Erdogan with leverage in future negotiations with various regional players—including Russia, which is surely scrambling to negotiate the future of its military bases in Syria.

Whatever the motivations, Turkey will now be expected to take a central role in whatever government emerges out of the current chaos. Success in repatriating Syrians from Turkey back to Syria will be a critical test for Erdogan’s approval at home, as will be how he navigates the expanded Israeli occupation of Syrian territory. Abroad, Erdogan’s ability to maintain relations with Moscow and Iran will likewise be critical for the future of Turkey’s application to both BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Yet with a frustrated population at home, a multitude of nation states and non-state actors jostling for power in and around Syria, and a potentially difficult-to-control political force in charge of Syria, Erdogan may have this time bitten off more than he can chew.

Khamenei on December 11 also implicitly blamed Turkey for the lightning push of Syrian rebels who reached Damascus from their strongholds in the northwest with little resistance.

“It should not be doubted that what happened in Syria was the product of a joint American and Zionist plot,” he said.

“Yes, a neighboring government of Syria plays, played, and is playing a clear role…but the main conspirator, mastermind, and command center are in America and the Zionist regime,” Khamenei added.

The U.S.-designated terrorist organization Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its allies — some of whom are linked with Turkey — ousted Assad on December 8, less than two weeks after launching their offensive.

Syria under Assad served as a crucial part of a land corridor connecting Iran to the Levant, which was considered the logistical backbone of the so-called axis of resistance — Iran’s loose network of regional proxies and allies.

Iran spent billions of dollars and sent military advisers to Syria to ensure Assad remained in power when civil war broke out in 2011.

Russia — where the ousted Syrian leader has been granted political asylum — also backed Assad, while Turkey has supported rebel groups who aimed to topple the regime.

A Khamenei adviser once described Syria as the “golden ring” in the chain connecting Iran to its Lebanese partner, Hezbollah. With the ring broken and Hezbollah’s capabilities degraded after a devastating war with Israel, experts say the axis has become severely weak.

“Foiled,” Digital, Dream / Dreamland v3 / Clip2Comic, 2024

Khamenei said only “ignorant and uninformed analysts” would assess that the axis has become weak and vowed that its reach “will expand across the region more than before.”

Reza Alijani, an Iranian political analyst based in France, told RFE/RL’s Radio Farda that Khamenei’s comments were more “trash talk” than anything else.

“The axis may not have been defeated, but it has suffered a serious blow and the Islamic republics arms in the region have been deal major hits,” he said.

Alijani argued that factions within the Islamic republic’s core support base may be starting to question Khamenei’s policies and vision after the recent setbacks, which he said is a cause for concern among the clerical establishment’s top brass.

With reporting by Hooman Askary of RFE/RL’s Radio Farda

Via RFE/ RL

Copyright (c)2024 RFE/RL, Inc. Used with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

( Middle East Monitor ) – Turkiye’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan must be delighted about what is unfolding in Syria, though it is a feeling bound to be tempered by swiftly changing circumstances.  Iran’s Shia proxies have been weakened by relentless Israeli targeting and bombing.  Russia’s eyes and resources are turned towards war in Ukraine.  With reports that Syrian rebel groups are now fighting on the outskirts of the capital Damascus, the Assad regime looks frail, its leader either in hiding or evacuated.

In the salad mix of jihadis, nationalists, and run of the mill mercenaries, Turkiye’s hand looms large.  Its intervention in Syria’s conflict was motivated by two main goals: the containment, if not elimination of Kurdish militants in northern Syria, seen as indistinguishable from their PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) counterparts in Turkiye itself, and creating conditions of stability or “safe zones” that would enable a return of Syrian refugees when feasible.

Since August 2016, Turkiye has made three incursions seizing parts of Syria’s north, imposing an occupation using regular troops and auxiliary forces including the Syrian National Army (SNA) and a coalition of groups comprising former Free Syrian Army (FSA) fighters.  In 2018, the Military Police was established by both Turkish authorities and the Syrian Interim Government (SIG), a force ostensibly intended to protect the civilian population.  Instead, this period of Turkish rule has been marked by brutality, repression and sheer neglect.

In its February 2024 report, Human Rights Watch documented instances of abductions, arbitrary arrests, unlawful detentions (these include children), sexual violence and torture.  The perpetrators spanned elements of the SNA, the Military Police, members of the Turkish Armed Forces, the Turkish National Intelligence Organisation (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı, MİT), and various military intelligence directorates.  To this colourfully gruesome range of cruelties can be added the abuse of property rights, looting, pillaging, confiscation of property, extortion and the absence of any consistent system of restitution.

The group enduring the heaviest burden of suffering are Kurdish residents, notably those that had received protection from the US-backed Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) comprising the People’s Protection Unit (Yekineyen Parastina Gel, YPG), and the Women’s Protection Unit (Yekineyen Parastina Jin).  These forces proved crucial in countering the Islamic State (ISIS) group.  In October this year, Erdogan reiterated the long held view that such Kurdish protective units were merely “the Syrian branch of the PKK terror group, destined to be abandoned, left isolated.”  Arabs and other groups seen as having links to the SDF and the Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria (AANES) have also been targets of Turkish-led ire.

The SNA is no friend of the headline grabbing Islamist outfit, Hayat Tahrir-al Sham (HTS), the primary spear in the lighting operation against the Assad regime.  HTS has marketed itself as a self-sufficient, modern, more considered group, less fire and brimstone from its al-Qaeda and al-Nusra iterations and supposedly more tolerant to other religions, sects and views.  Its leader, Abu Mohammad Al-Jolani, has managed to receive praise and plaudits in the Western media for that change, despite his listing by the US State Department as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” worthy of a $10 million reward to anyone willing to offer information leading to his capture.

Even on the progress of HTS, Turkish influence cannot be discounted, despite Ankara eschewing open support for the group.  As Fuad Shahbazov, writing for the Stimson Center remarks, the recent advances of HTS “would have been unthinkable without Turkiye’s military and logistical backing, and provision of advanced weaponry.”  It has also been suggested that Ankara gave a nod of approval to the offensive led by HTS after it failed to secure a rapprochement with Assad.

Erdogan’s statements on the advance show a slippery mind in operation.  On December 6, he told reporters after Friday prayers that the target of the offensive was evidently Damascus.  “I would say we hope for this advance to continue without any issues.”  But he also expressed the view that these advances were “problematic” and “not in a manner we desire”.  While not elaborating on that point, it could be gleaned from the remarks that he is concerned about various “terrorist organisations” operating in the rebel forces.

OPINION: As predicted, the revolution in Syria has reignited

The next day, the Turkish President decided to be lofty in his assessment as the rebels entered the suburbs of Homs.  “There is now a new reality in Syria, politically and diplomatically,” he declared in a speech delivered in the southern Turkish city of Gaziantep.  “And Syria belongs to Syrians with all its ethnic, sectarian and religious elements.”

In keeping with the views of other leaders responsible for intervening in the affairs of another state, Erdogan spoke of Syrian independence as viable, the will of its people as inviolable.  “The people of Syria are the ones who will decide the future of their own country.”  He hoped that the country would “quickly regain the peace, stability, and tranquillity it has been longing for 13 years.”  He went on to remark that “responsible actors and all international organisations” should support the preservation of the state’s territorial integrity.

The audacity of such statements does nothing to conceal the sectarian and ethnic dangers unfolding at the end of this Ankara-sponsored mission.  The fall of Bashar al-Assad will imperil Shia communities and do even more harm to the Kurds, leaving the door open for Salafism.  The rebel groups, only united by the common cause of overthrowing Assad, may well find battling each other hard to avoid.  As for the territorial integrity Erdogan speaks of, Turkish officialdom and policy will never wear it short of any number of guarantees Ankara is bound to extort on hefty terms.  And as for refugees?  Expect many more to gush out in desperation.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor or Informed Comment.

Via Middle East Monitor

This work by Middle East Monitor is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

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Bonus video added by Informed Comment:

France 24 English: “Syria at risk of ‘fragmentation’: Amid ‘scenes of popular joy’, Syrians worried about ‘what’s next’

The rebels swiftly captured Aleppo, Syria’s second-largest city, marking the first time the city has changed control since 2016. After taking Aleppo, the rebels advanced southward, seizing villages, towns, and the key city of Hama on December 5.

The central city of Homs appears to be their next target.

Although Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has denied any involvement in the rebel offensive and stated that the crisis in Syria is the result of Assad’s refusal to engage in political dialogue with the opposition, Syrian state media has accused Israel and Türkiye of supporting the insurgents’ advance.

The offensive occurred amid Türkiye’s attempts to normalize relations with the Syrian government. However, these efforts had stalled, since Assad demanded that Türkiye withdraw its military forces from northern Syria as a precondition for normalization — a condition Türkiye has refused.

The Complex Relationship Between Türkiye and HTS

HTS was officially formed in January 2017 as a merger of various Islamist and jihadist groups. HTS’s main component, Al-Nusra Front, was al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria before it claimed to sever formal ties to the organization in 2016.

HTS is widely regarded as a terrorist group by several countries, including the United Nations, the United States, and the European Union. Türkiye designated HTS as a terrorist organization in August 2018.

However, Türkiye has faced accusations of indirectly or covertly supporting HTS. Even if Türkiye was not directly involved in the rebel offensive, opposition sources in contact with Turkish intelligence have claimed that Türkiye gave the green light for the offensive, Reuters reported.

Journalist Fehim Taştekin notes that HTS’s agenda differs from Ankara’s goals and warns the Turkish government to abandon its “wishful thinking” about HTS. He added that HTS is cooperating with Türkiye pragmatically for now, despite considering its secular regime “un-Islamic.”

Despite the current cooperation between HTS and SNA, there have been several instances in the previous years where HTS and Turkish-backed SNA have clashed militarily, particularly in Idlib and other opposition-held areas.

Reactions in Türkiye

While Türkiye designates the HTS as a terrorist organization, the rhetoric of Turkish officials and pro-government media suggests approval, and in some cases, even celebration of the HTS offensive.

Some Turkish pro-government media outlets and social media accounts framed the offensive as a potential Turkish territorial expansion. Pro-government accounts circulated maps depicting expanded Turkish territories, including parts of northern Syria.

The Islamist newspaper Yeni Akit portrayed the symbolic raising of the Turkish flag over Aleppo’s citadel by Syrian rebels as a victory for Türkiye, stating, “The Turkish Flag Looks Very Fitting on Aleppo Citadel.” It further remarked, “Today, the Turkish flag waves over Aleppo Citadel, one of the city’s greatest symbols, which remained under Ottoman protection for approximately 400 years.”

Pro-government Yeni Şafak praised the rebel advance with the phrase ‘The children of Aleppo are returning home.’ while columnist and former Justice and Development Party (AKP) MP Aydın Ünal claimed that the “reconquest of Aleppo” upset opposition groups in Türkiye.

However, some pro-government pundits also claim Türkiye has no ties with HTS. Sabah newspaper columnist Okan Müderrisoğlu said: “HTS is recognized as a terrorist organization by Türkiye. For this reason alone, claiming that Türkiye has an organic relationship with HTS remains a crude accusation!”

Main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Özgür Özel, a center-left secularist, urged Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the head of the ruling pro-Islam Justice and Development Party, to avoid “plans to divide Syria” and called on Assad to open a dialogue with Türkiye to begin a new chapter for “the brotherhood of the peoples of Syria and Türkiye.”

Özel also stated, “The efforts of terrorist organizations like HTS to weaken the Syrian regime should be approached with great caution and rationality.”

What are Türkiye’s aims in Syria?

Veteran journalist Murat Yetkin claimed Ankara has three priorities in Syria.

According to Yetkin, the first goal is preventing a new wave of migration. The return of Syrian refugees to their home country has been a significant political debate in recent years and the high number of refugees has been a point of criticism for Erdoğan’s government.

This is why Turkish officials see the rebel offensive as an opportunity to facilitate the return of Syrian refugees. Interior Minister Ali Yerlikaya stated that 42 percent of Syrians in Türkiye come from Aleppo. He added, “If a safe and peaceful environment is established in Tel Rifat and Aleppo, there will be a strong inclination for people to return there.”

Türkiye’s second goal is to prevent pro-Kurdish forces from gaining new positions. On November 30, the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) launched ‘Operation Dawn of Freedom’ against both the Syrian Army and the pro-Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The core of the SDF, which is U.S.-backed, is the leftist Kurdish YPG (People’s Defense Units). The Turkish government makes no distinction between the YPG, a Syrian Kurdish militia, and the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party), an Anatolian-based guerrilla group that Turkey views as a virulent terrorist organization.

Türkiye’s state-run Anadolu Agency reported that the Sunni Arab SNA captured Tel Rifaat from the SDF Kurds, framing the offensive as part of efforts to disrupt the “PKK/YPG’s plan to create a terrorist corridor along the Tel Rifaat–Mare region.”

Yetkin said the third goal is resolving the crisis as much as possible through diplomacy and “proxy forces.”

To address the ongoing crisis in Syria, Iran, Türkiye, and Russia will meet in Doha for the Astana Summit. Several media outlets in Türkiye suggest that the rebel offensive will strengthen Ankara’s position in its normalization efforts.

CNN Türk reported that Ankara hopes Iran and Russia will pressure Bashar al-Assad to agree to negotiate with Türkiye following the meeting.

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Bonus video added by Informed Comment:

Voice of America: “Syrian rebels’ advances offer Turkey opportunity ”

Al-Sudani cautioned that “Iraq will not be a mere spectator to the grave repercussions of the events taking place in Syria, especially acts of ethnic cleansing of racial and religious communities there.” He emphasized that “Iraq in the past has been harmed by terrorism and by the consequences of the dominance of extremist organizations in regions of Syria, and would not permit any repetition of those episodes.” He stressed the importance of respecting the unity and sovereignty of Syria

Al-Sudani observed that “Islamic nations are not in need of internal partition, saying that “what is happening in Syria today is to the benefit of the Zionist entity [Israel], which had undertaken airstrikes on the Syrian Army in such a manner as to pave the way for the terrorist groups to establish dominion over further regions of Syria.” He denounced the Syrian Sunni rebels for having taken no position in support of “our people, the Palestinians,” and for having neglected to issue a frank denunciation of the [Israeli] aggression against Gaza.

The Iraqi PM office’s read-out ended by saying that the telephone conference was characterized by an emphasis on the importance of joint coordination between the two sides [Türkiye and Iraq], and on the necessity of supporting security and stability in Syria, since it directly affects the security and stability of Iraq and all the countries of the region [i.e. including Türkiye].

Al-Sudani’s cold fury with Erdogan comes through clearly in the read-out. It isn’t just the resentment by a Shiite leader of Erdogan’s Sunni triumphalism but also a sense that Ankara is being reckless and irresponsible in a way that could have dire consequences for Iraq.

Moreover, Al-Sudani was speaking as the prime minister of all Iraqis, and not simply as a Shiite head of state. He is getting enormous pressure from Iraq’s Kurds, who I figure are about 22% of the Iraqi population, and who see the particular rebels that took Aleppo as fundamentalist Arab radicals with a genocidal attitude toward Kurds. Northeast Syria is heavily Kurdish and Kurdish sources worry that the Kurdish population faces dire peril from the rebels.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Mohammad Shia’ al-Sudani, Digital, Dream / Cartoon v3 / Clip2Comic, 2024.

Many observers in the Middle East believe that Türkiye is at least to some extent behind the rapid conquest of Aleppo, Syria’s second largest city, by the Sunni Arab rebel groups, Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Syrian National Army (SNA). The Sunni rebel forces in northern Syria have also long been supported by the US Central Intelligence Agency, though they shunned some groups with known al-Qaeda ties, which now form part of HTS. The excellent military equipment, smart battlefield tactics, and crisp new uniforms of the rebels point to significant foreign support.

Last weekend, as Turkish-backed factions of the Syrian National Army (SNA), allied with HTS or the Levant Liberation Council, launched offensives against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) across various fronts in the broader Aleppo region, tensions escalated. Some of the cites below come from BBC Monitoring, for which, thanks.

The core of the Syrian Democratic Forces is the leftist Kurdish YPG paramilitary that was backed by the US in the fight against ISIL 2014-2018. Kurdish sources said that the SDF had established a humanitarian route to facilitate the safe evacuation of civilians to more secure zones. However, the Arab fundamentalists backed by Türkiye targeted and obstructed these evacuation efforts. So it was alleged by SDF commander Mazloum Abdi on “X”

Abdi wrote, “Events in northwestern Syria developed rapidly and suddenly, as our forces faced intense attacks from several sides. With the collapse and withdrawal of the Syrian army and its allies, we intervened to open a humanitarian corridor between our eastern regions, Aleppo and the Tal Rifaat area to protect our people [Kurds] from massacres. But attacks by armed groups supported by the Turkish occupation cut off this corridor. Our forces bravely defended our people in Aleppo, Tal Rifaat and al-Shahba. We are working to communicate with all actors in Syria to secure the protection of our people and safely evacuate them from the Tal Rifaat and al-Shahba areas towards our safe areas in the northeast of the country. While our forces continue to resist to protect our people in the Kurdish neighborhoods of Aleppo city.”

This statement was platformed by all major Kurdish media.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights alleged that some Syrian National Army fundamentalists had called for the beheading of Kurds in Aleppo. Video has also circulated of SNA fighters abusing Kurdish prisoners, according to BBC Monitoring.

To be fair, so far the fundamentalist Sunni Arab rebels do not appear to have committed atrocities of the ISIL type, and they aren’t ISIL.

The important thing is that neither the Iraqi Shiites, represented by Al-Sudani, nor the Iraqi Kurds are convinced that these fundamentalist Arab militias will treat Kurds and other minorities equitably.

Hoshyar Zebari of the Kurdistan Democratic Party in northern Iraq warned that some of the constituent groups of the HTS had been “incubators” for ISIL, though this allegation is historically not quite correct. The Jabhat al-Nusra or Succor Front derived from the Islamic State of Iraq, which had in turn derived from al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia. But it split with ISI, which became ISIL (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) in 2012. The Succor Front instead allied with Ayman al-Zawahiri’s al-Qaeda, which kicked ISIL out. Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, the leader of the Succor Front, distanced himself from al-Qaeda in 2016, turning against terrorism abroad to focus on taking territory inside Syria. None of this history can be very reassuring to leftist or liberal democratic Kurds, but it isn’t accurate to simply declare HTS to be the same as ISIL. Some of its constituents are branches of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. It isn’t that their rule would be good for women or minorities, but Sinjar-style massacres of Kurds may also not be their goal.

There is a sense in which al-Sudani leads what might be called the Sixth Iraqi Republic. The first four governments after the 1958 overthrow of the British-installed monarchy were nationalist, and headed by Sunnis.

They were:

1. `Abd al-Karim Qasim’s nationalist government
2. The first Baath government of 1963, which overthrew Qasim
3. The Sunni Arab nationalist goverment of the `Arif brothers 1963-1968, which overthrew the Baath
4. The second Baath government, 1968-2003

The Fifth Republic was installed by the Bush Administration and its longest-lived leader was Nouri al-Maliki. It fell when the so-called Islamic State group (ISIL, ISIS, Daesh) took 40% of Iraqi territory in 2014.

Subsequent Shiite prime ministers led the take-down of ISIL in alliance with Iran and the United States, rebuilding the Iraqi national army and welcoming the rise of Shiite paramilitary groups, the Popular Mobilization Forces. Together, and with the help of the US Air Force and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, the Sixth Republic reestablished Iraq as a unified state, even invading Kirkuk in 2017 to halt Kurdish subnationalist expansion.

What has happened in Syria could threaten the very foundations of the Iraqi Sixth Republic, which was born in the struggle against Sunni Arab radicalism. For one thing, Al-Sudani clearly fears that developments in Syria could lead some Sunni Iraqis to rebel against Baghdad. He may be completely off-base on that view, but he is not the only one in Baghdad to hold it.

So this perceived existential threat to the Sixth Republic is what led Al-Sudani to such vehement statements in his conversation with Erdogan, who won’t have agreed with any of al-Sudani’s fears. Erdogan sees the Syrian Sunni Arab rebels as political allies for Ankara and as far superior to the Baath government in Damascus.

No one hated the secular Arab nationalist Baath Party more in history than the religiously-minded Iraqi Shiites, so it is ironic indeed that they should now be standing up for Baath leader Bashar al-Assad.