(The Conversation) – Women from religious communities around the world, like the Dawoodi Bohras, are harnessing the potential of social media platforms to set up or expand their businesses and build entrepreneurial networks. The ease of access, wide reach and collaborative nature of these platforms is providing more women with financial opportunities previously unavailable to them.

Research shows that religion can impact women’s abilities to launch, operate and sustain a business. Religious attitudes towards entrepreneurship affect the support, financial or emotional, that women get from their families and communities.

But religious requirements can also provide the basis for entrepreneurship. Norms and customs around modesty or specific religious dress code can become valuable sources of income for female-led enterprises.

Yet, many women struggle to build businesses or form networks due to gender segregation rules that discourage working outside the home and make it logistically challenging.

Accessing opportunities

Using social media has helped many women navigate these issues by enabling them to conduct their business from the privacy of their homes. They have been proven to offer women more opportunities to connect personally and professionally.

The interactive nature of these platforms blurs social and geographical boundaries to form virtual communities. Through platforms, women can engage in dialogue and build networks of collaboration that provide support and feedback.

At the same time they can overcome many real-life difficulties and barriers. For many women, these virtual spaces compensate for the invisibility and lack of agency many of them often experience in professional contexts.

Online platforms help women balance their domestic and family responsibilities while enabling them to become financially independent. All-female platforms are created by traders to avoid the involvement and control of men which also helps them navigate the rules of gender segregation.

Many Orthodox Jewish women have used social media to build businesses and connections within their own communities while keeping in line with expectations around modesty. Women like Sarah Haskell, who goes by the handle @thatrelatablejew, create content that educates people about Judaism and also combats negative stereotypes about Orthodox Jewish women.

Muslim women all over the world also utilized the marketing potential of social media to create a modest fashion industry by reclaiming of the hijab. Many reappropriate symbols or phrases with negative connotations towards Islam such as “Muslim extremist” to sell t-shirts with the words “extreme Muslim” as a form of optimism-driven commodification.

They assert their identity while combating negative stereotypes about Islam and Muslim women. Entrepreneurial networks also function as a form of empowerment to overcome issues faced by them due to Islamophobia.

Bohra entrepreneurship

Dawoodi Bohras are a religious community known for their trading activities and entrepreneurial spirit. The community numbers around one million, living mainly in India with smaller diasporas around the world.

For Bohra women, work is a source of income as well as part of their religion and a way to give their lives meaning. This idea is based on historical examples of women such as the Prophet Muhammad’s wife Khadija who was known to be a tradeswoman as well as principles of equality that consider both men and women working together to ensure happiness and prosperity.

Traditionally, Bohra women would either market their products from home or operate physical stores. However, the rise of digital entrepreneurship allows them to expand online. Their ventures range from designing and selling the community’s unique religious dresses to accompanying accessories such as skullcaps, prayer mats, bags, jewelry as well as other items like food, toys, décor and religious teaching aids.

Some women sell exclusively online or as an extension of their physical businesses. They have their own websites or use different social media platforms and form online groups where women can interact, advertise their products and receive guidance and mentoring.

Support from community institutions is what differentiates Bohra women’s entrepreneurial activities on social media. Due to its entrepreneurial outlook and eager embrace of digital media, the community provides women with financial aid, online training and workshops and virtual bazaars which help them succeed.

During COVID-19 pandemic closures the community’s official business department, Al-Tijaarat Al-Raabehah, helped many entrepreneurs move to digital marketing.

The Dawoodi Bohra model shows how community support of digital entrepreneurship can help women achieve financial independence and success while respecting religious norms and beliefs.

Although these are small ventures in terms of demand and reach, social media platforms have helped Bohra women expand their realms of possibility and create strong networks across the globe.

Arwa Hussain, PhD Candidate & 2022-23 Concordia University Public Scholar, Concordia University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

(The Conversation) – Each year, the largest contemporary Muslim pilgrimage takes place in Iraq to remember Imam Hussein, the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson. Before the pandemic, this event reportedly drew more than 30 million people, but in recent years participation declined to more than 14 million. This procession from Najaf to Karbala, where Hussein is buried, commemorates the 40th day after his martyrdom, a typical length of mourning in Muslim traditions. In 2022, this falls on Sept. 17.

Following the death of the prophet in A.D. 632, a dispute developed over who would be his rightful successor. This became the source of the Sunni-Shiite divide. For Shiites, Hussein was their third Imam, a beloved spiritual and political leader.

After many years of war, the Umayyad dynasty, which lasted from 661 to 750, established its rule over the Middle East and North Africa. The inhabitants of Kufa, a garrison town in Iraq, were among those who defied the Umayyads and invited Hussein to lead them in revolt. But Hussein and his army were outnumbered and suffered a brutal defeat during the Battle of Karbala. Hussein was killed in 680 on the 10th day of the Islamic month of Muharram, a day known as Ashoura.

Scholars have long been fascinated by the variety of cultural performances evoking intense emotions that occur during Muharram. Since the 1979 Iranian revolution, Shiites have adapted the commemoration to connect Islamic history with the present and to highlight the need for social justice for Muslim populations today.

Public commemorations take place in other parts of the world as well. As a scholar of Shiite communities in Africa, I have studied the processions in northern Tanzania. These are usually scheduled according to the Islamic lunar calendar to fall on the ninth and 10th days of Muharram.

The history of Shiite Islam in East Africa

In Tanzania, Shiite Islam first arrived with the Khoja trading community, a caste from India that converted from Hinduism to Islam. Khojas began to settle in East Africa in the 19th century due to drought, famines and religious persecution in their homeland.

Initially, Shiite Islam was associated with Asian Muslims, whereas African Muslims were predominantly Sunni. Shiite Islam was slow to develop in East Africa.

In 1979, the Iranian government of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, was overthrown and replaced by an Islamic state headed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini that rejected Western influence. This cataclysmic event, known as the Iranian revolution, led to a political resurgence for Muslims globally, including in Africa. Muslims of all denominations were inspired by this first successful Islamic revolution since the time of the prophet.

Yet some Sunni Muslims around the world began to inquire about Shiite Islam, the faith’s minority branch, in part because of how they saw Khomeini and his Islamic state depicted in Western media. Some African Sunnis even became Shiites after extensive personal study that compared the primary texts of the various schools of Islamic thought. A 2012 Pew Research Center report put the percentage of Sunnis in Tanzania at 40% of Muslims and Shiites at 20%. Reasons for changing one’s religious affiliation were many. Ultimately, those attracted by Shiite Islam were convinced by its genealogical authority, since it follows the guidance of the family of the prophet. Many perceived Shiite jurisprudence to provide clearer answers to the religious questions they had long been asking.

One Shiite organization in Tanzania, Ahl al-Bayt Centre, or ABC, was established in 1986. With the support of Gulf Shiites, the nongovernmental organization expanded its influence. Now headquartered in a large complex in the environs of Arusha, a city in northern Tanzania, ABC developed into a prominent African-led Shiite network.

Commemorating Muharram in Tanzania

Khojas have been marching in Ashoura processions for the past century in what is today the United Republic of Tanzania. Haji Ali Nathoo was the longtime president of the Khoja Shiite community in Zanzibar, an Indian Ocean archipelago off the coast of Tanzania. He requested from the British colonial government that the 10th day of Muharram, called Ashoura, be a public holiday. This was granted in 1920.

Processions became an annual tradition in Zanzibar and Tanga, a port city in northeast Tanzania. They later gained popularity in urban areas with large mosques, such as Dar es Salaam, Tanzania’s coastal capital and a major commercial center; Arusha; and Moshi, a town near the Kenyan border in the foothills of Mt. Kilimanjaro. Processions require a permit from the government, as roads are closed and police protection is provided.

The Khoja Shiite community in Dar es Salaam, the largest in East Africa, constructs a large outdoor display during Muharram. This attracts community members and educates the general public about the Battle of Karbala. In Arusha, a smaller diorama of the battle scene is displayed outside the gates of the Khoja mosque.

Black signs with red, yellow or white lettering decorate mosques and main roads through town. One sign refers to Imam Hussein as “The inspiration for mankind to strive for Justice and Equality.”

Many Shiites attend various “majalis,” or gatherings, and organizations stagger the timing of their events as not to overlap. Food is always provided, ranging from small bags of sugar or rice to biscuits or a cooked meal served in the mosque. This food is thought to bring religious blessings to those who consume it.

Some Tanzanians donate blood, an accepted practice today among Shiites worldwide in remembrance and solidarity with Imam Hussein on the day he died. Blood donations have begun to replace self-flagellation, a blood-letting ritual performed by many Shiite men in order to re-enact and partake in the suffering of the Imam’s family during the Battle of Karbala.

Indian and African Shiite communities usually commemorate religious holidays separately in their respective mosques.

During COVID-19, Khoja mosques conducted religious events online for two years. They are back in person in 2022, while maintaining a hybrid option. The Ahl al-Bayt Centre community continued to gather throughout the pandemic.

Reclaiming the procession for African Tanzanians

I have twice attended the processions in Arusha – during September and October 2017 and more recently again in August 2022. Shiites march through the center of town from the Indian charitable hospital to the Khoja mosque.

Khojas carry staffs called “alam” that signify the battle standards used at Karbala. Decorated with various motifs representing Imam Hussein’s family, these symbolic flags are draped with red-splotched shrouds evoking bloody battle losses. Khoja mosques feature replicas of Middle Eastern mosques where Shiite Imams are buried; these are also paraded in the procession.

Since 2017, Arusha’s African Shiites have been organizing separate processions, which as an anthropologist I also joined. They aimed to reach communities in the outskirts of town and centered their march around African Shiite mosques – not Khoja community landmarks in the city center.

All dressed in black, the color of mourning, marchers carried signs predominantly written in Swahili announcing to the local population the virtues of Imam Hussein. Many men wore T-shirts printed for the procession. Some women and children wore headbands proclaiming “Labaik Ya Hussein” (I am here, O Hussein) or “Proud to be a Husseini.” Led by religious leaders, participants lectured through microphones, rhythmically beat their chests and recited mournfully beautiful Swahili-language “nudba” poetry written by the community about the Battle of Karbala.

As minority Muslims, not all African Shiite communities have the freedom or security to publicly proclaim their beliefs. In West Africa, in Sunni Muslim-majority Senegal, where I have long studied Shiite communities, Muharram is commemorated behind closed doors. In Nigeria, where public processions do take place, state security forces, long at odds with Nigerian Shiites, have attacked and killed participants.

In Tanzania, the government protects freedom of religion. And that is evident in the unique processions of the Indian and African religious communities sharing the peaceful message of Imam Hussein.

Mara Leichtman, Associate Professor of Anthropology and Muslim Studies, Michigan State University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Featured image: Shiite women prepare to march in the inaugural Ashoura procession in a neighborhood of Arusha, Tanzania, in 2017. Mara Leichtman CC BY

The 14th century Arab historian Ibn Khaldun is famed for his treatise Al-Muqqadimah and is regarded as “the father of social science”; he wrote about the rise and fall of states and civilisations. Tunis-born, his ancestors hailed from Yemen’s Hadramawt. He is notable for popularising the notion of ‘asabiyya which refers to social solidarity, group consciousness and political power. Ibn Khaldun put forth the argument that the strength of ‘asabiyya within a state corresponds to the political stability of that state. The origins of this concept of “clannism” ultimately lie in the harsh desert conditions where tribal affiliations are essential for survival, and has even been mentioned in the ahadith (sayings) of Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), although understood in the context of discouraging racism and nationalism.

However, the theory, as described on nybooks.com, postulates that, “When nomadic tribes unite, their superior cohesion and military prowess put urban dwellers at their mercy. Inspired as often as not by religion, they conquer the towns and create new regimes. But within a few generations, according to Ibn Khaldun, these victorious tribesmen lose their ‘asabiyya and become corrupted by luxury, extravagance, and leisure. The ruler, who can no longer rely on fierce tribal warriors for his defence, will have to raise extortionate taxes to pay for other sorts of soldiers, and this in turn may lead to further problems that result in the eventual downfall of his dynasty or state.”

The above scenario arguably applies to the founding of the first two Saudi states which ultimately led to the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. The unification of the Arabian peninsula under Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud was largely due to the conquests by the fierce Wahhabi Bedouin warriors known as the Ikhwan — Saudi loyalists who would later be organised into the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) — and, of course, the declining Ottoman empire. Only the staunch Zaydi Shia of Yemen and the resilient Ibadi of Oman were left untouched, having both resisted Wahhabi raids.

It appears to be a different story now.

Despite being the best-equipped in the Gulf, the quality and performance of the oil-rich kingdom’s armed forces leave a lot to be desired. As Foreign Policy stated, they are largely inexperienced with a limited track record, leaving them unprepared for the current conflict in Yemen, which appears to serve as “military practice” for the Saudis. Furthermore, in a 2017 presentation, US Major General Frank Muth, who served as Programme Manager for the SANG, spoke of the deficiencies in training and high casualty rates among the troops. Undoubtedly, the five year campaign against the Houthis of Yemen has achieved very little strategically other than contributing to the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. Critically, the Saudis are increasingly relying on mercenaries, particularly from Sudan, Pakistan and Yemen itself, to protect their fraught, porous southern borders. Former-Pakistan Army chief Raheel Sharif is also involved as commander of the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition.

The “rag-tag” rebel Houthis for their part are still highly tribal orientated; indeed, the Zaydi movement is named after the prominent Al-Houthi family which founded the “AnsarAllah” in the northern province of Saada. They are also fierce fighters and battle-hardened, having waged six on and off wars against the Yemeni government between 2004-2010. They have also had previous engagements with Saudi forces in 2009, again with few achievements on the latter’s part; the Guardian observed at the time that, “The Saudis are unlikely to succeed militarily in Yemen. Yemen’s army of 700,000 could not suppress the Houthi rebellion, despite five attempts since 2004. Now they are leaving Saudi Arabia’s untested army of 200,000 men to do the job for them.”

Supporters of the Houthis participate in a march to mark the 5th anniversary of the Houthis’ control of the Yemeni capital Sanaa, on 21 September 2019 [Mohammed Hamoud/Anadolu Agency]

As the Houthis have carried out their own aerial attacks on Saudi Arabian territory – including the audacious drone and missile strike on the Aramco oil facilities attributed to them — and have recently increased their cross-border raids against Saudi forces – most notably with the contested claims of having captured thousands of Saudi troops and mercenaries in addition to seizing munitions, territory and overrunning military bases in Najran province — it would be interesting to see how irregular, tribal warriors from the Arab world’s poorest nation pitted against the wealthiest kingdom in the region fit into Ibn Khaldun’s theory of the decline of the state. The presence of Canadian LAV-25 model light armoured vehicles in Houthi footage of their “Operation Victory from God” in Najran does suggest that the SANG were among the casualties or those captured in the raid. Furthermore, it has been argued in one publication that “Hezbollah-style harassment campaigns” along the border account for much of the Houthis’ tactical success.

I would go as far as to contend that the province of Najran represents the weakest link for Saudi state security; not only has the province witnessed numerous Houthi raids, but the loyalty of the province’s subjects is also suspect, given its modern history. Najran, along with the Saudi provinces of Asir, Jizan and Al-Baha were historically territories of Greater Yemen and formed part of the Zaydi Mutawakallite Kingdom before being annexed by the fledgling Saudi kingdom following the Saudi-Yemeni war in 1934. It is perhaps ironic to note that, during the hostilities of 1934, the “immensely rich” Zaydi Imam Yahya underestimated the “poor” upstart Ibn Saud and famously declared, “Who is this Bedouin coming to challenge my family’s 900 year rule?”

Najran is particularly interesting, not only for its historic Christian heritage, but also that it is one of two Shia majority provinces, along with the Eastern province in the kingdom. Unlike the Twelvers in the east, the Shia in Najran are of the Ismaili branch. In the year following the Saudi-led coalition air strikes, the Washington Institute stated that Najran is a “proud Shiite-majority city” but that the residents have largely been openly supportive of Riyadh’s war in Yemen.

However, this may no longer be the case, and understandably “the last thing the Saudi authorities want is for the Shia of south-west Saudi Arabia to remember that they were once part of a huge, powerful Shia kingdom that stretched south to the Indian Ocean.” There was also the incident of 2000 when Ismailis facing the closure of their mosques by the Saudi authorities took up arms in protest, forcing the governor of Najran, Prince Mish’al, to flee to the local Holiday Inn.

READ: Iran not ‘drawing back’ militarily after Saudi attack-US admiral

In my article on the Zaydi community of Yemen, I concluded that there is perhaps an opportunity for revolutionary ideas to cross the border between the increasingly Iranian influenced Houthis and the local residents of Najran, who Human Rights Watch describe as “second class Saudi citizens”. It is worth mentioning that others have speculated that the “Victory from God” operations in Najran — which involved seizing Saudi territory and capturing three brigades — could not have occurred on such a scale unless, as Juan Cole postulated, “the locals had averted their eyes”. In another article I also presented the theory that the Aramco attacks may have been carried out with assistance and reconnaissance provided by the local Shia population in the Eastern province.

If tweets by Saudi whistle-blower Mujtahidd are to be believed, Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman made plans to visit the Najran “front line” in a public relations show to dispel low morale among troops arising from feelings that they have been neglected, with some reportedly having hurled curses and insults at the royal family. There is strong reason to believe that Najran represents a vulnerability in the kingdom from a geo-political perspective. It could well be the fault line as much as the front line. The oil facilities and their lack of defence capabilities, as we have seen, also illustrate weaknesses in the kingdom. It may be the reason why Saudi air strikes have decreased significantly over the past few days, following a truce initiative by the Houthis, with veiled threats for continued responses to the strikes.

Although Saudi Arabia is not an empire, the fall of Rome in the 5th century offers many insightful parallels with the current state of the kingdom, chief among them being the reliance on disloyal “barbarian” mercenaries to protect their borders against the “barbarian hordes”; a declining economy; and higher taxation. Roman society became indolent and comfortable and adopted and promoted a form of Christianity which was intolerant to other cultures and religions. Sound familiar? As Ibn Khaldun once said, “The past resembles the future more than one drop of water resembles another.”

Omar Ahmed has an MSc in International Security and Global Governance from Birkbeck, University of London. He has travelled throughout the Middle East, including studying Arabic in Egypt as part of his undergraduate degree. His interests include the politics, history and religion of the MENA region.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor or Informed Comment.

Via Middle East Monitor

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Bonus video:

Al Jazeera: Houthis release video showing assault on Saudi troops